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ABSTRACT
This study examines Conservative backbench debate on European 
integration and British relations in the Middle East. It 
concentrates upon the Europeanists and the Suez Group and 
considers their attempts to influence British foreign policy 
from the formation of the Council of Europe in 1948 until the 
resignation of Sir Anthony Eden as Prime Minister in January 
1957.
Interviews with former parliamentarians and contemporary 
sources, published and unpublished, are used to assess their 
influence. The position of these groups within the spectrum 
of the Conservative party is considered, and the extent to 
which a common philosophy and motivation can be attributed to 
each faction.
It analyses the role of the Europeanists in supporting 
Continental moves towards European integration, as well as 
broader Conservative attitudes to European integration and its 
emerging institutions: the Council of Europe, the European 
Coal and Steel Community, the European Defence Community, and 
the Messina process. The study looks at the reasons for the 
Churchill government's failure to build upon the successes of 
the Europeanists whilst the Conservatives were in opposition.
The thesis seeks to show that the Suez Group occupied a more 
important position within the party than has been appreciated 
hitherto. Attention is paid to the views and role of this 
nascent group in the Palestine and Abadan crises, and in the 
negotiations over self-government for the Sudan, together with 
the role of the Suez Group in the party struggle over the 
Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal Zone Base in 1954. 
The part played by the Suez Group and the Anti-Suez Group in 
the Suez crisis of 1956 is discussed.
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PREFACE
I have always been intrigued by the suggestion that the 
Conservative party is more loath to express internal dissent 
in public than the Labour party, as this simply is not true. 
Equally misleading is the cynical view that backbenchers are 
merely cannon fodder for the division lobby: this is even more 
inaccurate when considering the decade after the Second World 
War when Conservative party managers were more tolerant than 
today.
Investigating backbench influence upon foreign policy 
certainly offered more of a challenge than the same exercise 
into the more perceptible influence of backbenchers upon 
domestic policy, but I was spurred in my research by the 
recent antics of the anti-Maastrict rebels and Britain's 
involvement in the Gulf War of 1991. The anti-Maastrict 
rebels are yet another manifestation of the spring of 
reactionary pressure within the Conservative party, which 
surfaces at regular intervals? however, unlike the 1940s and 
1950s, there now appears no choice to Europe other than 
'Little England', whereas in the 1940s and 1950s there 
appeared the options of the Commonwealth and Empire or 
Atlantic Union between Britain, Canada and America. America 
and the West's determination to confront Saddam Hussein 
offered a superficial historical analogy to my examination of 
the Suez Group's desire to confront Nasser in 1956, since in 
both cases it was hoped by a show of force to encourage 
sufficient internal dissent to overthrow a regime that was 
regarded as a vital threat to national interests.
This thesis also represents the triumph of academic 
perserverance over the demands of small children. I owe a 
great debt of thanks to the late Dr Roger Bullen, whose 
encouragement through the vissitudes of moving and early 
motherhood was invaluable. I would also like to thank my 
superviser, Professor Donald Watt, for his considerable 
insight and gentle guidance over the past five years? John 
Barnes and Dr Robert Boyce for their support and advice? and 
my father for his inspiration, humour and political acumen. I 
would like to thank my mother, Mrs Dorothy Grey and Mrs 
Susanna Bevan without whose help I could not have persevered. 
But my greatest debt is to my long-suffering husband, Bart.
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ABBREVIATIONS
BOAPAH British Oral Archive of Political and Administrative
History
C&L Conservative and Liberal
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EDO European Defence Community
EPC European Political Community
EEC European Economic Community
EFTA European Free Trade Area
ELEC European League for Economic Co-operation
FAC Foreign Affairs Committee
HC Deb Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Fifth 
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Series. House
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NL&C National Liberal and Conservative
OEEC Organization for European Economic Co-operation
SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organization
UEM United Europe Movement
UNO United Nations Organization
UU Ulster Unionist
WEU West European Union
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CHAPTER 1; INTRODUCTION
This thesis deals with backbench debate within the 
Conservative party on foreign affairs and MPs' attempts to 
influence the formulation and conduct of British foreign 
policy from January 1948 until the resignation of Sir Anthony 
Eden in January 1957.
The starting date is January 1948, when Bevin signalled a more 
favourable attitude towards ideas of European union 
circulating on the Continent. This choice offered the chance 
to compare the tactics of Conservative backbenchers in 
opposition, with their behaviour after the Conservatives were 
returned to power in October 1951. Eden's resignation as 
Prime Minister in January 1957 provides a natural break in the 
chronology. I have used the term 'backbench' to cover the 
entire party in opposition, and those behind the Treasury 
bench once Churchill returned to No. 10 Downing Street.
In the decade after the Second War there existed four 
discernible groups of Conservative backbench MPs who held 
decided views on particular aspects of British foreign policy. 
The issues were:
(i) British attitudes to West European integration;
(ii) British policy in the Middle East?
(iii) Britain and the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs (GATT); (the reverse of this was
Conservative pressure for the maintenance and 
extension of imperial preference);
(iv) relations with America and the United Nations 
Organization.
I have chosen British relations with Europe and the Middle 
East for my analysis. I have not tried to define a 
Conservative faction on imperial preference as at the time 
this was not seen as an issue of foreign affairs. The New 
Commonwealth (India, Pakistan and Ceylon), and to a great
- 13 -
extent the Old White Dominions were still seen as an integral 
part of Britain and no Conservative politician questioned the 
thought that the Empire formed an inalienable part of the 
fabric of British society, tradition and pattern of trade. 
Nor have I tried to define a specific Conservative anti-US and 
anti-UNO group; these feelings were remarkably widespread, but 
they were very largely inchoate. There existed a strong 
undercurrent of opposition to American policy, and what was 
seen as unnecessary British subservience to her war-time ally, 
but this rarely came into the open. Similarly, although many 
Tories felt that a system of 'spheres of influence' had 
functioned more satisfactorily, opposition towards the new UNO 
was expressed predominantly in private. Conservative 
hostility towards the UNO in the aftermath of the Suez crisis 
soon receded without any change in government policy towards 
the organization.
I have chosen to chart first the activities of the 
Conservative Europeanists1, and then the Suez Group and Anti- 
Suez Group as study of these groupings offers an interesting 
contrast between the influence exercised by a tendency, a 
well-organized faction, and an ad hoc pressure group. I 
propose to argue that these groups of MPs, which differed 
markedly in their organization, the public perception of the 
calibre of their membership and their approach, did have an 
impact on British foreign policy, although not for the reasons 
one might suppose.
11 have used this term to describe those Conservative MPs who favoured a more positive 
response to continental ideas of West European integration. This was not a contemporary 
term.
Published comment on the Europeanists, the Suez Group and the 
Anti-Suez Group
Although there is some important literature on the Tory 
backbencher and his/her role2, in comparison to the enormous 
amount of literature which concentrates on the political 
leadership in Britain's relations with Europe and the Middle 
East in this period, relatively little attention has been paid 
to Conservative backbench debate on these topics.
On Europe, opinion is agreed that the group's chief spokesman, 
Churchill, was 'forcing the pace of British and European 
policy from the foothills of opposition'3. Although Bevin 
bitterly resisted the siren of Europe as well as American 
pressure for closer, more rapid integration, the Europeanists 
helped to force the pace of public debate, and wrung unwilling 
concessions from Whitehall. But writers have concentrated on 
the intra-party debate on European integration between Labour 
and Conservative leaders, or on the '£lite' (that is, the 
Cabinet and senior civil service) approach to Europe4, and 
overlooked the debate within the Conservative party on the 
issue before the party's return to power. All are agreed 
that 'Europe' was not on the political agenda as far as the 
Conservative mainstream was concerned from November 1951 to 
December 1956. The reasons given are the hostility of Eden 
and the Foreign Office, and the aging Churchill's failing 
interest in matters outside his pet concerns of a summit with
2 see Robert Jackson: Rebels and Whips (London 1968); Hugh Berrington: Backbench 
Influence in the House of Commons 1945-55 (Oxford 1973); S E Finer, H Berrington and D 
Bartholomew: Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons 1955-59 (Oxford 1961); Leon 
Epstein: British Politics in the Suez Crisis (London 1964); see also D Leonard and V 
Herman: The Backbencher and Parliament (London 1980); Philip Norton: Dissention in the 
House of Commons 1945-74 (London 1974); Ronald Butt: The Power o f Parliament (London 
1964)
3 Michael Charlton: The Price of Victory (London 1983), p.80
4 see Charlton
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Russia, and the special relationship with the USA.5 John 
Young points out that 'Europe' was not dropped immediately 
from the Cabinet's political agenda6, but very little 
attention has been devoted to Conservative backbench attempts 
to foster Anglo-European links in the 1950s.7
Published comment on the Suez Group in 1953-54 tends to be 
dismissive; historians appear to have been heavily influenced 
by Anthony Nutting's view of these rebel MPs as a group of 
embittered ex-ministers and ambitious young men®. The 
historian Professor Donald Watt describes the Suez Group's 
influence as 'negative, indirect and outside the elite group' 
and awards it only nuisance value.9 However, Douglas Farnie 
in his book East and West of Suez grants these MPs' views more 
weight, as representative of wider Conservative opinion in 
Westminster and in the country. Leon Epstein gives more place 
to the Suez Group's role in the Suez crisis10. Epstein also 
discusses the case history of each of the eight outright 
dissidents of the Anti-Suez Group,11 but does not address the 
impact of their views.
Overall the role of the backbenchers has been under-estimated, 
and the principal reason may well be the difficulty of 
obtaining evidence of their activities. The social dimension
5 see Charlton
6 see John Young: ’Churchill’s No to Europe: the "Rejection" of European Union by 
Churchill’s Post-War Government 1951-52’: Historical Journal Vo\.2%, N o .4 ,1985, pp.923- 
937
7 see John Pinder and Richard Mayne: Federal Union (London 1990)
8 Anthony Nutting: No End of a Lesson (London 1967), pp.22-23
9 Professor Donald Watt: Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British 
Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (London 1965), p. 10
10 Epstein, pp.41-60
11 Epstein, pp.97-138
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of the contact between MPs and their leaders is crucial to 
understanding the politics of this era12, as backbench 
influence was usually exerted in informal ways and depended 
heavily upon private social contacts. The influence of 
personality on the interaction between politicians is 
frequently overlooked, but this pattern of personal likes and 
dislikes was woven into the very fabric of political debate. 
Personal affection for a fellow member, no matter how 
extraordinary his professed views, was very often accompanied 
by a greater tolerance for an aberrant opinion.13 Conversely, 
deepseated dislike would encourage dismissal of an argument. 
As the 1948-57 period is still accessible by means of 
interviews with participants, I have interviewed and written 
to more than 40 former MPs, attempting to fill the large gap 
between the anecdotal memoirs of MPs and the arid record of 
Parliamentary proceedings. The picture I have gathered is 
very different from the image of Conservative leaders being 
able to fob off their parliamentary colleagues.
The Political Significance of the Europeanists, the Suez and 
the Anti-Suez Groups
Some might argue that these groups were symptomatic of a more 
basic division of philosophy within the Conservative party; 
that is, the Europeanists and the Anti-Suez Group, and the 
Suez Group as an expression of the progressive and the 
reactionary wings. However, the party in these years defies 
attempts to identify fundamental divisions within the Tory 
ranks. When the lists of each group's adherents are examined 
more closely, at most a broad generalization can be made about 
the type of MP likely to be a member of each grouping. In 
each case there are important exceptions. For example, Julian 
Amery, whom some would firmly place on the 'right' of the
12 see Watt, pp. 1-15
13 Sir Reginald Bennett interview with author
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party, had supported the independence of India, held decidedly 
progressive views in social policy, opposed capital 
punishment, encouraged a more positive approach to European 
affairs, and yet ardently advocated the viability of Empire 
and opposed any withdrawal from British positions overseas 
from 1947 onwards. Angus Maude was another such latter-day 
'Social Imperialist'. And 'almost half the Suez Group of 
1956/7 voted for the abolition of capital punishment'.14 
Major Harry Legge-Bourke, another rebel with firm views on 
Britain's duty in the Middle East, regarded himself as a
progressive, liberal Tory15 - even if no one else did. 
Historians have noted this recurrent theme within the Tory 
party of military men with progressive social views and robust 
attitudes on foreign policy.16 But this notion cannot be
taken too far. Not all men who had achieved senior military 
rank during World War II held martial views on the conduct of
foreign policy (for example, Brigadier Frank Medlicott,
Brigadier Otho Prior-Palmer and Colonel James Hutchison). Nor 
did they all hold progressive social views (for example, 
Brigadier Terence Clarke, Brigadier Ralph Rayner).
The Suez Group's fundamental importance lies in 'the continuum 
it represents within the Tory party'17: this is the
discernible thread in Conservative party history which runs 
through opposition to Indian independence in the 1930s? 
opposition to the Yalta agreement? opposition to withdrawal 
from Palestine, Abadan, the Sudan and Egypt in the 1950s? 
opposition to government policy on Cyprus in the mid-1950s? 
opposition to entry into the European Economic Community in 
1962? Rhodesia in 1960s? the anti-Marketeers of the 1970s, and 
the anti-Maastricht rebels of the 1990s. Not all the members
14 John Biggs-Davison letter, Spectator 21.2.63
15 Sir Robert Rhodes James interview with author
16 Sir Robert Rhodes James
17 Wilfred Sendall interview with author
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of the Suez Group in the 1950s were rabidly anti-European. 
Those staunch imperialists who also favoured closer links with 
Europe were spurred by their conviction that the Empire and 
Europe could form a formidable economic bloc which would free 
Britain from American tutelage and the domination of the 
mighty dollar.
Other Conservative groups:
(a) the Progress Trust:
There were other important backbench ginger groups in this 
decade. Although Churchill directed that the Tory Reform 
Group be wound up in 1945, and decreed that there should be no 
more such political cliques as they dissipated the energies of 
the party, the Progress Trust continued to meet throughout 
these years. It was still in existence in 1956 as R A ('RAB') 
Butler dined with these MPs in the Suez Crisis.18 Originally 
formed in 1943 as a 'libertarian' counterweight to the Tory 
Reform Group which was advocating the implementation of the 
Beveridge Report, the Trust subsequently evolved into a forum 
to protect Conservative principles.19 In essence, it
represented the persistence of a pre-war view of the ideal 
political arrangement - paternalistic and strictly 
hierarchical. Its continued existence was indicative of the 
political influence it wielded and the value placed upon its 
work by Tory leaders.
The Trust was highly organized and possessed its own sources 
of information. It met weekly, the chairman had immediate 
access to the Chief Whip's office and to No. 10 whenever he so 
wished, and the monthly dinner invitations to Cabinet
18 R A Butler: The Art o f the Possible, (London 1971), p. 194
19 Hartmut Kopsch: "The Approach o f the Conservative Party to Social Policy during the 
Second World W ar\ PhD thesis, London School of Economics, 1970
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Ministers were not to be ignored.20 Its organization was 
extremely discreet and deliberately so, in the firm belief 
that private influence was the most effective way for a 
backbench group to convey its views to the party leadership. 
This was very much in keeping with the attitude to all private 
debate within the party's backbench committees; in the early 
1950s Tories were incensed to discover that discussion within 
the Foreign Affairs committee was being leaked to the press. 
The Trust's membership was selective and limited to 
approximately 20 MPs. Membership of this dlite group was 
considered a very great honour; two members were far more put 
out to discover that resigning the Conservative Whip would 
mean they were disbarred from the Trust than they were at the 
prospect of being excluded from the proceedings of the 1922 
Committee.21 The Progress Trust was composed not just of Tory 
grandees; its members were also MPs of considerable 
independence and acknowledged political influence, holding 
other important backbench positions. There is circumstantial 
evidence to suggest that past Chairmen and officers of the 
1922 Committee were also members of the Trust.22 The fact 
that at least 5 members of the Progress Trust were also Suez 
Group rebels, or former active members of this group, shows 
that in the eyes of their peers they were not negligible 
politicians, and places their opinions more squarely in the 
centre of the party than other political writers have 
appreciated. Conversely, membership of the Progress Trust 
gave the Suez Group an exceptionally powerful forum in which 
it could air and appeal for support for its views; in 
addition, the Suez Group could exploit the different political 
links offered by the Progress Trust, as the organization was 
a source of powerful political patronage, and formed a bond 
between its former members in the Cabinet and the
20 private information
21 Private information
22 see Kopsch
backbenchers. Given the number of dissidents who were also 
members of this key backbench group, Conservative party 
managers could not easily dismiss their views.
By the late 1940s many MPs had come to regard the Progress 
Trust, even more than the 1922 Committee, as the backbone of 
the Tory party; indeed, in the mid 1950s the Trust became the 
unofficial backbench cabal,23 setting the tone for the party's 
other official backbench committees. The success of the 
Progress Trust behind the scenes in influencing the agenda and 
tone of political debate within the Conservative party 
obviated the need to publicize such views. So political 
commentators who asserted that the claim of sustained 'right- 
wing' influence on the Conservative party was hollow24 
completely missed the point.
(b) Conservative Ginaer Groups on Home Affairs;
The formation of the One Nation group after the 1950 general 
election had a considerable impact on the Conservative party 
conference later that year; spurred by their frustration at 
the apparent continuation of the bankrupt policies in the 
1930s, nine new young members published their coherent social 
philosophy in the pamphlet 'One Nation'. The three most 
prominent original members were Iain Macleod, Enoch Powell, 
and Angus Maude.25
In addition to his activities in the Suez Group, Ralph 
Assheton led a backbench ginger group which was fiercely 
critical of Butler's economic policy in the 1950s. Captain 
Charles Waterhouse was another prominent member of this 
faction. There also existed an informal group whose main aim
23 Private information.
24 eg Donald McLachlan, Daily Telegraph, 30.1.57
25 The other founder members were John Rodgers, Gilbert Longden, Cuthbert Alport, 
Robert Carr, Edward Heath and Richard Fort.
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was the introduction of commercial television. Its success 
gave a considerable fillip to other pressure groups.26 
Nabarro led a group which harried the Conservative Government 
on fuel and power; and Hinchingbrooke, from his position as 
Chairman of the backbench Transport Committee, led pressure 
for a change in transport policy.
(c) Informal Groups:
There were other more informal regular gatherings. Each 
political generation had its own dining club; the NAAFI (No 
Aims Ambitions Fractional Interest) Club was another jocular 
dining club27, as was the 5,000 Acre Club (a telling 
reflection of the extensive landed interests of some 
Conservative MPs). The Conservative 'Brigadier Group' was a 
creation of the press, inspired by the election of a 
considerable number of former serving officers, of whom great 
things were expected. They included Otho Prior-Palmer, John 
Selwyn Lloyd, 'Toby' Low, Frank Medlicott, and after 1950, 
Enoch Powell. Their political views ranged widely, as did 
their preparedness to toe the party line.
Conservative Backbench Influence and Government Policy
The nature of the post-war Conservative party, the character 
of the House of Commons, and the forms of public debate 
outside Westminster all had an important bearing on the way 
politicians behaved.
a) The Mechanics of the Conservative party;
The Conservative party operated in a more complicated fashion 
than a simple model suggesting Tory leaders outlining policy 
to their uncomplaining supporters. As far as an
26 Sir Geoffrey Cox interview with author
27 ’Our fundamental rule was never to be seen talking willingly to a Whip, and above all 
the Chief Whip’: Sir Reginald Bennett
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'organizational' model can be defined, it was a case of small 
backbench groups - the leaven within the lump - attempting to 
seize the attention of the leadership, as well as trying to 
drum up support within the central mass to demonstrate to the 
leadership the extent of this support. The attention of these 
factions was thus primarily devoted to the leadership since in 
the overwhelming majority of instances once the party's 
seniors had declared for a policy, the loyal rank and file 
fell in line without too much agonizing thought. But there 
was a limit to which the leadership would give: there was a 
decided element of bluff and counter-bluff. It is because of 
this constructive tension between the leadership and their 
supporters, that I have devoted attention to the Conservative 
leadership as well as to the backbenches.
(b) The Nature of The Conservative party:
The rejection by the electorate in 1945 proved a very 
chastening experience, and for the first few years in 
opposition the party was 'punch drunk'.28 However, after the 
shock of defeat dissipated, the talk among party managers in 
Westminster and in the country became 'not if we get back in, 
but when'.29 Bolstered by the work of Butler and his 
'backroom boys' in the Conservative Research Department in 
reshaping Conservative policy to offer a positive alternative 
to socialism, by 1948 the Conservatives were 'back in 
business'.
The Tory party of the 1945 Parliament was a different animal 
from the pre-war creature. The anti-appeasers' considerable 
success in weeding out candidates who had supported what were 
seen as the bankrupt policies of the Chamberlain era, was 
carried further by the defeat of many pre-war Tories in 1945.
Not only was the Parliamentary party much smaller;
28 Lord Fraser of Kilmorack interview with author
29 Ursula Branston interview with author
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approximately one third of the Conservatives in the new 
Parliament were newcomers. The elimination of those too 
closely associated with discredited policies, the revitalized 
sense of purpose, combined with the greatly reduced number 
(213 MPs), reinforced the links between the 1945 intake and 
older MPs.
The party was strengthened by the election of a considerable 
number of independent—minded MPs, whose war-time service 
rendered them less inclined to obey the dictates of the Whips' 
Office. Added to this was the continued presence of older MPs 
who regarded their constituencies as personal fiefs (for 
example, Ralph Rayner and Robert Boothby). Therefore the 
newfound freedom, and indeed irresponsibility of opposition, 
as compounded by greater tendency to political independence. 
In a real sense the 1950 election did see the passing of a 
political generation, despite the reappearance of some 1930s 
stalwarts. This was the result of a large number of pre-war 
MPs declining to stand again and changes in the selection 
process, thanks to the Maxwell Fyfe reforms of 1948. The 
intake of 92 new Conservatives included grammar school Tories 
and industrialists, with different connections and allegiances 
which broadened the base of party in the Commons. Their 
success outside Parliament engendered a sense of personal 
confidence. They were increasingly less beholden to the 
aristocratic families who had formerly controlled seats and 
were more inclined to question the wisdom and judgment of 
their leaders, expecting the government to earn the loyalty of 
its supporters.30
However, despite this political 'changing of the guard' , the 
spirit of the 1930s was by no means dead. The tradition of 
Tory political families continued, as well as the tradition of 
sons of peers beginning their political apprenticeship in the 
House of Commons. There also persisted among some members the
30 Paul Williams interview with author
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attitude that the best way to address a problem was a quiet
word with the Minister, who was probably a family friend, in
the box at Ascot.31 As before the War, contacts and
friendships formed at school, university, through the regiment 
or other war-time experiences continued to play an vital part. 
There continued for many an 'old fashioned' view of politics. 
This sense of public service was characteristic of the decade. 
The Conservative backbenches contained many 'knights of the 
shires'32, who entertained no sense of ambition beyond serving 
their constituents and their country to the best of their 
ability - from the backbenches (for example, Legge-Bourke,
Anthony Hurd, Guy Lloyd and Charles Mott-Radclyffe).33 These
knights formed 'the ballast of the party'. Instinctively
conservative and wary of rapid change, they were men of 
principle and independent thought, but whose loyalty to the 
party was unswerving. For them, the greatest length to which 
their opposition to government policy would go was their
studied absence from Westminster despite the imposition of a
three-line whip.34
After the War the Whips' office, widely regarded as a home for 
retired army majors, persisted in its opinion of the party as 
a superior public school35 or regiment and sought to impose 
military discipline on the backbench troops. This, together 
with the experience of public school and war service,36 
instilled in the party generally a certain discipline and
31 Lord Watkinson interview with author
32 Lord Watkinson
33 John Morrison and Arthur Vere Harvey, although not strictly ’knights of the shires’ 
since they were made Lord Margadale and Lord Harvey respectively, were other highly 
regarded and influential backbench MPs.
34 see Division on Suez Base Agreement, 29.7.54, Hansard Official Report. Fifth Series. 
Parliamentary Debates. Commons Volume 431 columns 820-822.
35 Christopher Hollis: Seven Ages (London 1974), p. 177
36 John Baldock interview with author
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sense of order: 'the feeling that Westminster was a glorified 
officers' mess'37 was reinforced by the continued practice of 
addressing MPs by their war-time rank which persisted until 
the mid-1950s.38 Pressure on a recalcitrant MP was very well- 
mannered in the late 1940s and early 1950s. (This offered a 
stark contrast to David Margesson's methods as Chief Whip 
before the War.) Conservative MPs had a very well-defined 
sense of what was and what was not acceptable in the game of 
politics. 'There was never any Whips' pressure on the party 
association in my day. Any attempt by the Whips office to 
produce any influence at all on the constituency would have 
been met with an immediate rebuff; the Whips would never have 
touched the question of a difficult MP with his constituency 
association - it would not have been right'.39 Gradually the
Whips' Office came to be seen as a step on the ladder of
promotion within the party, signalled by the promotion of 
Edward Heath40 in 1951. (His friends were horrified, and
thought he had consigned himself to political oblivion.)41 
With this change came a change in the pressures and tactics 
used on unruly backbenchers. This most famously came to 
light in the aftermath of the Suez crisis when Patrick
Maitland publicly complained42 of the extraordinary means of 
persuasion exerted on his local agent and constituency party 
to try and silence Maitland's opposition to Britain's 
withdrawal from Port Said.
Finally, one last important fact about the Tory Party in the
37 Sir Bernard Braine interview with author
38 see Hansard volume 548 (1956-7)
39 Lord Glendevon (formerly Lord John Hope) interview with author
40 MP for Bexley 1950-74; Bexley and Sidcup 1974-
41 Lord Carr interview, British Oral Archive of Political and Administrative History, the 
London School of Economics
42 Daily Herald 8.12.56
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late 1940s and 1950s was the sustained grip exerted behind the 
scenes by the 'old school Tories'. Some party stalwarts 
resented the advent of the welfare state and the adjustments 
being recommended by Butler and his cohorts, and were firmly 
resistant to the views put forward by others of a more 
progressive stamp within the party and later the Government. 
Through membership of the Progress Trust and their executive 
positions on the relevant backbench committees, notably the 
1922, the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Treasury 
Committee, they ensured that the agenda and tone of debate 
within these forums maintained a robust flavour.43 This 
highly discreet influence ensured the continuation of the Tory 
party as a class organization44, despite its more progressive 
public face.
Political Debate 1948-1956:
(a) The House of Commons in the 1940s and 1950s:
The House of Commons in the 1940s and 1950s was very different 
from today. This made a considerable impression on the manner 
of debate. The need for outside employment or independent 
wealth to supplement a meagre parliamentary salary meant that 
full-time Conservative MPs were rare. Attendance at debates 
was poor, except on important occasions or when the Member 
wished to speak.45 Those who could fill the Chamber were few: 
on the annunciator the names Churchill, Bevan, Boothby or 
William (Will 'Y') Darling, described as 'the licensed jester 
of the backbenches'46, could rouse MPs from their roosts in 
the smoking rooms or the bar, but 'most people beat it to the
43 Private information
44 Private information
45 Sir John Astor interview with author
46 Hollis, p. 174
- 27 -
Tea Room as soon as the Minister sat down'.47 This made good 
attendance at a debate worthy of comment. The different
pattern of attendance was underscored by the lack of office 
facilities in the Palace of Westminster. 'Only the very grand 
had offices there'48? more often an MP would use one of the 
communal rooms, or indeed the committee corridor, to dictate 
correspondence to a secretary. In the 1950 Parliament during 
the Conservative war of attrition against the knife-edge 
Labour majority of 6, marathon all-night sittings and snap 
divisions obliged many young MPs to sleep where they could 
find a convenient bench.49 In addition, the relationship 
between backbenchers and ministers was very much less 
structured. Although the reversal of Conservative fortunes in 
1945 induced greater contact and sense of camaraderie between 
senior and junior MPs, there remained a discernible divide 
between the ranks of the party, and the political generations. 
The generation gap, underlined by war-time and opposition 
experience, became even more apparent when the Conservatives 
returned to office in 1951: one new entrant in 1950 commented, 
'Ministers were very much more remote, more 'godlike'. One 
might see them in the Smoking Room'50, but given the general 
pattern of parliamentary attendance, this was the exception 
rather than the rule.
All of this made the private forums of debate very 
important.51 It reinforced the importance of party backbench 
committees52 as a primary source of information and augmented 
the influence of opinions expressed there. Discussion in
47 Wilfred Sendall
48 Sir John Astor
49 John Baldock
50 Lord Watkinson; see Harold Watkinson: Turning Points (Salisbury 1986) p.33
51 Sir Charles Mott-Radclyffe
52 Lord Watkinson
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these committees was confidential? therefore it was possible 
to have uninhibited exchanges of view in a way impossible on 
the floor of the House.53 As these committees were attended 
by a Whip, they 'were very much a two-way street: we heard the 
government view ahead of the backbenches, and we got to the 
government what the party had in mind'.54 Therefore in the 
1940s and 1950s the Conservative backbench committees 
exercised very considerable influence over their front bench. 
This influence was enhanced by the very fact it was discreet. 
Relatively few in number, the most important elective 
backbench committee was the 1922 Committee, followed by those 
which shadowed the three great offices of state: Foreign
Affairs, Treasury and Home Affairs. These committees met 
regularly; others, for example the Defence Committee, were 
convened only to discuss specific issues when they arose. 
Lord Glendevon, (then Lord John Hope) recalled: 'I was on the
executive of the 1922 in 1951-3 and we used to see Winston 
every month or two. We did not mince our words, so much so 
that once he said, "Now, if you will forgive me, I will go and 
see my other Cabinet".' Lord Glendevon also served on the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, acting as vice-chairman in 1952-53: 
'Every committee, including the Foreign Affairs committee, was 
powerful. The leadership never ignored their views? we (the 
Foreign Affairs Committee) were certainly always listened to. 
Eden never rode roughshod over us, nor ignored us. He never 
put a foot wrong.'55
The other venue for Conservative MPs was the Smoking Room, 
supplemented by the Members' Dining Room as a place to meet, 
gossip and exchange views. All the MPs to whom I spoke were 
united on their view of Parliament's seductive and enjoyable 
club atmosphere and 'the fun of politics'. But they were are
53 Nigel Nicolson interview with author
54 Lord Glendevon
55 Lord Glendevon
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divided on whether the Smoking Room was the most important 
venue for discussion, supplemented by the Dining Room? or 
whether backbench committee rooms formed the powerhouse of 
debate. Essentially, this depended upon the type of MP. The 
social animals or the intriguers - such as Boothby, Peter 
Smithers, or Julian Amery - had a decided preference for the 
former? whereas the more patrician (Lord John Hope, Nigel 
Nicolson, John Jacob ['Jakie'] Astor) placed the emphasis upon 
the latter.
The problem for research is, of course, that Smoking Room 
discussion is undocumented, and in view of the laws of libel 
in certain cases probably happily so. I have been obliged 
therefore to fall back upon the backbench committee minutes, 
private reminiscences, and the Hansard record, which although 
only a pale reflection of the robust exchanges that took place 
in the privacy of the Smoking Room and at Mrs Goddard's table 
in the Members' Dining Room56, give a fair indication of the 
temperature of debate within the party.57
(b) The MP outside Parliament;
The pattern of the political world in the 1940s and 1950s 
opened different avenues to those MPs intent on furthering 
political causes. With television in its infancy, political 
debate outside the House of Commons was conducted largely on 
the hustings, in public meetings in constituencies, and in the 
press. MPs had far more contact with the general public and 
many older MPs deplored the introduction of 'surgeries'.58 
There was greater attendance at public meetings, and down in 
his constituency fastness - away from the control of Central 
Office - an MP was likely to be more forthright 'on the stump'
56 Mrs Goddard was a portly waitress renowned for looking after senior backbenchers in 
the Dining Room: Sir Peter Smithers letter to author
57 confirmed by Sir Peter Smithers
58 eg Reginald Bevins: The Greasy Pole (London 1965), p.21
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than at Westminster. Here the importance of the local and 
provincial press was significant, since the public relied upon 
the radio and the printed word for information. MPs' speeches 
were syndicated around the country in a manner no longer seen.
The True Extent of Backbench Influence
Then, as now, parliamentary views on the extent to which 
backbench MPs could influence the government varied widely? 
the spectrum of opinion ranged from those newly elected MPs 
who initially saw their position as the opportunity to 
contribute decisively to political debate59? to those 
longstanding backbenchers whose estimation of their individual 
capacity to influence events was extremely limited indeed: 
'Most of the duties of an MP could be better performed by an 
intelligent poodle dog'.60 This cynicism is misleading. The 
impact of backbench opinion was greater than one might 
suppose. This backbench influence was largely informal, and 
therefore extremely difficult to measure: it was more a
process of constant 'action and interaction'. 'In the life of 
a Parliament many ideas are put forward within the party. All 
are thrashed out in frank debate upstairs, in meetings with 
Ministers or in other ways.' As the Whips attended backbench 
meetings, 'the guidance they subsequently issue as to how 
members should vote is merely the outcome of these discussions 
... Those policies that are accepted only rarely fail to 
satisfy the party's supporters. Even so MPs do on occasion 
dissent both in subsequent public debate and in the division 
lobbies from the agreed policy of their party colleagues as 
expressed by the Whips. In the main though they find little 
need to do so. They have already influenced the party's
59 Sir John Astor
“ Hollis, quoting Lecky, p. 165
- 31 -
policy to their satisfaction.'61
Obviously Conservative backbench opinion was only one factor 
in the government's formulation and management of foreign 
policy. Opinion within the Labour party (when in power), 
Conservative Central Office, the pro- and anti-Tory press, 
opinion in the constituencies and the City all played a part. 
Admittedly a government pays far more attention to its own 
ranks. When the Conservative party was in power its 
backbenches could not be totally ignored since soothing 
backbench sensibilities was an essential part of the smooth 
running of the government's business. Although direct 
influence on government decisions may have been rare, indirect 
influence was a constant factor. I have sought to gauge the 
influence of my chosen groups in the judgment of their 
contemporaries (at the time and with hindsight); the extent to 
which these groups were able to capture press and public 
attention and support; the time and energy devoted by 
government spokesmen to answering their complaints, and the 
quality of the government's responses. The terse minutes of 
the Foreign Affairs Committee are also revealing.
(a) Criteria for influencing policy:
There were a number of important criteria which governed 
backbenchers' attempts to exert influence, individually or 
collectively. These were the political experience of the 
individual MP; the personality of the MP(s) involved; the size 
of the backbench revolt and the government's majority; and the 
unity of the Cabinet. There were also opportunities for MPs to 
appeal to, or manipulate, opinion outside the Chamber. 
Support for a cause in the House of Lords, in the press, in 
the party in the country (constituency associations), and 
general public opinion could be crucial in promoting a 
particular line.
61 Thomas Iremonger letter, Times 29.5.55; also Stanley Prescott letter, Times 2.6.55
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b) Methods of influencing foreign policy:
The field of foreign policy tends to be less confrontational 
(the Munich and Suez crises were notable exceptions) than the 
home front in the House of Commons as the former involves 
almost no legislation and Parliament is normally only required 
to endorse or register disapproval of the government's line. 
However, backbenchers did exert influence on the terms on 
which foreign policy was debated, advocated and defended, and 
the professional civil servants in the Foreign office were 
very conscious of the political situation in which ministers 
had to quote.
(i) Public Methods:
Conservative backbench MPs strove to bring influence directly 
to bear on the government (whether Labour or Conservative) in 
a number of ways:
(1) Early Day Motions?
(2) questions on the floor of the House;
(3) participation in debates, abstention in the division 
lobby;
(4) very rarely, since it could prove counter-productive by 
bringing their government down, cross-voting?
(5) and even more rarely, resigning the party Whip;
(6) extra-parliamentary means: conversations with lobby
correspondents, critical letters and articles in the 
press, week-end speeches in constituencies, and speeches 
in extra-parliamentary organizations.
(ii) Private Methods:
There was also a variety of discreet avenues available:
(1) private conversations in the Smoking Room and dining 
rooms, the corridors of Westminster and Members' lobby?
(2) the Whips' office and with (when in power) relevant 
ministers and their Parliamentary Private Secretaries?
(3) comment in the 1922 Committee, or relevant backbench 
Committees (Defence, Foreign Affairs) and sub-committees 
(Army, Navy, Mediterranean).
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The Conservative leadership, in opposition and in government, 
was more sensitive than is generally acknowledged to their 
backbenches.62 In the years 1948-1956 Conservative backbench 
MPs had considerable opportunity to influence British foreign 
policy, and they were not shy of exploiting these openings. 
In opposition and woefully outnumbered in the House of 
Commons, the Tories' best hope on contentious issues, such as 
Europe, might have seemed to lie in acting collectively to 
'trim' foreign policy and to contribute to minor adjustments 
rather than major shifts in policy. However, several factors 
conspired to assist their efforts: the existence of
considerable cross-party support for closer relations with 
Western Europe, and the titanic presence of Churchill 
successfully offset the Labour government's massive 
parliamentary majority. Denied access to the same 
information, backbench criticism might have been ill-informed 
and therefore ineffective, but Bevin and Attlee were 
scrupulous in keeping their former war-time colleagues, 
Churchill and Eden, fully informed by regular briefings. Back 
in government from October 1951, the Conservative government's 
principal foreign policy critics on their own benches. 
Frustrated by the lack of impact of their opinions within the 
privacy of party committees, the Suez Group MPs decided to 
resort to direct, public pressure to counter Eden's Egypt 
policy as well as maintaining their attack behind the scenes. 
Again, these critics did not suffer from lack of information: 
through war-time links, many Conservative backbenchers had 
their own equally reliable sources (such as Julian Amery and 
Neil ('Billy') McLean, who used to great effect their 
knowledge gleaned from the 'old boy network' in the 
intelligence service).
In opposition and in government, the Conservative 
backbenchers' contribution towards the climate of debate in 
foreign affairs, was probably more important than their
62 Times, 22.4.55
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contribution to policy formulation - to the 'atmosphere of 
contentment or disillusion' - serving as a check on policy 
makers by helping to set the parameters within which the 
government was obliged to manoeuvre. Conservative
backbenchers concurred that while it was not their role to 
make policy, 'we are failing in our duty if we do not help 
form it' .63
63 Gilbert Longden memorandum to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Foreign Affairs Committee minutes, undated. 1.56
CHAPTER 2: CONSERVATIVE ATTITUDES TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
To the extent that classifications can be imposed upon the 
party on the question of European integration, Conservatives 
can be divided roughly into three categories.
Categories of Conservative Opinion
It must be stressed that this categorization is only 
approximate. At the time no such hard and fast divisions were 
apparent to the active participants; indeed, questions put to 
surviving MPs from this era about the extent to which specific 
groupings could be identified on Europe, prompted snorts of 
laughter and derision. Composition of these groups tended to 
shift according to the international climate, and as the 
debate became focused upon specific proposals.
(a) the Europeanists;
The Europeanists were the vocal MPs who favoured closer co­
operation with Europe, although even they harboured 
considerable differences of view on Britain's role. Their 
opinions ranged from Churchill's preference for British 
sponsorship and support (stopping short of actual membership), 
to those who were keen to see British participation in 
confederal arrangements with Europe (see below). The group 
included MPs whose membership of organizations favouring more 
'extreme' measures (for example, Federal Union, World 
Government) indicated their enthusiasm for close links with 
Europe to prevent a future war, rather than for the goal of 
British political federation with Europe. 'No Conservative 
favoured a federal Europe'.1
(b) the Sceptics:
Between those who urged a more positive approach towards
1 Sir Peter Smithers
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Europe and those who remained distinctly suspicious, sat 
uncomfortably those who were ambivalent about the lure of 
Europe. They harboured feelings that Britain had far more 
pressing concerns than involvement beyond her traditional 
sphere of action, or strong doubts about the implications of 
closer association with Europe, which they feared might 
jeopardise Britain's historic ties with the Empire and 
Commonwealth. This was not an active pressure group, but 
rather an unorganized collection of MPs whose feelings were 
aroused only on specific issues or particular occasions, 
moving the fulcrum of opinion within the party.
(c) the anti-Europeans:
This small group, on the 'diehard' or reactionary wing of the 
party, became deeply opposed to any closer ties with the 
Continent. Most appear to have regarded their continental 
neighbours as degenerate, second-rate foreigners.2 Although 
not all who opposed links with Europe did so on these 
chauvinist grounds, these Conservatives felt a deep-seated 
antipathy towards any moves which might limit Britain's 
freedom of action and prejudice her future. These MPs were 
also staunch supporters of imperial preference.
The Europeanists
Although the press might speak of the 'Strasbourgers' as an 
identifiable parliamentary faction, the Conservative 
Europeanists did not represent a united bloc within 
Parliament. Advocacy of closer links with Europe was left to 
individual, often well-placed Conservative backbenchers. 
Unlike the Suez Group's cause, there was widespread cross­
party support for European integration and support from 
outside organizations at home and abroad (the United Europe 
Movement (UEM - founded 1947), the European League for
2 Sir Peter Smithers
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Economic Co-operation (ELEC - founded 1946) and the Council of 
Europe (founded 1948) where the means used were those of 
education, discussion and persuasion.
Conservative views on Europe in the late 1940s should not be 
seen though the prism of later antagonisms towards the 
Continent that emerged in the 1950s. In the 1940s the 
question of Europe was inextricably linked to the question of 
security.3 The bedrock concern was that there should never 
again be war between the European nations - specifically 
France and Germany - and, as the shadow of Russia fell across 
the continent, that Europe must unite to protect herself 
against this threat. While ideas of European integration or 
co-operation were amorphous, there was an overwhelming sense 
that this cause which restored a sense of self-worth (and 
greater protection) to the defeated nations of the Continent 
was highly laudable. European unity was also seen as a means 
of offering hope and encouragement to the East European 
nations under Russia's yoke, seen in the stress placed in the 
original declaration of Churchill's United Europe Movement 
(UEM) on the whole of Europe, and the formation and activities 
of the UEM's East European Committee.
Approximately 60 Conservatives favoured a more active approach 
towards European integration. There was a hard core: 'a
personal Churchill clique, which went back to anti­
appeasement ':4
Winston Churchill 
Robert Boothby 
Harold Macmillan
3 Lord Eccles interview with author
4 Lord Amery interview with author
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Duncan Sandys5
Beyond this lay two outer concentric circles of MPs whose 
enthusiasm for Europe fluctuated between 1946 and 1949, 
forming a combination of 'enthusiasts for some form of closer 
union, and pro-Commonwealthers', who, while accepting that 
closer unspecified links with Europe were an excellent idea, 
were determined that 'nothing should be done which might 
adversely affect the Commonwealth and Empire, particularly to 
the advantage of "Continentals”'.6 Using the extensive lists 
in Ronald Mackay's papers in the London School of Economics' 
archive, membership of the British Committee of the European 
League for Economic Co-operation (ELEC), attendance of 
international conferences (Gstaad, the Hague and Interlaken), 
debates and Early Day Motions (EDMs), it is possible to 
identify the following Conservatives:
Tufton Beamish 
Herbert Butcher (NL&C)
Uvedale Corbett 
Viscountess Davidson 
Lord Willoughby de Eresby 
Rupert de la B&re 
Douglas Dodds-Parker 
David Eccles 
Walter Elliot 
Ian Orr-Ewing 
Walter Fletcher 
John Foster 
Hugh Fraser 
Connelly Gage (UU)
5 Sandys was out of Parliament from 1945 until February 1950, when he was returned 
for Streatham. However, I have included him on the basis of his relationship with Churchill 
and his position in the European Movement.
6 John Hay letter to author
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David Gammans 
Sir Cuthbert Headlam 
James Henderson Stewart 
Viscount Hinchingbrooke 
Quintin Hogg 
Christopher Hollis 
Anthony Langford-Holt 
Norman Hulbert 
James Hutchison 
Montgomery Hyde 
Lord John Hope 
Edward Keeling 
Colin Thornton-Kemsley 
Richard Law 
Martin Lindsay 
Jocelyn Lucas 
Hugh Lucas-Tooth 
Sir Peter MacDonald 
John Maclay (NL&C)
Reginald Manningham-Buller 
Sidney Marshall 
David Maxwell Fyfe 
Hugh Molson
Charles Mott-Radclyffe 
Sir Thomas Moore 
William Neill (UU)
Godfrey Nicholson 
Basil Nield 
Anthony Nutting 
Christopher Peto 
Oliver Poole 
David Price-White 
Otho Prior-Palmer 
David Renton (NL&C)
Peter Roberts 
Roland Robinson 
Douglas Savory
Walter Smiles (UU)
Alec Spearman 
Henry Spence 
Ernest Taylor 
William Teeling 
Peter Thorneycroft 
Lady Tweedsmuir 
Arthur Vere Harvey 
Sir Wavell Wakefield 
George Ward 
Gerald Williams
Churchill's 'personal clique' was ably supported by Maxwell 
Fyfe, and Thorneycroft and Eccles through their work on the 
British Committee of ELEC; and by MacDonald and Roberts in the 
parliamentary all-party group for Europe. Teeling, George 
Ward, Hutchison, Headlam, Hugh Fraser, Keeling and de Eresby 
also took a particularly active interest. Although they were 
sensitive towards potentially conflicting obligations of 
Empire and Europe - they strongly resisted British 
participation in a European customs union which did not permit 
the continuation of imperial preference7 - they were confident 
that the problems could be bridged.8
Beyond these MPs, there existed a wider circle of interested 
observers in the developments in Europe, willing to put their 
names to EDMs recommending closer links with Europe or to 
attend the Hague conference. However, although these MPs were 
not perhaps as sceptical as Eden, their enthusiasm for the 
cause was certainly more restrained:
Derek Heathcoat Amory 
Brendan Bracken 
Alfred Bossom
7 see Hutchison 22.1.48, HC Deb M 6A15
8 MacDonald 22.1.48, HC Deb.446.488
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Norman Bower 
Malcolm Bullock 
Edward Carson 
William Cuthbert 
William Darling 
George Drayson 
William Duthie 
Ian Fraser 
Sir Gifford Fox 
Thomas D Galbraith 
Ernest Gates 
Arnold Gridley 
Patrick Hannon 
John Hare 
Frederick Harris 
Anthony Head 
Sir John Henderson 
Sir Arthur Howard 
Sir John Kerr 
Neill Cooper-Key 
Alan Lennox-Boyd 
Geoffrey Lloyd 
John Selwyn Lloyd 
'Toby' Low 
Duncan McCallum 
John Maitland 
Ernest Marples 
John Maude 
Frank Medlicott (NL) 
Alan Noble 
Cyril Osborne 
Charles Ponsonby 
Stanley Prescott 
Victor Raikes 
David Robertson 
Stanley Reed 
Sir Frank Sanderson
Sidney Shephard 
William Shepherd 
Edward Smith 
Oliver Stanley 
Malcolm Stoddart-Scott 
Henry Studholme 
Robert Thorp 
Derek Walker-Smith 
Mervyn Wheatley 
Christopher York 
Sir Arthur Young
Support for closer British ties with Europe ebbed and flowed 
even within the ranks of the Europeanists: there was an
element of 'jumping on the political bandwagon' in the early 
years. There were 39 Tories among the 133 MPs who supported 
the establishment of a 'European federation within the 
framework of the UNO' in January 1947? and 62 Conservatives 
initially supported Mackay's European Parliamentary Union.9 
57 signed the EDM calling for a political union and trading 
area, whereas by February 1949 the more restrained EDM was 
supported by 61 Conservatives and included many from the wider 
circle. A critical point came at the second European 
Parliamentary Congress at Interlaken in September 1948? 
British delegates included MacDonald, Keeling, Langford-Holt, 
Moore, Roberts and Savory. Here a marked divergence of 
principle emerged between those who favoured British 
participation in a European federation, and those who could 
not countenance such a move because of Britain's other ties 
and responsibilities. The split within the ranks of the 
British all-party group widened in the remaining months of 
1948. This culminated in Robert's resignation as secretary to 
the British Group of EPU and the establishment of a new, 
separate all-party committee in February 1949. The moderation 
in aims was reflected in the more restrained EDM of February
9 Mackay papers, LSE
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1949 (see below).
(a) Churchill's Decision to Adopt the Cause of Europe:
In any discussion of the Conservatives and Europe in the 1940s 
the principal figure is Churchill. Without his leadership and 
inspiration, the cause of Europe would never have acquired its 
political momentum, nor would the Conservative party have come 
to be closely identified with the cause in the public's mind, 
however mistakenly.
To a great extent, the political vacuum in Europe after the 
Second World War lent itself overwhelmingly to the European 
ideal, which found wide appeal across the political spectrum. 
The European countries were in a state of misery and 
collapse.10 The United States appeared to be repeating its 
disastrous retreat into isolation (despite membership of the 
newly formed UNO) just as the Russian barbarian seemed poised 
to ravish the prostrate European nations that lay outside 
Soviet control. 'In the first few years after the War, 
Britain was the sole European victor [although] she had 
suffered materially ... by comparison with the other countries 
in Europe [she was] still relatively rich and her commerce and 
industry were largely intact.'11
From the outset Churchill was a key player. Long before the 
War he had pondered the notion of European Union. At the time 
of the Briand Plan (1929-30) Churchill wrote an article 
published in the Saturday Evening Post (a popular American 
magazine, which admittedly did not enjoy a wide readership in 
Britain), setting out his views on British association with 
such an entity: 'We are with Europe but not of it. We are
linked but not comprised. We are interested, associated but
10 Harold Macmillan: Tides of Fortune 1945-55 (London 1969), p. 155
11 John Colville: The Churchillians (London 1981), p.208
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not absorbed.' He was to repeat the strand of these thoughts 
on European integration on various occasions in the succeeding 
years: in 1939 as President of the New Commonwealth Society 
(an organization which was crucial to early support for 
European union) he called for a supranational peacekeeping 
force for Europe; in 1940 as part of a desperate attempt to 
shore up crumbling French morale following the French army's 
shattering defeat by Hitler's troops, he proposed an 
indissoluble union between France and Britain with a common 
parliament. Between 1940 and 1942 he dwelt several times upon 
the idea of unifying Europe under a Council with powers to 
enforce its decisions12 - a kind of European UNO.
He returned again to the idea in speeches immediately after 
the War.13 Thus his speech entitled 'Let Europe Arise', 
delivered at the University of Zurich on 19 September 1946, 
stemmed largely from a long-held conviction, augmented by his 
desire to prevent future Franco-German animosity and his 
concern that if European civilisation was to save itself from 
Russian encroachment it had to do so by its own efforts. This 
speech, which was widely reported, was a logical progression 
from his address at Fulton, Missouri, six months earlier, when 
he warned of an iron curtain descending across Europe from 
Stettin to Trieste.
A desire to promote lasting peace14 was not the only 
ingredient in Churchill's decision to act as leader of the 
United Europe Movement in early 1947. Motives of political 
calculation and personal vanity almost certainly also 
featured. Churchill enjoyed 'an unrivalled position as the 
war leader who had helped to save Europe ... but he was also
12 Walter Lipgens: A History of European Union (Oxford 1982); and Lipgens ed: 
Documents on the History of European Integration Vol.IL Plans for European Union in 
Britain and in Exile 1939-45, pp.229-233
13 in Brussels 16.11.45 and the Hague 8.5.46
14 Colville: The Churchillians, p.208
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a party politician, an active and sometimes truculent leader 
of an Opposition anxious to weaken and as soon as possible 
take the place of the existing government'.15 He was also an 
intuitive politician par excellence, and sensed the emotional 
attraction of the phoenix rising from Europe's ashes, as well 
as the practicalities. Later Labour accusations that 
Churchill's adoption of the cause of European unity was merely 
a publicity stunt, motivated solely by political 
opportunism16, probably contained an element of truth. In 
Robert Boothby's opinion, Churchill was not very interested in 
being leader of the Opposition after all those years of 
supreme power.17 With the English domestic political scene 
offering little scope for him to play world statesman, a 
united Europe held out a potential solution to Franco-German 
antagonism and perhaps best of all it presented a weapon with 
which to beat Labour at Westminster.
Once persuaded by Duncan Sandys to act as Chairman of the UEM, 
Churchill threw his considerable energies into 'the crusade 
... of forming a united Europe'.18 However, Churchill was 
never a convert to active British participation in European 
integration, and in this he remained a product of his 
political generation. His intention was for Britain to 
'promote unity':19 this country should provide moral support 
and intellectual leadership for a United Europe, but Britain 
would stay, of necessity, outside the emerging institutions. 
Britain was to provide the vital link with America, and 
because of her Empire, with Africa, Asia and the Pacific
15 Macmillan, p. 159
16 Ungoed-Thomas, 17.11.49, HC Deb.469.2305
17 Boothby, in Alan Thompson: The Day Before Yesterday (London, 1971), p.88
18 Boothby, in Thompson, p.88
19 Colville: The Churchillians, p.208
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basin.20 He was to make a virtue of his lack of a clear plan 
on how European integration was to be achieved, claiming that 
his task was to provide the vision; it was for others to fill 
in the details. To be fair, in the early years very few 
people had a clear idea of the means and the ends, save for 
the Federalists who saw European integration as the halfway 
house towards their utopia of world government.
Churchill did not share the federalists' conviction of the 
need for European political federation for its own sake. 
However, free from the constraints of office he and his 
pro-European supporters fell into the trap of trying to offer 
all things to all men. Intent on 'forcing the European pace 
on the Europeans, he aimed his speeches at a world 
audience'.21 Churchill recognized the need to attract a broad 
spectrum of support from existing organizations for his newly 
created United Europe Movement, but his own preference for 
generalizations and keen domestic political sense that 
specific details might prove unattractive (or indeed 
unpalatable) to the British electorate, encouraged vague and 
ambiguous statements from Churchill and his supporters. In 
Lord Fraser's opinion Churchill's words were clear22, but the 
enthusiasts chose to read more into his declarations than he 
had implied, while those worried about the implications were 
increasingly concerned. In Zurich Churchill had spoken of 
Britain's 'benevolent association' with a United States of 
Europe, implying that Britain's position as head of the 
Commonwealth precluded ordinary membership. However, his 
speech at the Royal Albert Hall on 16 May 1947 (to mark the 
inauguration of the United Europe Movement) referred to 
Britain as member of a European family and having to play her 
full part, adding that although the Commonwealth would have to
20 Colville: The Churchillians, p.208
21 Lord Fraser
22 Lord Fraser
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support such an association he saw no reason why the Dominions 
would not do so, thus implying Britain's active participation. 
There remained an inherent contradiction in Churchill's vision 
towards European unity, which 'he never resolved, either 
intellectually or emotionally'.23
Churchill's decision to adopt the cause of Europe was 
influenced by three Conservatives:
(i) Robert Boothby:
Boothby had been a supporter of ideas of European integration 
since the 1920s? in 1928 he had helped write a book which 
touched on the subject with Macmillan and Loeder. Aware of 
the Continental appeal of a revived Europe through his 
contacts with the Free French in the 1940s, he had called for 
the creation of a United States of Europe in his despatches 
from the San Francisco conference in 1945.24 Boothby 
repeatedly expressed his ardent conviction of the need for 
economic, political and cultural integration in Western 
Europe25, on the grounds that Western democracies were too 
small to survive as independent political and economic units 
flanked by the United States and Russia. Boothby acted as 
secretary to the ad hoc all-party parliamentary committee 
which had drafted the EDM of 16 March 1948 which called for 
Western Union. By April 1948 this committee boasted of 58 
Tory and 70 Labour MPs.26
Boothby was an extremely gifted, able, but flawed politician. 
One of the most outspoken Conservatives of his generation 
since his election to Parliament in 1924 for Aberdeenshire
23 Colville: The Churchillians, p.208
24 Robert Boothby: Recollections of a Rebel (London 1978), p.216
25 see 4.6.46 HCDebA23.1944-1954; and 19.6.47 HC Deb.438.23U-IS
26 Mackay papers
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East, and a former protege of Churchill, he was asked to join 
Churchill's European venture at the outset? but he never 
regained Churchill's total confidence which he had enjoyed in 
the 1920s and 1930s.27 Boothby was still tainted by the 'Czech 
gold scandal' of the early 1940s and there remained within the 
Conservative Party an undercurrent of mistrust about 'what 
could be in it for Boothby'. As one former colleague
expressed it: 'it was said that at his christening, the good
fairies had given him every gift - except the ability to 
distinguish right from wrong.'28 One of the few MPs able to 
rouse his colleagues from their roosts in the smoking rooms or 
the bar with the appearance of his name on the annunciator, 
his speeches attracted comment but not respect: 'He had the 
character that when he made a speech in the Commons, you could 
be sure that the applause he got came from the opposition 
benches'.29 In a sense, he was the Conservatives' Richard 
Crossman, with whom he was great friends. He was disliked
intensely by establishment Tories: James Stuart, the Tory
Chief Whip until 1948, loathed him.30 Thus although Boothby 
held sincere and articulate views on British ties with the 
continent, persistent questions about his integrity undermined 
the force of his message. He was appreciated as a very 
convivial companion, but was regarded as 'a thoroughly bad 
man! '31
(ii) Leo Amery:
The public's identification of the cause of Europe with 
Churchill after the War frequently caused Leo Amery's role to 
be overlooked. No longer an MP but still very much an elder
27 Robert Rhodes James: Bob Boothby (London 1991), pp.337-8
28 Sir Reginald Bennett
29 Sir Reginald Bennett
30 see Within the Fringe (London 1967), p. 104
31 Sir Godfrey Nicholson interview with author
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statesman of the party, Amery had long held coherent views of 
the place of Europe in an expanded imperial economic structure 
- ideas which his son, Julian, absorbed, and argued with 
intellectual conviction and vigour.
Amery knew well the pre-war continental pro-European 
politicians, such as Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi32, and 
had attended conferences on the topic in the 1930s. A 
political ally of Churchill from the days of his opposition to 
appeasement, Amery persuaded Churchill to come to lunch to 
meet Coudenhove-Kalergi in early 1939? this meeting prompted 
Churchill to publish an article in the Evening Standard on the 
importance of a united Europe.33 Amery sent Churchill the 
text of his speech to the London University on the subject of 
European integration, and came to believe that this was the 
origin of Churchill's call in Zurich.34 It was certainly a 
contributory factor. Amery was involved from the outset in 
Churchill's pro-Europe venture, urging him to pursue the 
matter.35 Amery's contacts with Coudenhove-Kalergi became 
very important as Coudenhove-Kalergi was busy reviving his 
pre-war organization and was very concerned that Churchill 
should preside at the Congress Coudenhove-Kalergi was 
proposing to convene early the following year.36 Julian 
Amery37 was staying with Coudenhove-Kalergi in Gstaad when a 
telegram arrived from Churchill: 'I remember you have a
European movement and I am thinking of starting one. I would
32 President of the Pan-European Union, which he founded in 1923, and which held 
regular congresses, and founder of European Parliamentary Union (1947).
33 Lord Amery
34 Leo Amery diary entry 19.9.46, in John Barnes ed: The Empire at Bay - The Leo 
Amery Diaries 1929-45, p. 1060
35 Barnes’ transcript of Leo Amery Ms: Amery to Churchill, 20.9.46
36 Barnes’ transcript of Leo Amery Ms: Amery to Churchill 24.7.46
37 MP for Preston 1950-66; Brighton Pavillion 1969-92
- 50 -
like to combine. Please send all details.7 Lord Amery 
recalls:
7Coudenhove-Kalergi telegraphed back: "Julian Amery
staying with me and will bring full details.” I came 
back to London fully briefed, and rang up Churchill7s 
office and was invited to lunch on 20 September. [Leo 
Amery, Sandys and Boothby were also there.] I reported 
on Coudenhove-Kalergi and sat in on the conversation. 
The importance of my father was that Churchill was very 
conscious that the imperial wing of the party might be 
very unhappy? to make him vice-chairman was seen as an 
answer to any criticism that the European movement was 
not anti-Empire.738
Until his death, Leo Amery remained an impassioned supporter 
of European unity but his position as head of 7the imperial 
preference boys739, which Churchill and his fellow 
Conservative Europe enthusiasts had hoped to harness to their 
cause, in fact diminished the force of his message, as 790% of 
these imperial stalwarts were anti-European7.40 Leo Amery 
remained firm in his belief that at all costs Britain must 
avoid a return to a 7balkanized7 Europe where small states 
looked to outside patrons for support in their squabbles, and 
provoked confrontation between these patrons. In his view, 
only a European Commonwealth could hold its own against Russia 
and figure as one of the real world powers.41 Amery shared 
Sandys view that 7the only hope of keeping Germany with us is 
to hold out the prospect of playing a real part in a united
38 Lord Amery
39 Sir Peter Smithers
40 Sir Peter Smithers
41 Barnes’ transcript of Leo Amery Ms: Amery to Churchill 12.11.45
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Europe rather than as an annexe of Bolshevism'.42 He also saw 
Europe in domestic political terms -as a 'positive antidote to 
socialism' - hoping to use the idea as a creed to attract the 
working classes.
(iii) Duncan Sandys:
Sandys was crucial in persuading Churchill to adopt the cause 
of Europe. Initially urged by Churchill to interest himself 
in Coudenhove-Kalergi's attempts to revive his pre-war pan- 
Europe organization, Sandys had been in close touch with 
Coudenhove-Kalergi throughout the summer of 1946. Churchill 
was reluctant to become involved in such moves, on account of 
the overtly anti-Russian bent of Coudenhove-Kalergi's 
concept.43 There may also have been an element in Churchill's 
thinking of giving a tiresome and ambitious son-in-law 
something to do.44 However, Churchill had come to the 
conclusion that if Europe was to defend itself, from without 
and within, it must unite; he argued this fervently at dinner 
several days before he was due to address the University of 
Zurich in September 1946. Sandys and Jan Smuts were impressed 
by his argument and convinced him to use his forthcoming 
speech as an occasion to issue a clarion call to the free 
nations of Europe.45 Sandys also helped to draft Churchill's 
speech.46 Despite Churchill's reluctance to follow up this 
address with an organized campaign action,47 he was keen to 
see the genesis of a movement for European unity, and agreed 
by late September to chair the new organization, provided this 
did not amount 'anything more than signing letters and acting
42 Barnes’ transcript of Leo Amery Ms: Amery diary entry 22.8.46
43 Barnes’ transcript of Sandys Ms: Churchill to Sandys 25.6.46, and 29.6.46
44 Lord Deedes interview with author
45 Barnes’ transcript of Sandys Ms
46 Lord Amery
47 Barnes’ transcript of Sandys Ms
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as the figurehead'.48 Following Churchill's Zurich speech 
Sandys lost no time in organizing a committee to promote the 
United Europe idea. 49 Although officially only the general 
secretary of the movement, Sandys played the decisive role in 
maintaining the momentum unleashed by his father-in-law.50 
Out of Parliament until 1950, Sandys devoted his prodigious 
energy and tenacity to the issue, seeking to provide the 'nuts 
and bolts' to Churchill's grand design. 'The man was a steam 
roller - he would grind away in first gear and nothing could 
stand in his path'.51
From the outset he was keen to enlist all sections of the 
Conservative party for the nascent movement, as well as 
recruiting Labour and Liberal support.52 Sandys accordingly 
approached known supporters of European integration (Boothby 
and Macmillan), but also Tories who were important for the 
influence and respect they commanded within the party: Harry 
Crookshank, Lord Cranborne53, Walter Elliot, Geoffrey Lloyd 
and Oliver Stanley. Sandys also advised Churchill in the run­
up to the inaugural meeting of the United Europe Movement at 
the Albert Hall in May 1947, 'it is important that a few more 
of the leading members of the Conservative Party should be 
associated with the United Europe Movement. Otherwise there 
is some danger that feeling left out, they may become 
suspicious or hostile to it.'54 He suggested inviting Eden, 
Hudson, Butler, Anderson and Law. Significantly, Eden's name
48 Barnes’ transcript of Sandys Ms
49 John Pinder and Richard Mayne: Federal Union, p.94
50 Lord Amery; Macmillan, p. 157; Boothby, p.216
51 Lord Orr-Ewing interview with author
52 Barnes’ transcript of Sandys Ms: Sandys to Churchill 4.10.46
53 succeeded his father as Marquis of Salisbury in 1947.
54 Barnes’ transcript of Sandys Ms: Sandys to Churchill 27.4.47
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had not been included in the list of those to be canvassed at 
the outset of discussions the previous winter. Sandys 
appreciated the need to enlist Eden's support (v id e  his 
suggestion to Churchill that 'the invitation to Anthony should 
come personally from you' to the Albert Hall meeting) but he 
certainly did not crave Eden's involvement. Sandys harboured 
a deep resentment of Eden, by now Churchill's acknowledged 
heir, which dated from the 1930s55, and which Sandys did 
nothing to hide. 'It became a sort of feud within the Tory 
party.' 56
While acting as Churchill's liaison officer with the emerging 
European movement, to a large extent Sandys was left to his 
own devices. His influence was very considerable? for
example, Churchill sent Sandys the text of the speech he 
intended to make at the inaugural meeting at the Albert Hall? 
'Sandys did not like Churchill's speech, and wrote his own 
version, which he sent back to Winston. Churchill did not 
like that, and rang Sandys up asking for the original. Sandys 
said he was very sorry, but he had torn it up. As there was 
no common copy, Churchill had to make Sandys' speech, with 
such changes as he could make.'57 Sandys used his
relationship with Churchill as an umbrella for his activities
on the Continent. Both were keen to organize the formation of 
a group outside England: it was Sandys contacted French
federalists. He also attended Coudenhove-Kalergi's
'preliminary European parliament' at Gstaad in September 1947, 
with his former parliamentary colleague and friend Somerset de 
Chair. 'At one point Sandys commented to me: "I think the old 
man should have sent a telegram to the Conference. You write 
it.” So I wrote it and Sandys transmitted it to Coudenhove-
55 Robert Rhodes James: Churchill - A Study In Failure (London 1970) p.335
56 Lord Amery
57 Lord Amery
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Kalergi, who read it out very proudly'.58
Sandys deliberately sought to harness existing groups 
favouring European integration, including those promoting 
political federation, to exploit their organizations and 
contacts. Accordingly, Churchill's committee contained four 
representatives of Federal Union.59 Sandys himself favoured 
more modest co-operation between governments but recognized 
that he needed continental support for his campaign, and that 
the federalists could deliver one of the few multi-national 
groupings. Sandys also enlisted supporters of World 
Government, on the basis that 'European unity should be 
pursued as the immediate practical step and that any idea of 
World Government is a project for the more distant future'.60 
Sandys thus decided to go to Amsterdam in 1946, and Gstaad and 
Montreux in 1947. In Montreux Sandys attended as an observer, 
but was hardly idle. He spoke at a public meeting at the 
Palais des Sports, and after talking to Joseph Retinger 'the 
whole of one night', the two men decided join forces to 
organize a large-scale Congress of Europe.61
(b) Other Prominent Conservative Supporters of European 
Integration;
In Walter Lipgens view, the great majority of party 
politicians had no idea of European unity before 1946, or had 
resigned themselves to its impossibility. Certainly Quintin 
Hogg, writing on the federation of Europe for the Spectator in
58 Somerset De Chair interview with author
59 see Pinder and Mayne, p.94
60 Barnes’ transcript of Sandys Ms: Sandys to Churchill 23.12.46
61 John Pomian ed.: Joseph Retinger: Memoirs of an Eminence Grise, (London 1972), 
p.215
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1943,62 concluded that the idea was impractical. Indeed, 
until 1948 the average Tory had not given the matter any 
thought.63 However, not all had concluded that the notion was 
a lost cause and should be abandoned, nor ignored the idea.
(i) Macmillan:64
Another supporter of Churchill in 1938 and 1940, Macmillan had 
given thought to ideas of European integration as far back as 
the 1920s when, together with Boothby and Loeder, he had 
written a book which touched on the topic. As part of 
Sandys' deliberate policy, Macmillan was among the senior 
Tories invited to the inaugural meeting at the Albert Hall, 
and was later included on the General Committee. By 1949 he 
had taken on the important and influential position of 
chairman of the East European committee of the UEM.
In these years, Macmillan was still as much in the political 
wilderness as he had been before the Second World War, despite 
his war-time position as Resident Minister in North Africa. 
His decision to join forces with the Europeanists appeared to 
contain more than an element of political opportunism.65 He 
was not so cynical a politician for this to be his only 
motive, but the glamorous appeal of the crusade, and the not- 
inconsiderable element of eschewing the forlorn political 
landscape at home66, combined with his desire to pour himself 
into politics to compensate for the wasteland of his personal 
life. To his credit, Macmillan was a sincere admirer of Jean 
Monnet, and his greatest nightmare was a revived Germany
62 quoted in Walter Lipgens ed.: Documents on the History of European Integration, 
p.240; and Hogg: Making Peace (London 1945)
63 Lord Colyton (formerly Henry Hopkinson) interview with author
64 MP for Stockton-on-Tees 1924-29, 1931-45; MP for Bromley 1945-1964
65 John Hay
66 Alistair Home: Macmillan 1894-1956 (London 1988), p.314
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without Britain's counterweight, or even worse a revived 
Germany unshackled to the West leaning towards Russia (the 
spectre of Rapallo). He had coherent views on the necessity 
to harness the industries of the Ruhr to the economies of the 
West, which he repeatedly voiced inside and outside 
Westminster. Europe became the new focus for his idealism,67 
but his enthusiasm for this newfound cause came to appear to 
some of his colleagues as 'boundless and excessive'68: on 17 
August 1949 he went so far as to support the Council of 
Europe's resolution calling for the Committee of Ministers to 
be an executive authority with supranational powers.
(ii) David Maxwell Fyfe:69
A former Attorney-General and Prosecutor at the Nuremberg War 
Crimes Trials, Maxwell Fyfe attended the first meeting of 
Churchill's committee on 3 December 1946 and was invited to 
join the managing committee of the UEM at the beginning of 
1947. Unlike Macmillan, Sandys and Boothby, Maxwell Fyfe had 
not supported Churchill in his opposition to appeasement 
before the War. Some of Maxwell Fyfe's colleagues ascribed 
his fervour for Europe as an attempt to atone for his stance 
on Munich.70 In the intervening period between the Congress 
of the Hague, and the convention of the Consultative Assembly 
of the Council of Europe, Maxwell Fyfe devoted 'considerable 
study to a European Convention of Human Rights', serving as 
one of the rapporteurs to the International Judicial Section, 
set up by the European Movement, which set about preparing a 
draft Convention.71
67 Home, p.314
68 Home, p.314
69 MP for West Derby 1935-1954.
70 Lord Eccles
71 see the Earl of Kilmuir: Political Adventure (London 1964), p. 176
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(iii) David Eccles:72
Another member of Churchill's committee, Eccles' undoubted 
ability was unfortunately marred by his arrogance which earnt 
him the nickname 'Smartyboots' in the party. Nor was Eccles 
a Smoking Room man which might have mitigated this fault in 
his critics' eyes. His parliamentary impact was inhibited by 
his inability to make political friends, and unfortunately he 
spoke less well in the House than he did in private.73 
Concentrating on the economic aspects of European union, 
through his membership of the British Committee of ELEC, 
Eccles saw the argument for European union as fundamentally 
one of security: the chance to avert renewed Franco-German 
hostility, and to defend Europe against Russia's advance.74 
His preference for economic arrangements for an integrated 
Europe was for laissez faire arrangements based on the 
extension of the GATT procedures. This was a marked contrast 
to the Amery and Boothby approach.
(iv) Peter Thorneycroft:75
Peter Thorneycroft was also on Churchill's committee. Co­
founder of the Tory Reform Group in 1942 with Lord 
Hinchingbrooke, Thorneycroft served on the British Committee 
of the ELEC with Eccles and Macmillan.
(v) Walter Elliot:76
Elliot was invited by Leo Amery to join Churchill's movement 
in late 1946. Elliot's political position was somewhat 
anomalous: tipped in the 1930s as a potential leader of the
72 MP for Chippenham 1943-62
73 Reginald Bevins: The Greasy Pole (London 1965), p.30
74 Lord Eccles
75 MP for Stafford 1938-45; MP for Monmouth 1945-66
76 MP for Lanark 1918-23; MP for Kelvingrove 1924-45; MP for Combined Scottish 
Universities 1946-50; MP for Kelvingrove 1950-58
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party77, his political confidence had been shattered by 
Munich, and although he was acknowledged as one of the senior 
party stalwarts by the 1940s, he remained a broken man.
(c) Second-tier backbenchers:
(i) Sir Peter MacDonald:78
Born in 1895, MacDonald was very much an old-world Tory - an 
ardent supporter of imperial preference, and a prime example 
of the school of thought within the Europeanists who envisaged 
the union of economic blocs together with their colonial 
empires. By his own admission,79 MacDonald was sceptical 
about European federation and Britain's participation in any 
such moves, but he was impressed by the enthusiasm on the 
Continent. Chairman of the Conservative party Imperial 
Affairs Committee, as well as a founder member of the all­
party parliamentary committee on European union, MacDonald was 
sensitive to fears that closer integration with Europe might 
interfere with relations with the Commonwealth. He asserted 
in general terms that the old loyalties of Empire and the new 
obligations of Europe could be reconciled,80 but he was 
emphatic that all depended on what shape the policy took. If 
this required the surrender of British sovereignty, then he 
was against joining such an organization.
MacDonald joined Ronald ('Kim') Mackay's Parliamentary group 
for European Parliamentary Union (EPU). There developed 
considerable tension within this parliamentary group between 
Mackay's band of federalists and those Conservatives and 
National Liberals who favoured a looser British association
77 Philip Goodhart: The 1922 (London 1973), p. 126
78 MP for the Isle of Wight 1924-59
79 22.1.48, HC Deb.446MZ
80 22.1.48, HC Deb.446.448
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with Europe. This came into the open at the Interlaken 
conference in early September 1948, and was resolved when the 
all-party group was constituted in February 1949? this group 
formally withdrew from EPU, and its officers were delegated to 
approach the British Council for the European Movement (which 
was to be formed shortly), but to retain the group's 
parliamentary autonomy. MacDonald and Boothby were elected as 
Vice-Presidents.
(ii) Peter Roberts:81
Like MacDonald, Roberts was originally involved (as Secretary) 
in Mackay's EPU British group, but could not support Mackay's 
federalist approach. He resigned as Secretary from this group 
in December 1948. When the all-party group was set up in 
February 1949, Roberts was elected Hon. Secretary.
(d) Analysis of Pro-European Conservative Thought
Among the Conservative Europeanists, just as within the 
European Movement as a whole, differences existed over 
Britain's relationship with the Continent. These differences 
lay at the very heart of the Movement. Churchill remained 
convinced that Britain's role was to act as sponsor. He might 
speak of Britain being part of the European family, but this 
was always in the context of his vision of the 'three 
interlocking circles'; Britain's relationships with America 
and her Commonwealth and Empire precluded placing the greatest 
emphasis on Western Europe. Sandys, on the other hand, was 
more swayed than Churchill by the arguments of Monnet and 
Spaak, although a considerable part of the attraction of the 
federalist movement was the support it commanded on the 
Continent. Also Sandys had come to feel, with the end of the 
British Raj in India, that the days of the Empire were
81 MP for Sheffield, Eccleshall 1945-50; MP(C&L) for Sheffield, Heeley 1950-66
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numbered; he was fearful that if Britain allied with America 
she would be too subordinate to exercise any influence. In 
his opinion Britain was no longer a great power, and union 
with Europe offered the only feasible alternative. He 
envisaged union with Europe based on the Marshall Plan, with 
economic integration leading to military integration82; thus 
he conceived of the vital necessity of British membership of 
a European community - something which Churchill did not 
endorse. The division within the ranks of the Europeanists 
was not just along political lines; there were also marked 
differences in the economic sphere. Eccles, an active 
campaigner in the ELEC movement, favoured a laissez faire 
approach (along the lines of the GATT), whereas Boothby argued 
long and hard for a union with Europe and the overseas 
territories, welded together into a coherent economic bloc. 
The need to gloss over these divisions contributed to the 
confusion over the precise meaning of such phrases as European 
union, European unity, European federation, European 
integration. Unfortunately, this proved a two-edged sword as, 
in turn, the continental federalists and their supporters in 
Britain raised hopes in Western Europe that they only had to 
wait until Churchill was returned to power for Britain to 
become a full member of a united Europe.
The ambiguity necessary to patch over differences among 
pro-European politicians and political activists was evident 
from the outset.83 With the benefit of hindsight this seems 
an inherently flawed approach, but at the time the method 
provided the necessary cloak for European integration to move 
forward. Thus whether or not it is fair now to criticise Tory 
politicians for their contradictory and frequently misleading 
rhetoric is beside the point. Churchill himself repeatedly 
refused to be drawn, in public or in private: when quizzed by 
Boothby in the train on the way to the first Strasbourg
82 Barnes’ transcript of Sandys Ms: De Rougemont Diary 28.8.47
83 see Aidan Crawley, 17.11.49, HC Deb.469.2236-43
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Assembly, on what he meant by a United States of Europe, 
Churchill replied, 'We are not making a machine, we are 
growing a living plant, and we must wait and see until we
understand what this plant turns out to be'.84 Not
unnaturally this imprecision, together with the apparent
endorsement by the party through the presence of leading 
Conservatives on the United Europe Committee (Boothby, Maxwell 
Fyfe, Stanley, Leo Amery, Sandys and Ernest Brown), fostered 
the belief among British and continental supporters of 
European federation that Churchill and his like-minded 
parliamentary colleagues favoured active British participation 
in European political and economic integration, and that, by 
extension, so did the Conservative party. Nice distinctions 
between 'European unity' and 'European union' were lost on the 
bulk of the British public. The link between the Tory party 
and European integration was reinforced in the public's
imagination when the National Executive of the Labour Party 
forbade any of its members to have anything to do with 
Churchill's United Europe Committee.
This unintentional but occasionally deliberate obfuscation 
aroused the antagonism of the Labour party from the start? 
Churchill protested that the UEM did not aspire to compete 
with the government in any way but was merely designed to 
foster 'moral, cultural, sentimental and social unities and 
affinities through Europe'85, but he was accused of seeking 
to make 'political capital out of what is fundamentally a 
non-party ideal'.86 Labour felt that if Churchill really 
wished to use his unique position in Europe, he should have 
resigned the leadership of the opposition and raised himself 
above party political considerations.
84 Boothby, p.217
85 22.1.48, HC Deb.446.553
86 Crawley, 5.5.48, HC Deb.450.1297
The Sceptics
(a) Eden
Eden was the most prominent Tory agnostic. Throughout the 
late 1940s he was noticeably restrained in his comments on 
closer association with Europe. In this Eden was 'anti- 
Europe': 'although his war papers talked much of European
union, by the end of the War he had come to the conclusion 
that we were broke, Europe was even broker, and our only hope 
was to be with the Americans'.87 However, Eden was not 
crudely 'anti-European': he was acutely aware of the need, and 
the desirability, for harmonious relations with the Continent. 
Nor was he oblivious to the advantages of some sort of 
European economic integration. On several occasions since 
1945 he had called on the government to take steps to secure 
closer economic co-operation with 'our Western neighbours, and 
in particular with France'.88 This remained firmly in the 
context of inter-governmental co-operation. He approved of 
the development of the Organization for European Economic Co­
operation (OEEC) as 'wholly compatible with the progressive 
development of trade which we all want to see within the 
Empire'.89 There was a logical progression from this approval 
of inter-governmental economic co-operation to his arguments 
that Britain should accept the French invitation for 
discussions on the Schuman Plan in 1950.
He remained a convinced 'Concert of Europe man', 'a product of 
his political generation'.90 Eden shared with Churchill the 
goal of close and harmonious relations between European 
states, and also the vision of Britain at the centre of the
87 Lord Amery
88 19.6.47, HC Deb.437.1743 and 15.5.47, HC Deb.43$.223%
89 19.6.47, HC Deb.438.2238
90 Lord Fraser
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'three interlocking circles'. The difference between them lay 
in their use of 'emotion'. 'Eden's temperament could not have 
been more different from Churchill's. They both broadly 
agreed with Britain not being part of Europe. But Churchill 
was forcing the pace on the Europeans in Europe; his speeches 
were aimed at a world audience ... They had a different 
approach to Europe.'91 Eden, although a consummate diplomat, 
was not a man of vision; he concentrated more on tactics, and 
he shared with the Foreign Office an innate distaste for the 
sentimental underpinning of the European movement. Eden 
remained in close touch with Foreign Office officials, both 
because of his war-time role and because it was clear that if 
the Conservatives were reelected he would again be Foreign 
Secretary. His personal prejudice was thereby reinforced by 
the civil servants. Unlike Churchill, and in particular 
Sandys, who saw the emotional yearning for European 
integration as the essential fuel for their cause, the 
practical Eden regarded such sentiments as clouding the issue. 
He had no time for such distractions.
Eden supported Bevin so that isolationist forces on the left 
of the Labour party should not prevail. He, and other more 
thoughtful Conservatives also realized Bevin's stance on 
Europe was more in tune with the British electorate. As far 
as the Sceptics were concerned there were already satisfactory 
British moves towards Europe through the Brussels Pact, the 
European Recovery Programme leading to the creation of the 
inter-governmental OEEC, and then the NATO negotiations 
prompted by the 1948 Berlin crisis. These appeared of more 
concrete benefit than the more nebulous ideas of European 
political co-operation.
Eden's vanity, it seems, was also involved. He was the other 
acknowledged foreign affairs expert on the Conservative 
benches, yet 'Churchill was getting all the applause, all the
91 Lord Fraser
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glamour for his leadership of Europe'.92 He came to see 
Churchill's conduct in the Council of Europe as a 'party 
stunt', devoid of any political meaning.93 Jealous of his 
position within the party, Eden was quick to react to any 
perceived slight. Churchill's refusal to have a shadow 
cabinet per se - relying instead on a group of senior 
parliamentary colleagues who were called upon to speak in the 
House on a variety of topics - did nothing for Eden's amour 
propre. 'It was almost automatic that if there was a foreign 
affairs debate, Eden was chosen to lead unless Churchill 
wanted to do so himself? [but] no one had a prescriptive right 
- therefore Eden had to [work to] maintain his supremacy in 
foreign affairs. This played a part in it'.94
Sandys' attempt to soothe potentially ruffled feelings did not 
extend to a concerted campaign to recruit Eden. (As they 
admitted, Boothby and Sandys later saw this as a fundamental 
mistake.) The hostility of key active Europeanists to Eden 
was heartily reciprocated. 'I think he was impatient of 
Sandys, Macmillan and Boothby, who did not hold him in high 
regard either. There were mutters that Eden had not really 
been anti-appeasement before the war.'95 For political and 
personal reasons, Eden was deeply suspicious of the behaviour 
of those who surrounded Churchill, whom he regarded as 
potential rivals for the crown, and preferred to distance 
himself from his ebullient leader's pronouncements. However, 
his appearance at the Albert Hall and at the Hague conferred 
upon the proceedings the official stamp of party approval. 
There was no distinction in the eyes of the public between the 
front ranks of the party on the issue.
92 Lord Amery
93 Kilmuir, p. 177
94 Lord Amery
95 Lord Amery
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(b) The Majority of the Party
Eden's distaste for the pro-Europe policy pursued by Churchill 
undoubtedly made the older, more empire-minded Tory 
backbenchers pause for thought. In addition, other members of 
Churchill's shadow cabinet were noticeably reticent on the 
subject of Europe. Whereas Macmillan and Maxwell Fyfe were 
vociferous supporters of Churchill's pro-Europe policy, 
Butler96 and Stanley97 spoke in increasingly qualified terms. 
A month after Churchill's speech in Zurich, Butler had urged 
greater economic co-operation with Europe,98 and opened the 
foreign policy debate in early May 1948 with the words 'there 
must be even more urgency in pursuing this desirable aim'. 
However, he came to see Churchill's European crusade as an 
electoral liability.99 Similarly, Stanley spoke in support 
of European union at the inaugural meeting of the UEM and was 
a member of the United Europe Committee. However, he shared 
Eden's prejudices100 and his statements became increasingly 
more restrained. Their fellow Conservative front bench 
colleagues in the Commons (Ralph Assheton, Patrick Buchan- 
Hepburn, Harry Crookshank, Oliver Lyttleton, William Morrison, 
James Stuart and Henry Willink) were pointedly subdued or 
silent. The leading Tories in the House of Lords, Salisbury 
and Woolton, were also notably cautious.
The majority of the party echoed Eden's view that 'the whole 
European "thing” was insubstantial'.101 Their number
96 MP for Saffron Waldon 1929-64
97 MP for Westmoreland 1924-45; Bristol 1945-50
98 22.10.46, HC Deb A l l .  1523
99 Shuckburgh diary February 1949, quoted in Michael Charlton, The Price of Victory, 
)
100 Kilmuir, p. 186
101 Sir Peter Smithers
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fluctuated over the period 1947-50 as the party's enthusiasm 
for Europe waxed and then waned, but their underlying anxiety 
over Churchill's European posturing did not abate. Sandys' 
political antennae were acutely sensitive to this unease; he 
sought to alleviate internal party tension in his 
recommendation that all senior Conservatives should be invited 
to the UEM's inaugural meeting, specifically to avoid any 
feelings of exclusion or pigue among senior Tories. He also 
pointed out to Churchill on the eve of his inauguration speech 
that he had heard 'there is a certain amount of feeling among 
Conservative backbenchers that they have not sufficiently been 
taken into your confidence about your United Europe Movement 
and there is in consequence a danger they may become hostile 
to it'.102 Sandys added that he thought it would be wise for 
Churchill to address the 1922 committee in the near future to 
'endeavour to secure their good will and support'.
In the period after the first flush of public enthusiasm 
generated by Churchill's Zurich speech and before the Congress 
of the Hague in May 1948, anxiety about Churchill's 
involvement in Europe abated but never completely disappeared. 
Initially many were borne along on the pro-Europe tide but 
their enthusiasm was not very well thought out.103 As time 
went on some shifted their stance as Churchill and his 
supporters persisted in their policy statements on Europe that 
were long on eloquence but short on substance, and frequently 
seemed to commit the party to a drastic departure in its 
traditional approach to Europe. The sceptics firmly believed 
'of course, nothing will ever come of it, and probably just as 
well'.104 'Doubts crystallized a bit at the Hague
102 Sandys to Churchill, 17.4.47, quoted in Martin Gilbert: Never Despair (London 1988), 
p.321
103 Lord Colyton
104 John Hay
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Conference',105 but these reservations never led to the 
formation of a Conservative centrist group to counter 
Churchill and his fellow enthusiasts: it was rather a section 
of the party.106 'Feelings ranged from dislike to suspicion 
to wariness'107 - outspoken opposition came from the diehard 
wing of the party.
The Sceptics tended to be of an older political generation who 
wanted to rescue Europe from her post-war impotence, and to 
help unite the continent under British leadership, by 
association with the British Commonwealth - an approach 
favoured by Eden and other leading Conservatives. In this 
they supported Bevin's approach to Western Europe. In essence 
so did Churchill. It boiled down to a question of tone and 
tactics. Thus when Attlee stated, 'Western Europe cannot live 
by itself as an economic unit ... hence the desire for wider 
integration with Africa and other overseas territories and 
with the great Western democracies and with our own 
Dominions',108 he was voicing the Conservative sceptics' 
creed for relations with Europe. While supporting Western 
European integration in the abstract, the Sceptics favoured 
Bevin's gradualist, inter-governmental approach, 'rather than 
to have some kind of dramatic meeting with a concrete plan 
where probably all the difficulties of the plan would come out 
most clearly and all the details would cause dissension ... 
Union of Europe is a fruitful idea ... [but] we must be 
careful not to think that it is something exclusive, and 
something that excludes the rest of the world.'109
105 Lord Amery
106 Lord Amery
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-  68 -
(c) The Reasons for Conservative Ambivalence:
There existed on both sides of the House a profound feeling 
that the value of British institutions had been reconfirmed by 
their survival in the crucible of war, together with a 
realization that Britain's salvation in the recent conflict 
had lain with two non-European nations, Russia and America. 
There existed, too, the feeling that twice in the past fifty 
years Britain had become deeply embroiled in the continent, 
and 'each time it had had disagreeable results'.110 The 
Conservative party's tradition of colonial connections 
reinforced these MPs' recent service experience. The 
continuing conviction that the British Empire and emerging 
Commonwealth was the mainstay of Britain's great power status, 
and that this unit had a viable future, provided a powerful 
counterweight to the lure of Europe. Therefore, it was felt, 
Britain should not ally herself too closely with the 
continent.
For some of these MPs, their personal support for Churchill 
was ambivalent. Although Churchill and his supporters had 
ruthlessly weeded out party opponents in the selection 
process, aided by the failure of many former Chamberlain men 
to be reelected in 1945, there existed an 'anti-Churchill' 
rump after the War.111 Of the Sceptics, 35 had supported 
Neville Chamberlain in 1940, and only two Churchill (Drewe and 
Winterton). There was an attempt to oust Churchill as party 
leader in 1947,112 and renewed rumblings against his 
leadership following the Conservatives' defeat in the South 
Hammersmith by-election in February 1949.113 However, in the 
main, dissatisfaction against his leadership was confined to
110 Sir Richard Body interview with author
111 Lord Amery; Somerset de Chair interview with author
112 Stuart, p. 146-7
113 Macmillan, p.287
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private grumbles that 'the Old Boy is past it', not active 
intriguing to replace him.114
The Anti-Europeans:
As the euphoria created by Churchill's ringing rhetoric 
subsided, and calm reflection reasserted itself, so too did 
deep unease at the public utterances by some on the Tory front 
bench. Eden's obvious reservations and the silence from other 
respected members of Churchill's informal shadow cabinet 
confirmed many Tories in their gut feeling that their leader's 
attachment to European integration was woefully misplaced. 
Among a small section of the party this disquiet hardened into 
a deep-seated antipathy towards European federation, with or 
without Britain.115 These MPs developed a hearty dislike of 
the Council of Europe116 on the grounds that it was an 
international pressure group117, but it was not until the 
Conservatives forced a debate on Labour's refusal to attend 
the Paris talks on the Schuman Plan that this opposition to 
European integration came into the open.
These MPs tended to be stalwart supporters of the Empire, for 
whom Britain's imperial record was a source of considerable 
pride and achievement; they favoured increasing collaboration 
with the Commonwealth because this would not restrict 
Britain's freedom of action. They shared the view that every 
time Britain became entangled with Europe, the result was
114 Lord Glendevon
115 Legge-Bourke, FAC 5.5.54
116 The first meeting of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe was in 
August 1949.
117 Sir Herbert Williams, HC DeZ?.480.1458 and Legge-Bourke HC 7)^.480.1479, 
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disagreeable.118 They were therefore determined that Britain 
should retain her historic aloofness from the Continent. This 
was not a large group, and its parliamentary opposition tended 
to be subdued. It was rare that these MPs' antipathy to 
Europe emerged in debate or at question time. More usually 
they confined their criticism to party committees or discreet 
words to the Whips. This does not mean that their convictions 
were any less deeply held.
The following Conservatives came to be stoutly opposed to 
Europe in the 1945 Parliament:
Max Aitken 
Beverley Baxter 
Eric Gandar-Dower 
Harry Legge-Bourke 
Anthony Marlowe 
Arthur Marsden 
Sir John Mellor 
Stephen McAdden 
Kenneth Pickthorn 
Waldron Smithers
The first seven MPs on this list all gave notice to the 
Conservative Leadership that they opposed American sponsorship 
of closer ties with the Continent by voting against Marshall 
Aid in 1948. The influence of the right-wing press was 
apparent: Anthony Marlowe was the son of Thomas Marlowe,
former editor of the Daily Mail; Max Aitken was Beaverbrook's 
son and Beverley Baxter, another Canadian and journalist for 
the Beaverbrook stable, was a crony. Despite his membership 
of Churchill's personal war-time clique, Beaverbrook 
vehemently opposed the Tory leader's crusade, even going to 
the lengths of directing his newspapers to avoid any coverage 
of the issue in their columns in the 1950s. Kenneth Pickthorn 
was another Tory who developed decidedly anti-European views.
118 Sir Richard Body
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An intellectual and former Cambridge don who was once 
described by Oliver Stanley as 'God's gift to Socialism',119 
his acerbic tongue and sarcastic manner was not to every one's 
taste. Like Eden, Pickthorn was strictly a 'Concert of 
Europe' Conservative, who came to be deeply distrustful of 
those who supported a more active role in Europe. He once 
stormed out of a Conservative backbench committee discussion 
on Europe, 'complaining that the smell of pate de foie gras, 
and clink of glasses was making him feel nauseous'.120
The Motivation of the Sceptics:
Part of the problem was Churchill. There continued a residue 
of distrust of Churchill, who was evidently not a Tory: 'A 
Grand Whig!'.121 Baxter, Mellor and Marlowe had supported 
Chamberlain in 1940. In addition, Churchill's message on 
Europe appeared confused. 'Nobody outside of an intimate 
circle knew what he thought about Europe ... To the 
backbenches it simply seemed that he was saying that Europe 
was a good thing and should set itself up on better lines than 
before, and that the Empire was a good thing and should 
continue to be such. How he proposed to reconcile the two was 
unclear.'122 However, this lack of clarity - vital if 
Churchill and Sandys were to carry the motley collection of 
European politicians along with their crusade - alienated the 
anti-Europeans, unused perhaps to the apparent chicanery that 
accompanies diplomatic negotiations.
A discernible thread of anti-American feeling united these 
opponents of closer links with Europe? there was also a
119 Lord Glendevon
120 Sir Peter Smithers
121 Enoch Powell interview with author
122 Sir Peter Smithers
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noticeable anti-UNO flavour in their views. They were strong 
suspicious of American encouragement for European union. Did 
America see Britain as a second-class nation, in the same 
category as the prostrate and morally bankrupt nations of 
Western Europe? The idea that Britain was no longer a power 
of the first rank, and fit only to be, as Bevin once expressed 
it, 'a cog in the European wheel' was deeply insulting. To 
the anti-Europeans it seemed that America was trying to hurry 
European integration to provide the excuse for another retreat 
into the 'splendid isolation' of the years following the Great 
War - a concern they shared with Bevin and the Foreign Office. 
These MPs were consistently opposed to what they regarded as 
American economic imperialism, voting against Bretton Woods 
and the US loan in 1945;123 however, this vote is not an 
infallible litmus test of Tory attitudes towards Europe as 
Boothby, Hollis,124 Nutting,125 Thorneycrof t, Moore,126 
Savory127 and Teeling128 also had voted against the party 
whip on the matter. It was feared that the creation of a 
United States of Europe was part of America's plan through the 
GATT to create global free trade without, of course, America 
lowering its own high tariff walls; Marshall Aid was thus seen 
as Europe under American tutelage.
These Tories tended to be among the longer serving MPs, 
although the date of entry into Parliament is not an certain 
guide to backbenchers' attitudes towards Europe, as Boothby,
123 47 Conservatives voted against Bretton Woods, with 74 Tories voted against the second 
motion, despite an Opposition two-line whip instructing MPs to abstain.
124 MP for Devizes 1945-55
125 MP for Melton Mowbray 1945-56
126 MP for Ayr Burghs 1925-50; MP for Ayrshire and Bute 1950-64.
127 MP (UU) for Queen’s University, Belfast 1940-50; MP for South Antrim 1950-55
128 MP for Brighton 1944-50; MP for Brighton Pavillion 1950-69.
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MacDonald and Cuthbert Headlam129 proved.130 They also 
tended to be the more vocal supporters of imperial preference 
and pride in Empire - again Boothby, the Amerys, MacDonald, 
Moore and Peter Smithers are exceptions. Support for imperial 
preference and distrust of the United States did not 
automatically rule out support for Europe, but such feelings 
tended to make those harbouring such thoughts much less 
inclined to do so. Mostly, 'they saw it as a straight case 
of either/or. If that were so, there was no doubt which it 
should be'.131 Britain's post-war recovery and salvation lay 
in developing her links with Commonwealth and Empire, not with 
some untried notion of European union.
The idea of Empire was all-important to these men. It was 
'still the main religion of the Tory party'.132 In marked 
contrast to the opportunities offered by the Empire and 
Commonwealth, to these Tories
'Europe was a basket case. Not to put too fine a point 
on it, the French were regarded with contempt after their 
abject performance in 1940 and during the Vichy years. 
The Germans were regarded with intense dislike, though 
not with the bitter hatred which I remember after World 
War I ... The Italians had run away pitiably in North 
Africa and had been panicked by a couple of British 
cruisers into sinking their own fleet, through sheer 
incompetence ... Charming people, but no one took them 
seriously ... There was not much else. But the Empire, 
all told, had come up trumps in a tight corner, 
[although] nobody actually said all this in public. It 
is difficult to realise today just how powerful [the
129 MP for Barnards Castle 1924-29, 1931-35; MP for Newcastle-upon-Tyne 1940-51
130 All were elected to Parliament in 1924.
131 Sir Peter Smithers
132 Lord Amery
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Empire] was, in the national mind and particularly in 
Conservative thinking, right up to the early Sixties. 
Many of us thought ... that the concept could be revived 
and indeed could take on a new and greater dimension in 
the form of the Commonwealth. This would give Britain a 
part more in keeping with her post-war capabilities, 
would give free rein to the political aspirations of the 
Colonial Empire and the Dominions, and would give us a 
distinctive position in the modern geopolitical scene. 
It was attractive from every point of view.'133
These MPs did not share Macmillan's recurrent fear of Germany 
dominating a United Europe. As the 1940s progressed, there 
was a growing Conservative awareness of a revival of German 
economic competition in British overseas markets, but 'Germany 
looked altogether too decrepit still to be thought of as a 
threat, and the Germans of those days were distressingly 
apologetic'.134 As for the notion of a Communist United 
Europe: 'certainly the Communist threat in Europe,
particularly in France and Italy, was perceived as being much 
more substantial than it really was, [but] I doubt whether 
[this] idea crossed the horizon at any time.'135 Europe 'did 
not appear to many people to require much thought!'.136 
Insofar as they considered the issue at all, faced with the 
idea of Europe uniting without Britain, these diehard 
opponents of European union entertained the historic feeling 
that a Europe united without Britain was a danger to this 
country and Britain should therefore try to prevent it 
happening.137
133 Sir Peter Smithers
134 Sir Peter Smithers
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137 Sir Peter Smithers
- 75 -
Summary:
From the start there were internal Conservative tensions on 
the preferred approach to 'Europe', between the enthusiasts, 
the pro-Commonwealthers, the sceptics and the 'out-and-out 
antis'.138 So long as it appeared that the Conservatives 
would not have to take 'Europe' seriously, these remained mere 
undercurrents of opinion. However, when faced with the 
reality of Europe in the shape of the Schuman Plan, the 
Conservative party was forced to confront the issue. Then 
'came the divergence on principle'.139
138 John Hay
139 Lord Amery
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CHAPTER 3: THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND EUROPE:
IN OPPOSITION 1948—50
Although the post-war bipartisan foreign policy did not extend 
to the issue of European union, the Conservative Europeanists 
did secure notable success in forcing a reluctant Labour 
government to acknowledge the momentum for European 
integration on the Continent. Conservative politicians were 
instrumental in organizing the Congress at the Hague in 1948, 
and in pressing Bevin to agree to the creation of the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Thanks to 
Churchill's initiative, supported by the Conservative 
delegates, the West Germans were admitted to this Assembly and 
their right to a voice in international affairs was 
recognized. Indeed, at times it appeared that Churchill and 
his colleagues at the Council of Europe were running an 
unofficial foreign policy from Strasbourg.
As the Russian military threat to Western Europe appeared 
increasingly menacing (with the arming of the East German 
'police' and the outbreak of the Korean war), Churchill seized 
international attention with his demand in August 1950 for the 
immediate creation of a European army under a unified command 
with a single Defence Minister. This did not enjoy the same 
success as Churchill's earlier suggestions. The British 
government refused to participate in discussions about the 
form the European Army should take, while American demands for 
West German rearmament led to French insistence on an 
elaborate supranational structure: the proposed European
Defence Community, known as the Pleven Plan, envisaged the 
integration of national units at the lowest possible level.
The Move towards Europe: Labour vs Conservative
In January 1948, following the breakdown of the Conference of 
Foreign Ministers the previous month, Bevin signalled that he
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was more favourably disposed towards European integration.1 
Influenced by ideas from the Continent (to which Churchill was 
giving such prominence), Bevin hoped that, by organizing a 
Western European system, 'backed by the power of the
Commonwealth and the Americas, it should be possible to
develop our own power and influence to equal that of the
United States of America and the USSR ... by giving a
spiritual lead now we should be able to carry out our task in 
a way which will show clearly that we are not subservient to 
the US or the Soviet Union,'2 Further evidence of the Labour 
government's determination to press ahead with a more positive 
approach to Europe came with negotiations with the French and 
the Benelux countries which culminated in the Brussels Treaty 
(March 1948). In negotiating this treaty, the Labour 
Government was 'consciously borrowing some of the ideas of the 
[continental] Federalists ...? that there should be a 
Parliament, for instance, and that it should cope with all 
kinds of social and economic matters which would not normally 
be in a Treaty ... short of accepting their actual 
supranational element which we thought ... was not acceptable 
to Great Britain.'3 These were also the ideas to which 
Churchill was giving such prominence.
Although Labour's move towards Europe had been welcomed by the 
Tories,4 the Europeanists remained impatient at the 
government's caution in seizing the lead in Europe.5 The 
continental federalists too were disappointed in the Brussels 
Treaty, which was only integrated on the military side (on 
other matters it remained an alliance), and in the 'leisurely
1 see 22.1.48, HC Deb.446.383-409
2 Bevin Cabinet paper, drafted by Gladwyn Jebb 4.1.48 and 5.1.48, quoted in Michael 
Charlton: The Price of Victory, p.54
3 Lord Gladwyn in Charlton, p.55
4 see 22-23.1.48 HC D ebM 63^ -622
5 Nutting HC Deb.446.409-413 and Mott-Radclyffe HC Deb.446.497-502, 22.1.48
- 78 -
consideration' by the Treaty powers of a Franco-Belgian 
proposal for a European Consultative Assembly and a British 
counter proposal for a European Council on a inter-government 
level.6 Lord Gladwyn, then a senior Foreign Office adviser 
to Bevin, recalled, 'Despairing of the British government 
joining some kind of federal Europe organized their own and 
got Churchill actually to lead the Great Congress at the 
Hague, which met to form a real European entity and unity.'7
This remark is misleading: in reality, it was Sandys who had 
determined to contact the federalists, and together with 
Retinger lobbied to such effect that the 'counter show'8 at 
the Hague was organized. Lord Gladwyn's comment also implies 
that Churchill was a dupe in the federalists' plans. This was 
not the case. Churchill and Sandys fully realised the 
federalists' aims but were intent on channelling their energy 
and drive, as well as the power of their organization, towards 
this exciting new concept. Both felt that to specify too 
rigid a form for future European relations would be counter­
productive; the critical factor was to harness the emotional 
appeal of the Idea. Bevin's initiative in inter-government 
co-operation was thus sidetracked and overshadowed by the 
glamour of Churchill and the excitement his campaign generated 
on the Continent. With hindsight, Churchill's and Sandys' 
approach had inherent problems. Indeed, Churchill was aware 
that Conservative Europeanists were in danger of voicing 
high-sounding phrases which merely wished away difficulties.9 
However, out of office, the Conservatives 'could give the 
appearance of being all things to all men, and the very fact 
of being in opposition, encouraged opposition to the
6 The Earl of Kilmuir: Political Adventure, pp. 174-5
7 Lord Gladwyn in Charlton, p.57
8 Lord Gladwyn in Charlton, p.56
9 Churchill, 23.1.48 H CD^.446.548-561
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government policy regardless of content'.10 This combined 
with Churchill's own personal predilection for grandiloquent 
phrases: 'We are sure this European policy of unity can
perfectly well be reconciled with and adjusted to our 
obligations to the Commonwealth and Empire of which we are the 
heart and centre'. With such an example, there was little
incentive for the Europeanists to grasp the nettle.
'The motive force of Tory opinion in this period [on Europe] 
were (sic) more a function of the views of one man - Churchill 
- and less of a conscious party reappraisal or adherence to 
historic traditions. Churchill had set the pace for thought 
and action for integration with Europe by virtue of his status 
as a world statesman'.11 Until the Congress at the Hague, 
most Tories paid no attention to the lure of Europe.
Britain's own troubles, although considerably less severe 
economically, politically and spiritually than those endured 
by the Continental countries, were sufficiently absorbing that 
'the ordinary Tory did not have a clue'.12 The Congress at 
the Hague changed that dramatically. Although many still only 
had the haziest idea of what was being proposed, the topic 
attracted enormous attention,13 and to a great extent
unreasoned support.14
(a) The Conservative Enthusiasm for Europe
With the Communist coup in Prague in February 1948 providing 
further stimulus to discussion on West European integration,
10 Jeremy Moon: European Integration in British Politics 1950-63 (London 1985), p.86
11 Moon, p.86
12 Lord Colyton
13 see FAC 14.4.48
14 Lord Colyton
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Conservative Europeanists continued to set the pace of debate. 
Against the background of Sandys' 'persistence and 
perseverance'15 in the International Committee of the Movement 
for European Unity16 to organize a congress of Europe, on 16 
March 1948 Boothby, MacDonald, Roberts, and the Labour MPs 
Shawcross, Mackay and Hale sponsored an EDM calling for 
Western Union, which stated 'that in the opinion of this 
House, steps should now be taken in consultation with other 
members of the British Commonwealth to. create in Western 
Europe a political union strong enough to save European 
democracy and the values of Western civilization, and a 
trading area large enough, with the Colonial territories, to 
enable its component parts to achieve economic recovery and 
stability.' The motion went on to call for a 'long term 
policy designed to bring forthwith a Council of Western Europe 
consisting of representatives of the governments of the 16 
participating countries in the European Recovery Programme, 
and Western Germany, to lay down the lines of common action'. 
The motion ended by calling for a constituent assembly to be 
formed to frame a constitution for a democratic federation of 
Europe with 'defined powers with respect to ... external 
affairs, defence, currency, customs and the planning and 
production, trade, power and transport'.
The motion was 'not without importance', as it put in specific 
terms an aspect of foreign policy 'which has not been put in 
concrete terms before [and] represents quite an advance as it 
has brought together many different points of view'.17 Thanks
15 Harold Macmillan: Tides of Fortune, p. 156
16 in which Churchill’s UEM committee cooperated with the French Council for United 
Europe, chaired by M. Herriot; the Economic League for European Co-operation, based in 
Brussels under M. van Zeeland; the European Union of Federalists, whose chairman was 
Brugmans, a Dutchman, and the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales, composed of Christian 
Democrats. Kilmuir, p. 174
17 Mackay to William Ross, Labour MP, 1.4.48, Mackay papers
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to the efforts of Conservative and Labour sponsors,18 over the 
following weeks19 this EDM was signed by approximately 200 
MPS, over 60 of whom were Conservatives. The sheer number of 
signatures - gathered in the Easter recess - reflected the 
interest and support for Europe being generated by the 
forthcoming Congress.
It was a fairly radical document for any Tory to sign; despite 
the strong federalist tone, the following were not deterred:
Tufton Beamish 
Norman Bower 
Malcolm Bullock 
Frederick Burden 
Edward Carson 
Neill Cooper-Key 
Uvedale Corbett 
Viscountess Davidson 
Lord Willoughby de Eresby 
Douglas Dodds-Parker 
David Eccles 
Walter Fletcher 
Connelly Gage (UU)
David Gammans 
Sir Cuthbert Headlam 
Derek Heathcoate Amory 
Quintin Hogg 
Christopher Hollis 
Sir Arthur Howard 
Hugh Fraser 
James Hutchison 
Jocelyn Lucas 
Edward Keeling 
Anthony Langford-Holt
18 see Mackay papers 1.4.48
19 16.3.48 - 27.4.48
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Martin Lindsay 
'Toby' Low 
Hugh Lucas-Tooth 
Commander John Maitland 
Douglas Marshall 
John Maude
Frank Medlicott (NL&C)
Charles Mott-Radclyffe 
Godfrey Nicholson 
Basil Nield 
Allan Noble 
Ian Orr-Ewing 
Christopher Peto 
Oliver Poole 
David Price-White 
Sir Stanley Reed 
David Renton (NL&C)
Frank Sanderson 
Walter Smiles (UU)
Alec Spearman 
Ernest Taylor 
William Teeling 
Peter Thorneycroft 
Colin Thornton-Kemsley 
Derek Walker-Smith 
Arthur Vere Harvey 
Wavell Wakefield 
George Ward 
Gerald Williams20
These Conservatives form an interesting cross section of 
political generations and outlooks. The list contained the 
independent souls, such as Lindsay, and inveterate members of 
ginger groups (Ian Orr-Ewing and Vere Harvey). Some were
20 EDM No. 33: European Union. Orders of the Day and Notices of Motions Vol.3 
(1947-48) 2274
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newcomers to the European idea, while others, such as Hogg, 
had given the matter considerable thought. Approximately half 
were first elected to Parliament in 1945 and youth was 
prominently represented? however, pre-war MPs were also 
conspicuously present: the Economist was surprised the 'old 
fashioned Tory' Sir Cuthbert Headlam21 had signed. Of the 
older Tories, some were inveterate supporters of Churchill? 
others had supported Chamberlain in the Munich crisis and in 
May 1940 (Wakefield, Orr-Ewing, Taylor, Davidson, Reed and 
Sanderson) - there was possibly an element in their support of 
Churchill's European crusade, as with Maxwell Fyfe, of wishing 
to live down that opposition. Some were passionate believers 
in the continuing cause of Empire. To read the names Vere 
Harvey,22 Dodds-Parker,23 Carson,24 Gammans25 and Fletcher26 
seems surprising, in view of their later second thoughts about 
the wisdom of closer economic and political ties with Europe, 
and Dodds-Parker's and Teeling's support of the Suez Group. 
However, their signatures were symptomatic of the prevailing 
Conservative optimism that a way could be found to reconcile
the old loyalties of Empire and the new obligations of Europe,
using imperial preference to integrate the two trading 
systems.
Five of those who signed later had second thoughts about the 
strong commitment to Europe embodied in this EDM: an amendment 
sponsored by Major Harry Legge-Bourke,27 clearly concerned at 
any diminution of national sovereignty, stressed 'agreement'
21 MP for Barnards Castle 1924-29 and 1931-35; Newcastle upon Tyne North 1940-51
22 MP for Chester, Macclesfield 1945-71
23 MP for Banbury 1945-59; Cheltenham 1964-74
24 MP for Isle of Thanet 1945-53
25 MP for Hornsey 1941-57
26 MP for Bury and Radcliffe 1945-55
27 MP for Isle of Ely 1945-73
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rather than mere 'consultation' with the Commonwealth. This 
was seconded by Mott-Radclyf f e,28 Beamish,29 Low,30 Lucas,31 
and Vere Harvey. Mott-Radclyffe was to become a member of the 
Conservative delegation to the Council of Europe in the 1950s, 
but throughout his political career he remained a 'strong 
moderate'. Although he firmly believed in the benefit of 
closer links with Europe, he was concerned that at no point 
should Britain distance herself from the Commonwealth and 
Empire, her historic source of strength. Low's commitment to 
Europe was similarly qualified. Vere Harvey attended the 
Hague Congress and became a member of the all-party 
parliamentary committee on Europe? his later opposition to the 
Schuman Plan demonstrated that while he fully supported 
continental moves towards integration, he disapproved of 
closer British ties with Europe which smacked of federalism, 
(see below). Ralph Glyn32 signed the second amendment to the 
Western Union EDM, put forward by the Labour MP Richard 
Stokes, which accepted co-operation with Europe, but rejected 
federation.
The Labour Government's reluctance to be pulled into Europe 
willy-nilly was increasingly obvious. MPs from all parties 
felt it was particularly important to have a debate on 
European integration before the Hague Congress.33 Churchill 
was noticeably reticent in his support, warning that although 
he thought it a good thing that the motion be debated, he 
himself was not prepared to favour one particular structure or
28 MP for Windsor 1942-70
29 MP for Lewes 1945-74
30 MP for Blackpool North 1945-62
31 MP for Portsmouth South 1945-66
32 MP for Abingdon 1924-53
33 Thomeycroft, FAC 21.4.48
- 85 -
another.34 He remained determinedly aloof from the 
parliamentary pressure to debate the issue in the succeeding 
fortnight,35 seeking instead to counter government criticism 
that his was a one-man crusade by demonstrating the widespread 
backbench support for the topic. Despite its unwillingness to 
grant parliamentary time to debate European union,36 not least 
because of a suspicion on the Labour backbenches 'about 
anything that can get such strong support from our 
opponents',37 the government was obliged to bow to intense 
parliamentary pressure, orchestrated through Mackay's all­
party group. The group's Conservative officers, Boothby, 
Roberts and MacDonald played a prominent part and helped to 
arrange the names of members wishing to speak, and coordinated 
and assisted in the preparation of speeches.38
The EDM on Western union was debated during the second day of 
the foreign policy debate on 5 May, an unusual mark of 
attention for a backbench motion. In the main Conservatives 
showed themselves enthusiasts for membership of a European 
association or integration with Europe.39 However, again 
following Churchill's example, every Tory speaker with the 
exception of Boothby, sought refuge in statements which 
deliberately avoided specific examination of Britain's exact 
role in a united Europe. Generalities successfully concealed 
any uncomfortable incompatibility of their traditional beliefs 
and their new-found support for such a far-reaching notion. 
Boothby disdained such obfuscation, elaborating his arguments 
for the need for a planned European economy combined with the
34 FAC 14.4.48
35 FAC 14.4.48 and Butler, FAC 21.4.48
36 FAC 21.4.48
37 Thomas Braddock to Mackay 1.4.48, Mackay papers
38 All-party group minutes 21.4.48, Mackay papers
39 HC DebASO. 1270-1392
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development and regional and federation of European colonial 
territories. Calling on the government to make plain its real 
intentions towards Europe, he argued passionately for a 
positive union, supported by the British Commonwealth and the 
United States and not just for immediate political or economic 
ends, which he felt would fail, or for defensive ends, which 
would lead to war.40
Despite the Europeanists' success in helping to generate 
parliamentary interest and debate on European union which 
influenced Bevin and the Foreign Office in their negotiations 
on the Brussels Treaty, the Labour government was not 
persuaded into accepting the available vehicle for Europe 
before the Congress at the Hague. However, thanks in large 
part to the Conservative Europeanists, the government 
increasingly was on the defensive: coming immediately before 
the Hague meeting, the cross-party support for the EDM on 
Western Union had a considerable impact upon continental 
politicians 'where people generally doubt whether British 
support for any real form of European federation is quite 
genuine'.41 The instruction to Labour MPs to stay away from 
the Congress, issued by their National Executive Committee, 
appeared motivated by pique, and also left the stage free for 
Churchill.
(b) Conservative Doubts Surface:
The Conservative Europeanists had not won their colleagues' 
wholehearted approval. As enthusiasm for European integration 
surged within the party, a sizeable number were entertaining 
doubts about the wisdom of Churchill's campaign. Eden had 
already publicly endorsed Bevin's cautious approach, 
implicitly rebuking his more enthusiastic colleagues.
40 HCDeb.450.1371-1382
41 Mackay to Ross 1.4.48, Mackay papers
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However, Eden was intent on preserving a facade of unity with 
Churchill: he wanted 'the closest and most effective
collaboration, economic, political and cultural, with all the 
free nations of Europe,' but '[t]hat collaboration can take 
any of a number of forms ... Some people speak of a united 
Europe and others again speak of a union of the nations of 
Western Europe. In my judgement, each and all of these 
objectives can be reconciled.'42 His reservations emerged 
again in his speech in the debate on Western Union, when he 
again made association with Europe conditional upon the Empire 
and tried to temper the Europeanists' enthusiasms by reminding 
them of Britain's global responsibilities which ruled out any 
exclusive association with Europe. Clearly hoping to 
discourage those who pinned their hopes on European political 
union forming the bulwark of Europe's defences in Europe, Eden 
reasserted that ultimately Britain's security lay with America 
(an uncomfortable, indeed unpalatable, truth for some Tories). 
Trying to play down Conservative aims, Eden concluded, 'We 
seek the same results in foreign policy which the Foreign 
Secretary is at this time trying to pursue'.43
This scarcely coded public criticism echoed private 
Conservative misgivings which surfaced in committee about the 
direction Churchill and his fellow enthusiasts were taking the 
party.44 A 'considerable portion' of the party 'was doubtful 
and even anxious about [the] movement' on the grounds that it 
might prejudice Britain's position as head of the Commonwealth 
and Empire.45 Others criticised the EDM as appearing to 'jump 
all the fences at once', and tended to by-pass ministerial
42 22.1.48, HC Deb.446.423
43 5.5.48, HC Deb.450.1270-1280
44 see FAC 14.4.48
45 Macmillan, p. 159
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responsibility in international affairs.46 MPs were reminded 
that the League of Nations had shown the dangers of embarking 
on grandiose schemes before the foundations had been properly 
laid.47
The Congress at The Hague
Before his departure for the Hague Churchill was made aware of 
these hesitations about his role as leader of the UEM, and was 
sufficiently concerned to make an unusual appearance before 
the Foreign Affairs Committee in mid-April. He implicitly 
acknowledged that the party was not united with his 
qualifications, ' the Conservative party as a whole welcomed 
the broad aims of his and other movements', (my italics). But 
he rebuffed private criticisms of unofficial 'European' action 
(clearly aimed at Sandys), stating that he was content to 
leave individuals to work out their actions as they pleased. 
Once more he stressed his vision of the growth of Europe as 
providing an opportunity for Britain to resume on a new plane 
her moral leadership in world affairs, repeating his view that 
Britain's cultural and political inheritance, together with 
her geographic position, placed her as the natural focus for 
developments in Europe.4®
The Congress at the Hague from 7-10 May was a resounding 
success. Organized by the whole European movement, it was 
attended by 730 delegates, including several former Prime 
Ministers, 29 former foreign ministers and several ministers 
in office. A strong Conservative delegation attended, but it 
was not numerous.49 These delegates enjoyed themselves
46 Pickthom, FAC 21.4.48
47 Pickthom
48 FAC 14.4.48
49 28 sitting Conservative MPs, 7 Conservative candidates and Leo Amery
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immensely: 'It was a jolly good party!'50 The opportunity
of being entertained by friends, with the chance to renew old 
friendships and make new ones underlined the fun and spectacle 
of the occasion; the venue offered a marked contrast to a 
joyless Britain, where all seemed grey, arid and regulated.51 
Eden also attended, more out of a sense of duty than any 
enthusiasm for the cause,52 and his presence, despite the 
contingent of 41 Labour MPs who defied 'Bevin's diktat',53 
reinforced the impression that the Conservative party closely 
identified itself with the emerging European cause and 
favoured European integration, whereas the Labour party did 
not.
'The guidelines of what was later done over the next twenty or 
so years to achieve various measures of European Unity were in 
fact first laid down at the Hague in Resolutions and 
Declarations'.54 The central figure was Churchill,55 the 
main speaker, placing himself at the head of the European 
unity movement which was endorsed by so many continental 
leaders and politicians. Conservatives played important roles 
in the Conference's committees: Maxwell Fyfe, who 'wanted to 
say something on human rights',56 joined the cultural 
committee; Manningham-Buller acted as Chairman of the Steering 
Committee of the Political Committee, which considered the 
draft political resolution. Behind the scenes, Sandys played 
a vital part through his key position as Chairman of the 
International Committee of the Movements for European Unity;
50 Lord Eccles
51 Macmillan, p. 161
52 Lord Amery
53 John Hay
54 John Hay
55 Kilmuir, p. 175
56 Kilmuir, p. 175
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he was still dealing with European matters referred to him by 
his father-in-law. Sandys fought hard at the Hague to resist 
continental efforts to promote resolutions favouring a 
supranational approach to unity, but he was prepared to go 
beyond Churchill in promoting union with Western Europe. The 
principal outcome of the Congress was the resolution for the 
creation of a new European institution, a parliamentary 
assembly. In the eyes of some Conservatives, no less 
significant was the decision ('though the papers made little 
of it/57) to promote the East European exiles from observers 
to full delegates. 'It shows that the movement is intended 
not just as a strategic bridgehead for the United States, but 
to serve the political and moral idea of Europe itself'.58
It was mainly as a result of Sandys' prodigious energies that 
there emerged from the Congress 'a movement for something more 
extensive than the Brussels Treaty organization'.59 Together 
with Paul-Henri Spaak (former Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister of Belgium) and Retinger, he lobbied with such 
effect60 that the most spectacular of the Hague resolutions 
was achieved. His efforts were backed by the Europeanists at 
home who continued to harry the government. The highly public 
manner in which Churchill and his UEM committee chose to put 
before Attlee the results of the conference and its main 
proposals was a deliberate reproof: the theatre of their
procession from the House of Commons to Downing Street61 
undoubtedly appealed to Churchill's sense of mischief, but 
also conveyed the sense of frustration and dissatisfaction 
felt by pro-European politicians at Labour's reaction to
57 Julian Amery to John Biggs-Davison 20.5.48, Biggs-Davison papers
58 Amery to Biggs-Davison
59 Lord Gladwyn in Charlton, p.57
60 John Pomian ed.: Memoirs of an Eminence Grise, pp.222-3
61 Macmillan, p. 163
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continental events. On their return from the Hague the 
Conservative members of Mackay's all-party group for European 
Union endorsed the committee's proposal to put down a motion 
asking for the convening of a European assembly, deliberately 
coinciding62 with efforts to secure the tabling of similar 
motions in other European parliaments. Support for this 
motion was widely canvassed.
(a) The Reaction within the Conservative Party
Behind the scenes Conservatives MPs were increasingly 
agitated. By the late 1940s the Tories considered themselves 
very much 'back in business', (manifest in their hopes of 
success in the South Hammersmith by-election of 1949). This 
improvement in the party's fortunes, together with the more 
concrete forms of inter-governmental organization which were 
developing (such as the OEEC), encouraged a restrained 
approach to Europe.
Even the enthusiasts had been concerned by the division at the 
Hague between those who favoured a confederal Europe and the 
majority who wanted to press ahead with federal 
arrangements.63 Although great care had been paid to the 
wording of the various articles to bridge the gap,64 they 
realized if the Conservative party intended to stay inside 
European Parliamentary Union, which was heavily involved on 
the side of federation, it would have to work very hard to 
control that view.65 Backbench MPs were also well-aware that 
Churchill's leadership and Eden's presence at the Hague were 
bound to give the impression that the party was broadly in
62 Mackay papers 23.7.48
63 see FAC 3.6.48
64 Manningham-Buller, FAC 3.6.48
65 Roberts, FAC 3.6.48
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favour of the Hague resolutions, while the emotional appeal of 
a United Europe concealed the stark fact that people at large 
had simply no understanding of 'what sovereignty involved, nor 
how the status of the British parliament might be affected'.
The pervading backbench desire was for an urgent 
clarification of policy - it is revealing of the confusion 
within the Tory ranks that Butler thought it necessary to 
state his understanding of Churchill's conception - and 
leading Tories appreciated the necessity of sustaining a 
positive party line, 'which could be used by members, speakers 
and candidates'.66 As Pickthorn pointed out, the party could 
not afford a split on so major an issue. European unity was 
the political issue of the hour, and the Conservatives - in 
marked contrast to the Labour party - appeared to be giving a 
coherent and positive lead on the matter. On one point the 
party was united: the Empire was not to be by-passed.
(b) The Reaction within the Government
For the British Government the outcome of the Hague, with the 
final resolution calling for the establishment of a European 
Assembly, was a disagreeable surprise, reinforced by the 
spectacle of Churchill revelling in the platform provided by 
the Congress. In deputations to the Prime Minister on their 
return, the Europeanists found Attlee friendly at first, and 
felt he 'could have been pushed further'.67 However, as 
Attlee deferred Bevin on foreign affairs, Bevin's obduracy was 
a11-important.
Human emotions and frailties entered the political picture. 
Bevin was piqued by Churchill's behaviour: 'Bevin, the Foreign 
Office and the Government regarded the Hague as simple 
grandstanding by Churchill to compensate for the loss of the
66 Butler, FAC 3.6.48
67 Barnes’ transcript of Sandys Ms: Violet Bonham Carter to Churchill 24.6.48
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British General Election!'68 'He probably thought Churchill 
was taking advantage of his reputation to push ideas that had 
not been fully worked out, and on which he, Ernie, would have 
had some suggestions to make ... There was a certain jealousy 
[and] irritation at Churchill's intervention in the field of 
Foreign Affairs.'69 Bevin's objections went beyond the 
personal level. At the outset 'there is no doubt he 
appreciated very clearly the need to bring France and Germany 
into a state of mutual understanding and co-operation ... Then 
as the negotiations developed he had a slight fear that the 
Parliament might take too much upon itself, that they would 
get out of hand, and the Council of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe would not be able to keep the Parliamentarians in 
check ... He feared it would become a nuisance.'70 He 
'looked with some suspicion at any movement which might 
involve a European institution composed of democratically 
elected bodies or even representatives of democratically 
elected Parliaments; anything that needed to be done for 
European unity could surely be better done by Governments 
working through ministers, ambassadors, and officials'.71 
There was also an attempt among Socialists generally to 
promote the concept that liberties and prosperities of Europe 
were only safe in Socialist hands.72
But under pressure from their Brussels Pact allies (in 
particular the Belgians and the French), supported by 
Conservative lobbying at home and abroad and deputations from 
his own backbenches,73 Bevin in succeeding months was obliged
68 John Hay; see also Pomian ed., p.220
® Sir Roderick Barclay in Charlton, p.78
70 Sir Roderick Barclay in Charlton, p.75
71 Sir Roderick Barclay in Charlton, p.75
72 Macmillan, pp. 158-60; see also Healey in Charlton, p. 120
73 Christopher Mayhew in Charlton, p.76
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to acquiesce in the establishment of a European assembly, 
despite his determination that Britain 'shouldn't go into any 
kind of federal thing'. 'However, he did not wish to veto, 
and felt obliged "to give them something and I think we'll 
give them this talking shop in Strasbourg".'74 Labour's 
acceptance of the Council of Europe encouraged the optimists 
to hope that the government would do everything to make the 
assembly a success. The pessimists within the European camp 
feared that Labour's acceptance, only to 'allow the plan to 
fade out in failure or neglect would be a disaster for Europe 
and a fatal blow to British post-war policy'.75 They 
appreciated76 Bevin's insistence on the preeminence of the 
Council of Ministers was designed to be a wrecking move. 
Their concern was well-founded. The prevailing sentiments in 
Whitehall remained unease or downright hostility, especially 
in the Treasury and Foreign Office, as Whitehall continued to 
misjudge the intensity of the mood in Europe: 'A lot of them 
thought that this was a lot of nonsense anyhow and that we 
ought to concentrate chiefly on our relations with America and 
that was the only thing which really mattered? and if the 
others wanted to get together then, as I think Churchill 
fundamentally thought, if they really wanted to get together 
in a supranational organization, well, let them.'77
Throughout the remainder of 1948 the Labour Government's 
consistent drive was to dilute quite deliberately the 
supranational idea in Europe78 which emerged from the Hague. 
The pressure on Britain to be associated with Europe on the 
economic front had been gathering in 1947 and 1948 through the
74 Christopher May hew in Charlton, p. 77
75 Barnes’ transcript of Sandys Ms: Lord Layton to Sandys 13.5.48
76 Layton to Sandys
77 Lord Gladwyn in Charlton, p.57
78 Lord Gladwyn in Charlton, p.57
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discussions surrounding a Customs Union, paralleled by the 
political and military aspects of the Treaty of Brussels 
negotiations. Bevin and Foreign Office officials, who 
regarded the Customs Union idea as inimical to Britain's 
Commonwealth interests and her world position, successfully 
deflected these pressures into the creation of the OEEC. 
There came a strong indication that the British government's 
suspicion of organizations outside national government control 
was hardening into outright hostility, when Spaak's nomination 
to the Chairmanship of the OEEC was vetoed. Spaak noted in 
his memoirs: 'Bevin's feelings were undoubtedly influenced in 
part by his wish to prevent the OEEC from being led by a man 
whose ideas about the organization of Europe differed from 
those of the British Government.'79
The Foreign Office's guiding principle remained that Britain 
should not become more involved in Europe than America was 
prepared to be, for fear that 'if we became involved in the 
purely European grouping, they were more likely to pull out'80 
which would leave Britain with the worst of both worlds. The 
corollary of this anxiety meant that Labour's policy towards 
Europe throughout this period was directed at combatting the 
'endemic US disposition to isolationism'81 through opposition 
to anything that detracted from inter-governmental links with 
the Continent. Churchill shared the Foreign Office's view of 
the vital necessity of American support in the emerging Cold 
War. The fundamental difference between them lay in 
Churchill's conviction of the necessity of Britain 'being 
there' to give direction, whereas Bevin and the Foreign Office 
remained convinced that it was a distraction to the main 
thrust of their inter-governmental efforts through the OEEC 
and NATO.
79 The Continuing Battle, p. 196
80 Lord Sherfield in Charlton, p.59
81 Lord Sherfield in Charlton, p.59
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Churchill's vision and enthusiasm continued to exceed what
Bevin and the Foreign Office considered desirable or
practicable politics.82 Through his support and position as 
the figurehead of the European Movement, Churchill was running 
a powerful 'unofficial' foreign policy.83 Thanks to his
leadership and Sandys' efforts, there had developed the
parallel channel of Europe84, encouraging the Europeans to 
direct their energies into the formation of the Council of 
Europe, rather than West European union, to achieve their 
desired goal of supranationality. Labour was fighting a 
determined rear-guard action, harassed at home by Churchill 
and the Conservative Europeanists85, from within their own 
party (led by Mackay), and from abroad by the Americans and 
Europeans. Bevin's tactics were to delay while appearing to 
be constructive.86 He did not attempt to wrest back the 
initiative by trying to build up the economic and social side 
of the Brussels Treaty organization.87 Bevin's determination 
to persevere88 with his concept of a West European inter­
governmental organization, in which America was fully 
involved, meant that in comparison to continental enthusiasm 
for the Council of Europe the Labour government appeared the 
odd-man-out. The Europeans (and that meant predominantly the 
Federalists), supported by Churchill and Conservative 
Europeanists, were defining the debate; the fact that Western 
Union, the OEEC, and NATO (especially after 1952) were served 
by integrated machinery was obscured.
82 Charlton, p.65
83 Charlton, p.65
84 Lord Gladwyn in Charlton, p.56
85 Lord Sherfield in Charlton, p.58
86 Charlton, p.63
87 Lord Gladwyn in Charlton, p.56
88 Lord Sherfield in Charlton, p.59
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The Europeanists and the Conservative Sceptics: The Beginning 
of 1949
By the beginning of 1949, with an election increasingly in the 
air (in mid-1949, the Tories led the polls with 46%, compared 
to Labour's 40%), Tory doubts about the Europeanists' 
behaviour - principally Churchill's because of his 
incomparable position - were hardening. Evelyn Shuckburgh 
recalls being present at an interview between Hector MacNeil, 
Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, and Butler in February 
1949, 'in effect, sharing their concern together about the 
activities of Churchill on the European scene and thinking it 
was going to be a great embarrassment to either, whether it 
was going to be a Labour or Conservative government ... I 
think they were both thinking that the Council of Europe would 
be ruined by Churchill's overenthusiastic espousal of 
Federation.'89 Eden certainly endorsed Bevin's view that 
foreign policy pronouncements were the prerogative of the 
Foreign Secretary.90
The Moderation of Conservative Opinion:
The Conservative Europeanists themselves were also having 
second thoughts about the direction in which the federalists 
were heading. Tensions within the British Group of European 
Parliamentary Union (EPU) became irreconcilable at the 
Interlaken conference in September 1948 where the five 
Conservative delegates were 'not prepared to accept any 
immediate transfer of sovereignty to a European Parliament or 
a European political authority ... If European union is to 
come about, as it must, it is not going to be assisted by
89 Shuckburgh in Charlton, p.79
90 Lord Carr; Lord Glendevon
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'fanatical federalists' or constitution-mongers'.91 On 10 
February 1949 a new British all-party group was constituted, 
marking its formal withdrawal from the EPU.
Conservative reservations were reflected in the change in tone 
of the cross-party EDM, put down on 23 February 1949. Boothby 
and MacDonald (vice chairmen) and Roberts (Hon. Secretary) 
were among the all-party sponsors of this motion which 
welcomed the steps taken by the signatories of the Brussels 
Pact to establish a Council of Europe and expressed their 
opinion that British representation should reflect the 
relative strengths of the political parties in the House of 
Commons. No further mention was made of creating a democratic 
federation of Europe, with defined powers over external 
affairs, currency, customs and trade, as the ultimate goal. 
The earlier EDM had envisaged a constituent assembly 
specifically framing a constitution for such a federation. 
This motion did not specify the desirable role of the Council 
of Europe. Altogether it was a far more moderate declaration 
of Britain's association with Europe.
The motion attracted 24 new Tory signatures, (but 27 of the 
previous motion did not sign). Fifty-three of the 130 
signatures came from the Conservative party and their allies. 
Those who had already signed the 1948 EDM on West European 
Union included:
Robert Boothby 
Uvedale Corbett 
Viscountess Davidson 
Lord Willoughby de Eresby 
David Eccles 
Hugh Fraser 
David Gammans 
Sir Cuthbert Headlam
91 MacDonald letter, Times 29.9.48
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Quintin Hogg 
Christopher Hollis 
James Hutchison 
Edward Keeling 
Martin Lindsay 
Hugh Lucas-Tooth 
Jocelyn Lucas 
Sir Peter MacDonald 
Frank Medlicott 
Charles Mott-Radclyffe 
Basil Nield 
Ian Orr-Ewing 
Peter Roberts 
Ernest Taylor 
William Teeling 
Peter Thorneycroft 
Arthur Vere Harvey 
Derek Walker-Smith 
George Ward 
Gerald Williams
The new signatures came from:
Brendon Bracken
William Cuthbert
Barnaby Drayson
William Duthie
Sir Arnold Gridley
Sir Robert Grimston
Sir Patrick Hannon
John Hare
Lancelot Joynson-Hicks
Wing Commander Norman Hulbert
Major Duncan McCallum
Hugh MoIson
Sir Thomas Moore
Colonel Ponsonby
Otho Prior-Palmer
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Victor Raikes
Roland Robinson
Professor Douglas Savory (UU)
Malcolm Stoddart-Scott 
Robert Thorp 
Lady Tweedsmuir92
These additions were of an older political generation, with 
the emphasis firmly on British links with her Empire and 
Commonwealth, rather than any new forms of association with 
Europe. In normal circumstances, the Chairmen of the 1922 
committee were not given to signing backbench motions: the 
extraordinary inclusion of Gridley's93 name on the order paper 
conveyed the official endorsement of the party backbenches 
upon this more moderate stance. Of the other additional 
signatories, Bracken94 was a Churchill intimate, but one who 
did not approve of his leader's activities on Europe.95 
Raikes96 had supported Churchill on India in the 1930s; and 
Hannon97 had signed Legge-Bourke's amendment which sought to 
curtail possible British enthusiasm. In addition, nine of the 
above signatures had supported Chamberlain in 1940 (Gridley, 
Hannon, Bracken, Grimston,98 Raikes, McCallum,99 Ponsonby,100
92 EDM. No.21: European Consultative Assembly. Orders of the Day and Notices of 
Motions (1948-9) 23.2.49
93 MP for Stockport South 1935-55
94 MP for Paddington North 1929-45; Bournemouth 1945-1952
95 Lord Amery
96 MP for South East Essex 1931-45; Liverpool, Wavetree 1945-1950; Liverpool, Garston 
1950-57
97 MP for Birmingham Molesley 1921-1950
98 MP for Westbury 1931-64
99 MP for Argyll 1940-58
100 MP for Sevenoakes 1935-50
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Moore and Robinson101). Twenty-seven of those who had 
supported the 1948 EDM did not sign the second motion. Given 
the manner in which signatures for EDMs are collected in 
Westminster, nothing sinister can necessarily be read into the 
absence of their names. However, it is interesting to note 
that Noble102 was Eden's PPS, and Fletcher and Carson took a 
robust imperialist stance on foreign affairs in the 1950s.
In March 1949 another meeting was organized in Brussels by the 
European Movement, on a more limited scale to the Hague. This 
conference was chiefly devoted to matters of organization and 
to define the immediate programme of propaganda. Macmillan 
contributed to the plans formulated there, on the basis of his 
lecture tour of Germany and Italy the previous autumn, where 
he had found 'growing enthusiasm for the European idea'.103 
Peter Smithers, prospective Conservative candidate for 
Winchester104, was asked to act as Secretary to the group of 
three preparing a British position (Sandys, Victor Gollanz and 
Lord Layton). 'Most of the drafting was done by Duncan, who 
was an extremely meticulous and able draftsman and who would 
revise a document again and again until he was satisfied.' 
105 A major achievement of the Brussels conference, in which 
Maxwell Fyfe played an extremely important part, was the 
drafting of a Charter for Human Rights together with the 
recommendation for the creation of a European Court. At the 
conference the clear division was increasingly apparent 
between the French and Belgian view - formal and theoretical, 
that if Governments could be induced to sign a Treaty obliging 
them to co-operate, this would compel them to bring their
101 MP for Widnes 1931-35; Blackbpool 1935-45;Blackpool South 1945-66
102 MP for Chelsea 1945-59
103 Macmillan, p. 163
104 MP for Winchester 1950-64
105 Sir Peter Smithers
- 102 -
economies and societies into line with one another and finally 
to arrive at political unity - and the pragmatic British and 
Scandinavian view. The British Conservatives argued that 
until progress had been made with the harmonization of the 
various European economies and the integration of society 
there was no chance that political unity could be achieved. 
A premature Treaty would break down in practice. This 
fundamental difference of opinion remained unresolved and was 
to wreck the Council of Europe.106
The following month the Westminster Conference, devoted to 
economic and financial matters, was convened under the 
auspices of ELEC. A number of distinguished economists, both 
outside and inside the European Movement, attended. The chief 
questions addressed were currency convertibility, European 
payments, the organization of basic industries (what was to 
become the European Coal and Steel Community) and the refugee 
problem. Both these conferences were preliminaries to the 
long-awaited convention of the Council of Europe; however, 
they received scant attention in the press. The post-war 
shortage of newsprint was largely responsible, but political 
correspondents recognized that such topics did not sell 
newspapers. Similarly, these conference recommendations, with 
the exception of the Charter of Human Rights, fell upon stony 
ground in Whitehall. The Conservative Europeanists continued 
to urge the government to take a more favourable attitude 
towards Europe, in Parliament107 and outside through such 
organizations as the British Committee of ELEC, in which 
Thorneycroft, Macmillan, and Eccles were particularly active? 
but despite their continuing campaign the Labour government's 
enmity remained entrenched.
106 Sir Peter Smithers
107 eg. Macmillan, Hugh Fraser, Headlam and Foster, 21.7.49, HC 467.1570-1689
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The Assembly of the Council of Europe
The Statute of the Council of Europe was signed in London on 
5 May 1949; the inaugural meeting of the Consultative Assembly 
was on 10 August 1949. The Conservative members of the 
British delegation were Churchill, Macmillan, Maxwell Fyfe, 
Boothby, Eccles, and Sir Ronald Ross (representing the Ulster 
Unionists), with John Foster108 and Lord Birkenhead as the 
Conservative 'substitutes'.
(a) The Conservative Europeanists and the Council of Europe
In Strasbourg the Conservative delegation held the stage, in 
marked contrast to their position in Westminster. The 
Consultative Assembly contained most of the leading figures of 
Free Europe109 who 'would only listen to the Conservatives 
because of Churchill. I did feel it was rather awkward for 
Labour because they were the government and enjoyed a large 
majority, [but] you had to be there to understand the extent 
to which Churchill was the spirit of Europe.'110 Thus, as 
'the war leader who had helped to save Europe',111 Churchill 
enjoyed an unrivalled position at Strasbourg. Not content to 
play world statesman, Churchill - to the consternation of his 
colleagues112 - rapidly assumed the role of party 
politician.113 He shared the general 'childish delight' 
among Tory delegates in a forum in which they could beat 
Labour.
108 MP for Chester Northwich 1945-74
109 Kilmuir, p. 178
110 Lord Eccles
111 Macmillan, p. 159
112 Macmillan, p. 175
113 Macmillan, p. 159
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As far as the continental delegates were concerned, the 
Conservative delegates made a valued contribution to the 
proceedings.114 Maxwell Fyfe served on the committee of 
fifteen 'to examine and interpret' the Assembly's remit, and 
was elected chairman of the Legal Committee.115 He made the 
issue of human rights his special work in the Assembly, 
calling in the main meeting on 19 August 1948 for a convention 
setting out 'basic personal rights, to be acknowledged by all 
governments, and a minimum standard of democratic conduct for 
all members'. The matter was referred to the Legal Committee, 
which drafted the Convention of Human Rights, designed to 
provide 'a moral basis for the activities of the Council', 
with machinery in the form of a Commission on Human Rights and 
an International Court.
Macmillan and Eccles served on the political and economic 
committees respectively. Boothby's work on the Committee of 
General Affairs, to which questions on political authority 
were referred, was particularly important because of its work 
on federalist demands for the creation of a political 
authority without delay? in the search for a compromise 
formula, the idea of a 'confederation of Western Europe' 
emerged.116 Sandys' position greatly augmented the
Conservative delegates' ascendancy. Operating from the 
offices of the European Movement in Strasbourg, 'since a very 
large number of the members of the Assembly were well known to 
him, [Sandys] exercised much influence behind the scenes, in 
addition to acting as Chief of Staff to Churchill'.117 It 
may have also enabled Churchill to control some of Sandys' 
more exuberant public utterances as Churchill could point out 
that Sandys' presence in Strasbourg was in an unofficial
114 Spaak, pp.208-209
115 Kilmuir, p. 178
116 Anthony Nutting: Europe Will Not Wait (London 1960), p.26
117 Macmillan, p. 165 and p. 176
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capacity.
In addition to Maxwell Fyfe's work on the Convention of Human 
Rights, Churchill and his fellow Conservative delegates made 
a lasting and positive contribution in their advocacy and 
support for the admission of the West Germans118, 
representing the return by the pariah to the diplomatic fold. 
In an abrupt change of tack from party political animal in the 
debate on 16-17 August on Europe's political future, 'he rose 
to an altogether different plane,' giving a speech which 
though long awaited, 'must have been to the majority of those 
present a disappointment'.119 Acutely aware that Germany was 
the most immediate of Europe's problems, and that the spectre 
of a revived and remilitarised Germany was already rearing its 
head only four years after the defeat of Hitler, Churchill 
made the question of Germany the main and almost sole theme of 
his speech 'shocking some and almost bullying others'120 by 
his insistent 'Where are the Germans?'. Only Churchill could 
have done this: his question caused initial deep offense among 
those delegates from former occupied lands, but the validity 
of his message was recognized by even the most reluctant. 
Thanks to Churchill's initiative and Macmillan's subsequent 
work in the political committee, at the end of the meeting the 
Assembly passed a final resolution for the discussion of the 
admission of new members to the Council of Europe - ie the 
whole German question. Before the delegates left Strasbourg 
a standing committee was created, empowered to deal with the 
Committee of Ministers. Maxwell Fyfe was selected as a member: 
'I was told that, in view of my Nuremberg visit, my plea that 
the then new West German state should be brought back into the 
comity of nations ... had some effect. Yet the main 
inspiration was Winston's original vision and continuing
118 West Germany was not formally in existence until November 1949.
119 Macmillan, p. 175
120 Macmillan, p. 176
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pressure for the practical content of his slogan "Europe 
Unite11.'121 In the House of Commons Bevin expressed his 
willingness to try and get matters agreed as soon as 
possible.122 On 30 March 1950 a formal invitation was issued 
to the West German government.
(b) The Reaction of the Labour Government
There were, however, limits to the influence of Conservative 
delegates, who played such a prominent part in the first 
Assembly's proceedings. The Labour government did not regard 
their contribution as benign. Churchill was 'the spirit of 
Europe', but he - rather than the elected Labour government - 
also represented Britain in the eyes of the continentals. 
Churchill's party-political behaviour at Strasbourg infuriated 
Labour delegates and government alike123 and served to 
reinforce the conviction that the Council of Europe was 
embarrassing124, practically useless and potentially 
dangerous.125 Despite impassioned speeches, the Europeanists 
failed to convince Attlee and Bevin that 'Europeanism' offered 
a viable alternative to the government's pursuit of 
'Atlanticism'. The Labour government in the Council of 
Ministers, apart from the establishment of the European Court 
and the Convention on Human Rights, and the inclusion of the 
West Germans, studiously ignored or vetoed the bulk of the 
Assembly's resolutions.126
121 Kilmuir, p. 179
122 Bevin, 17.11.49, HC DebA69.2209
123 Herbert Morrison: An Autobiography (London 1960), p.279
124 see Morrison, p.279
125 see Bevin, 17.11.49, HC Deb.469.2208
126 John Pinder and Richard Mayne: Federal Union, p. 103
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Nor did the Conservative Europeanists persuade the bulk of 
their colleagues that the emerging links with Europe were 
complementary with, or even could strengthen, ties with Empire 
and Commonwealth. Churchill's awareness of the abiding 
Conservative doubts that Britain's position as head of the 
Empire and Commonwealth might be prejudiced, had not inhibited 
him in any way at the Consultative Assembly, although these 
thoughts were certainly in the minds of his Strasbourg 
colleagues.127 Churchill's conduct in Strasbourg heightened 
Conservative alarm back home. Eden, the most 'conspicuous 
absentee' from Strasbourg,128 shared the growing Conservative 
consternation over the direction Churchill and his cohorts 
appeared to be taking the party.129 Their presence and 
behaviour at the Consultative Assembly appeared counter­
productive because it closely identified the Tories with the 
federal ideas.130
The Conservative Europeanists and the Party Conference of 
1949:
At previous party conferences, including the conference 
following Churchill's Zurich speech, Europe had been viewed in 
conjunction with America and the Commonwealth: that Europe had 
been considered at all was due to Churchill's and other senior 
Conservatives' prominent roles in European organizations and 
committees. Now, for the first time since Churchill's rousing 
cry 'Let Europe Unite' three years before, Europe became an 
issue in its own right, thanks to Sandys' determination to put 
down a resolution on the issue; this was mirrored by
127 see Eccles’ suggestion that delegates to the Council of Europe should be aware of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee’s views, FAC 6.7.49
128 Kilmuir, p. 177
129 Lord Glendevon
130 see Manningham-Buller, FAC 3.6.48; and Pickthom and Stanley, FAC 1.11.49
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Conservative undercurrents of dissent which surfaced both 
before and during the party conference.
Gridley, the Chairman of the 1922 committee, was moved to 
write to Sandys urging him to modify the wording of the 
resolution on Europe. Gridley warned: 'at the last meeting of 
the 1922 Committee hopes were expressed that every effort 
should be made to avoid any risk of divided views on the 
United Europe resolution at the forthcoming party conference 
... It is felt that no risk should be run in attempting to 
commit the conference to any detailed plan of action before 
the party in the House has had a full opportunity of 
discussion thereon.' Pointing out that there was to be a 
general meeting of the Foreign and Imperial Affairs Committees 
shortly after Parliament reassembled, Gridley continued, 'it 
would be disastrous if anything happened at the conference 
which might divide the party at a time when complete unity is 
essential in the face of the coming general election'. He 
included a stark instruction that Sandys was not to say
anything on his resolution which 'might give rise to
controversy or difference of view'.131 Gridley clearly 
feared Sandys was poised to do this.
This was an extraordinary intervention by the most powerful 
chairman of the official backbench committees, and spoke 
volumes for the private representations made to Gridley by his 
fellow backbenchers. The Europeanists still only comprised 
about 60 MPs, out of a total complement of 213 Conservatives.. 
Some of those initially swept along by the ringing words of 
1948 were having second thoughts on the emerging form of 
'Europe': what did the motion passed at Strasbourg mean when
it called for the Council of Europe to become a political
authority with limited but definite powers? What of the 
resolutions passed in the French and Italian Parliaments that 
the Council of Europe should become as soon as possible an
131 Barnes’ transcript of Sandys Ms: Gridley to Sandys 4.10.49
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elected Parliament? A rather pedestrian figure, unimaginative 
and somewhat pedantic, Gridley would never have taken this 
step on his own initiative? he was not in the same league as 
later Chairmen of the 1922 (such as John Morrison), and his 
position on the backbenches was overshadowed by more 
illustrious names. Nevertheless, coming from the Chairman of 
the 1922 whose job it was to represent backbench views to the 
party leader, these comments carried considerable weight. 
They were also an implicit criticism of Churchill. As leader 
of the party's 'praetorian guard', Gridley was far more aware 
of the hesitation132 within the Parliamentary party than 
Churchill, who despite the grumbles of discontent at his 
absences from the House of Commons, remained an aloof figure.
Not only were the knights of the shires alarmed at the thought 
of Sandys going full steam ahead on Europe, hand-in-glove with 
European federalists. Attempts to present a coherent approach 
to Europe had encountered two difficulties:
(i) the first was that Conservative enthusiasts spoke in 
different tongues: Boothby on economic matters favoured 
planning, and was vociferous in his attempts to promote a 
coherent economic plan towards integration with Europe? 
Eccles, on the other hand, preferred the laissez faire 
approach. Macmillan seemed to favour making the Council of 
Ministers more of a European Cabinet - which to some implied 
a federal solution which threatened to erode the sovereignty 
of the British Parliament - whereas Churchill resisted any 
notion of a federal solution133?
(ii) the second was that the process continued to evolve? it 
was not simply a matter of formulating a policy in response to 
a specific event. All West European politicians were feeling 
their way, and inevitably contradictions surfaced. Therefore 
the obvious solution was to refrain from a definite line of 
policy. As a tactic, this 'fudge' had the merit of avoiding
132 see Crawley, 17.11.49, HC Deb.469.2236
133 Crawley, 17.11.49, HC Deb A69.2235-6
- 110 -
alienating Conservative sceptics and unbelievers at home, but 
raised Continental expectations which could not be fulfilled.
Sandys moved swiftly to defuse Conservative criticism about 
the implications of closer union by sending Gridley a copy of 
the speech he intended to make at the conference. Still 
hopeful of evolving a political structure of Europe out of the 
Council of Europe, Sandys was careful to ensure that the text 
of his resolution, which welcomed the creation of the Council 
of Europe and supported measures for closer European unity as 
consistent with the unity of Empire, had Churchill's and 
Macmillan's prior approval, and Leo Amery's support, which was 
very important for the imperial wing of the party. His 
decision to enlist Macmillan reflects the growing influence of 
the latter's ideas on Europe upon Churchill, who had been 
impressed by Macmillan's intervention in the Shadow Cabinet on 
Empire-Europe policy for the election. Both realised the 
impact a coherent approach could have on the Liberal party and 
the electorate as a whole.134 Sandys also recruited Eccles 
and Foster, asking Foster to second the general resolution at 
the conference. The resolution was passed, no small thanks to 
the careful selection of speakers from the floor in support of 
the motion.
The Conservative Europeanists and Their Opponents: The End of 
1949
By the end of 1949 Conservative advocates of closer links with 
Europe were fighting on three fronts:
(a) within the European Movement against the federalists: at 
the Executive meeting in Paris on 16 December 1949, Boothby, 
MacDonald and Layton sought to tone down the aggressive 
federalist approach advocated by representatives of France,
134 Barnes’ transcript of Sandys Ms: Sandys to Macmillan 26.9.49
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Italy and Holland; and on the International Committee, Sandys 
was still trying to straddle the growing gulf between the two 
camps, seeking compromise between those who advocated 
evolution and the exponents of a contractual method.
(b) within their own party: the Sceptics and the Anti-
Europeanists had not been won over, as the first formal 
backbench discussion in the Foreign Affairs Committee on the 
implications of the Council of Europe in early November 
clearly revealed.135 Several MPs raised their concern 'not 
so much at the content ... as the form' of the Assembly, 
fearful that although Conservative members were not supposed 
to be representatives of their party, the image of these MPs 
in cahoots with continental politicians who were all espousing 
European federation, gave the impression that the Conservative 
party endorsed British membership. Alarmed by what was seen 
as excessive exuberance for European unity expressed by some 
Conservative delegates136, there was a general desire to move 
away from 'a private army'.137 Some conceded that
Conservative delegates had avoided any pitfalls at the first 
session of the Consultative Assembly, and 'had not committed 
the party to anything undesirable'.138 Others were not so 
charitable, feeling this was more by luck than good judgement: 
the whole idea was moving too fast and the instability of 
European governments (France leapt to mind) demonstrated 'that 
this was not the moment to jump all the way'.139 The 
Sceptics wanted a coherent, restrained Conservative party 
view, 'expressed through consultation before meetings of the
135 FAC 1.11.49
136 notably Macmillan. See Alistair Horne, Macmillan 1894-1956, p 314
137 Stanley, FAC 1.11.49
138 Stanley, FAC 1.11.49
139 Pickthom, FAC 1.11.49
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Council of Europe'.140 This was to be done as discreetly as 
possible: Conservative grandees were keen to avoid signs of 
dissension on Europe unity to prevent adverse election 
propaganda.141
The issue that gave particular concern was preference policy, 
the touchstone of Empire. In August 1949 Conservative 
delegates at Strasbourg had voted for a resolution which asked 
for the creation of an economic union of free Europe which 
would include 'the abolition by stages of restrictions on the 
movement of men, money and goods'.142 Although the message 
from the Dominions at the recent Commonwealth Relations 
Conference was that short of federation, there was general 
support for European unity,143 there remained concern that a 
customs union might cut across the preference system and might 
alienate the newly independent sub-continental countries. Too 
close links with France and Holland might also identify 
Britain with their 'outdated colonial systems' and any formal 
session of sovereignty might affect India's foreign policy 'in 
a way undesirable to us'.144
The Europeanists moved swiftly to soothe their colleagues' 
ruffled feelings, implying the Conservative delegates' role at 
Strasbourg would change if the party was in power,145 and 
acknowledging the need to harmonize the claims of Europe and 
Empire in the economic sphere.146 They stressed Britain's
140 Stanley, FAC 1.11.49
141 Earl Winterton, FAC 1.11.49
142 Hugh Dalton: High Tide and After. Memoirs (London 1962) p.335
143 Butler, FAC 1.11.49
144 Butler, FAC 1.11.49
145 Macmillan, FAC 1.11.49
146 Macmillan, 17.11.49, HCDeb.469.2323
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first duty remained to its Empire and the sterling area,147 
and sought to allay fears of an attack on imperial preference 
by reassuring their colleagues that no more had been done at 
Strasbourg 'than to recommend to the Committee of Ministers 
calling of a conference to discuss freeing of trade in 
sterling area and Western Europe'.148 All were aware that 
the party 'would be utterly opposed to any formal federation 
of Europe'.149
(c) against the Labour government, implacably opposed to their 
brand of Europeanism. Labour sought to play down the 
importance of the discussions at Strasbourg. Herbert 
Morrison, as Leader of the House, refused several times 
Conservative requests to consider the outcome of the 
Strasbourg meeting as the topic of a separate debate in the 
autumn of 1949, despite support from his own side,150 
insisting that the topic should be included in the Foreign 
Affairs debate. Frustrated at the behaviour of the delegates 
of the unelected Consultative Assembly, Bevin determinedly 
stressed the importance of the Council of Ministers, saying 
pointedly in the Foreign Affairs Debate on 17 November 1949, 
'I am sure ... th[e] committee of ministers will prove vital 
to the unity of Europe. They represent their governments... 
[T]he Assembly ... has a different function to perform. The 
ministers, themselves, being responsible representatives of 
their governments will from time to time have matters referred 
to them on which decision have to be taken.'151 With the 
exception of the Convention of Human Rights and the admission 
of the West Germans, the Council of Ministers studiously
147 Macmillan
148 Eccles, FAC 1.11.49
149 Stanley, FAC 1.11.49
150 Business of the House 27.10.49, 3.11.49, 10.11.49
151 Bevin, 17.11.49, HC DebA69.220%
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ignored the Consultative Assembly's resolutions.
Summary:
Thanks to Churchill's public endorsement, and the work of key 
Tories behind the scenes, the Conservative Europeanists had 
given great impetus to the ideal of European integration and 
had achieved a remarkable influence over Britain's relations 
with Europe, building upon support for European unity from the 
Continent, America and Monnet's friends in London. Bevin had 
been obliged to react to their efforts, even if this was in 
annoyance rather than swayed by persuasive argument. By late 
1949 it appeared that the Council of Europe was the principal 
means by which European unity and the creation of a political 
authority could be achieved, rather than the inter­
governmental approach of the Brussels Pact.
However, although Conservative Europeanists had helped 'hi­
jack' the debate, their success in promoting a more positive 
approach to Europe had decided limits. They had aroused 
intense opposition within the Labour government and Whitehall, 
and severe misgivings within their own party. Despite some 
remarkable concessions, Bevin persisted in his Atlanticist 
approach to relations with Europe. In fact Bevin's 
determination to pursue closer European co-operation through 
inter-governmental agencies was probably strengthened by the 
Conservatives' campaign. Nor had the Conservative European 
enthusiasts convinced the Conservative party in the country 
nor British public opinion generally. The Labour government 
was indeed more in tune with the British public on this 
matter. The fact that European integration was an evolving, 
messy process inevitably laid its Conservative supporters open 
to Labour charges of contradiction and hypocrisy and private 
criticism from their colleagues. Given the diversity of 
opinion within the European movement, between supporters of 
federalism and confederalism, these accusations were
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unavoidable as the only route open to the Conservative 
leadership was deliberately to avoid a definite stand. With 
the advent of the Schuman Plan in 1950, however, the 
Conservatives could no longer seek refuge in obfuscation.
- 116 -
CHAPTER 4; THE WAITING ROOM OF POWER; 1950-51
After the February election in 1950 power seemed within the 
Conservatives' grasp. Although the 3% swing to the Tories was 
insufficient to return Churchill to Downing Street, Labour's 
working majority was slashed to 6, and another election seemed 
imminent. As their party moved closer to power, the 
Conservative Europeanists' stance was modified, stemming from 
a renewed sense of responsibility and doubts about the 
electoral wisdom of enthusiasm for Europe. Within three 
months of the election the Conservatives were confronted with 
the Schuman Plan, designed to control West Germany's coal and 
steel production. Although the Conservative Europeanists on 
the middle benches led their party's attack on the Labour 
government's refusal to attend the Schuman Plan discussions, 
the government and Whitehall officials were not persuaded by 
their arguments; nor were their backbench colleagues convinced 
of the Plan's merits. The ultimate federalist goal lying 
behind Jean Monnet's functional proposal was of crucial 
importance, and there were powerful emotional arguments 
involved: Britain as part of Europe vs Britain and her
Commonwealth and Empire. In addition, political memories were 
still raw from the recent parliamentary battle over the 
nationalization of Britain's own iron and steel industries.
Conservative Europeanists continued to press the government to 
respond more positively to continental proposals for European 
integration, advocating the inter-governmental Macmillan- 
Eccles Plan in the Council of Europe. However, this proposal 
lacked domestic support: the British government remained
determinedly aloof from the Paris discussions, and although 
Churchill and Eden lent their qualified support, for many 
Tories, embarrassing the government on the issue no longer 
held the same political attraction. Monnet's determination 
to contain the Ruhr industries in a supranational structure 
sealed the Macmillan-Eccles Plan's fate.
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Churchill and his colleagues successfully brought the idea of 
an European army to international attention in August 1950. 
They also scored a minor but not insignificant triumph in 
calling for the inclusion of Commonwealth observers in the 
Strasbourg proceedings. However, Conservatives were dismayed 
by the Pleven Plan which emerged in October 1950 as a 
compromise between American insistence upon an increased 
European contribution to its own defence, and French fears of 
a revived, rearmed Germany. The Pleven Plan was an extension 
of Monnet's supranational ideas for the control of West 
Germany, with its proposals for the integration of national 
armies at the lowest possible level in an European Defence 
Community (EDC). It made military nonsense and bore no 
relation to Churchill's original concept of a revived Grand 
Alliance.
The Effect of the February 1950 Election
The changing of the political guard in this 'new Model 
Parliament',1 marked by the sizeable intake of young and 
capable MPs, altered the balance within the party on Europe. 
These younger MPs were more inclined to look favourably on 
Britain taking the lead in Europe: some saw a united Europe 
principally as a defence against the Soviet Union; others 
appreciated the economic advantages the concept offered - the 
chance to combine the Empire and sterling area with Europe to 
create a formidable trading bloc; and there were those Tories, 
such as Headlam, Hopkinson and Kerr, who viewed the moves to 
European unity as desirable in their own right.
(a) Europeanists:
Departures:
Lord Willoughby de Eresby 
Sir William Neill (UU)
1 Lord Watkinson
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Ernest Taylor
Sir Gifford Fox
Sir Patrick Hannon
Sir Arthur Howard
Sir John Kerr
David Price-White
Sir Stanley Reed
Sidney Shephard
Frank Sanderson
Sir Arthur Young (d. 1950)
Arrivals:
Julian Amery 
Nigel Davies 
John Hay 
Edward Heath 
Henry Hopkinson 
Hamilton Kerr 
Gilbert Longden 
John Rodgers 
Duncan Sandys 
Peter Smithers 
John Tilney
(b) Anti-Eurooeanists:
Departures:
Max Aitken 
Eric Gandar-Dower 
Arthur Marsden
Arrivals:
Enoch Powell 
Gerald Nabarro 
Herbert Williams 
Roland Russell
Hopkinson, a former career diplomat and head of the
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Conservative Parliamentary Secretariat, had been a keen 
European since the War when he had been much influenced by 
Monnet's ideas.2 Hay,3 Kerr4 and Rodgers5 became
Parliamentary Private Secretaries to the pro-European 
ministers Thorneycroft6, Macmillan7 and Eccles® respectively. 
Kerr® became Macmillan's PPS when the latter was appointed 
Minister of Defence in 1954.
Conservative Attitudes to Europe:
(a) Conservative Divisions Persist:
Conservatives remained divided as to the best way to link 
Western Germany with the free nations of Europe. Churchill 
continued to call for Germany within a united and free Europe, 
urging very strongly that everything possible should be done 
to encourage and promote Franco/German reconciliation as an 
approach to unity, or even perhaps some form of union; but he 
resisted 'attempts to draw up precise and rigid constitutions 
... too soon, or in a hurry'.10 Some Tories, such as 
Macmillan and Eccles, felt that as Germany still needed to be 
contained for the future security of Europe, Britain should be
2 Lord Colyton
3 MP for Henley 1950-74
4 MP for Oldham 1935-45; Cambridge 1950-66
5 MP for Sevenoakes 1950-79. Rodgers was a former colleague of Eccles at the Ministry 
of Production during the War.
6 President of the Board of Trade
7 Minister of Housing and Local Government
8 Minister of Works
9 MP for Oldham 1935-45; Cambridge 1950-66
10 28.3.50, H C D eb .m .\96
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a full partner of whatever arrangements emerged to counter 
what was seen as inevitable German domination. Others felt 
Britain's imperial position posed an insurmountable barrier to 
full participation of any such arrangements. There was also 
the perennial problem of German reunification (and the spectre 
of German revanchism), with many politicians arguing that 
Western Germany needed to be anchored firmly in the Western 
camp before any such proposals could be considered.
The Conservative Europeanists remained frustrated by what they 
regarded as the plodding and half-hearted pace with which 
military and economic co-operation between the various states 
in Western Union was being pursued, arguing that if this 
continued, there could be no hope of escape from the 
destruction of Europe if war should come. However, growing 
concern over the possible effect upon the British electorate 
of too European a stance was tempering their enthusiasm. 
Macmillan, who had gone to the lengths in August 1949 of 
tabling an amendment in the Consultative Assembly proposing 
that 'the Committee of Ministers shall be an executive 
authority with supranational powers', was now stressing that 
although Britain could not isolate herself from Europe, the 
Empire 'must always have first preference'.11 Boothby's 
ardour was also cooling: at the beginning of the year he
called for the creation of European Political Authority with 
'limited competence but defined powers' which, if it was to 
have any reality must include Britain and Germany'.12 As 1950 
wore on, he came to share concerns about the direction in 
which French supranationalism appeared to be taking the 
debate.
11 Macmillan article, Manchester Despatch 11.10.49, quoted in Alistair Home: Macmillan 
1894-1956, p.321
12 28.3.50, HC Deb A l l .262
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(b) The Economic Debate:
In the mid-1940s Conservatives had contributed to discussions 
on economic integration with Europe, principally in 
organizations such as the British Committee of ELEC, but there 
had not been widespread consideration of these implications 
within the Tory party; for example, the 1947 Conservative 
industrial policy statement virtually ignored Europe, and 
concentrated almost exclusively on the Commonwealth and 
colonies.13 By the end of the decade this had changed. 
Thanks to Marshall Aid, Western Germany was experiencing a 
remarkable economic revival, reflected in Conservative 
backbench questions on the reemergence of the threat of German 
exports to the British overseas market.14 Although the 
country was still under Allied control, this industrial 
recovery stimulated the debate over the future of the Ruhr 
industries, in the past the foundation of the German war 
machine. Before the advent of the Schuman Plan (May 1950), 
Conservative spokesmen had called on the government to study 
the political and economic implications of possible 
integration of Europe's heavy industry. Eden publicly had 
supported the argument for closer collaboration between the 
Ruhr and its competing industries in both France, Belgium and 
Luxembourg15, and had advocated integrating the heavy industry 
of Europe as a whole. In addition, the Conservative paper on 
the internal framework of the Ruhr had been circulated by the 
policy committee of the Parliamentary party in January 1949, 
and was subsequently submitted to Sir Andrew Duncan (of the 
British Iron and Steel Federation) for private comment. 
Macmillan, who had raised the matter in general terms in the 
House of Commons16, worked with Thorneycroft, Eccles, and Lady
13 Jeremy Moon: European Integration in British Politics 1950-63, p.87
14 see also Nigel Davies maiden speech, 28.3.50, HC Deb.473.269-273
15 9.12.48, HC De£.459.589-594
16 23.3.49 HCDebA633S4-5
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Tweedsmuir in the British Committee of ELEC in discussions on 
ideas of international control of the Ruhr's iron and steel 
industries. These discussions led to consideration of a 
report on European coal and steel industries at the 
Westminster Economic Conference in April 1949.
There was a widespread Conservative belief that a return to 
'cut-throat international competition based on free 
non-discriminatory multilateral trade' would be a return to 
economic anarchy. Despite concerted attacks on the 
preferential trading system from the United States, the Empire 
was still very much a going concern and some Conservative 
Europeanists, for example, Boothby, Amery, and Smithers, 
believed that the future lay with creation of larger economic 
blocs; in their eyes, the Empire and Western Europe formed a 
natural bloc and would offer a powerful counterpoint to the 
American economic leviathan. Not all pro-European Tories 
argued for this radical solution, but those who favoured 
increased European economic co-operation were concerned that 
a Western economic bloc which excluded Britain would sabotage 
the sterling area.
Conservatives and The Schuman Plan
The issue of European integration came to a critical point for 
the Conservatives when the French Prime Minister, Robert 
Schuman, issued an invitation to the British Government to 
attend talks on Jean Monnet's proposal for European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) in May 1950.17
Given Churchill's leadership of the UEM and Eden's presence at 
the Albert Hall meeting and the Hague congress, there was a 
general anticipation that the Conservative leadership would
17 This proposal was the result of the failure of Britain and France to agree on the future 
of the Ruhr industries since the War. See Lord Plowden, Lord Roberthall and Etienne Hirsch 
in Michael Charlton: The Price of Victory, pp.82-8.
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applaud the French initiative. The Conservative Europeanists 
saw the need for a swift and positive response: otherwise 
their party would lay itself open to the Labour charge of 
hypocrisy. However, the immediate Conservative reaction to 
Schuman's proposals was muted: it was not until 19 May - 10 
days after Schuman's invitation to the Labour Government - 
that Churchill welcomed the Schuman Plan as an important and 
effective step in preventing another war between France and
Germany. This was a heavily qualified statement, not the
wholehearted endorsement desired by the enthusiastic 
Europeanists: 'We welcome the Schuman proposal cordially in
principle but we must nevertheless consider carefully the way 
in which Britain can participate most effectively in such a 
larger grouping of European industry. We must be careful it
does not carry with it a lowering of British wages and
standards of life and labour. We must, I feel assert the
principle of levelling up, not of levelling down.'18 The 
uncomfortable reality of European integration was at last 
raising its head, forcing Churchill to take a specific stand 
on the issue - something he had successfully avoided hitherto.
(a) The Conservative Dilemma
Although there was widespread Tory indignation at French 
behaviour - first in springing the idea on Britain, then 
presenting an ultimatum19 - compounded by a marked aversion 
to being bound in advance20, Conservative politicians 
recognized and appreciated the motivation of the French plan 
as 'primarily an invention to resolve the dilemma of Germany 
rearmed'. If the German army was not reconstituted, Western
18 speech in Edinburgh, reported in Times 20.5.50
19 Churchill, 27.6.50, HCDebA16.2Ul
20 Cherwell, House of Lords Official Report. 5th Series. Parliamentary Debates. Lords 
volume 168 columns 1219-1226
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Europe would be at the mercy of Russia; if it was, France 
would again be at Germany's mercy. But if the steel 
industries of the two countries were merged, it would be 
impossible to make war.21
The problem was the manner proposed for integration. Although 
Britain had accepted supranational functional institutions in 
two World Wars (these had, of course, been for a limited 
duration), Churghill's own preference remained British 
sponsorship of Europe, short of actual membership? his fellow 
Europeanists favoured closer co-operation, but along inter­
governmental lines. Schuman's initiative was specifically a 
supranational scheme. This principle had bedeviled Sandys' 
attempts in the International Committee in 1949 and 1950 to 
reconcile the British preference for collaboration short of a 
surrender of sovereignty, with the continental preference for 
a more radical approach. With the Schuman Plan on the table, 
such a dichotomy of opinion could no longer be concealed.
Conservatives were divided on the Schuman Plan which meant 
that the party was loath to declare its stance. No record 
remains of the Foreign Affairs Committee meetings at this 
time, but former MPs recall that most discussion on the issue 
took place in the Smoking Room, or the Dining Room.
'It tended to be divided into those who had a firm 
opinion one way or the other, who discussed mainly 
amongst themselves. In other words they reinforced one 
another in their preconceived opinions. There were many 
Members for whom the whole thing was slightly unreal and 
difficult to understand: it did not correspond at all 
with the political world in which they lived. There was 
more informed discussion outside of Parliament than 
within it, conducted through the Press and in various 
groups and movements.
21 Cherwell
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'I think my view [on the Schuman Plan] was quite widely 
held. Most serious thinkers would have admitted that 
some dilution of sovereignty was necessary if we were to 
have the advantages of togetherness ... The “French" 
view in so far as it deserved that name, was seen by me 
and I suspect by many others as a rainbow affair. There 
were out-and-out Federalists in France and in politics 
but they were not by any means a majority, and it was 
obvious then as it is today that the French would never 
accept supranationality if it really inconvenienced them. 
The political future therefore looked fluid rather than 
rigid and it was our business to take part in it in order 
to push the outcome our way. I am here expressing the 
view of many of us at that time who knew the score from 
first hand experience in Strasbourg. But to others, 
simply studying the documents or the newspapers, the 
position appeared in much cruder terms of black and 
white.'22
In marked contrast to the view that any treaty involved some 
piecemeal diminution of national sovereignty and British 
participation was vital 'to push things our way', those 
Conservatives who did not have the advantages of the 
Strasbourg experience, judged the issue in strictly national 
terms. Many were annoyed at the Europeans who 'were always 
keen to know on which side of the fence the Tories would 
land',23 which echoed the Labour government's own preference 
for an empirical approach v s  the French desire for a 
theoretical framework. Some Conservatives disliked the 
proposed economic arrangement on principle: the Schuman Plan 
was 'trying to make an honest woman of a cartel'.24 It would 
be far better if European heavy industry continued under
22 Sir Peter Smithers
23 Somerset de Chair letter, Times 24.6.50
24 de Chair
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private enterprise. However, the political implications of 
such a union were of supreme importance. It was seen as a 
slippery slope: once Britain had set foot upon it and
subordinated two key industries, 7 it would seem to me 
inevitable that we are entering on the path of political 
integration as well7.25 The issue was seen as a case of 
either Empire or Europe, and 7if the Conservative party is now 
to take a further deep plunge into Europe, it must not be 
surprised if the countries of the Commonwealth are not 
prepared indefinitely to tag along like a gaggle of Strasbourg 
geese7. 26
Lord Watkinson remembers having a crisis of conscience over 
the Schuman Plan: 7 It was muddled by two things: many
backbench Tories felt they were choosing between France and 
the USA. Looking back to the War, America had been a more 
secure and satisfactory ally than France7.27 In Watkinson7s 
eyes too, the Schuman Plan was not limited to an arrangement 
governing coal and steel. It was a commitment to federate 
Europe. As such, it was unacceptable to him and he strongly 
felt it would be unacceptable to the British people. 
Similarly, Aubrey Jones28 opposed the Schuman Plan, and wrote 
an article in The Bulletin (of the British Iron and Steel 
Federation) expressing his opposition. Jones came to support 
the Messina process in the late 1950s, but 7at that stage I 
was a Burkean Conservative, believing in the sanctity of 
inherited institutions, and the common unity implicit in the 
Schuman Plan was an artificial aspiration7.29 His beliefs
25 de Chair
26 de Chair
27 Lord Watkinson
23 A former assistant to Sir Andrew Duncan (the independent Chairman of the British Iron 
and Steel Federation) and Deputy Director before his election as MP for Birmingham Hall 
Green in 1950.
29 Aubrey Jones interview with author
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were backed by his knowledge that 'the British steel industry 
were against it, as were the French steel industry'.30
Within the small group of Churchill's intimates there were 
also 'important differences on the immediate problem and the 
general approach to vital issues'.31 The Conservative party 
could no longer disclaim responsibility as it had been able to 
do between 1945 and 1950, and this sense of responsibility was 
felt by both the Conservative front and back benches.32 
Churchill was deeply and publicly committed to the principles 
of the UEM. Although Eden had 'not taken an active part',33 
nevertheless he fully realised the immense opportunities 
either for success or failure in restoring Europe's strength 
and had publicly advocated economic integration with Europe. 
On the other hand, some of Eden's front bench colleagues were 
'definitely opposed to the surrender of sovereignty'34 
(undoubtedly Crookshank), or saw practical disadvantages for 
British industry. British steel was the most efficient in 
Europe, and this country was producing better and cheaper coal 
than her European rivals, with a readily available market 
overseas. What therefore could be gained by exchanging the 
present system? Another faction which included Macmillan and 
Eccles, felt that no matter the difficulties and dangers, the 
greatest danger would be if the European industry was 
remodelled without a British contribution even at the talks.
30 Aubrey Jones
31 Harold Macmillan: Tides of Fortune, p. 192
32 Macmillan, p. 192
33 Macmillan, p. 192
34 Macmillan, p. 192
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(b) The Conservative Europeanists' Response to the Schuman
Plan:
Keen to seize the political initiative,35 the Conservative 
Europeanists on the middle benches swiftly undertook a series 
of manoeuvres to counteract their colleagues' reluctance. 
Macmillan used a constituency speech on 17 May 1950 to urge a 
positive British response.36 The British Committee of ELEC 
(whose Conservative Parliamentary members included Julian 
Amery, Eccles, Macmillan, Thorneycroft and Lady Tweedsmuir) 
similarly urged:
'The Schuman proposals to create a European steel and 
coal organization as one of the foundations of a new 
Europe may prove to be as momentous as General Marshall's 
offer at Harvard ... It is not enough to applaud it. We 
must take our full share in working out the Schuman Plan. 
Its political and economic implications are of great 
importance, but the details remain to be worked out. It 
is therefore very much in Britain's interest that we 
should take an active part in its elaboration from the 
beginning ... We cannot turn our back on Europe at this 
critical moment.'37
Beaverbrook issued a broadside on behalf of the imperialist 
anti-European wing of the party the following day when this 
letter was violently, and predictably, attacked in the Daily 
Express; this at least had the merit of airing the debate.
Boothby followed up this opening salvo with a letter written 
from Paris, describing the 'prevailing [French] impatience ... 
with the timidity and insular selfishness of British foreign
35 Macmillan, p. 188
36 Macmillan, p. 189
37 letter, Times 22.5.50
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policy [which] is widespread ... We might have led the 
movement for European union and moulded it according to our 
desires. We have chosen instead to obstruct it at every turn. 
What is now quite certain now is that we cannot stop it. If 
we continue upon our present course we shall find ourselves in 
a position of total isolation.'38 The same day speaking to 
a group of industrialists in London, Macmillan referred to the 
possible consequences of failure of the Schuman plan: Europe
could never revert to the situation which existed before the 
proposal was made. If the plan was not successful, the 
situation created might be the turning point. It would create 
one of two hideous results - either people would lose 
confidence in Western Europe as a whole, or the plan would 
operate under a Germany not controlled by Britain, or America, 
a Germany of the wrong kind. Britain might see a German 
Schuman Plan in the next five years which might be akin to a 
Ribbentrop-Stalin pact.39 (This persistent fear was to colour 
Macmillan's attitude towards Eden's treatment of European 
Defence Community (EDC) in the 1950s.)
For these Conservative Europeanists there was a vital 
principle at stake in the Schuman Plan: it was nothing less 
than British leadership of Europe. They recognized the Plan 
as a bid by the French40, with America's blessing, to direct 
emerging European institutions down the desired federal path, 
preventing the British (Conservative and Labour alike) from 
merely relying on the genuine European wish to ensure British 
participation to limit the scope of the relationship. Thus 
it was imperative that Britain attend the forthcoming talks 
in Paris to direct the emerging institution down acceptable 
inter-governmental channels to protect British and 
Commonwealth interests.
38 Times 1.6.50
39 Times 2.6.50
40 Etienne Hirsch, p.88 and Lord Sherfield, p.93 in Charlton
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Despite the government's reluctance to participate in the 
talks -manifest in its resistance to repeated Conservative 
calls for an early debate on the Schuman Plan, on the grounds 
that British suggestions were being held in reserve until the 
talks in Paris had had 'a fair run' - the Europeanists did 
not give up hope of swaying the debate in their favour. In a 
long letter to the Times, Eccles accused the Government of 
harbouring ideas of national sovereignty that were out of step 
with the Continent. He did not believe that Britain should 
urge member states of the Council of Europe by themselves to 
form close political federation for 'full federation is 
unwise', but added that Europe felt the need for piecemeal 
pooling of sovereignty. He was critical of France's methods 
of negotiating, 'but there is still time to take her hand and 
good reasons why we should'. He rebuffed Labour's arguments: 
the Schuman Plan could be used as a means of extending the 
areas of full employment? the Commonwealth would welcome 
British participation as it offered a stable market for 
produce in expanding prosperity of Europe? imperial preference 
could be maintained as was made clear at the Strasbourg 
meeting in December 1949? unless German competition was 
rationalized it would create future problems and the danger of 
a steel glut as soon as supply overtook demand? and the 
strategic problem of German dominance in Europe: the Schuman 
Plan would make sure, if ever there was another war, France 
and Germany would be on the same side: 'But on which side? How 
can we tell unless we are members of the Plan?'41
Much to the Conservative Europeanists' consternation, 
Churchill did not seize the heaven-sent opportunity to wrong­
foot the government, even when Attlee's polite refusal to 
attend the Paris talks on 13 June 1950 coincided with the 
publication of Labour's National Executive Committee's 
pamphlet on European unity, laying Labour wide open to 
accusations of clumsiness and ineptitude. Churchill's
41 Eccles, Times 6.6.50
- 131 -
reluctance compared with Eden's determination that Schuman's 
overture should not be ignored. Eden had long argued for 
closer economic co-operation in Europe, and held coherent 
views on the future of the Ruhr industries. Concerned that 
Britain would miss a critical chance to help resolve Franco- 
German antagonism, his declaration to Anthony Nutting that 'it 
was madness to turn down the idea as Bevin had done'42 was a 
logical progression from these earlier arguments. But Eden 
had no time for the political goal evident in Schuman's 
proposal; he believed that Britain could successfully direct 
negotiations down inter-governmental channels which would 
benefit all concerned. At a Young Conservatives rally in 
Yorkshire, he set out very clearly his alternative view of 
British association with Europe: 'We have many times made
clear that in any conflict of friendship or interest the 
British Commonwealth and Empire will always come first. We 
say this not merely out of loyalty or affection, but because 
we know it is as the heart and centre of the Commonwealth 
family that we can make our fullest contribution to promote 
our own prosperity and the peace of the world ... But while 
these convictions must always have first place in our minds, 
we should still have confidence to be able to play a full and 
constructive part in world affairs in Europe and elsewhere.'43
Alarmed that his party was still undecided on its position44, 
and fearful that his colleagues might not reach an effective 
decision or even might support the government line, Macmillan 
sent an urgent minute to Churchill urging participation in the 
forthcoming discussions along the lines of those accepted by 
the Dutch (reserving the right to go back on its prior 
acceptance of the general principles of supranationality if, 
in the course of negotiations, it proved impossible to
42 Sir Anthony Nutting interview with author
43 Times, 16.6.50
44 Macmillan, pp. 193-5
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translate these into practice). 'It is now widely reported 
that the British government will make an immense [and probably 
successful] effort to reopen negotiations ... in that event it 
is absolutely vital that this should come about as a result of 
pressure from the Tory party and from you.' He further 
exhorted his leader, 'You started united Europe ... This is 
the first supreme test ... you cannot let down all in 
Europe'.45
Pleading with Churchill to put down a motion as soon as 
possible, he backed his argument with a description of a 
meeting of Conservative MPs (probably the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, although no record remains of the proceedings) 
which had taken place on 19 June 1950. Approximately 80 MPs 
had attended, and of the speakers, about two-thirds had been 
in favour of the Schuman Plan, and 'only two or three against 
... Some of those who have special knowledge of the industries 
concerned had given their support ... The overwhelming 
majority that the party should take a lead and a motion should 
be tabled.'46 Not surprisingly, Macmillan was putting a heavy 
gloss on Tory attitudes to the Schuman Plan. The two-thirds 
of those present were not necessarily in favour of a 
supranational organization. Although Macmillan pointedly 
referred to the positive attitude desired by the younger 
element, this was by no means universal. The views of some 
200 Conservatives who had not attended the meeting were still 
open to question. Undaunted, Macmillan pressed ahead. With 
Boothby (who was currently in Paris) his most likely 
informant, Macmillan craftily appealed to Churchill's vanity, 
reporting that the British Embassy in Paris was spreading 
rumours that Churchill, under influence of his advisers and 
fearful of losing votes, was preparing to retreat on the whole 
concept of a united Europe now that practical decisions were 
being made. Macmillan then sent Churchill a draft motion
45 Macmillan, p. 194
46 Macmillan, p. 195
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urging the use of the Dutch model. Boothby also wrote to 
Churchill urging him to provide 'the leadership for which the 
western world is now praying'.47
Under these pressures Churchill finally made up his mind and 
was 'followed with differing degrees of enthusiasm by all his 
colleagues and the party as a whole'.48 True to his
apolitical nature, Churchill enlisted the support of the
Liberals. The joint EDM pressed the government to take part 
in the Paris negotiations while reserving freedom of action if 
the plan proved impractical. As the Times noted, the wording 
carefully refrained from committing its supporters to
endorsing wholeheartedly the Schuman Plan. In effect the
opposition parties confined themselves to criticising Labour's 
decision not to attend the Paris negotiations. Clement 
Davies, the Liberal leader, had wanted the motion to be worded 
differently and in stronger language, but had at once agreed 
with Churchill on the overriding need to coordinate the attack 
on the government. The motion was framed thus to attract the 
widest possible cross-party support.
Churchill, whose slow reaction to Schuman's proposal reflected 
his own ambivalence, had undoubtedly realised that a great 
many Tories would not be able to stomach open Conservative 
support for the Schuman Plan. The careful attention to the 
preparation of the Conservative case in the party's briefs on 
the topic was clearly aimed at discounting internal as well as 
external criticism. A concerted effort was made to discount 
the argument that Conservatives were using the Schuman Plan 
merely as a stick with which to beat the government. Ursula 
Branston, the author of these briefs from the Conservative 
Research Department, argued 'we went a long way towards 
supranational bodies in the economic sphere through the 
Marshall Plan and the OEEC, and in the military sphere through
47 20.6.50, quoted in Horne, p.320
48 Macmillan, p. 196
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NATO. If we want to dictate terms - better still if we want 
to be in a position where we do not need to dictate terms on 
which European integration can move towards gradually, we have 
to lead not follow.'49 The party briefs also sought 
assiduously to disarm Labour's claim that Conservative support 
for the Schuman Plan was incompatible with opposition to iron 
and steel nationalization: the Schuman Plan would be a change 
in general policy, not ownership and the basis of management 
of Britain's coal and steel industries. The political 
consideration for Britain was the 'disequilibrium which would 
be set up in the whole European structure if the Franco-German 
relationship was to develop apart from the UK'. The political 
separation, if it crystallized, might easily extend to 
separation in matters of defence as well as economics. 'The 
vital factor is Germany rather than France. If Germany 
obtains a dominant role, it might not be revived militarism as 
much as an artificial bid for neutrality which would paralyse 
the French - with disastrous consequences. For our own sakes 
as well as Western solidarity, we have to be an active 
participant. /5°
(c) The Schuman Plan Debate: Conservative Doubts Persist
The Conservative and Liberal motion successfully raised the 
political temperature at Westminster and 'the Schuman Plan 
debate was the most important thus far in the session'.51 
This was not solely because of the united opposition attack on 
the government. The press had picked up the feeling prevalent 
among many Tories that the Government might be right and 
Churchill and Eden were marching too far ahead of the party's 
traditional policies; the Times gave notice of the day's
49 Foreign Affairs Committee brief 13.6.50
50 FAC brief 13.6.50
51 Madras Mail 7.5.50
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debate under the headline 'Misgivings among backbenches of 
party policies'.52 Conservative sceptics were very concerned 
at the implications of Churchill's motion. For them, if 
Churchill supported the view that it was a choice between 
winning the Cold War by subordinating national sovereignty and 
forfeiting national sovereignty by losing the Cold War, he 
would signal a great departure in Conservative and national 
policy.53
The bulk of the party was in a dilemma.54 For them 
Churchill's motion was either a deft parliamentary manoeuvre 
to put the government at a disadvantage, or by implication a 
new and important policy declaration by Her Majesty's 
Opposition. Privately many Tories felt that the Dutch analogy 
was misleading since the Dutch were prepared to accept a 
federal solution if it could be found to be practicable; thus 
the EDM seemed to imply the government should have accepted 
Schuman's prior condition. This would indeed have been a 
startling departure from traditional Tory policy towards 
Europe as it would mean that the Conservatives accepted a 
supranational authority as the first principle, subject only 
to being shown this was practicable - an acceptance which 
would come as a great surprise to Tory voters. Alarmed and 
irritated that some of their colleagues seemed 'to have become 
more European than the Europeans'55, dissenting Conservatives 
appreciated Labour's riposte that after vehemently opposing 
the nationalization of British iron and steel, the Tories were 
apparently implying their willingness to 'run half way across 
Europe' to give away control to a body outside British 
control. Like Labour, the Conservative party as a whole had 
no intention of handing over commanding heights of British
52 26.6.50
53 de Chair letter, Times 24.6.50
54 de Chair
55 de Chair
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industry to outside control. At the time Britain was 
producing half the coal and one third of the steel produced in 
Western Europe: there appeared therefore little immediate
apparent benefit. Many Conservatives privately accepted 
Labour's argument that Tories would not have accepted French 
invitation had they been in power and presented with the same 
condition of attendance. Conservative party managers hoped 
to deflect this (valid) criticism with the counter accusation 
that the Schuman Plan arose from 'a most maladroit handling of 
foreign affairs and it is nothing more than a diplomatic 
disaster that Britain was absent from Paris'.56 Recognizing 
the charge of hypocrisy, they stayed quiet.57
The debate itself began under a cloud? although most MPs were 
'inclined to play down the significance of the events in 
Korea, their minds kept wandering in a Far Easterly 
direction'.58 The debate was conducted on two levels.59 
The first issue was the basis on which talks should have been 
conducted? the second concerned the wider question of 
sovereignty. There were clear arguments against the first 
charge that the government should have gone to Paris, with the 
Dutch reservation: it was against British diplomatic tradition 
to tie the government's hand beforehand? and the feeling was 
widespread that it would be wrong to take a step that might 
reduce, rather than enhance the chances of agreement in Europe 
on the principles of the Schuman Plan. On the second, 
broader, issue of sovereignty there was a divide. Whereas 
some Conservatives might rationally admit that every treaty 
involved the relinquishment of some aspect of sovereignty, 
there remained a fundamental reluctance on both sides of the 
House to place such vital British interests under foreign
56 Times 26.6.50
57 see Observer 2.7.50
58 News Chronicle 1.7.50
59 Macmillan, p. 196
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control. There was also the employment aspect.
It was therefore not surprising that the Conservatives 
concentrated on the issue of Labour's refusal to attend the 
Paris negotiations. The Labour benches were very aware of the 
Conservative predicament. 'The only real difference between 
us and the Conservatives - and Churchill made a superb speech 
in the House - was that Churchill thought we should be in the 
negotiations and be perfectly free to say, "We're not having 
it" or "we're not going to join it", whereas Attlee and Bevin 
said, "No, let them have the negotiations and we'll look and 
see what they produce at the end of the day, and then we'll 
decide and see whether there is any relationship we can have 
with it".'60
(d) The Outcome
Despite some initial speculation that the government would be 
beaten in the vote on the Schuman Plan61, and whether there 
would then be an immediate General Election62, the 
government's confidence that it could command its usual small 
majority was not misplaced. The opposition were 15 short in 
the first division: five Conservatives were absent through 
illness: Stanley, Stoddart-Scott, Headlam, Gage and Roberts, 
and six Tories ostentatiously abstained on a three-line whip, 
although they voted with their party in the second division of 
the night:
Harry Legge-Bourke 
Stephen McAdden
60 Wilson in Charlton, p. 109
61 P.A. Lobby Correspondent in Cambridge News and others 27.7.50
62 Since the end of May the Attlee government had survived from division to division 
only with the support of the Bevanites.
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John Mellor 
Gerald Nabarro 
Enoch Powell 
Arthur Vere Harvey
These six MPs represented 'the other wing of the Conservative 
party who believe ... that any supranational authority must be 
totalitarian if it is successful and chaotic if it is not, and 
in any event Britain will be robbed of her nationhood and her 
powers of defence'.63 It is interesting that all six of these 
men later opposed Eden on his Egypt policy. Their revolt was 
'fairly spontaneous, not a formal conspiracy ... a result of 
informal chats in the Members' lobby and elsewhere'.64 Only 
Legge-Bourke had drawn attention to himself in the debate? the 
national newspapers were agreed that apart from the leading 
protagonists, his speech calling for outright rejection of the 
Plan had caused the greatest stir.65 While not all Tories 
necessarily agreed with what Legge-Bourke said - at one point 
he called for the winding up of the UNO - his sincerity and 
courage commanded respect.66 The other dissenters 'gave their 
leaders no warning. None of them protested at the various 
secret meetings held that week. Those who did toed the party 
line of the day.'67 Politically, the most remarkable rebel 
was Enoch Powell, 'intellectually and morally one of the 
outstanding backbenchers on either side'. Vere Harvey's 
opposition seems surprising, given his endorsement of British 
support of European union in the all-party parliamentary 
committee in the late 1940s. For him, the supranational
63 Statist 1.7.50
64 Legge-Bourke, quoted in Andrew Roth: Enoch Powell: Tory Tribune (London 1970),
p.68
65 eg. Guardian, News Chronicle, Financial Times, Daily Mirror, Daily Herald on 
27.6.50, as well as the provincial newspapers
66 Peterborough Citizen 30.6.50
61 Observer 2.7.50
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nature of Schuman's proposal was undoubtedly the sticking 
point. Unluckily for these rebels, the same evening the 
Government announced their position on the two-day old Korean 
War so their rebellion was largely ignored in Westminster, 
although it attracted considerable press attention,68 and 
enjoyed outright support in the right-wing press.69 
Beaverbrook lost no time in 'leaping back into the political 
arena to vocalize the section of the Tory party which regarded 
the French proposals as tantamount to the destruction of 
British economic links with the Commonwealth'. 70
Conservative pressure on the government on what was 
fundamentally a procedural difference, was to no avail. The 
decision not to attend the Paris talks had been made at a rump 
Cabinet meeting, with some important absences: Bevin was ill, 
and both Attlee and Cripps were away on holiday. Neither 
returned for the meeting - which implied the matter was not 
taken very seriously.71 Nor was the Commonwealth consulted.
The government saw no need to alter this stance following the 
Schuman Plan debate. A critical figure in the Labour
government's attitude was Roger Makins, described as 'the most 
influential official at the time'.72 In a key position as 
Economic Deputy Under-Secretary, he represented a powerful 
counterweight to those within the Foreign Office (such as 
Kenneth Younger) who would have liked to have taken a more 
positive approach. But Foreign Office advice and the British 
Government's decision to stay out of the Schuman negotiations 
reflected British attitudes and national self-perceptions at
68 eg. Times, Edinburgh Evening News, Daily Graphict Daily Express, Guardian, News 
Chronicle
69 eg. Truth 30.6.50 and Statist 1.7.50
70 Westminster Review, in Egypt Gazette 5.7.50
71 Lord Gordon-Walker in Charlton, p.I l l
72 Michael Cullis in Charlton, p. 118
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the time.73 The virtual ultimatum from Schuman had given the 
impression 'that Schuman did not want us in ... you don't do 
that to a proud country. Feeling was terribly high about the 
manner in which it was done'.74 Foreign Office advice 
remained 'Western Europe with the United Kingdom was not 
strong enough to stand alone. A wider grouping ... was 
essential if the Western democracies were to be secured' and 
continued to stress the 'essential importance of our 
relationship with the United States'.75
The Macmi1lan-Eccles Plan
'Unhappy and dissatisfied with the outcome of the Schuman Plan 
vote', which they refused to accept as the last word76, the 
Conservative Europeanists decided to use the opportunity of 
the next Consultative Assembly in Strasbourg in August 1950 to 
propose a compromise, since they recognized legitimate 
objections to the Schuman Plan as it currently stood.77 They 
felt that the British government's objections to surrendering 
national sovereignty would be shared by other European 
governments, especially Holland and Belgium, when details of 
the plan became known. They were also banking on French fears 
of handing her weak and obsolete industry to German control 
without a British counterweight; they underestimated French 
determination in this regard.
As a result of hard work and assistance from organizations 
such as ELEC, on 15 August 1950 the 'Macmillan-Eccles Plan'
73 Charlton, p. 120
74 Lord Gordon-Walker in Charlton, p . l l l
75 Lord Sherfield in Charlton, p. 122
76 Macmillan, p.201
77 Macmillan, p.201
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was put forward in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of 
Europe. It was not presented as a cut-and-dried plan, but in 
the belief that 'they are the kind of proposals which a 
British government could and ought to have put forward at 
least as a basis of discussion'.78 Its main purpose, set out 
in the formal resolution, was to 'meet British fears without 
injury to the main feature of the [Schuman] Plan'.79 In other 
words, it was designed to meet British fears of putting a 
vital industry in the hands of foreign bureaucrats. Macmillan 
felt this preserved 'some tenable position for Britain', and 
(significantly) his own party. The Plan differed from the 
Schuman original in broad areas: the experts coordinating the 
iron and steel industries were to be responsible to a 
Committee of Ministers, and thus the link with the respective 
member Parliaments would be maintained. Secondly, the basic 
social, economic and strategic interests of each country would 
be safeguarded from encroachment by experts. Finally, any 
member could withdraw at three months' notice. The imperial 
preference system should not be jeopardized as far as British 
exports to the Commonwealth were concerned, and the authority 
would have only advisory powers vis-a-vis capital investment 
in Britain. Other clauses sought to protect wage standards 
and bargaining? the voting powers of members of the authority 
should be in proportion to the production and consumption of 
coal and steel in the member countries. Since the British 
coal and steel industry occupied a preeminent position in 
Europe, this was a blatant tactic to ensure British supremacy 
in decision making. Finally British association and signature 
to any such treaty was to be subject to the ratification of 
Parliament.80
78 FAC brief 18.9.50
79 Macmillan, p.202
80 taken from Macmillan, pp.202-3
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(a) The Impact of the Macmillan-Eccles Plan
Significantly these proposals did not have their Conservative 
colleagues' wholehearted approval. Of the informal shadow 
cabinet, Macmillan noted Lyttleton approved, whereas Churchill 
was only 'fairly satisfied'. In his autobiography, Macmillan 
explained this away with the argument that the authors 
preferred Churchill not to put his name to this paper, as he 
had not had time to consult his Shadow Cabinet. 'It was also 
felt that Churchill should stay out of detailed controversy', 
even if he should give his general blessing.81 Eden had been 
more forthcoming. In discussions with Macmillan, he expressed 
his opinion that this contribution was beneficial from Europe 
and the Conservative party's point of view.
The authors of the revised plan realized that a federal plan 
would not be acceptable to the British electorate, which was 
a crucial consideration since an election seemed imminent. 
The Macmillan-Eccles Plan was designed as a compromise between 
the French and British positions, but also to reassert British 
leadership of Europe. It foundered upon Monnet's
determination that the British would not sabotage his 
carefully laid plans to tie the German and French economies 
tightly together. In the debate on the Schuman Plan in the 
Assembly, although Macmillan's speech was well received, Paul 
Reynaud argued that as the agreement on the Schuman Plan would 
be signed in four weeks nothing further could be done, and 
appealed to Macmillan to withdraw his amendment.82 'As a 
consequence of the immediate and continuing favourable 
responses the Europeans and the Americans made to the Schuman 
proposals, Britain lost the more or less controlling influence 
it had managed to exercise until then over the evolving
81 Macmillan, p.203
82 Macmillan, p.209
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character and extent of European unity.'83
The scant attention paid by the British press to the 
Strasbourgers' tactics was critical. Crossbencher fulminated 
that by their advocacy of the Schuman Plan these Conservatives 
enabled Herbert Morrison to do real damage to their cause 
against the nationalization of iron and steel. The 'far­
sighted men,' such as Legge-Bourke were applauded; whereas 
'those slap-happy Schumanites, Boothby, Eccles and Macmillan' 
received the blame for laying the Tories open to 'this 
devastating argument'.84 Crossbencher concluded, 'The Tories 
have promised that if they are returned at the next election 
they will denationalize steel. This too is not enough. They 
must promise not to internationalize it.'
The Conservative delegates at the Council of Europe felt very 
frustrated at the apathy in their national press, in public 
opinion, and in Westminster. Macmillan held a press 
conference immediately after the vote on the Schuman Plan in 
Strasbourg, and remarked, 'Of course I know that all this is
only small beer and no one at home takes the slightest
interest!' Behind the apparent self-deprecation, he was 
obviously bitter his campaign had achieved such limited 
success. His Strasbourg colleague, Lord Birkenhead ruefully 
commented the delegates of the Council of Europe had the 
feeling that they were at the hub of the universe in
Strasbourg, and it had been a chastening and salutary
experience on his return to Westminster to discover his 
political friends felt he had been buried in oblivion. This 
impression was attributed partly to the 'famine in newsprint' 
but he 'could not escape the conclusion that many regarded the 
Council of Europe as a polyglot debating society ... merely 
duplicating the functions of NATO, the Brussels Treaty and
83 Charlton, p.89
84 Daily Express 24.9.50
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(b) The Reaction of the Labour Government:
The reaction at home was confined to the feeling that 
Conservative delegates were speaking with one voice at 
Strasbourg and with another at home.86 The Macmillan-Eccles 
Plan had no impact whatsoever on the British domestic scene. 
Labour's studied disdain of the Strasbourg Assembly continued, 
seen in the government's reluctance to grant parliamentary 
time to consideration of the Strasbourg resolutions: such
discussion should come out of time allotted to the Opposition. 
The Strasbourg resolutions were finally debated on 13 November 
1950 against the background of the Pleven Plan. Labour, stung 
by Tory accusations of sloth and ineptitude, returned to the 
theme that Conservatives had carried national political 
controversy to Strasbourg, with the accusations of 
semi-sabotage. 'But either because of the political situation 
at home or for whatever reason the British Government made no 
further move to take part in this great affair.'87 There was 
small consolation for the Conservative delegates to 
Strasbourg. In May 1951, there took place the last stage of 
discussions at the Consultative Assembly on the Schuman Plan, 
which considered the report of the Committee and the 
appropriate resolution. According to Macmillan, although it 
was tragic that the British government had refused to join the 
initial talks, 'my colleagues and I could take some 
satisfaction in the final form of the Schuman Plan, since the 
Higher Authority although still supranational, was not 
supreme'.88
85 15.11.50 HLDeb. 169.336-37
86 see Birkenhead
87 Macmillan, p.210
88 Macmillan, p.212
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The European Army
Long before the Korean War, Conservative politicians had 
argued for the rearmament of Western Germany within the 
Western camp. Widespread anxiety about a Communist invasion 
of Western Germany - the Soviet Union and its satellites 
already enjoyed an overwhelming superiority in numbers of 
troops, tanks and divisions in central Europe - had been 
fuelled with the news of Russia's arming the East German 
'police'.
(a) The Conservative Europeanists and The European Army
Churchill raised the topic in the Foreign Affairs debate on 28 
March 1950.89 Julian Amery chose the subject for his maiden 
speech in the same debate.90 In their view, Europe must be 
convinced that Britain would come to its aid. Eden preferred 
to stress the Atlantic Pact (signed April 1949) as the 
preferred vehicle for a German contribution to Western 
defence.91 But for the Labour party, and indeed for many 
Conservatives, the prospect of a revived German High Command 
and possible resurgence of Prussian militarism was deeply 
repugnant. It was still only five years since Hitler's 
defeat. The Conservative Europeanists' were the targets of 
accusations of advocating German rearmament when there was no 
pressing need. Bevin was determined to resist such calls, 
declaring firmly that 'all of us are against' the rearming of 
Germany.92
89 28.3.50, HC Deb.413. 191
90 tfCD<£.473.218-223
91 28.3.50, HC Deb.413.316
92 28.3.50, HCDeb.413.324
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The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 heightened 
existing fears. There was a strong feeling among the
Europeanists that the Council of Europe was entitled to, and 
should, discuss defence - an area which the Council of 
Ministers jealously guarded as their prescriptive right. (Eden 
and the majority of Conservatives agreed with Bevin on this.) 
Undaunted, Churchill raised the idea of a European Army at the 
second Assembly in Strasbourg in August 1950, his second major 
contribution to the Europe debate. As with other aspects of 
his European 'policy', Churchill had no well-defined plan? the 
details were to be provided by his worker bees, in particular 
Sandys. Insofar as Churchill had conceived the structure of 
such an organization, he imagined something akin to the Allied 
Command of World War II. 'His purpose was to throw out general 
ideas and give impetus towards movements already at work. It 
was for others to find detailed solutions.' But as Churchill 
commented, there was a method in his approach: 'I am sure it 
would be a mistake to get involved in details. The Council of 
Europe can never at this stage in affairs deal with problems 
that belong to executive governments. It may point the way and 
give inspiration.'93
(b) The Reaction of the Labour Government
Although Churchill and his fellow Europeanists were not 
successful in persuading Bevin of the merits of the idea, it 
was thanks to the Conservative leader that the idea of German 
rearmament through a European army entered international 
debate. The Labour government only very reluctantly 
acquiesced in the notion of German rearmament upon the 
insistence of the Americans. America had indicated in the 
first NATO staff meetings in 1949 that she did not intend to 
commit any further ground troops to Europe. Her change of 
position in September 1950 was conditional upon the rearming
93 Churchill to Macmillan, quoted in Macmillan, pp.218-219
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of Western Germany: this increase in American troops in Europe 
was temporary until 12 German divisions had been raised and 
ready to take up their position. Intent on satisfying 
American demands, yet determined to contain its former foe, 
the French Foreign Minister Rdne Pleven outlined his plan to 
the French National Assembly in October 1950. Pleven 
acknowledged that his ideas were based on Churchill's plan 
presented to the Council of Europe earlier that summer.94
Churchill's support for Labour's foreign policy generally was 
'a powerful reinforcement' for Attlee and Bevin in their 
decision to support German rearmament against the wishes of 
most of their Cabinet colleagues. They knew they could rely 
upon Churchill (despite continuing reluctance inside the 
Foreign Office and the Parliamentary Labour Party) to bring 
the Conservatives to support the policy and make it 
bipartisan. 95
(c) Conservative Opinion of the Pleven Plan
The Conservative Europeanists themselves were unhappy with the 
French version of Churchill's original idea. The debate 
within the Tory party over the solution to the German problem 
continued between those who saw the need to incorporate 
Germany into the Western defence system required allaying the 
fears of the French (the Eden thesis)? and those who argued 
that the extravagant French proposals for European rearmament 
were doomed to failure, and should be allowed to fail, 
providing Britain with the opportunity to suggest a practical 
alternative (the Macmillan thesis: Macmillan felt the Pleven 
Plan was more likely to soothe the French than to frighten the
94 Anthony Nutting: Europe Will Not Wait, p.37
95 Martin Gilbert: Never Despair, p.575
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Russians.)96 Those who were vehemently anti-European, such 
as Herbert Williams and Legge-Bourke were firmly opposed to 
the EDO97, stressing a preference for joint command (ie, on 
NATO lines) for Europe's defence.
Churchill disliked the Pleven Plan intensely, describing the 
proposed army as a 'sludgy amalgam'. His influence upon other 
Europeanists was so potent that when he evinced less interest 
in Europe, they chimed in accordingly.98 Faced with the 
direction Europe was now taking, most of the Conservative 
Europeanists began to blow 'hot and cold' towards Europe. 
Sandys persisted, asking the Labour government to reconsider 
its opposition to the European Army.99 In February 1951, he 
undertook a personal initiative, sending a compromise plan for 
a European army to ministers of governments taking part in the 
forthcoming conference in Paris. Sandys was currently the 
r a p p o r te u r  for the European Army for the European Assembly, 
but he stressed, somewhat ingenuously, to each recipient that 
he was acting in a private capacity. His proposal was for the 
creation of a European army by progressive stages, arguing 
that arrangements would be confined to practical military co­
operation without any political and constitutional 
implications. Hopefully this would enable all West European 
countries, including Britain, to participate in the second 
stage. Sandys envisaged that those nations who wished to 
conclude 'a closer and more defensive union would together set 
up the necessary European political institutions on the lines 
of the Pleven Plan, or any other agreed basis'.100 This 
attempt at a functional, inter-governmental halfway house
96 Home, p.322
97 13.11.50, HC Deb.480.1458 and 480.1483
98 taken from Home, p.321
99 13.11.50, H CD eb.m .1415
100 Sandys to Bidault, the French President, 9.2.51, Biggs-Davison papers
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failed to satisfy French fears, and Sandys' initiative came to 
nought.
Europe and the Commonwealth
Another minor success achieved by the Conservative delegates 
to the Strasbourg Assembly was the invitation extended to 
Commonwealth parliamentarians to attend the Assembly's 
proceedings. The Conservative delegates were constantly 
mindful of the tensions within their party on the issues of 
Europe and Empire and the instinctive mistrust of the 
continent in Britain.101 The instigators of the invitation 
to Commonwealth politicians clearly wanted to widen 
Commonwealth involvement in British links with Europe. 'As 
long as we are the only members of the Commonwealth present at 
Strasbourg, we are bound to keep looking over our shoulders to 
make sure that we are not getting out of step with 
Commonwealth opinion. But it is difficult to give a lead when 
you are looking over your shoulder, especially in an Assembly 
where decisions have to be taken quickly and there is not 
always time to refer back.' It was hoped that if there were 
representatives of Commonwealth opinion with them - not 
officials but politicians who could give broad guidance at 
every stage - then they would have the confidence to take 
decisions 'and run the risk that leadership demands'.102 In 
May 1951 the European Assembly, on this initiative of the 
British delegates, issued an invitation to Commonwealth 
governments to be represented at Strasbourg by official 
observers. The following month an Empire Commonwealth 
conference met to consider methods of establishing closer 
economic relations between Western Europe and the British 
Dominions.
101 Butler, 1.11.50, HC Deb.480.166
102 Julian Amery to Biggs-Davison 17.1.51, Biggs-Davison papers
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Summary
The influence wielded by the Conservative Europeanists in 1950 
and 1951 was less potent than in the previous Parliament but 
their achievements were far from negligible. The Labour 
government was forced to account for its negative stance 
towards the Schuman Plan? in the opinion of one junior Labour 
Minister, Churchill's 'Why not be there?' was devastating.103
The Macmillan-Eccles Plan did help influence the final 
structure of the European Coal and Steel Community, albeit it 
in a minor way. Their greatest success lay in Churchill's 
public advocacy of a West German contribution to West European 
defence through the creation of a European Army, which 
considerably influenced the Pleven Plan.
The Conservative Europeanists' contribution to international 
debate was, in the eyes of their continental colleagues in 
Strasbourg, of great importance. Outside that forum they 
dwindled in significance. The Attlee government remained 
resolutely hostile to the Council of Europe proceedings. Not 
only had there developed a lamentable confusion between 
official and personal views expressed there,104 the 
Consultative Assembly grossly exceeded its brief. By 1951 the 
British government further sought to undermine any legitimacy 
of discussion in Strasbourg by refusing to send a senior 
government minister for the 1951-53 session.
Nor had the Europeanists won over their Conservative 
colleagues. In May 1950 the Conservatives were faced with an 
uncomfortable issue which obliged them to examine - for some 
probably for the first time - what exactly they had envisaged 
when supporting general sentiments of European co-operation? 
the partisan process of government provided an convenient 
escape route for those who could not stomach the Schuman
103 Wilson in Charlton, p. 110
104 Attlee, 13.6.51, HCDebAM.229%
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Plan's ultimate federalist aim. Once German rearmament became 
the political issue of the decade, the manifest ambivalence of 
the Tory Sceptics about the form 'Europe' was taking was 
increasingly shared by their more enthusiastic Conservative 
colleagues. Thereafter the difference between the Labour 
government and the Conservative Europeanists lay in the 
question of emphasis and tone, not substance. And again it 
was the impression of Churchill's titanic personality upon his 
party that was the crucial factor: when he 'reined in' on 
Europe, so did his supporters.
- 152 -
CHAPTER 5; THE TRIUMPH OF EDEN: 1951-56
With Churchill's return to Downing Street, continental 
federalists and Conservative Europeanists had high hopes of a 
substantial shift in Britain's attitudes towards European 
integration. However, both groups were swiftly
disillusioned. The Conservative delegates to Strasbourg found 
themselves the pariahs of the Assembly after Eden's statement 
in Rome (November 1951) that Britain would not join the EDC. 
Thereafter, as Churchill's government adhered to Bevin's 
foreign policy on Europe, Conservative backbench attempts to 
foster more positive attitudes to inter-governmental co­
operation through the Council of Europe were marginal and very 
largely ignored. Eden's approach appeared vindicated when, 
following the French government's refusal to ratify the EDC 
treaty in August 1954, his suggestion for German rearmament 
under the NATO umbrella (extending the Brussels Pact 
arrangements for West European union) was accepted. There was 
universal Conservative pleasure that the British preference 
for inter-governmental arrangements appeared to have triumphed 
over continental enthusiasm for supranationalism.
There was no broad policy change when Eden became Prime 
Minister, although the new Foreign Secretary, Macmillan, had 
been an ardent supporter of Europe. However, after 1955 
there was growing Conservative backbench support for more 
involvement with Europe, thanks to the defeat of imperial 
preference at the party conference in 1954 (an issue which had 
proved a powerful distraction from European integration in the 
early 1950s), and the arrival of a younger generation of MPs 
in the 1955 Parliament. This support was an unexpected and 
welcome prop to Macmillan's and Thorneycroft's moves to 
associate Britain with the emerging common market in a free 
trade area in 1956.
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The Effect of the October Election
a) Europeanists:
Departures:
Norman Bower 
Nigel Davies 
Quintin Hogg 
Uvedale Corbett 
Sir Cuthbert Headlam 
Ernest Gates 
John Maitland 
John Maude 
Stanley Prescott 
Robert Thorp 
Mervyn Wheatley
Departures (1951-55):
Malcolm Bullock (1953)
Edward Carson (1953)
William Cuthbert (1954)
Edward Keeling (1954)
Sidney Marshall (1954)
Richard Law (1954)
Walter Smiles (1953)
Christopher York (1954)
Arrivals:
John Hughes Hallet 
Nigel Nicolson (1952)
(b) Anti-Europeanists:
Departures (1951-55):
Waldron Smithers (1954)
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The 'CrunchStrasbourg, November 1951
The Conservative Europeanists had considerable hopes for a 
more enthusiastic attitude to Europe, encouraged by 
Churchill's past advocacy and the presence of leading 
supporters of closer relations with Europe within the 
government; Sandys, Eccles and Thorneycroft were ministers, 
and Macmillan and Maxwell Fyfe held Cabinet posts. Maxwell 
Fyfe was appointed to lead a strong delegation to Strasbourg? 
a further fillip came in the week before the Assembly's 
meetings when, 'despite strong opposition from the Foreign 
Office', Churchill appointed Boothby to represent the 
Conservatives, and by implication the government, in a debate 
in Strasbourg between members of Congress and a delegation 
from the Consultative Assembly.1
Although the Conservative delegates concurred with their 
government that the Pleven Plan was quite unsuitable,2 
accepting the powerful strategic arguments against British 
involvement, they were keen that there should be a marked 
change in tone. They assured the Strasbourg Assembly that the 
new Conservative government would give more encouragement to 
the Council of Europe: although Britain could not belong
exclusively to any one grouping - considerations of defence3, 
Commonwealth ties and the economic implications of the 
sterling area precluded British participation in a purely 
European community - Britain might be the lynch pin between a 
wider Atlantic community and 'European arrangements on a 
supra-national basis'.4
They were swiftly disillusioned. 'Maxwell Fyfe spoke in the
1 Robert Boothby, Recollections of a Rebel, p.219
2 Lord Amery
3 In 1950 British troops were active in Egypt, Malaya and Korea.
4 Boothby, quoted in Times, 20.11.51
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morning in Strasbourg. The big guns [Winston, Macmillan] were 
sitting in Whitehall, but Maxwell Fyfe was acting with full 
Cabinet authority.'5 Although the wording of his statement 
was carefully cautious, Maxwell Fyfe was convinced that he was 
issuing a positive statement which significantly changed the 
emphasis of Britain's approach.6 He meant 'that we would join 
the Pleven discussions to remould it. We would take a full 
and honourable part in negotiations which Britain had refused 
to do over the Schuman Plan, brushing aside the commitment to 
supranationalism. We all went off to lunch and came back at
5.00pm when we saw the papers with the headline about Eden's
statement in Rome7 ... The whole thing was unbelievably 
awful.'8 'We were regarded as almost untouchables, and it
would be better if we went home.'9
On 3 December 1951 the whole Conservative delegation in 
Strasbourg (Amery, Boothby, Beamish, Horden, Hollis, Mott- 
Radclyffe and Lady Tweedsmuir) signed a round-robin letter to 
Churchill saying their position was intolerable.10 'It was 
a desperate message ... saying we must make our goodwill known 
otherwise Europe would fall apart and form something without 
us. It was a really strongly worded letter of protest asking 
if we had gone back on everything that we said.'11 Boothby
5 Lord Amery
6 Sir Robert Rhodes James interview; see Anthony Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, p.40
7 At a press conference following the NATO meeting, Eden suggested that while Britain 
would not supply formations to the European army she might be able to take part in other 
ways: Times 29.11.51
8 Lord Amery
9 Ursula Branston
10 Lord Amery; and see Boothby, p.221
11 Boothby: in Alan Thompson, The Day Before Yesterday, p. 104
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wrote personal letters of protest to Churchill12 and Eden13 
during December 1951, stressing American Congressmen visiting 
Strasbourg wanted Britain to take the lead in European 
federation to counter the possibility of West German
domination, but received no reply. Similarly, Henry 
Hopkinson, the leader of the British delegation to Strasbourg 
the following year, wrote to Churchill of the 'ill feeling' 
Britain's rejection of the EDC was causing in Europe. 
'Nothing happened. Thereafter the European Movement rather 
sank. Although we went on meeting, the steam went out of 
it./14
The Conservative Europeanists and Europe: 1951-1955
The events of November 1951 proved to be a watershed.
Thereafter there emerged three lines of approach in
Conservative backbench attitudes to Europe:
a) thanks to the distractions of German rearmament and the 
political form this was taking through the EDC/EPC, and
imperial preference, only a hard core of MPs within the 
Strasbourg delegation and in organizations such as the British 
Committee of ELEC, worked to counter Eden's indifference to 
the development of Little Europe, and sought to offer 
alternative military and economic arrangements: Amery,
Smithers and Boothby?
b) the 'centrist line', favoured by those Conservatives who 
wanted a British lead within the Council of Europe and a
12 John Young: ’Churchill’s "No” to Europe: The Rejection of European Union by 
Churchill’s post-war Government 1951-52’, Historical Journal 1958, pp.923-937
13 see Robert Rhodes James: Bob Boothby, p.364
14 Lord Amery
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closer association with the ECSC,15 and who were profoundly 
discouraged by the Foreign Office's indifference. These MPs 
included Beamish, Boyle16, Hope,17 Maclay (after 1954),18 
Nicolson,19 Longden,20 Kerr21 and Roberts; and Hay, Foster, 
Reader Harris,22 Hughes Hal let,23 Pitman,24 Cyril Black,25 
Hugh Fraser,26 and Tilney27 who were closely connected with 
Federal Union or its parliamentary group;28
c) the 'Eden thesis': Eden's unwillingness to join moves
towards European integration was the obverse of his desire for 
Britain to continue to play a world role. The Foreign
Secretary preferred association with Europe not participation 
- the Atlantic approach, which ignored the Council of Europe. 
The bulk of the party endorsed his attitude.
15 Roberts and Hope, FAC 5.5.54
16 MP for Handsworth 1950-70
17 MP for Midlothian and Peebles 1945-50; Edinburgh Pentlands 1950-64
18 MP for Montrose Burghs 1940-50; Renfrewshire 1950-64
19 MP for Bournemouth 1952-59
20 MP for Hertfordshire South West 1950-74
21 MP for Oldham 1935-45; Cambridge 1950-66
22 MP for Heston and Isleworth 1950-70
23 MP for Croydon 1951-55; Croydon North East 1955-64
24 MP for Bath 1945-64
25 MP for Wimbledon 1950-70
26 MP for Stone 1945-50; Stafford and Stone 1950-83
27 MP for Liverpool, Wavetree 1950-70
28 see John Pinder and Richard Mayne: Federal Union
- 158 -
(a) Conservative Europeanists and Military Integration:
'For better or for worse the ideal of a United Europe [became] 
identified in the public mind with the plan for the European 
Defence Community.729 Conservatives were agreed that Britain, 
with its global military, economic and colonial commitments, 
could not join a European federation. At first glance, it 
seems curious that the Conservative Europeanists did not point 
to French willingness to join such a federation which 
contrasted so sharply with British animosity, but even the 
enthusiasts argued there appeared no comparison between 
British and French circumstances. Although France might have 
as many extra-European interests and anxieties, 'Britain was 
a special case with a completely different approach? the 
French did not have the equivalent of the White Dominions'.30 
Their conviction remained, based partly on long-standing 
Anglo-French colonial animosity and France's defeat in 1940, 
that Britain was the only other global power, apart from 
America and the Soviet Union.
Although there was widespread Conservative scepticism about 
the possibility of European political union and the viability 
of the EDC,31 most Tories endorsed Eden's support of the EDC 
process in the absence of a French alternative: 'no one was 
prepared to contemplate the future without the French'32 and 
the French were adamant in their opposition to independent 
German rearmament within NATO. Eden was determined that West 
European plans to federate would not fail for lack of British 
encouragement, but Britain could not join the EDC. Even 
those European moderates (eg Hope, Mott-Radclyffe, Longden) 
who were conscious of the danger of a rearmed Germany allied
29 Amery article, Daily Telegraph 9.6.52
30 Lord Thomas interview with author
31 Sir Peter Smithers
32 Lord Glendevon
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with Russia33, agreed this country could not surrender 
sovereignty34 over her armed forces to a European political 
authority: the Commonwealth, the 'most stable force in the
world', remained Britain's first priority.
Only a few Conservative Europeanists argued it was possible to 
put forward a constructive alternative to the idea of Britain 
joining a European federation. Boothby vehemently opposed the 
EDC in favour of German rearmament within NATO, arguing it was 
indefensible to ask the French and Germans to join something 
in which Britain was unwilling to participate. He did not 
believe the French would ratify the EDC, nor that there was 
any real French support for the idea of a 'Little Europe' 
federation.35 Smithers, too, saw growing French concern at 
the possible repercussions for the French Union in European 
federation and apprehensions that this would lead to German 
interference in French colonial policy.36 By mid-1953
Smithers was convinced that Germany would dominate the Six and 
that if the EPC failed, 'Germany would emerge from the 
subsequent chaos as the leader and still obtain American 
support'. As Germany was not regarded as stable politically, 
the situation seemed particularly grave. Britain had to be 
prepared to intervene with an alternative policy.37
Amery initially argued British association with the EDC, short 
of full participation, was the correct course. Since a 
European army was a pre-requisite for West German rearmament 
and such an army 'will probably not be formed without British
33 Longden, FAC 5.5.54
34 FAC 7.7.54
35 FAC 29.10.52
36 FAC 29.10.52
37 Smithers, FAC 17.5.53
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participation',38 a token British force could be placed under 
European command. In addition, 'if the British contingent 
were to include a Canadian unit or units it would be a 
Commonwealth force, and serve as a symbol of the special 
Europe-Commonwealth relationship, within what is somewhat 
nonsensically described as the Atlantic Community'. Britain 
could help prevent a collapse of the European idea by stating 
plainly she could join a European union run along Commonwealth 
lines39? such a proposal might help assert British leadership 
in Europe.40 Amery helped Macmillan41 draft his submission 
to Cabinet in January 1952,42 but Eden's supremacy in Cabinet 
quashed this initiative.
By late 1953 an unlikely alliance had developed between pro- 
Europeans and anti-European Tories: both groups were
frustrated at Eden's persistence in propping up the French 
over the EDC and wanted the government to 'get off the 
fence'.43 Amery had come to regard the EDC as 'a mistaken 
policy'; there was a danger the arrangement would tie France 
and Germany so closely that this would tip the balance against 
Britain.44 Amery appreciated the difficulty in withdrawing 
support immediately, but questioned the need 'to make active 
propaganda' in continued support of the EDC.45 The anti- 
Europeans were antagonized by America 'pushing the federal
38 Amery to Biggs-Davison 7.12.51, Biggs-Davison papers
39 Manchester Guardian 1.2.52
40 Amery to Biggs-Davison 7.12.51, Biggs-Davison papers
41 Lord Amery
42 see Young: ’Churchill’s "No” to Europe’, p.931-934
43 see Smithers, FAC 1.7.53
44 FAC 7.7.54
45 FAC 1.7.53
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idea'46? the government's present 'gutless'47 policy must 
change to a decision for or against EDC - if the decision was 
against, the Conservative government should do its utmost to 
defeat the EDC.
There was universal Conservative pleasure over West European 
Union (WEU) - the extension of the Brussels Pact, permitting 
the rearmament of Germany within NATO, brokered by Eden in 
October 1954): this 'magnificent lead'48 which 'exemplif[ied] 
British, rather than continental techniques, allowed for 
organic growth'.49 European enthusiasts hoped the government 
would now go beyond its prior 'half-hearted support [to] 
Strasbourg'.50 British interests required encouraging a 
Strasbourg revival now that the federal idea was dead; the 
moment appeared right to consider advances in economic as well 
as political integration.51 The work of the Economic 
Committee of the Council of Europe should be pushed ahead in 
co-operation with the new Brussels Treaty organization. Eden 
was not receptive to these ideas, having no desire to cut 
across the OEEC's work or to encourage political or economic 
polarization. Nor did he wish to see an grouping of NATO's 
European partners which excluded Britain's North Atlantic NATO 
allies, America and Canada.52
46 Legge-Bourke, FAC 5.5.54
47 Legge-Bourke, FAC 5.5.54
48 Amery, quoted in Times 8.10.54
49 Smithers, FAC 23.11.54
50 see Smithers, FAC 10.11.54
51 Britain joined the ECSC as an associated member on 21.12.54.
52 FAC 23.11.54
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(b) Conservative Europeanists and Political Integration: 
British Leadership in the Council of Europe;
For the Conservative Europeanists, the debate over the most 
desirable arrangement for German rearmament was part of the 
wider debate over the question of British leadership of 
Europe. They appreciated the need for a strong Europe to earn 
Washington's respect, to forestall American dictation or 
abandonment. The unspoken question was 'Who is to be 
America's principal ally in Europe: Germany in the Six, or 
Britain in the Fifteen?'
After November 1951 continental Europe was 'no longer 
comforted by assurances of Britain's "close association" or 
"warm welcome" or by any other euphemisms for no direct 
participation'.53 Rudely disabused of the illusion that only 
Labour's 'selfish' refusal to take part had prevented the 
Federal Union of Europe, and that a Conservative government 
could be cajoled into changing policy54, henceforth the idea 
of 'Little Europe' dominated. Eden's acceptance of this, 
through his support of the French throughout the tortured 
progress of the EDC treaty and his persistent refusal to 
support the Council of Europe55 despite appeals from the 
Europeanists,56 left the stage free for the Six, and for the 
Germans to become the Americans' favoured continental allies 
through US loans and aid to the EDC. The work of those 
dedicated Conservative Europeanists who strove to ensure that 
Britain's voice was heard in the forum of 'Big Europe' was 
relegated to the side lines.
53 Times 29.11.51
54 Times 29.11.51
55 The "lowly" level (Lord Colyton) of those ministers appointed to lead the British 
delegation manifestly demonstrated his poor opinion of the Strasbourg Assembly.
56 Boothby, quoted in Times 7.1.52
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For the Conservative Europeanists it was 'a black period'.57 
Struggling for Britain to regain the political initiative in 
Europe, a battle which Eden was content not to fight, they 
were immensely frustrated at the Foreign Secretary's refusal 
to exploit an inter-governmental, pragmatic institution which 
'was tailor-made for British interests'.58 They repeatedly 
urged Eden to demonstrate the value Britain placed upon the 
Assembly's deliberations in a vain attempt to counter the 
development of the Six and the corresponding exclusion of 
Britain. They feared German domination of the emerging 
entity, particularly once the issue of German reunification 
resurfaced as the Soviet Union sought to woo West Germany from 
the Western camp.
The Europeanists scored one ephemeral success. The combined 
pressure of pro-European junior ministers, backbench delegates 
to Strasbourg59, and civil servants obliged the Foreign 
Secretary to put forward the 'Eden Plan' in 1952? drafted by 
Nutting, the junior Foreign Office minister leading the 
Conservative delegation 1952-4, this plan was designed to 
harmonize the emerging institutions of the Six with the 
Council of Europe, by amending the Statute of the Council of 
Europe to permit its existing organs to become the 
institutions of the ECSC and the EDC. The enthusiasts 
publicly welcomed the Eden Plan as an important advance in 
Britain's attitude to Europe.60 Britain's relations with the 
ECSC would be 'scarcely distinguishable from full 
membership'.61 The Tory delegates worked hard at their
57 Ursula Branston
58 Sir Peter Smithers
59 Lord Glendevon
60 Amery article, Daily Telegraph 9.6.52; Nutting: Europe, p. 144
61 Amery, Daily Telegraph 30.9.52
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allotted task62 of showing the Eden Plan was not simply a ruse 
to allow Britain to control the pace whilst remaining outside 
the new political organs. Amery was appointed rapporteur of 
the General Affairs Committee of the Consultative Assembly to 
resolve relations between the inner Six and the outer Nine. 
By the end of 1952 'Britain's position had greatly improved 
and much credit was due to Amery';63 the enthusiasts were 
boasting 'there seems to be a considerable swing away from 
"Little Europe” back towards our original ideas'.64 But the 
Conservative Europeanists soon realized that the Eden Plan was 
merely 'window dressing'.65 The political landscape in 
Strasbourg remained forlorn as the Eden Plan slipped below the 
surface. It had created a positive impression among the 
countries of 'Big Europe' but roused the suspicions of the 
Six, in particular Monnet and 'the Germans who would prefer 
that there should be no links between the Six and Britain'.66 
Continental opinion no longer saw Britain as dragging its 
feet, but instead 'was inclined to suspect that we might be 
trying through the Eden proposals to mould federal 
developments our way'.67 The Eden Plan failed to divert the 
continentals from their chosen course.68
Nor did the Eden Plan mark a sea change in Eden's and the 
Foreign Office's attitudes on the value of the Council of 
Europe and the desirability of British leadership in 
Strasbourg. 'The policy of the Government was perfectly
62 Times 24.9.52
63 Nutting, FAC 29.10.51
64 Amery to Biggs-Davison 27.11.52, Biggs-Davison papers
65 Lord Thomeycroft interview with author
66 Daily Telegraph 24.9.52
67 Amery, FAC 9.7.52
68 see Nutting: Europe, pp.44-45; Paul-Henri Spaak: The Continuing Battle, p.226
- 165 -
clear. They wanted to be in on the act so far as they could 
be, in order to prevent any excesses which might unify Europe 
against us.'69 To the profound disgust of some Tory 
delegates,70 the British government's line remained that every 
encouragement should be given to the formation of the
projected Little Europe and that if federation should fail, 
Britain must not in any way be to blame.71 This led to a 
public split within the Conservative delegation to 
Strasbourg.72 These and other protests made through the
Whips' office and to Eden about the damage caused by the 
Government's negative attitude were to no avail. 'It was 
always made clear in one way or another by the Foreign Office 
people in charge of the British Conservative delegates that we 
should not "rock the boat", "go native", be too enthusiastic 
about the pie-in-the-sky ideas of "integration", and above all 
not to let the Government down. This ... caused even more 
harm, because "the British are always so negative and they'll 
always find some way to argue that any progress towards
integration is either impossible, impracticable or dangerous 
[to British interests]".'73 The committed Europeanists
'did advocate in speeches and in Committees of the
Council of Europe that we were personally in favour of 
closer links ... but these views had to be expressed 
tactfully so as not to upset our British colleagues nor 
to exceed the bounds of Government declared policy; there 
would have been no surer way of being dropped from the 
Delegation for the following year and therefore robbed of 
what was at the time the best forum for putting forward 
our opinions. [To say nothing of jeopardising any
69 Sir Peter Smithers
70 see Daily Telegraph 12.5.53
71 Nutting at Strasbourg, reported in Daily Telegraph 9.5.53
12 Daily Telegraph 12.5.53
73 John Hay
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possible elevation to office!]'74
(c) Conservative Europeanists and Economic Integration:
The principal division in the Conservative European camp came 
in the economic sphere: between the 'anti-GATT' MPs (Smithers, 
Amery, and Boothby), and the ' pro-GATT' MPs (such as Hope, 
Gilbert Longden, Tilney and Nicolson) who favoured 'Atlantic 
Union'. To a very great extent, the battle within the 
Conservative party over Europe in the 1950s has to be seen in 
tandem with the internal struggle over imperial preference.
(i) Europe and 'Europe Overseas'
Boothby, Smithers and Amery continued to argue vehemently that 
Europe and Empire were complementary, not contradictory, 
strongly supported by Leo Amery. 'Entry into a European 
customs union would not by itself create a better balanced 
economy ... Europe and the British Commonwealth as a whole can 
most usefully supplement each other.'75 As the 'only
practical means by which that end can be achieved' was 
imperial preference, this campaign was aimed specifically at 
America and her campaign for 'non-discrimination'.
Between 1951 and 1953 there was strong continental pressure to 
concentrate on ideas for greater unity of the Six alone (for 
example, the Pflimlin plan, covering agriculture), 
particularly for currency union with a European central bank.. 
'Many of the promoters of [this] did not conceal their 
intention of waging an economic war against the sterling area 
and the leadership of the City of London'.76 The British 
section of ELEC felt this would tend to disrupt the European
74 John Hay
75 Leo Amery letter, Times 1.1.52
76 Juliet Rhys Williams letter, Times 19.10.53
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Payments Union (EPU) and might end the greater co-operation in 
trade and finance between the sterling area and Europe for 
which it had always worked. A small number of Conservatives 
strove hard to counter this movement towards the economic 
federation of the Six. Boothby's and Hollis' proposals for 
the possibilities of drawing together the economies of Europe 
and the sterling area, together with their suggestions that 
exchange markets should be established in some European 
centres with upper and lower limits controlled by an 
equalization fund, were reflected in the recommendations of 
the Council of Europe's Economic Committee in 1951.77 Boothby 
had already called for a world monetary conference to 
reconsider the Bretton Woods agreement, on the grounds of 
constant balance of payments difficulties, inadequate stocks 
of gold at its present price, and of hard currencies, and the 
restrictions which nearly all the signatories of the Bretton 
Woods agreement had been forced to maintain. Amery 
passionately believed that 'the Commonwealth is the ground 
plan to which all other things must be attached'. His desire 
for Britain to take a greater lead in European affairs was a 
reflection of his reluctance to be dependent upon America.7*
As these Conservatives saw it, no purely European, nor purely 
Commonwealth solution was possible. The answer was 'the 
abandonment of the obsolete doctrine of non-discrimination', 
the extension of the preferential system, and the reduction of 
dollar imports to the level of dollar income.7* 'It is idle 
to imagine that a united Europe alone, whether it included 
Britain or not, could ever provide both the guns and butter or 
escape from dependence on the United States ... Only a Europe 
which has integrated its economy with that of countries ... 
[supplying] raw materials in which it is deficient and for
77 Times 5.12.51
78 Amery profile in The Queen, 14.7.54
79 Boothby letter, Times 21.2.52
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which it is dependent upon America' was a viable economy, and 
only the sterling area could provide this.80 Intent on 
retaining the British initiative of the Eden Plan, Amery 
suggested to the Conservative Foreign Affairs Committee that 
'we should have some new suggestion for debate' at the 
Strasbourg Assembly in September 1952, which might develop the 
idea of the Commonwealth and Europe sharing economic resources 
as a balancing factor in relation to the dollar world.81
Thanks to these MPs' efforts - largely on Boothby's initiative 
as vice-chairman - in 1952 the Economic Committee of the 
Council of Europe drafted a set of proposals which came to be 
known as 'the Strasbourg Plan', intended to improve economic 
relations between the Council of Europe and overseas countries 
with which these countries had constitutional links. Boothby 
was building upon the 1951 Commonwealth-Europe conferences in 
Brussels and London, held under the auspices of ELEC, which 
had examined the possibility of closer economic co-operation 
between Commonwealth countries and Western Europe with a view 
to narrowing the dollar gap. His Strasbourg plan proposed a 
two-tier preferential system - leaving the existing 
Commonwealth preferential agreements in place, and developing 
a second preferential system within the whole group. Its aim 
was to harness the industrial resources of Western Europe to 
the raw material of its associated territories and by 
providing assured markets for both, to increase trade and 
production.82 The Plan was overwhelmingly accepted by the 
Assembly and the Committee of Ministers. Eden sent it round 
the Commonwealth. It was then pigeonholed.83 These proposals
80 Hollis letter, Times 2.1.52
81 FAC 9.7.52
82 John Biggs-Davison: The Walls of Europe (London 1962), p.66
83 Biggs-Davison, p.66
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received scant attention at the 1953 Commonwealth 
Conference,84 and were 'poleaxed' by the British Treasury.85 
While Conservative Europeanists felt that it was 
'understandable' that Britain held aloof from the Schuman 
Plan, 'much less justified was the British failure to exploit 
... [this] scheme ... [which] would have realised Bevin's 
ambition and brought Europe and "Europe overseas" together in 
a vast area of preference and development'.86
This hard core of MPs persisted in their attempts to foster 
economic links between the EPU and the Commonwealth. The 
British section of ELEC devoted its energies to making the 
British view on European economic integration heard and 
understood 'against what at one time seemed hopelessly adverse 
tide'.87 At the unofficial monetary conference organized by 
ELEC in Brussels in February 1953, building upon the shared 
feelings of influential groups in France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and West Germany, the British delegation (which 
included Leo and Julian Amery) managed to deflect the 
propensity towards smaller areas of co-operation.88 The final 
resolution welcomed the Schuman Plan, but stated plainly 
ELEC's preference for a 'truly European market' which was 
defined as a common market on the widest possible scale. 
Julian Amery and Boothby also formed part of the British 
delegation to the European Movement's second economic 
conference, held in London in January 1954, whose ultimate aim 
was 'to favour conditions which will lead to the creation of 
a free world market with the free movement of goods and 
currencies between Europe, the Commonwealth and the dollar
84 Beddington-Behrens letter, Times 8.5.53
85 Boothby, p.223
86 Biggs-Davison, p.66
87 Times 9.2.53
88 Times 9.2.53
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world'.89 In order to deal with immediate problems the 
conference examined the possibility of closer economic and 
social ties between countries of Western Europe and their 
associated overseas territories, and the Commonwealth; this 
was the natural sequence of events from the Council of 
Europe's recommendations on the Strasbourg Plan. The economic 
tide seemed to be turning away from Little Europe.
(ii) Atlantic Union:
'Of course going on at the same time was Atlantic Union. 
This was quite a considerable movement, although there 
was not much structural propaganda. NATO was the 
successful alliance and seen as a thoroughly satisfactory 
organization. Many people felt this should be kept going 
and give it more political clout. There was an Atlantic 
Union Committee, and a lot of people from outside 
Westminster were interested. It was welcome to the 
Conservative government for quite a while because the 
more intrepid people like Amery were so pro-Europe.'90
These Conservatives opposed increased protection on the 
grounds that it would limit the field of economic opportunity, 
and the remedy of Europe plus Empire was inadequate and 
unrealistic.91 They looked to the 'oceanwide partnership of 
the Commonwealth, Western Europe, and the United States', 
arguing that those who looked to Western Europe, their 
overseas territories and the sterling area 'would permanently 
cut Canada away from the Commonwealth'92 since Canada was not
89 Biggs-Davison papers
90 Ursula Branston
91 Cyril Osborne letter, Times 4.1.52
92 Tilney letter, Times 23.2.52
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in the sterling area.93 Canada was the key - 'so close to 
America economically, yet linked to Britain by friendship and 
tradition'.94 This group firmly believed in the need for 
closer integration of policy and action between Europe, the 
Commonwealth and the USA to form a 'more organic 
organization'. NATO should be expanded beyond a mere military 
alliance (NATO from the beginning did have a wide remit), as 
'such alliances serve only for limited periods of dire and 
obvious peril'. Nor could effective arrangements in the 
economic field be secured through ad hoc  functional bodies 
which, like the OEEC and the Economic Commission for Europe, 
often overlap'. An Atlantic Community should not be 
restricted to the countries of the Atlantic seaboard, but 
'embrac[e] the civilizations of the democracies of free 
Europe'. To further this, a cross-party group, the 'Friends 
of Atlantic Union'95, was formed which included Ted Leather, 
Longden, Tilney, Alfred Bossom and Nigel Nicolson.
In 1954 members of the Committee and Council of Atlantic Union 
founded a European Atlantic group, 'to provide a regular forum 
for members of existing European and Atlantic societies where 
they can maintain contact and discuss developments of European 
and Atlantic Communities'.96 Longden and Nicolson were 
elected Executive members. The aim was to give background 
information on political and economic co-operation between 
NATO and various other international associations with the 
Council of Europe, West European Union, the OEEC and the 
ECSC.97 However, 'in the end people became convinced that 
Atlantic Union did not matter, because they concluded that
93 Tilney letter, Times 9.12.52
94 Tilney letter, Times 4.1.52
95 see Friends of Atlantic Union letters, Times 25.9.51 and 9.7.52
96 Biggs-Davison papers
97 Biggs-Davison papers
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America would not divorce herself from the NATO alliance. And 
as long as they were part of the alliance, with NATO defending 
Europe, why worry about the European movement?'.98
The Influence of the Conservative Europeanists 1951-55:
During Churchill's peacetime administration their political 
influence was negligible. Backbench pressure obliged Eden to 
offer the palliative of the Eden plan, but this came to 
nothing, thanks to French opposition. In essence, 
Conservative backbench support of 'Big Europe' through the 
Council of Europe foundered on the rock of Conservative front 
and backbench indifference.
i) the loss of Churchill's interest and support:
'We all thought at Strasbourg that Winston was fighting a lone 
and desperate battle against a hostile Cabinet on Europe. Not 
at all ... There was no battle because nobody in Cabinet put 
in a word for Europe as far as I can make out. Not even 
Maxwell Fyfe or Macmillan who had been ardent champions of 
Europe ... Winston lost interest.'99 Churchill's refusal to 
give the lead, leaving British policy towards Europe to Eden 
and the Foreign Office (who were) deeply suspicious of all 
schemes for European union100, seemed incomprehensible to 
some.101 Others did not speculate about Churchill's change 
of stance 'because he had had a thoroughly unreliable 
political career. We were all aware of his past 
inconsistencies'.102 To his personal coterie, Churchill's
98 Ursula Branston
99 Boothby in Thompson, p. 104
100 Lord Carr
101 Viscount Muirshiel (formerly Jack Maclay) interview, BOAPAH, LSE
102 Lord Glendevon
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absence of interest was easily explained: 'Churchill's idea of 
a united Europe was more akin to de Gaulle's Europe des 
Patries. [He] always had at the front of his mind the concept 
of the close relationship of the English speaking peoples, and 
above all of England and the US.'103 The idea of a 
supranational organization was not his idea of ideal European 
co-operation.104
In December 1951 Churchill toyed with the idea that the EDC 
might be transformed into an 'integrated force' which 
emphasized national units; he was defeated in Cabinet by Eden, 
supported by the majority of his colleagues, which 'ruled out 
the danger of Churchill's idea supported by the pro- 
Europeans'.105 Churchill's great age militated against a 
fight with his Foreign Secretary on Europe. There was an 
element of not wishing to saddle his successor with a policy 
of which Eden disapproved106, and he was also fighting a war 
against Eden in the Middle East. 'He was tired and his one 
big idea was a summit with Russia. Therefore he did not push 
the Europe idea as much as he should have.'107 'He 
concentrated on the few things that interested him.'108 
Boothby too blamed this obsession 'with the idea of going down 
in history in a final phase of his premiership as a great 
peacemaker'109 for Churchill's lack of interest. Whatever 
their opinion on the reason for Churchill's silence, 'those of 
us who believed in Europe were left flat. It was very
103 Colville in Thompson, p. 104
104 Lord Carr
105 see Young: ’Churchill’s "No” to Europe’, pp.930-31
106 Sir Anthony Nutting
107 Lord Amery
108 Lord Carr
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dispiriting to those of us who saw Europe as the future.'110
The young European enthusiasts were loath to approach the 
Prime Minister as 'persuading Churchill' (to take a more 
positive line) was not a promising prospect on any subject, 
particularly for new backbenchers.111 Boothby did try and 
failed.
(ii) the decisive influence of Eden:
To the ardent Europeanists, Eden was the villain. 'I am sure 
that there was a sharp division between [Churchill] and Eden 
on this subject. The latter thought the whole European 
"thing” was insubstantial and I would guess that it was a 
condition of his accepting the post of Foreign Secretary that 
there should be no Europe nonsense. The fact that the first 
meeting of the Consultative Assembly after the Conservative 
election victory was ignored by Anthony and that the negative 
position was stated immediately at it by Maxwell Fyfe, 
suggests that this had all been definitely settled in 
opposition.'112 Eden had indeed already indicated there 
should be 'no Europe nonsense'. 'I remember when the 
government was formed in 1951 Churchill spoke to Eden, saying, 
"I want you to have a Minister of European Affairs, and I 
suggest this should be Duncan.” Eden was adamant. He said (a) 
there was no reason for having such a Minister, and (b) he did 
not want Duncan. He wanted Selwyn and me.'113
From the outset, Eden was determined 'not to become involved 
[in European union] and his decision was vital'.114
110 Lord Glendevon
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'His position was quite clear: he intensely disliked the 
idea of European Union in any form other than the Concert 
of Europe ... He did not believe that there was any 
political substance in the movement on the Continent. 
His view of Europe was that of a skilled diplomat - a 
"Concert" - shades of Metternich. If I sat next to him 
in the smoke room he would say, "Now, old boy, anything 
but Europe." His prestige within the Foreign Office was 
immense. He was indeed a marvellous negotiator. His 
hostility to any engagement by Britain in the European 
process was translated into (i) the Maxwell Fyfe speech 
(November 1951) and (ii) the appointment of a minor 
official named Gallagher as British Permanent 
Representative in Strasbourg. In the Committee of 
Ministers' Deputies Gallagher systematically obstructed 
every constructive move: he was the most hated man in 
Strasbourg.'115
The Foreign Secretary was in favour of greater co-operation 
within Europe, but this should be between nation states. He 
regarded Britain as 'an active and enlightened European nation 
with a world role and not as a limb of Europe'. Britain 
should play a leading part in Europe for three reasons: (i) 
her history in Europe? (ii) her role in the War; and (iii) the 
'three circles'. He and the Europeanists differed in the 
emphasis they placed on relations with Europe and the clash 
came because so many of the European enthusiasts' ideas 
appeared to Eden to underestimate or undermine Britain's role 
in the world.116 Eden was 'also very conscious of the 
general public and he was convinced that Europe could not be 
sold to the country'.117 Eden was right: 'the public
attitude was a hangover from the War: after the strain of war,
115 Sir Peter Smithers
116 Lord Carr
117 Ursula Branston
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most people were so thankful to be at peace. Foreign 
adventures were not on the agenda, nor did they like the idea 
of being tied up with the French and the Germans.'118
Personalities also came into play. Accusations that he had 
personally stifled Churchill's pro-European inclinations 
rankled.119 Eden was convinced that the Conservative 
Europeanists 'were not just a policy pressure group, as much 
as a scheming policy pressure group'.
'The Council of Europe gave them platforms to make 
speeches with no government backing at all. It was not 
commonplace then for politicians other than ministers to 
go abroad to speak in a formal international forum such 
as the Council of Europe and thereby appear to obtain an 
international importance for what they said. He had 
fairly old-fashioned ideas that it was up to the Foreign 
Secretary to make policy and there should be no free 
enterprise efforts which made life difficult for him. 
Even if he had agreed with the content of what they were 
saying, he would have been tetchy because it was out of 
his control. People buzzing about on the periphery 
pretending more influence than they possessed were not 
welcome. He could not appreciate them, although he could 
understand them only too well, or at least their motives. 
Eden was inclined to think it was all much more of a plot 
than it was, but underlying this was the majority view, 
which he shared with the Foreign Office, that none of 
this would come to fruition ... He thought EDC would 
fail, and that Britain's proper role was to stand back a 
bit and to use her diplomatic skill to pick up the 
pieces, knock heads together, generally get all concerned
118 Ursula Branston; see also Times 1.9.50, quoted in Hugh Dalton: High Tide and After, 
p.336
119 Evelyn Shuckburgh: Descent to Suez, p. 18
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to see sense and moderation.'120
His one concession to backbench pressure on Europe, the Eden 
plan, 'had a good impact on the backbenches. They knew Eden 
was not a pro-Europe man, but thought it was a very 
constructive thing to do. Eden took the idea round the 
capitals of Europe to gain support, which created a very good 
impression. Nutting told me later that Eden had not wanted to 
do so at all, but had been pressured by his civil 
servants.'121 But Eden was increasingly less susceptible to 
such backbench pressure. 'As time passed and Churchill was 
still in the saddle, Eden was critical of Churchill on an 
increasing number of matters, and Europe was obviously one of 
them.' Lord Glendevon recalls 'an upsetting moment' in 1954 
when junior Minister at the Foreign Office, in charge of the 
Europe department: 'There came a critical moment in the
Strasbourg context when I sent a minute to Eden saying it 
would be a good thing if he came to the next meeting. To my 
amazement, I got a note back, written on my memo, saying, ”1 
am astonished I should be given this advice. Strasbourg is of 
no importance whatever”. Of course he did have a quick 
temper, and I made allowances, but I was very taken 
aback.'122
(iii) Whitehall:
With the exception of Nutting, 'Eden worked entirely with and 
relied upon his civil servants'.123 These civil servants 
reinforced Eden's natural scepticism. Roger Makins124,
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together with a number of other people thought that the 
American/British partnership was crucial'125 and were deeply 
suspicious of European union; this sentiment pervaded
Whitehall: the Board of Trade, under the leadership of
Thorneycroft and Frank Lee, the Permanent Under Secretary, was
the notable exception.126 'The Treasury and Foreign Office 
[were] not in favour of us pressing the matter at the
time',127 and as both ministries 'were a very powerful team, 
with two very experienced ministers at their head, both of 
whom were in the running for Prime Minister, and certainly not 
people Churchill wanted to take on',128 Eden's approach to 
Europe had very powerful backing.
(iv) lack of ministerial support:
'With Sandys at Supply, Maxwell Fyfe at the Home Office, and 
Eccles relegated to the Ministry of Works - to his chagrin - 
the champions of Europe were isolated.'129 The heavy
burdens of office left little time for outside projects. In 
addition, 'they were on the fringe. Macmillan did produce a 
paper, but ... he was only Minister of Housing, and did not 
carry any weight.'130 Macmillan who had his fingers burnt131 
thereafter confined his energies to his ministerial brief. 
Eden's 'stay out' view was supported by the majority of the 
Cabinet. As Salisbury expressed it, 'We are not a continental 
nation but an island power with a colonial empire and unique 
relations with the independent members of the Commonwealth. 
Though we might maintain a close association with the
125 Sir Edward Boyle interview, BOAPAH, LSE
126 Sir Anthony Nutting
127 Butler in Thompson, p. 104
128 Lord Thorneycroft
129 Lord Amery
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131 see Young: ’Churchill’s "No" to Europe’
- 179 -
continental nations of Europe, we could never merge our 
interests wholly with theirs. We must be with, but not in, 
any combination of European powers'.132 Of the junior 
ministers, Hopkinson was rapidly promoted to Secretary for 
Overseas Trade at the Board of Trade, then was made Minister 
of State at the Colonial Office in May 1952. Hopkinson led 
the Conservative delegation to the Council of Europe in 1952, 
but a severe accident (he was badly burned in a fire on a 
train outside the Nancy tunnel just before Christmas) made 
this a brief appointment. Thereafter, his ministerial 
position effectively deprived the Europeanists of his support 
as he confined himself strictly to his brief. Lord 
Glendevon's pro-European inclinations were circumscribed by 
office.
Conservative Europeanists might reasonably have hoped British 
policy towards Europe to take a more positive turn after 
Macmillan's appointment as Foreign Secretary,133 especially 
as this coincided with the Messina conference, 'but ... Eden 
was Prime Minister'.134 In his first speech in the Commons 
Macmillan referred to the importance of the 'European Idea', 
but thereafter did nothing to promote it.135 Macmillan was 
only Foreign Secretary for a short time and his tenure was not 
a success; Eden was determined to guide British policy, this 
time from No 10. Eden and Butler decided to withdraw 
Bretherton from the Spaak Committee deliberations in Brussels 
in November 1955. 'I think [Macmillan] found everything much 
more of a strain than he had expected, and his health seemed 
to suffer. Younger people, particularly, had great hopes of 
Macmillan. He was a good mixer, clever, amusing and had a lot 
of backing among young people. But he did not make much of
132 PRO.CAB128/24 CC(52)30 13.3.52
133 Sir Peter Smithers
134 Sir Peter Smithers
135 Nigel Fisher: Macmillan (London 1982), pp. 151-2
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[Europe].'136 Macmillan's own political courage appeared to 
be lacking: 'He was never anxious to fall out with those in 
charge, because he did have ambitions. I could not say we had 
a spokesman at the top for Europe. As Foreign Secretary, he 
was extremely careful and cautious. His private commitment 
was there, but he was not prepared to take an heroic 
part./137
(v) The attitude of the Conservative backbenches:
In the early 1950s generally, 'there was very little in the 
party's mind, or the House of Commons' mind on the question of 
Europe'.138 'A certain number of people ... were very keen 
on it, but I can't say we would find many people going onto 
street corners and shouting "Hoorah for Europe". They were 
open to be led in early stages, but as time went on the thing 
polarized into people being either for or against it.'139
There were the distractions of other, seemingly more important 
issues. When the Conservative party did turn its mind towards 
Europe, a 'large element' was opposed to closer links. There 
was a general Conservative distaste for the federal vehicle 
chosen for German rearmament140, although many Tories had no 
greater love for the idea of 'Big Europe': 'An awful lot of 
decent colleagues thought nothing would come of the Council of 
Europe and that Strasbourg did not matter. It was a bit of a 
dog's dinner because Eden had become very much against 
it.'141 Outright opposition came from the 'right wing' but
136 Ursula Branston
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'was not very dramatic, nor tiresome, in marked contrast to 
its behaviour in the Suez Crisis'.142
The problems of Bia Europe: Conservative attitudes to the
Council of Europe:
Most Conservative backbenchers regarded the Council of Europe 
w^s an irrelevance, serving no useful purpose.143 'About 
half a dozen set the pace, people like Julian Amery. But the 
more serious people, the more conservative moderates never 
moved from their healthy scepticism ... So much talk on 
Europe centred on Germany. Germany bounded forward with 
enormous speed and her reentry into international politics was 
through France, not through us'. The effect was two-fold: 
'Germany was not looking to Britain, so the British people 
were disgruntled [and] as it was obvious Germany was working 
with France, a decided feeling grew up that this was not a 
healthy situation. This instinct in the country was shared to 
a great degree by both parties in the House of Commons. 
Therefore Europe struck very few chords back home.'144 There 
was also an residue of animosity towards the French. 'Much 
depended on French behaviour from time to time, which always 
seemed to be unpredictable. Hostility is too strong a word. 
The French politicians and Governments always seemed unwilling 
or unconcerned about the effects of their words and actions on 
the British, who in turn they distrusted! There is nothing 
new in all this, and it's been so for centuries ... On the 
whole I got on pretty well with my French colleagues ... but 
I was always wary of taking them 100 percent at their 
word!'145
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Another part of the problem was that the Council of Europe was 
'less frequented than formerly by great parliamentarians of 
weight' and its method of work - meeting for one month - meant 
that it was not easy to develop at once into a forum for 
adequate discussion of large issues of foreign policy.146 
The work of the Conservative delegates was also considerably 
hampered by the poor view party managers and most Tory MPs 
took of the Strasbourg Assembly, reflected in the lack of 
debating time made available to the Council of Europe 
proceedings.147 Going to Strasbourg was regarded by many as 
a 'jaunt' or 'jolly' - 'They've got some marvellous 
restaurants there, you know!'148 Trips to the Council of 
Europe were certainly regarded by Conservative delegates as 
most enjoyable: Nigel Nicolson recalls serving on the Cultural 
Committee of the Assembly, and with his fellow committee 
members agreeing to convene their meetings in some of the 
beautiful cities in Europe (Florence, Venice, etc).149 'It 
was great fun. It was rather like a Christmas game, only this 
game was called "Foreign Secretaries”. You played the role, 
pontificated on policy, without power and responsibility. 
[But] it was not a great honour. The Minister and the rest of 
the party saw it as a joke, and the constituencies did not 
understand it at all. We were very frustrated by having so 
little influence and knowing we were regarded with a certain 
degree of contempt.'150 'As to the value placed on the work 
and recommendations of the Council of Europe, the House of 
Commons in the 1950s seemed to pay little, if any attention - 
nor, I suspect, did Whitehall and Ministers. After all, if 
you sent people to Strasbourg ... you'd think they were
146 Times 17.5.51
147 see De Freitas, 2.7.53, HC Deb.517.585
148 John Hay
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probably just having a good time there and you needn't take 
their reports, etc, particularly seriously.'151
Strasbourg was also seen as a distraction from an MP's work at 
Westminster. 'Going to Strasbourg made life complicated 
because of the tug-of-war between the choice of whom was 
recalled when there was a two- or three-line Whip. If those 
who had been selected were keen on Europe and had respect for, 
and hoped to make something of the Council of Europe - we were 
very reluctant to send people haring back to vote in 
Westminster, because it looked like a lack of respect for WEU 
and the Council. Some people found it quite a nuisance 
because they felt they missed a lot at [Westminster]. The 
Council of Europe was not a powerful body, but it was 
immensely interesting.'152
Given the pervading Conservative scepticism towards the 
Council of Europe and the government's desire to forestall any 
free-lance promotion of closer links with Europe, the 
selection of delegates to the Assembly in the 1950s cannot be 
taken as an guide to enthusiasm for Europe.153
Recommendations were made by the Whips Office on several 
grounds:
(i) one was certainly support for closer relations with 
Europe: 'Quite a few who were able to be included more than 
once, ie who got more than a year there, became more and more 
convinced and persuaded that this game was for real - and that 
the UK having made some bad blunders at the start should buck 
up'.154 Another was a facility for European languages. The 
delegations always included a member of the Ulster Unionists,
151 John Hay
152 Sir Robin Chichester Clarke interview with author
153 John Hay
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to counter any accusations of Conservative neglect of the 
province, and criticism from the Irish Republic over the 
north? and a Whip.155
(ii) it was a method short of office of rewarding and 
encouraging promising backbenchers, who might show with 
Strasbourg experience that they were worthy of junior office;
(iii) an assessment of the MP's reliability not to get swept 
away by the heady (and 'unrealistic') rhetoric of the 
continentals;156
(iv) on the basis of ability and suitability for some area of 
the Council's work. 'I was asked because I was known to be a 
solicitor by profession and, as the Chief Whip's secretary put 
it on the phone when asking me if I wanted to go: 'They've got 
a Legal Committee which you could be on" ; 157
(v) there was an element of 'widening the horizons' of a few 
Conservatives, to cultivate their interest in Europe. As 
Chief Whip, Heath asked Ursula Branston who was secretary to 
the delegation in Strasbourg, whether she had 'any ideas on 
the composition of the next group, and "What did I think of 
the way things were going, the feelings of those who were 
attending?"'
'I myself was not very enthusiastic about how things were 
going, and pointed out that the Europeans themselves were 
disappointed because we did not have enough 'stars', our 
delegation was rather piano politically, with no sign of 
it having much clout back home. Heath thought this was
155 Sir Robin Chichester Clarke
156 Mott-Radclyffe was one such delegate ’who came from a much earlier school of 
thought (and who) was too much a cynic to really believe we Europeans knew what we were 
talking about.’ Sir Peter Smithers
157 John Hay
- 185 -
rather naive of me and replied, "the more people we can 
send who are not stars but likely to become interested in 
Europe in the future, the better." He persisted in 
sending [people] with orders to observe and learn; they 
were to make up their own minds but understand they were 
to do as directed. Therefore he was a strong force in 
the Whips' office for Europe behind the scenes. Of 
course the leader was always appointed by the 
Conservative leadership. Those who went to Strasbourg 
learnt an enormous amount, and the seeds of the future 
were sewn but they did not come up to the extent that 
Heath hoped. It was very much an uphill struggle. None 
of the British delegates to Strasbourg were very 
prominent politicians back home. They had no drawing 
power. Television was not as powerful as it is now. 
Rippon, Martin Madden, David Price, etc. were all 
excellent people but Westminster was the only place they 
could secure an audience. It was no good their going 
round the country.'158
All in all, 'Strasbourg did not make much impact. It did not 
get much publicity, although [there was] a certain amount in 
the universities', but it never got a grip on British public 
or political opinion.159
The Distraction of Imperial Preference:
The struggle for Europe in the 1950s must be seen in tandem 
with the party debate over imperial preference.160 Once 
this cause had been defeated by Thorneycroft at the 1954 party 
conference, with his successful attack on a critical motion on
158 Ursula Branston
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the GATT, the party was free to look beyond the immediate 
horizon of the Empire and Commonwealth to closer economic 
links with Europe.
In the first months of the Conservative government, Britain's 
sterling crisis prompted earnest political debate on the 
optimum way to solve the country's pressing problems. There 
was a universal Tory desire to escape from the domination of 
the mighty dollar, but attitudes varied on how best to 
construct an economic unit 'which can stand on its own feet, 
in which the countries of the free world outside the dollar 
area can live and breathe'.161 For a section of the 
Conservative party imperial preference was the obvious 
solution. This cause echoed the moves of those who placed 
greatest emphasis on Britain's links with her Commonwealth and 
Empire over and above Britain's commitment to NATO and ideas 
of Atlantic Union.162 Approximately 30 Conservative signed 
an EDM urging the government to remove where possible 
obstacles to establishment of imperial preference.163 Some 
'enthusiasts for the Empire [thought] of Imperial unity and 
European unity as contradictory causes'.164 For others
'there was no cleavage between the two'165: Empire and Europe 
'were compatible, indeed complementary'.166
'It is difficult to realise today [1993] just how 
powerful [the idea of Empire] was right up to the early 
Sixties. Many of us thought, including myself, that the 
concept could be revived and indeed could take on a new
161 Boothby letter, Times 21.2.52
162 see Hugh Berrington: Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons 1945-55, p. 172
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and greater dimension in the form of the Commonwealth. 
This would give Britain a part more in keeping with her 
post-war capabilities, would free rein to the political 
aspirations of the Colonial Empire and the Dominions, and 
would give us a distinctive position in the modern 
geopolitical scene. It was attractive from every point 
of view. Some thought that it was a case of Europe or 
the Commonwealth and, if that were so, there was no doubt 
which it should be. No one said and I doubt anybody 
thought that the Commonwealth was a dead duck from the 
start.'167
The Conservative Party and Europe: 1955-1956
(a) Europeanists 
Departures:
Rupert de la B6re 
Walter Fletcher 
Thomas D Galbraith 
Christopher Hollis 
Professor Douglas Savory 
Gerald Williams
(b) Anti-Europeanists:
Departures:
Sir John Mellor
(c) The Revival of Interest in Europe:
Although 'the great majority of the party did not pay much 
attention to Messina' (June 1955) as 'we were fully involved 
on the defence side through Eden's WEU, and through NATO,
167 Sir Peter Smithers
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Germany had come back into "the family"',168 over the next 
eighteen months, there was a revival of interest in Europe, 
thanks to an influx of younger MPs in the May 1955 Parliament. 
Of these, again there was a hard core. 'Geoffrey Rippon was 
the main swing of this, and got a group going after his 
election to Parliament in 1955. There were only a few of us, 
6 or 7 in the original group':169
Richard Body 
Keith Joseph170 
Peter Kirk 
Martin Maddan 
Robert Mathew 
Geoffrey Rippon 
John Rodgers
Rippon171 had been in local government in the late 1940s, and 
'had started organizing linking European councillors and local 
government - it was the forerunner of town twinning. Martin 
Maddan172 got a group around him who used to meet at the 
English Speaking Union. He was a federalist - there is 
something about Brasenose!/173 Richard Body174 'rather went 
along with some of the federalist arguments. The 
constitutional significance had not struck me at that point.' 
Other in-coming Conservatives who were particularly
168 Private information
169 Sir Richard Body
170 MP for Leeds North East February 1956-87
171 MP for Norwich South 1955-64; Hexham 1966-87
172 MP for Hitchin 1955-64; Hove 1965-73. Deputy Chairman of Federal Union’s 
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174 MP for Billericay 1955-59; Holland with Boston 1966-
sympathetic were Frederick Corfield175 (a barrister in the 
same chambers as Mathew) whose ideas for greater European co­
operation stemmed from his lengthy incarceration as a German 
POW? and David Price,176 a close personal friend of Kirk.177
For the Conservative Europeanists, Messina was the 'result of 
the Government's refusal to assume its responsibility in an 
intergovernmental organization, the Council of Europe, in the 
Fifties. Those such as myself thought of it as just what we 
expected and thought it would succeed.'178 Their views 
differed sharply to those who thought the whole project would 
fail (Eden, Maudling, Selwyn Lloyd). However, concern that 
'Britain would be left behind again'179 had been growing 
slowly but steadily on the Conservative backbenches.180 
'There was a ground swell of opinion'181 between November 
1955 and July 1956 in favour of a more positive attitude 
towards the discussions on a common market initiated at 
Messina. Backbench concern at EURATOM proposals surfaced in 
party committees182 but were dismissed by government 
ministers, who were convinced that the relance was 'doomed to 
failure' because lack of popular support in France for 
supranational solutions183 and because of French
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77 MP for Gravesend 1955-64; Saffron Waldon 1965-74
78 Sir Peter Smithers
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protectionism.184
A group of backbenchers, notably Boothby and Rippon, were 
determined that Britain should try to direct this 'impetus'. 
Boothby raised the topic in the House, pointing out it would 
be 'very unfortunate if a common market were to be formed in 
Europe with great reciprocal advantages to the countries 
concerned and we were totally excluded'.185 Three weeks 
later Rippon moved an adjournment debate on 5 July 1956 in 
which he and Boothby pressed the government to give reasons 
for its policy of indifference towards the Messina process. 
Edward Boyle, Economic Secretary to the Treasury, who was 
known to be sympathetic to greater co-operation with the 
Continent, was given the task of replying for the government. 
He did this 'unsatisfactorily',186 although Rippon and his 
group took some comfort from Boyle's assurance that 'the 
Government have not got a closed mind on the subject'.187
Faced with an impending important OEEC meeting, and concerned 
that a decision 'cannot be long delayed' while the government 
claimed 'that we cannot be sure at this stage that the venture 
will succeed',188 Rippon, Mathew, and Rodgers put down an EDM 
on 10 July 1956, which suggested sending an observer to the 
Messina Talks. They were anxious Britain should play 'a full 
and effective part in the preliminary stages'.189 If
Britain took a negative attitude, 'we may well have to face 
the implications of them succeeding without us'. These MPs 
conceded that given Britain's special position the government
184 Thorneycroft and Macmillan, FAC 14.3.56
185 Boothby, 19.6.56, HC Deb.554.1207
186 Lord Rippon interview with author
187 Robert Mathew letter, Times 13.7.56
188 Mathew
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might have to make a number of reservations, especially on 
agriculture, and that a common market might be acceptable in 
some form, but not in another. Above all, they did not want 
Britain to be in a position in which other West European 
nations signed a draft treaty, and Britain was obliged either 
to stand aside, or take part on terms that she had no part in 
settling.190
As the enthusiasts admitted, there had been 'remarkably little 
public interest in the country at large ... focused on the 
vital question of the establishment of a Common Market'.191 
However, they remained intent on demonstrating that there was 
growing backbench 'recognition of the importance of the issues 
at stake'192 and support for British moves towards the Six, 
rather than merely 'letting them get on with it, as we can 
join them at any time'.193 'It seems a comparatively timid 
move today, but at the time it was a brave thing to do.'194 
The motion expressed agreement 'in principle on the 
establishment by stages of a common market in Western Europe' 
and urged the government to accept the invitation to 
participate in the negotiations, 'with a view to ensuring that 
if, or when, any treaty is signed the way will be open for 
British participation ... on an acceptable basis and in 
accordance with the interests of the Commonwealth and 
Empire'.195
190 Mathew; Boothby, 19.6.56, HC Deb.554.1207 and 5.7.56 HC Deb.554.1673-74
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Sponsored by Rippon,196 Mathew, Rodgers, Joseph, Harold 
Steward and the Liberal MP Holt, this EDM was signed by 89 
Tory and Liberal MPs (62 Labour MPs signed a similar EDM). 
'There is always an element of Smoking Room jollity in signing 
EDMs, but they are a good expression of growing opinion. Both 
my EDMs showed a certain pressure to move towards the 
Community.'197 The signatures attached to this EDM show age 
and date of entry into Parliament were closely related on MPs' 
attitudes to Europe. Of the 1955 entry, 'the Europeans 
outnumbered the Empire men by nearly 2:l'.198 Rippon and his 
colleagues were seeking to nudge the government towards 
accepting the basic principle of British participation, in the 
belief that once this had been achieved, there would be ample 
room for manoeuvre and compromise, provided there were 
safeguards and exceptions, notably for agriculture and 
horticulture. British participation would open co-operation 
on a far wider basis. They argued 'no fundamental conflict of 
interest or ideology' existed between those who advocated an 
expanded Commonwealth and those who urged closer integration 
of Western Europe.199
(d) The Conservative Europeanists and the European Free Trade 
Area (EFTA1:
By the mid-1950s 'more and more people recognized that the old 
pattern of trade with the Commonwealth was breaking down, and 
this involved the exploitation of the European market'. 'The 
Commonwealth is still our biggest market, [but] it is not the
196 Sandys’ PPS - which ’demonstrates the greater latitude permitted to a PPS in the mid- 
1950s’: Lord Rippon
197 Lord Rippon
198 Hugh Berrington: Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons 1955-59, p.90 and 
pp. 117-119.
199 Rippon letter, Times 3.10.56
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market which is expanding the fastest.'200 There was a 
feeling among younger MPs, with the signs of the eventual 
break-up of Britain's colonial empire, that Britain could no 
longer have a captive market. But 'we wanted to keep the 
sterling area: we attached enormous importance to this.'201
Britain's relations with the Commonwealth and Europe were an 
increasingly popular political topic in the autumn of 1956. 
The plan for a free trade area - Plan G - which had begun to 
take shape in early 1956,202 was paraded before the party 
conference at Llandudno in early October, following 
Macmillan's and Thorneycroft's proposals to Commonwealth 
Finance ministers gathered in Washington for the IMF meeting 
in September 1956.
The main concern at Llandudno, apart from the Suez question, 
was Britain's links with the Commonwealth and Empire. The new 
Expanding the Commonwealth Group, which favoured widening the 
Commonwealth rather than widening the Empire, published a 
pamphlet during the conference suggesting foreign countries 
'accepting the fundamental principles upon which the 
Commonwealth is founded' might be permitted to become members. 
'A free association of Commonwealth communities comprised the 
seeds of a world system for which the middle powers are 
craving.'203 A Commonwealth partnership was best suited to 
a shrinking world threatened by partition between America and 
Russia.
This free trade area plan offered 'the way out' between the 
emerging European Economic Community and the Commonwealth, 
with the proposal for British 'association' with the Six by
200 Maurice Macmillan maiden speech, 26.11.56, HC Deb.56\.70-74
201 Lord Rippon
202 Alistair Home: Macmillan 1894-1956, p.386
203 Times 4.10.56
- 194 -
means of a free trade area. This preserved ties with the 
Commonwealth by guaranteeing the continued free entry of goods 
into Britain. Most Conservatives favoured a free trade 
area.204 It would 'open our export trade to the most rapidly 
expanding major market in the world'; it would 'prevent the
exclusion of the UK from European trade? it would 'preserve
the spirit and substance of imperial preference'; it would be 
advantageous, to the Commonwealth, 'both as a growing market 
... and a source of capital'? and British association in the
early stages would 'enable us to shape and influence the
detailed planning'.205
There was a residue of opposition from the diehard imperial 
wing with arguments for the need of an extensive preferential 
system outside as well as within the Commonwealth system: 
Britain should assert her full right to discriminate. Free 
trade was only beneficial to the creditor and highly dangerous 
to the debtor.206 There were also decided and persistent 
Conservative reservations about agricultural and horticultural 
produce,207 as Macmillan acknowledged with his assurance to 
the party conference that it would 'be an absolute condition 
that agricultural products of all kinds ... should be 
excluded' to preserve the Commonwealth structure and to 
protect home agriculture.208 Others saw 'great risks in this 
policy. Some industries would be able to seize the greater 
opportunities abroad, others would feel keener competition at 
home. There would have to be changes to the industrial
204 see Rippon letter, Times 3.10.56, and Richard Hornby, 26.11.56, HCDeb.561.84-88
205 Conservative Research Department paper, 26.10.56, summarizing Conservative 
Finance Committee meeting 23.10.56
206 Legge-Bourke letter, Times 25.9.56
21X7 see Hornby, HCDeb.561.84-88
208 CRD summary 26.10.56
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pattern ... and these would not always be welcome.'209
209
210 
211 
212 
213
Conservative opinion was divided on the ultimate role of the 
free trade area: was it a rival to the emerging Common Market, 
or a halfway house? 'Many saw [EFTA] as a counterweight in 
the beginning, as well as a stepping stone. I did not see it 
as a suitable permanent alternative.'210 A few saw it as a 
deliberate wrecking tactic: 'The whole EFTA exercise was meant 
to throw a spanner in the works [which it, predictably, failed 
to do]. Encouraged by Eden, the Foreign Office had persuaded 
themselves that the supra-national idea would fail and they 
would seek to give it a push in that welcome direction.'211
At this point the government had not yet come to final 
conclusions on this very complicated subject. The
Commonwealth had been consulted? it was canvassing industry, 
both the employers and the Trade Union Congress.212 
Complementing these moves, Rippon and his small band persisted 
in their efforts to persuade the government to co-operate in 
the Messina proceedings, acting as parliamentary sponsors for 
Federal Union's survey of attitudes of members of Commonwealth 
Parliaments since the Commonwealth seemed to be the main 
hindrance.213 Rippon, Maddan and Rodgers, together with 
Spens, Stoddart-Scott, and Braine put down a second EDM on 12 
December 1956. This was signed by 110 MPs and urged the 
government to call a conference with the West European powers 
to consider further practical steps towards European unity, in 
the belief that the 'best interests of the UK and the rest of 
the Commonwealth lie in the closer association of the UK with
CRD summary
Lord Rippon
Sir Peter Smithers
CRD summary 26.10.56
Pinder and Mayne, p. 147
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Western Europe in conditions which safeguard existing 
Commonwealth relationships'. Shuckburgh cynically attributed 
the sizeable Tory support for joining some sort of European 
confederal system to baser electoral motives as the 
Conservative electoral prospects were 'at present very 
dim'.214
One effect of the Suez crisis was to increase Conservative 
support for participation in a new West European 
community.215 Disassociation with America was not in the 
sponsors' mind,216 but 'there was an element of anti-US 
feeling for people like Hinchingbrooke ... Some of the 
converts to our pro-Europe policy were very critical of 
Eisenhower and Dulles'.217 The assumption that 'America 
would never stand aside if British vital interests were at 
stake'218 had been rudely dispelled. 'As a result we must 
now turn urgently to consolidating our relations with Europe, 
for example the creation of a free trade area in association 
with a common market. By moving closer to Europe we stood the 
best chance of improving our relations with the United 
States.'219 Amery looked beyond this: a concerted common
European policy could be pursued in the Middle East if 
possible with America, and without her if necessary.220
214 Shuckburgh, p.361
215 Berrington, 1955-59, p. 106; see Hay, Ramsden and Lindsay letter, Times 28.11.56
216 Lord Rippon
217 Lord Rippon
218 Smithers, FAC 14.11.56
219 Smithers and Braine, FAC 14.11.56
220 CRD summary of Consultative Assembly general political debate 8-11.1.57
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The Influence of Conservative Europeanists 1955-56;
The British government confidently anticipated that, thanks to 
Eden's success in rearming Germany through WEU in 1954, the 
British preference for inter-governmental co-operation had 
triumphed and the French bid for European leadership had been 
foiled; henceforth there would be no nonsense about 
supranational structures. The relance following the meeting 
at Messina in June 1955 thus came as a disagreeable surprise. 
However, this did not fundamentally alter British 
officialdom's perception of European supranationalism as an 
irrelevance. Britain could join the track at any time. There 
was no urgency.221
Rippon's EDMs, although they gathered substantial backbench 
support had no effect on the government policy on the Messina 
discussions. The Conservative government did not desire a 
customs union, for the same reasons that had influenced its 
Labour predecessors. Treasury officials were convinced that 
Messina would weaken the OEEC, the British choice for economic 
co-operation with Europe. However, these backbench gestures 
did bolster government moves towards Europe through a free 
trade area, once these had been initiated by Macmillan and 
Thorneycroft, ably supported by Lee and other civil servants 
at the Board of Trade. Thorneycroft had concurred that the 
right way to deal with the problem was not by direct assault 
but by showing good will and co-operation. 'That had already 
succeeded in pushing France to one side'222 and the 
manifestations of backbench pressure 'encouraged Macmillan to 
enter Britain into negotiations, with the feeling of well- 
founded backbench support'.223
221 Lord Eccles, recalling Sir Roger Makins’ reaction
222 FAC 14.3.56
223 Lord Rippon
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Rippon's EDMs did not develop into a concerted backbench 
campaign. Although neither EDM was uncompromisingly European, 
both prompted an amendment from Legge-Bourke, denouncing 
attempts to lure Britain into federal schemes 'incompatible 
with our free association of sovereign states'. He was 
supported by Alan Green and Captain Orr; and by Vere Harvey, 
Lucas, Biggs-Davison, Paul Williams, McAdden, Hirst, Page and 
- surprisingly - Beamish. Nor did the government welcome the 
second 'unhelpful' demonstration. The Chief Whip told Rippon 
if he continued with 'these motions' he might have to give up 
being a PPS.224 The government's emphasis remained
resolutely on EFTA, not the Messina approach.
Summary:
For the Tories in the 1950s, Europe was the dog that did not 
bark. After their party's reelection, the Conservative 
Europeanists were remarkably impotent compared to their 
influence when in opposition. But they formed neither a 
coherent nor a sizeable group in Parliament; none was a 
leading politician? and their cause did not achieve a 
resonance within the parliamentary party and in the country. 
For most Tories, the developments of the Six prior to 1954 
were merely a 'temporary emotional aberration'?225 There did 
not seem the need for Britain to strive for leadership in 
Europe to divert attention from federalism. The majority of 
those who guestioned Eden's approach were the imperial 
preference stalwarts, who regarded Britain's struggle over the 
GATT to be of prime importance. Those imperially-minded MPs, 
who wanted to use Europe to fight multilateralism and 
domination by the dollar area, were very few. Gradually, the 
tide turned in favour of the pro-Europeans, thanks in large
224 Lord Rippon
225 CRD pamphlet: Some Reflections on British Foreign Policy, written by Ursula 
Branston. March 1959.
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part to the defeat of imperial preference. 'Eden's
resignation in January 1957 did seem to mark the departure of 
a generation within the Foreign Office itself, and the arrival 
of people like Donald Maitland [who went on to help Edward 
Heath negotiate Britain's entry into the Common Market] who 
were strong Europeans.'226
226 Wilfred Sendall
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CHAPTER 6: THE GENESIS OF THE SUEZ GROUP AND THE ANTI-SUEZ
GROUP
The formative experiences of the Suez Group were the debacles 
over Palestine in 1947-1948 and Abadan in 1951. Although 
Conservative critics of the Labour Government's handling of 
these crises were unable to pressure the government either 
into imposing a settlement in Palestine or despatching troops 
to protect British lives and property at Abadan, both episodes 
served to identify those Tory MPs who held passionate views 
about Britain's place in the Middle East1 and the best means 
to sustain her pre-eminent position. The short but intense 
Conservative party furore over the proposed agreement with 
Egypt over the Sudan proved the catalyst of the Suez Group.
The Irresponsibility of Opposition vs the Constraints of 
Power:
In opposition Churchill and his shadow cabinet could evade 
difficult choices by giving their backbenchers their head, as 
the Abadan crisis demonstrated. Although Churchill reined in 
some of the more extreme utterances of his supporters, there 
was no need for him to worry too scrupulously about the 
practical effects of the belligerent approach Conservatives 
were advocating. In contrast, the resumption of
responsibility in October 1951 necessarily demanded a coherent 
and pragmatic approach; the government's slim majority (17) 
also meant the Conservative party could no longer tolerate 
internal differences to the same degree.
Despite the constraints of power, there was a greater tendency 
to rebellion within the party. Certainly the stern 
instruction to errant backbenchers 'not to rock the boat' had 
the desired effect in some cases and the first eighteen months
1 Lord Ameiy
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of Churchill's government was 'touch and go'2 which, in 
itself, instilled party discipline. However, as the economy 
improved and the party's confidence grew, by the 1953-54 
session Conservative stirrings were much more noticeable. The 
Whips' hope that the government's slim majority would militate 
against too public and vigorous a demonstration of backbench 
discontent was not realised as the government faced internal 
revolts on a wide range of issues: fiscal policy, transport 
policy, commercial television, MPs' salaries, imperial 
preference/opposition to the GATT treaty, and foreign policy.3
There were various reasons for this backbench waywardness. 
Eden's reinstatement as Foreign Secretary, Butler's elevation 
to the Exchequer, and the despatch of Macmillan to the 
apparently marginal Ministry of Housing, ensured that 
Churchill's peace-time government was of a progressive stamp4 
which was not to the taste of the robust element on the Tory 
backbenches. Even those who accepted the need for Butler's 
measures craved a policy distinct from the socialists.5 There 
was also resentment over the rapid promotion of recent 
newcomers, such as Hopkinson, and jealousy over Sandys' 
promotion. The non-partisan emphasis of Churchill's 
administration greatly aggravated party discontent.6 
Backbench dissatisfaction that Churchill had surrounded 
himself with old cronies, giving little opportunity to postwar 
entrants at junior ministerial level, necessarily created a 
ripple effect onto the conduct of foreign policy; it liberated 
those able, ambitious younger members who might otherwise have 
been silenced by ministerial office. In addition, among those
2 Lord Fraser
3 see Times 15.6.54
4 Times 15.6.54
5 Times 10.4.52
6 Times 10.4.52
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senior Tories left out7 were Ralph Assheton, a former 
Financial Secretary and Chairman of the Party, and Walter 
Elliot, a former Minister for Agriculture, Secretary of State 
for Scotland, and Health. The exclusion of both these men 
was to have important consequences for the government's Middle 
Eastern policy as both men spoke with great political 
authority and commanded wide respect outside their immediate 
circle.
In the 1950s there was a growing independence of thought on 
the backbenches. Whereas most 'pre-war Tories from 
traditional middle-class backgrounds had had loyalty bred into 
them'8, the 1950 and 1951 elections saw the return of 
independent-minded pre-war MPs, for example, Waterhouse and 
Herbert Williams, who interpreted loyalty to the party in a 
different fashion to the Whips, and the arrival of a number of 
MPs who felt 'a government should earn the support of its 
backbenchers, not demand it'.9 As the 1950s progressed, there 
was an increasing tendency to question the authority of those 
ministers who had made their political reputations before the 
War. In addition, lack of contact between senior ministers 
and their backbench colleagues10 underlined the importance of 
the party committees as a vital conduit between the front and 
backbenches, and meant any lack of information available in 
committee was all the more keenly felt.11 It became 
increasingly difficult for party managers to maintain the high 
degree of public unity that had characterized the Conservative 
party since 1945.
7 Richard Law and Austen Hudson were also excluded.
8 Andrew Roth: Heath and Heathmen (London 1972), p.86
9 Paul Williams interview with author
10 Harold Watkinson: Turning Points, p.33
11 see Gomme-Duncan, FAC 25.2.53
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THE SUEZ GROUP
Of all the backbench rebellions facing the Conservative 
government between 1951 and 1956 the Suez Group was the most 
serious. Butler as Chancellor encountered considerably less 
difficulty from the backbenches than Eden - undoubtedly 
because the Suez Group enjoyed the tacit support of Churchill. 
The economic ginger group enjoyed no such favour from their 
party leader, although they might have expected more support 
from a former Chancellor? Churchill's experiences in the 
1920s had undoubtedly made him extremely wary of economics.
Unlike the Europeanists, whose cause enjoyed active cross­
party support, the Suez Group was a Conservative creation.12 
It comprised approximately 40, with a core of approximately 
28. It enjoyed the private support of a far wider circle, but 
these 'crypto-Suez Group' MPs were not prepared to sign 
critical EDMs, let alone carry their opposition to Eden's 
Middle East policy into the division lobby.
Membership:
(a) 1953-54 
Julian Amery*
Ralph Assheton* (PC)
Peter Baker13 
Philip Bell
Walter Bromley-Davenport 
Frederick Burden 
Terence Clarke 
Robert Crouch*
Will 'Y' Darling*
Patrick Donner*
James Duncan*
12 During the Suez crisis Eden’s policy of military intervention did receive unlikely 
support from the Labour MPs Emanuel Shinwell and Stanley Evans.
13 Baker was forced to resign his seat (Norfolk South) in 1954 because a financial scandal.
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Anthony Fell 
Fergus Graham*
Robert Grimston*
John Hall 
Frederick Harris 
William Hicks Beach 
Lord Hingchingbrooke*
Christopher Holland-Martin*
Ian Horobin*
Montgomery Hyde* (UU)
Captain Kerby* (elected March 1954)
Hamilton Kerr*
Harry Legge-Bourke*
Guy Lloyd*
Fitzroy Maclean 
Patrick Maitland*
Douglas Marshall (withdrew February 1954)
Angus Maude*
John Mellor 
John Morrison 
Gerald Nabarro*
James Pitman*
Enoch Powell*
Ralph Rayner 
Reader Harris 
William Rees Davies*
Professor Douglas Savory (UU)
William Teeling*
Captain Charles Waterhouse* (PC)
Herbert Williams (died July 1954)
Sir Charles Williams* (PC)
Paul Williams*14 (elected May 1953)
In July 1954 the Suez Group lost Fitzroy Maclean (who later
14 * Voted against the Government on the Suez Canal Base Agreement in July 1954
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joined the government as Under Secretary of State for War), 
Bell, Bromley-Davenport and Powell. Powell came to the 
conclusion over the summer that the British 'empire of 
positions' which had replaced 'the empire of government of 
peoples' after Indian independence, was an inconceivable 
theory if Britain could not hold Suez.15 When the Suez Group 
reconvened in November Powell informed his colleagues that 'I 
would not be taking part in any nonsense over Cyprus'.16
b) 1955-56:
In the May 1955 election the Suez Group lost a number of 
supporters through boundary changes (Assheton) and decisions 
not to stand again (Donner, Mellor, Rayner and Savory). But 
there were more active recruits:
Richard Body 
John Biggs-Davison 
Alan Green 
Ray Mawby
Neil ('Billy') Mclean (elected to Parliament in December 1954) 
Captain Orr
(c) Sympathizers ('crypto-Suez Group') 1953-56:
Sir William Anstruther-Gray 
Eric Bullus 
Frederick Burden 
Beresford Craddock
Lord Cranborne (retired February 1954)
Petre Crowder
Douglas Dodds-Parker (joined government in November 1953) 
John Eden (elected February 1954)
Nigel Fisher
15 Enoch Powell
16 Enoch Powell
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Walter Fletcher (retired 1955)
Richard Fort
Douglas Glover
Alan Gomme-Duncan
John Howard (elected 1955)
Edward Leather
Jocelyn Lucas
John ('Jacko') Macleod
Sir Thomas Moore
David Ormsby-Gore
Charles Ian Orr-Ewing
Norman Pannell
John Peyton
Kenneth Pickthorn
Victor Raikes
Ronald Russell
Christopher Soames
Sir Colin Thornton-Kemsley
John Tilney
Arthur Vere Harvey
The Suez Group MPs
The two prime movers in the creation of the Suez Group were 
Captain Charles Waterhouse, MP for Leicester South-East since 
1950? and the son of his former ministerial colleague Leo 
Amery, Julian Amery, MP for Preston since 1950.
(a) Captain Waterhouse:
The patrician Waterhouse who was the Suez Group's official 
leader, had represented Leicester South from 1924-45. He was 
a member of the Tory old-guard who preferred private meetings 
with the minister concerned as the means to iron out 
differences over policy. A former junior minister under
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Baldwin and Churchill and a Privy Councillor, he was 
unfailingly courteous to friends17 but somewhat distant to the 
new boys of 1950 and 195118 - unless they were the sons of 
friends, or shared his robust views on the requirements of the 
continuation of Britain's imperial role. Some of the newer 
entrants tolerantly described him as 'an old war horse'19 and 
dismissed his interventions. Others regarded him as a 'most 
unattractive character'20, commenting that his retention of 
the rank 'Captain' in peace-time was revealing21, and 
interpreted his role in the Suez Group 'as a sort of 
redemption' for his support for Munich.22 However, among
Waterhouse's older pre-war colleagues there was greater 
sympathy and understanding for his outlook23, even if these 
MPs did not share his views. Those such as Godfrey Nicholson 
on the party's liberal wing, recognized that Waterhouse's 
stance had a resonance in the constituency associations, even 
if it appeared increasingly outdated in the cold light of 
Britain's parlous economic position in the early 1950s.
Through his service in the Life Guards and his younger 
brother, Major General Guy Waterhouse,24 Waterhouse enjoyed 
widespread contacts with the military? his contacts were 
reflected and enhanced by his election to the Chairmanship of 
the backbench Defence Committee in November 1951. Waterhouse
17 Lord Amery
18 Sir Gilbert Longden interview with author
19 John Baldock
20 Private information
21 Private information
22 Sir Anthony Nutting
23 Sir Godfrey Nicholson
24 Former Inspector General and head of the British Advisory Military Mission to the Iraq 
army 1938-41.
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also took a leading position in the backbench ginger group 
which was fiercely critical of Butler's economic policy. 
Known as 'Slasher Waterhouse'25 because of his ardent campaign 
for large cuts in spending - which could only mean slashing 
social services - in July 1953 he was chosen as the Chairman 
of the Select Committee on Estimates. Waterhouse had also 
served as Chairman of the Conservative Conference in 
Scarborough 1952 and had given 'tacit approval to extremists' 
demands for a 2/= cut in income tax.26 His detractors held 
that his widespread business interests in the colonies27 had 
a direct bearing upon the areas of his political activity. 
Certainly, Waterhouse did have close business links with the 
British colonies in Southern Africa (his son also lived in 
Southern Rhodesia), and he was one of those people who later 
formed the pro-Rhodesia group in the 1960s.
(b) Julian Amery:
Through his personality and ability, Julian Amery rapidly came 
to outshine most of the Suez Group rebels, including 
Waterhouse, the Group's nominal leader.28 Amery was one of 
the leading Conservative critics of Labour's mishandling of 
the Abadan crisis, but it was the Conservative government's 
seemingly imminent grant of self-government to the Sudanese in 
early 1953 which spurred him and like-minded colleagues to 
take co-ordinated action. He and Waterhouse had been on 
civil, if rather distant terms since Amery's arrival in 
Parliament. A chance meeting in a lift in Cape Town in 
January 1953 proved decisive. Waterhouse had just visited the
25 Daily Telegraph 11.7.53
76 Daily Telegraph 11.7.53
27 For example, he was chairman of the Zambezie Exploring Company and the Rhodesia- 
Katanga Company.
28 Observer 20.12.53
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Sudan and was deeply disturbed that Eden seemed poised to 
'give it away'. Amery replied that what was even more serious 
was the rumour that, under American pressure, Eden was 
considering pulling out of the Suez Canal base, which would 
mean that Britain could not hold the Sudan anyway. They both 
came home and began talking to friends.29
Amery was a paradox, a true latter-day Social Imperialist: 
his pronounced liberal views in social policy accorded ill 
with the Suez Group's older members' more traditional views of 
the efficacy of capital punishment and the pernicious effect 
of the welfare state. His passionate advocacy of the 
compatibility of an expanded Commonwealth and closer links 
with Europe were compatible, were diametrically opposed to the 
opinions of many of his chosen colleagues in the Suez Group, 
(such as Legge-Bourke and Herbert Williams). Highly 
intelligent, articulate, able, from an impeccably imperialist 
stable and married to Macmillan's daughter, as a new 
backbencher Amery enjoyed a multitude of advantages. He was 
one who had 'enjoyed the habit of power' from an early age, 
and he unquestionably benefitted greatly from the considerable 
respect and affection for his father whose connections he 
exploited with great effect.
However, his energy and drive raised some eyebrows among the 
more sedate and orthodox members of the party. Amery was 
respected and his ability was unquestioned, but he and his 
political methods were not widely liked nor approved. Amery 
was a natural 'plotter' - an arch plotter in some people's 
book - with an innate passion for intrigue. Through no fault 
of his own, he suffered from 'too much political baggage'. 
His and his father's determination to overcome the tragedy of 
his brother commanded widespread sympathy and admiration, but 
there remained a residue of the memory of this family
29 Lord Amery; Legge-Bourke, 16.5.57, HCDeb.570.629-630; Julian Amery: ’The Suez 
Group: a Retrospective on Suez’ in Selwyn Troen and Moshe Shemesh ed.: The Suez-Sinai 
Crisis 1956 (London 1990), pp. 110-126
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connection; and although in the eyes of many he had had a 
'good War', with his exploits among the Albanian partisans 
being legendary, not all middle-ranking Conservatives approved 
of the circumstances surrounding his involvement in Balkan 
resistance to Nazi Germany and regarded him as a youthful 
adventurer who had manipulated his father's position in 
Churchill's Cabinet to his own personal glory.30 Nor did 
his friendship with Randolph Churchill commend him to all, who 
questioned his judgment of men. In all, he made an 
exhilarating, if rather exhausting political stable mate.
(c) Lord Hinchinabrooke:31
'Treading on Amery's heels'32 on the topic of the future of 
Suez Canal base, Hinchingbrooke was never shy of expressing 
his views on any subject. His house in Great College Street 
had been an important venue for backbench ginger groups since 
the days of the Tory Reform Committee.33 A traditional High 
Tory - or rather 'an old-fashioned Whig'34 - of patrician 
appearance and always immaculately dressed, he was regarded 
with tolerant affection by his Conservative colleagues, even 
though his opinions became more and more 'manifestly mad' with 
the passing years.35
At first glance there appear glaring contradictions in 
Hinchingbrooke's thought: his statement 'at home and overseas
30 Private information
31 MP for South Dorset 1941-62
32 Andrew Roth: Enoch Powell - Tory Tribune (MacDonald 1970), p. 114
33 Paul Williams
34 Michael Foot, in Daily Herald 14.11.52
35 Sir Reginald Bennett
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our commitments exceed our power736 seems at odds with his 
support for retaining a British presence at the Suez Canal. 
However, this was a question of political perspective. A 
supporter of a more liberal economy, Hinchingbrooke advocated 
a fundamental shift in the government's approach to domestic 
and foreign policy, based on reducing the burden of taxation 
and state controls, expanding the frontiers of free trade, 
reducing tariffs and quotas, while maintaining imperial 
preference, and seeking peace by negotiation not by threat of 
force.37 He was vehemently opposed to rearmament, German or 
British, on economic grounds, arguing vociferously that the 
burden this would impose would prove disastrously counter­
productive and there was no evidence that Communist countries 
wanted to capture countries by military means? rather they 
wanted to capture them by policies and processes of the mind. 
That could be done if Britain reduced her standard of life by 
too much rearmament and by denuding the country of goods and 
services.38
The heir to the Earl of Sandwich whose family had been in 
politics for three centuries, Hinchingbrooke benefited from 
his aristocratic political connections. However, he had 
always avoided the comfortable route in politics. Before 
entering the political arena he had spent two years working as 
a Woolwich factory hand, where he had joined a union. In 1938 
he had supported the anti-Chamberlain lobby, and had been one 
of the prime movers in the establishment of the Tory Reform 
Group, constituted to implement the Beveridge Report, and 
acted as the Group's first chairman. Some of his colleagues 
were sufficiently moved by what they regarded as the betrayal 
of the Conservative laissez faire tradition in social policy 
to establish the Progress Trust the following year,
36 Hinchingbrooke letter, Times 2.7.51
37 letter, Times 2.7.51
38 speech, reported in Southern Times 6.4.51
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specifically to counter such subversive ideas. Ironically, 
Hinchingbrooke later became a member.39
Hinchingbrooke held a decidedly Burkean view of the 
responsibilities and duties of a MP4°? he formed 'his views 
independent of any sort of dictation from any source'41, and 
put loyalty to conscience above loyalty to party. He once 
declared at an Executive meeting of the South Dorset 
Conservative and Unionist Association that if elected to 
Parliament he claimed the right to express and act upon his 
own opinions. The tempers of the good burghers of South 
Dorset were put to the test; when Hinchingbrooke's campaigns 
of criticism against Britain's rearmament programme and the 
government's transport policy coincided with his part in 
Conservative backbench moves to oust Churchill42, in the 
autumn of 1952 his local constituency association tried to 
deselect him on the grounds that Hinchingbrooke's 'repeatedly 
publicly expressed opinions ... on foreign affairs [notably 
the Middle East and German rearmament] and repeated attacks on 
party leaders, ... [had] gradually built up the possibility, 
in the opinion of the Executive, that would make a present of 
the seat to a Socialist if our member were again a 
candidate.'43 Happily for Hinchingbrooke, this deselection 
attempt failed.
(d) Maior Harry Lecrcre-Bourke:
Another prominent member of the group, Legge-Bourke was 'the
39 Private information
40 Spectator 17.10.52
41 Brendan Bracken, quoted in Southern Times 30.4.51
42 see Dcdly Mirror 6.8.52
43 Times 10.10.52
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most popular man in the House of Commons'.44 A former regular 
soldier in the Royal Horse Artillery, who had been ADC to Lord 
Killearn (the British Ambassador in Cairo during the War) he 
was a man of great integrity and simplicity, to whom honour 
was paramount. Legge-Bourke also held decided views on an 
MP's right to express profoundly held convictions, which might 
or might not be in accordance with the official party line. 
In the general elections of 1950 and 1951 he publicly declared 
on the hustings that he reserved the right to disagree with 
his party 'on matters such as foreign affairs which ought to 
transcend party considerations'45, and had already disobeyed 
the party whip on Palestine and the Schuman Plan.
Legge-Bourke's first meeting with Amery on the Egyptian 
question took place in July 1952, just after the group of 
radical nationalist officers had seized power in Cairo. 'It 
was in the following winter recess [1952-3] that Julian rang 
me up and asked whether I would come to a meeting in his 
father's house [in Eaton Square] if I was not satisfied with 
what was happening in Egypt.'46 As a long serving officer 
accustomed 'when the firing is going on [to] concentrate on 
firing back', Legge-Bourke's membership of a rebellious 
faction was unusual.47 Although he was alone out of the Suez 
Group in going to the extreme of resigning the party Whip in 
1954 following the conclusion of Heads of Agreement on the 
Suez Canal Zone base, throughout the 1956 crisis he maintained 
a deafening silence in public, and was very measured in 
private: 'It was "I told you so”. Things were going exactly as 
he had warned, but he had done all he could [in 1954].'48
44 Sir Richard Body
45 letter, Times 20.7.54
46 Roth: Powell, p.99; also Legge-Bourke, 16.5.57, HC Deb.570.629-630
47 Paul Williams
48 Author’s conversation with Captain William Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry Legge-Bourke’s
son.
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(e) Other Members of the Suez Group:
Other vocal members were Patrick Maitland,49 the heir to the 
Earl of Lauderdale, who had 'a distinguished record as a 
correspondent for the Times' and as an ex-diplomat had had 
long-standing interest in foreign affairs? and Angus Maude,50 
a fellow journalist, a leading member of One Nation and a 
member of the party's backbench Education Committee. 
Intelligent, articulate and caustic, Maude lent forceful 
intellectual persuasion to the Suez Group's cause. So did 
Enoch Powell,51 intellectually the most formidable of these 
younger MPs; an original member of the One Nation group, 
Powell's powerful arguments in the Chamber savaging Labour's 
policies were the talk of the smoking rooms. Powell was not 
invited to the original meeting of the Suez Group, but joined 
the group later.52 Paul Williams (whose election for 
Sunderland in May 1953 provided a great tonic to the Tory 
party) was a rapid active recruit for the Suez Group's 
crusade) as were 'Billy' McLean53 and John Biggs-Davison54 
following their election to Parliament in December 1954 and 
May 1955 respectively. A long-standing friend of Amery and 
'Billy' McLean, Biggs-Davison was well versed in the Suez 
Group's arguments through his role as secretary to the Foreign 
Affairs Committee while working the Conservative Research 
Department, and through his regular attendance of the Suez 
Group's meetings.
Other important members of the Suez Group were Fitzroy
49 MP for Lanark 1951-59
50 MP for Ealing South 1950-58; Stratford on Avon 1963-83
51 MP for Wolverhampton South West 1950-74; South Down (UU) 1974-83
52 Roth: Powell, p.99
53 Amery’s close personal friend and war-time colleague, MP for Inverness 1954-64
54 MP for Chigwell 1955-74
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Maclean,55 Sir Guy Lloyd56 (very much a Tory grandee, and one 
of Eden's few close friends), and the erudite and immensely 
likeable Hamilton Kerr, Macmillan's PPS. Another larger-than- 
life character, Fitzroy Maclean had had 'good war' as 
Churchill's special envoy to Tito's partisans, was a former 
diplomat, an author and a man of great personal courage and 
integrity. However, Maclean was not a 'natural politician'.57 
Macmillan when Prime Minister was to drop him from his 
government with regret, commenting that sadly Maclean's 
literary fluency was not matched by any parliamentary oratory. 
In the party behind the scenes no less important were 
Christopher Holland-Martin58 and Ralph Assheton.59 Holland- 
Martin's name was 'rarely in the news';60 a banker who had 
only entered Parliament in 1951, he had been elected joint 
Treasurer of the Party. He was also Macmillan's brother-in- 
law, which gave him an additional connection to Amery. His 
lack of public eloquence was more than compensated in private 
where, as the holder of eight directorships, he was a powerful 
advocate for the City. Tall, bespectacled and retiring, 
Crossbencher described him as a 'chief strategist for the Suez 
Group'61 canvassing MPs, organizing two secret memos for 
Churchill and helping to draft the dissident EDM of December 
1953. Assheton and Maclean were both Lancashire MPs whose 
constituency industries were dependent upon Sudanese and 
Egyptian cotton. To his bitter disappointment, in October 
1951 Assheton was offered a post in government 'in charge of
55 until he withdrew in July 1954. MP for Lancaster 1941-59; Bute & North Ayrshire 
1959-74
56 MP for East Renfrewshire 1940-59
57 Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker
58 MP for Ludlow 1951-60
59 MP for Rushcliffe 1934-45; City of London 1945-50; Blackburn West 1950-55
60 Sunday Express 20.12.53
61 Sunday Express 20.12.53
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a department' which he declined since this would not have 
offered him the opportunity to shape economic and financial 
policy. Together Waterhouse, Assheton led a backbench group 
which was fiercely critical of Butler's fiscal policy.
The Formation and Organization of the Suez Group:
The spur to the formation of the Suez Group was not only 
Eden's proposed treaties with Egypt over the Sudan and the 
future of the Suez Canal base. These MPs were fundamentally 
dissatisfied with the impact of their opinions through the 
official channels of the party, notably the Foreign Affairs 
Committee. While the formation of their ginger group was in 
fact an admission that their influence had failed thus far, 
these MPs felt that more could be achieved by public dissent.
The first meeting of 'the Suez Canal Committee' was held at 
Leo Amery's house, No 112 Eaton Square, on 5 October 1953.62 
Thereafter there was an inner group63 which met regularly, 
invited by Julian Amery on Waterhouse's instructions,64 and 
an outer group 'that was more amateur'.65 Waterhouse also 
usually invited a Whip to the meetings,66 'so that he could 
see for himself what views were held and by whom'.67 
Afterwards Waterhouse would write to Churchill, Eden or
62 Leo Amery to Waterhouse, 30.9.53, Waterhouse papers
63 Waterhouse, Julian Amery, Assheton, Robert Grimston, Holland-Martin, 
Hinchingbrooke, Lloyd, Morrison, Powell, Horobin, Fitzroy Maclean, Charles Williams and 
Legge-Bourke. Waterhouse papers
64 Lord Amery
65 Paul Williams
66 Lord Amery
67 Amery, in Troen and Shemesh ed., p . l l l
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Buchan-Hepburn (the Chief Whip) reporting the group's views.68
Maitland, a journalist with wide-spread connections, was in 
charge of briefing the press, both formally at press 
briefings, and by the more devious route of private briefings 
for a friendly agency stringer, as the Suez Group could then 
use the foreign date-line report as the basis for embarrassing 
questions in the House.69 Amery also used his contacts in the 
press to great effect. Derek Marks at the Daily Express was 
an ally (although at times an unreliable one70), as were Colin 
Coote, Ivor Thomas and Peregrine Worsthorne at the Telegraph, 
Malcolm Muggeridge, the editor of Punch,71 and John Junor.72 
Inevitably, the Suez Group targeted the Northcliffe and 
Beaverbrook press which were inherently well-disposed to their 
cause.73 Biggs-Davison acted on Amery7s specific
instructions74 to ensure that the Daily Telegraph's and Times' 
editors were kept up-to-date of the group's meetings and 
deliberations, drawing their attention to specific points 'to 
make sure they understand the significance'.75 The composite 
column, Crossbencher - "quite an important and influential 
column? its touch of scandal certainly made it more 
interesting to read!'76 - was particularly useful. To begin 
with, only British newspaper correspondents were invited to 
the press briefings which following the Suez Group's meetings.
68 Amery in Troen and Shemesh ed., p . l l l
® Lord Lauderdale interview with author
70 Lord Lauderdale
71 Lord Amery
72 Arthur Gavshon interview with author
73 Amery to Biggs-Davison 8.11.53, Biggs-Davison papers
74 eg Amery to Biggs-Davison 8.11.53, Biggs-Davison papers
75 Amery to Biggs-Davison 8.11.53, Biggs-Davison papers
76 Arthur Gavshon
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'However, the Group realised then that it was very important 
to influence opinion overseas, and especially American 
opinion, and therefore began to see foreign correspondents 
privately.'77
As far as running the Suez Group was concerned, Amery and 
Powell acted as secretaries.78 Amery organized hiring 
committee rooms for Suez Group meetings79, and together with 
Powell arranged for information to be distributed.80 Amery 
also had the political connections? his father was very active 
in opposing Eden's policy on Egypt until his death in 1955 and 
Amery benefited enormously from contacts made through his 
father, at school (Eton), university (Balliol) and during the 
War (intelligence service).81 In comparison, Waterhouse had 
the 'political form'.
The Continuation of the Suez Group:
'After the conclusion of the 1954 agreement with Egypt 
although some ... fell away, most of us ... remained convinced 
that we had been right in our assessment of the consequences 
of abandoning the base and believed it would still be possible 
to retrieve the ground that had been lost.'82 Anxiety over 
Britain's future in Cyprus provided the momentum for the Suez 
Group's continued existence. The Suez Group's dissatisfaction 
with the Foreign Affairs Committee persisted. It remained
77 Arthur Gavshon
78 Amery, in Troen and Shemesh ed., p . l l l
79 Room J was usually used. Waterhouse papers
80 Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker
81 see Scott Lucas: Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis (London 1991), 
p. 101 and pp. 193-4
82 Amery, in Troen and Shemesh ed., p. 112
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fundamentally unimpressed with the argument that the Foreign 
Affairs Committee 'enabl[ed] backbench MPs not only to receive 
information from the Government but to clear their minds in 
general discussion'83, and with the information available from 
the government on, for example, the details of the offer to 
Makarios.84 Indeed this Committee appeared one of the 'organs 
of party control, registering favourable or unfavourable 
reactions',85 rather than as a means to promote an alternative 
approach. 'The Committee met more often to learn of decisions 
already taken instead of helping to make them.'86 Pressure 
from these rebels led to the formation of the Middle East Sub­
committee in April 1956, to meet fortnightly: as
Hinchingbrooke was elected chairman, 'Billy' McLean served as 
secretary and the subsequent lists of those attended included 
Maitland, Legge-Bourke, Paul Williams, Hugh Fraser and Biggs- 
Davison, this represented the official coming-of-age of the 
Suez Group.
The Position of the Suez Group within the Conservative Party:
Although the Suez Group was later described as the 'whiff of 
grape-shot school'87, they cannot all be dismissed as 'crusty 
right-wingers'.88 In many ways individual members of the Suez 
Group were not on the periphery of the party. A considerable 
number of these MPs held important positions behind the scenes 
in the official and unofficial backbench committees of the 
party, which gave their views far greater weight than has been
83 Peter Smithers, FAC 8.2.56
84 Amery, Williams and Glover, FAC 8.2.56
85 Amery, FAC 8.2.56
86 Maitland, FAC 8.2.56
87 Anthony Nutting: No End of a Lesson, p. 36
88 John Baldock
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recognized. In the judgment of their peers, these MPs were 
not negligible men, which contradicts the received wisdom that 
the Suez Group could be summarily dismissed as diehard 
reactionaries.
Assheton was one of the most senior Tories on the backbenches, 
whose considerable influence was not widely recognized outside 
Westminster.89 His preferred method of political influence 
was to see the minister directly. Waterhouse was chairman of 
the party's backbench Defence Committee, Hinchingbrooke was 
chairman of the Transport Committee and Holland-Martin 
occupied the post of Treasurer of the Party. Six of those 
who signed the Suez Group's critical EDM in December 1953 were 
executive members of the 19229° and Morrison91 who had been 
elected as vice-chairman of the 1922 committee in 1951, went 
on to become Chairman in 1955. By 1956 Amery, Maude and 
Hinchingbrooke were members of the 1922 executive? 
Hinchingbrooke was also vice-chairman of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, and Chairman of the Middle East Sub-Committee. The 
Suez Group did not conform to a stereotype. Eight were 
'political youngsters of 40 or less and nearly half [were] 
under 50'.92 It contained several ardent Europeans, and keen 
partisans of World Government.93 The group was not synonymous 
with traditional Conservative thought on domestic issues. 
Although some Suez Group MPs held decided reactionary views on 
economic policy and capital punishment, not all were diehard 
on all fronts. Amery, Biggs-Davison, Hinchingbrooke, Maude 
and Powell held progressive views on domestic reform94 and,
89 Sir Charles Mott-Radclyffe interview with author
90 Duncan, Morrison, Darling, Powell, Legge-Bourke and Hinchingbrooke
91 MP for Salisbury 1942-64
92 Crossbencher, Sunday Express 4.7.54
93 Hugh Berrington: Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons 1955-59, p. 110
94 Leon Epstein: British Politics in the Suez Crisis, p.51
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together with Hyde and Reader Harris, had voted for the 
abolition of capital punishment, In fact of the Suez Group 
in 1956, approximately half had voted against hanging.95 In 
other spheres they made a considerable contribution to 
political debate. Enoch Powell was at the forefront of the 
new progressive Conservatism spearheaded by Butler at the 
Conservative Research Department. In some cases they were 
certainly young men in a hurry, anxious to make their 
political mark.
A considerable number of the Suez Group MPs enjoyed close 
links with Britain's colonies, both through family connections 
and through business interests. Herbert Williams, Legge- 
Bourke and Biggs Davison held important positions on Council 
of Empire Economic Union, founded by Leo Amery in 1929.96 The 
Suez Group also benefited from individual members' war 
experience and contacts: many had served in the Middle East, 
and others profited enormously from their war-time association 
with the diplomatic and intelligence services - Maitland, 
Amery, Fitzroy Maclean, 'Billy' McLean, Hyde and Kerby. As a 
group they were able to tap their social contacts, as well as 
their army and intelligence links, which meant that they were 
remarkably well-informed. In the Abadan crisis de Chair was 
able to use confidential information about the supply of 
military spares and jets to Egypt, gleaned from his friendship 
with the South African Charge d'Affaires in Israel, to attack 
the Labour government, much to their horror.97
In the Suez crisis three former members of the Suez Group 
played a vital part in Edward Heath's remarkable success 
holding the party together. 'I doubt [Heath] would have
95 Biggs-Davison letter, Spectator 21.2.63
96 Lord Killeam, another vociferous critic of Eden’s determination to negotiate with 
Nasser, was also a member of the Council.
97 Somerset de Chair
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succeeded but for the MTory Squires” ... such as Morrison, 
Legge-Bourke, [Anthony] Hurd,98 etc, who in those days tended 
to dominate the 1922 executive and who had the great advantage 
that they were financially completely independent and had no 
ministerial ambitions to cloud their judgment or in any way 
inhibit expression of their views'.99 While Heath's 
achievement is admitted and admired,100 the role of the 
Chairman of the 1922 in 1956, the large, avuncular, then 
archetypal Tory squire John Morrison, is frequently 
overlooked. Morrison and Heath were not natural political 
bedfellows coming from very different strands of Tory 
tradition, but they worked together very successfully. Just 
as Heath's effectiveness as Chief Whip was enhanced because he 
came after 'a number of bad ones'101, so Morrison's character 
and style was better suited to his position as the conduit of 
backbench opinion, than that of his predecessor, Derek 
Walker-Smith. Formerly an active member of the Suez Group 
while serving as Vice-Chairman of the 1922, as Chairman of the 
1922 Morrison put aside such personal considerations. Just as 
suspicions of Heath's own private doubts about the whole Suez 
affair102 helped him to keep channels open to all factions 
within the party, feelings that Morrison privately held robust 
views about the appropriate manner with which Egyptians should 
be dealt undoubtedly kept his links open with diehard 
Conservatives. 'Straightforward, fairminded, seen as
sufficiently independent, not hand-in-glove with the Whips, he 
had no desire to seek fame and therefore wielded far greater 
influence.'103 But 'he kept his head well below the
98 MP for Newbury 1945-64
99 Sir Frederick Corfield interview with author
100 Sir Frederick Corfield
101 Sir Reginald Bennett
102 Sir Julian Ridsdale and Nigel Nicolson interviews with author
103 Sir Anthony Kershaw interview with author
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parapet'104 for there was no mileage in publicity in his role 
as Chairman of the 1922.
The Public Perception of the Suez Group:
Members of the Suez Group therefore held a more central place 
within their party than has generally been recognized, and 
they had access to important, indeed vital forums for airing 
their opinions. But, unfortunately for their cause, the Suez 
Group was not a sum of its parts; the Group did suffer from 
the image of being composed of 'political lightweights'105 - 
backwoodsmen who had an out-dated view of British resources 
and power. It was true that, although the Group included 
influential and respected politicians, many of its members 
remained marginal politicians.
Some cut amusing figures: Bromley-Davenport, whose booming 
interventions invariably attracted opposition cheers? 
Brigadier Ralph Rayner, who was greeted frequently with cries 
of 'Tally ho!' from the Labour benches (a reference to his 
passion for hunting) when he rose to his feet in the Chamber? 
William Rees Davies whose raffish air, (heightened by his 
habit of wearing a cloak) together with the accident during a 
tank exercise in the Second World War which had cost him an 
arm, earned him the nickname 'the One-armed Bandit'. And not 
all MPs lent a particular cachet to the Suez Group: Montgomery 
Hyde (once described as the kiss of death to any pressure 
group to whom he belonged)106 was an inveterate member of 
rebellious factions. Hyde, an Ulster Unionist, was not widely 
liked, and his occasional salacious interest in more prurient 
topics was viewed with distaste. Gerald Nabarro was another
104 Sir Richard Body
105 Times 8.12.56
106 confirmed by Aubrey Jones and Sir Gilbert Longden
- 224 -
outsider: loud, brash and widely unpopular, his dogged
persistence - over the Clean Air Act, for example - was 
admired, but frequently viewed as misguided107. Captain 
Kerby, a quiet, somewhat secretive man, sought to create the 
aura of diligence with his constituents through his assiduous 
use of written parliamentary questions and letters to his 
local press? dining room gossip that he was a Russian spy108 
did not lend weight to his contributions to political debate.
The Philosophy of the Suez Group:
Superficially the Suez Group appear a polyglot 'colourful' 
group109 whose common denomination was eccentricity. 
Certainly, given the disparate nature of the Group which 
included several ardent Europeans with the 'empire stalwarts', 
no overall hard and fast philosophy pervaded. But certain 
important strands of thought on foreign policy were common to 
all.
The Suez Group's members shared a coherent view about the 
position of the British Empire and Britain's role in world 
affairs. They were determined to maintain the Commonwealth as 
a political and military entity110 and hotly denied 
accusations that they were chauvinists with an illusory view 
of Britain's potential influence.111 As Amery expressed it, 
'our position - power-political as well as geographical - is 
one of being between Russia and America, or if you prefer to 
think ideologically, between Totalitarian Socialism and
107 Lord Orr-Ewing
108 Lord Orr-Ewing
109 Lord Orr-Ewing
110 Amery, in Troen and Shemesh ed., p .I ll
111 eg. Biggs-Davison letter, Spectator 21.2.63
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Liberal Capitalism ... Our survival must depend on our ability 
to provide a solution for the problems first, of our own 
people, then of the different grades of the nations drawn 
naturally into our orbit under the present political 
constellation, ie, the colonies, Mandates, Dominions, Middle 
East, the sterling bloc and Western Europe.'112
This view of Britain's natural position being between Russia 
and America was key to their beliefs. Britain remained one of 
the Big Three: she should continue to be and act as America's 
equal, on the basis of diplomatic tradition and experience and 
her position as head of the Empire and Commonwealth. Any 
retreat from Britain's global commitments was viewed as fatal 
to her prestige: it would destroy the illusion of 'the empire 
of positions'113 and admit decline into second class power 
status. The answer to the erosion of British influence and 
prestige was seen to lie in the extension and consolidation of 
imperial preference. Welding the Commonwealth together into 
a united bloc would ensure continued British influence in 
world affairs, for as leader of a large unit her wishes and 
opinions could not be ignored. After the defeat of the 
imperial preference issue at the party conference in 1954, a 
considerable number of Suez rebels sought to give cohesion to 
the Commonwealth through the Expanding Commonwealth Group: 
Maitland was chairman? other Suez Group members and 
sympathizers who were involved included Amery, Tilney, 
Hinchingbrooke, Biggs-Davison, Paul Williams, Craddock, Ronald 
Russell and Angus Maude.
As the principal enemy of imperial preference, America seemed 
the relentless foe of British interests. There was a common 
desire for Britain to assert her independence of the United
112 Amery to Biggs-Davison 17.1.45, Biggs-Davison papers
113 Enoch Powell
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States114 politically and economically. The Suez Group's gut 
feeling was that Britain had been 'dead wrong'115 to take the 
American loan in 1945; the British economy should be 
consciously directed to the Empire and - for the Europeanists 
within the Suez Group - Western Europe. Marshall Aid was seen 
as American economic imperialism. The US was 'a young and 
ebullient nation', so it was essential that Washington should 
look to London for diplomatic leadership. Britain was fatally 
cast in that role by her economic and geographic 
situation.116 The sinister hand of American influence was 
seen in every British overseas loss, especially in the Middle 
East where America appeared a dangerous, untutored rival. 
Everywhere was seen 'the State Department's desire to break 
the British Commonwealth and establish Britain and Europe as 
satellites of the US defence network'.117 Their passionate 
conviction that Britain was America's equal was a recurrent 
theme - as was their belief that successive British 
governments had been lamentably subservient to Washington with 
dire results, and that Britain was being reduced to being 
America' s ' lackey'.118
In the eyes of the Suez Group, there was insufficient 
concentration on the aims and purposes of British foreign 
policy generally: for example, with regard to America, did 
Britain want an unqualified, unreserved alliance or some kind 
of balance of power? Maitland felt that the Foreign Affairs 
Committee should discuss 'regularly, seriously, and 
methodically our objectives around the world'.119 Just as
114 Biggs-Davison to Amery 13.11.45, Biggs-Davison papers
115 Ameiy to Biggs-Davison 22.5.47, Biggs-Davison papers
116 Hinchingbrooke in Sidcup, Eltham and Kentish Times 7.3.52
117 Paul Williams to Kenneth Black, his constituency chairman, 12.9.56, Williams papers
118 Paul Williams constituency speech, reported in Times 1.12.56
119 FAC 8.2.56
- 227 -
anti-American feeling was engrained in the Suez Group,120 so 
too was a pronounced distrust of the United Nations. Not only 
had the Labour government lamentably failed to use the new 
organization as an effective tool in international diplomacy, 
'we seem to be the hacks and serving men of the UN, waiting 
for other nations to act and not exerting our own rights and 
insisting on united action'.121 Extensive use of the
Russian veto had crippled the organization, therefore Britain 
should return to traditional methods of great-power diplomacy.
The Suez Group and the Middle East:
The Middle East was 'the new Empire'122 for the Suez Group 
and their supporters. Britain's position there was pre­
eminent and should remain so. These MPs continued to regard 
the Middle East as the strategic gateway to India and the Far 
East. There was an overwhelming necessity to keep key 
positions? first and foremost was, of course, the Suez Canal 
base. Britain's position in the region appeared to be under 
threat from two fronts: America, whom the Suez Group firmly 
regarded as Britain's junior partner in the region, on the 
basis of tradition and Britain's 'superior knowledge'123 
rather than raw military power? and Russia. There continued 
the notion of the London/Delhi axis, despite the independence 
of India in 1947124 - the hope that the two great Indian 
dominions would go on co-operating with London, as would the 
old white Dominions.125 Ironically they shared this belief
120 Enoch Powell
121 Hinchingbrooke, reported in Dorset Daily Echo 5.10.51
122 Lord Amery
123 Amery to Biggs-Davison 29.5.48, Biggs-Davison papers
124 Aubrey Jones
125 Lord Amery
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with Eden. Eden, however, pinned his hopes upon regional 
treaties and (hopefully) accumulated goodwill to bolster 
British prestige and influence in the region.
The age and political experience of these MPs was very 
relevant to their views on Britain's natural position in the 
world. Just as the Suez Group's older members were of a 
generation which had never doubted that Britain was great, the 
younger MPs were the children of the appeasers, to whom Munich 
had been a sign that, to put it politely, their elders had 
lost their nerve. This idea of the critical importance of 
'holding one's nerve' recurs again and again in the Suez 
Group's arguments. Throughout Britain's dealings in the 
Middle East in the decade after the War, the Suez Group was to 
call constantly for Britain to stand firm - convinced that the 
other side would eventually come round to the British 
position, and a satisfactory conclusion could be reached. The 
Suez Group were not impressed by arguments of the debilitating 
effect on Britain's influence of British material weakness, 
echoing Foch's opinion that morale is to matdriel 20:1. In 
the Abadan crisis Legge-Bourke agreed that it was not vast 
numbers of British troops that were required, 'but an 
awareness of minds ... that Her Majesty's Government are 
determined to protect the King's subjects and the nation's 
treasure, wherever and whenever endangered'.126
Throughout this period the Suez Group was united in its 
opinion that successive British Governments were following*a 
'policy of drift' in the Middle East. Its consistent view was 
that Britain 'still has a major role to play in world 
affairs'.127 Its anger was directed at British dependence 
upon America, frustrated that support for America elsewhere, 
especially in Korea, had not led to any corresponding support 
for Britain in the Middle East. Many members harboured a
126 letter, Daily Telegraph 11.7.51
127 Paul Williams to Kenneth Black 2.5.57, Williams papers
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long-standing dislike of the Tripartite Declaration (of 1950 
which guaranteed the armistice frontiers of 1948), which they 
felt 'could land Britain in an appalling situation'.128
The Whips' View of the Suez Group:
Throughout the internal party debate on the future of the Suez 
Canal Zone base, the Whips were hard at work to minimize the 
effect of rebel views on the bulk of the party. 'Patrick 
Buchan- Hepburn was frightened of the Suez Group? he took a 
lot of private soundings about them, as he really thought the 
Suez Group could derail the show. He campaigned very 
hard.'129 Under Buchan-Hepburn, therefore, the Suez Group 
were not dismissed as a group of embittered ex-ministers and 
ambitious young men. Assiduous attention was paid to their 
behaviour, and great efforts made to develop and maintain good 
contacts with the dissidents.130 After his elevation to the 
Whips office Richard Broman-White' s war-time experience in the 
intelligence services undoubtedly stood him in good stead with 
Amery, 'Billy' McLean, Fitzroy Maclean and Hyde.
'The Suez Group was not just a "one-off” thing. It was a last 
glow of Britain's imperial era ... a string of people who were 
inclined to believe that the government had made a fatal 
switch of emphasis with the liquidation of the Empire after 
the War and in throwing our lot in with America. It was too 
high a price to pay for American support. Therefore the 
Whips' office paid quite a lot of attention to them. We had 
endless meetings and debates about it all ... The Suez Group 
had a resonance within the party and the constituency
m Hinchingbrooke MES-C 23.4.56; Fraser and Paul Williams, FAC 18.4.56
129 Sir Richard Thompson interview with author
130 Private information
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associations. They were much more than a safety valve.'131 
Throughout the on-again, off-again negotiations with Egypt the 
Whips were pressed hard to keep the party on the rails, as 
there developed 'an enjoyable cat-and-mouse game ... behind 
the Westminster scene between the Whips and rebels'.132 
They were prepared deliberately to limit public debate in the 
Commons on the issue if the need, and the opportunity, arose.
The Suez Group's EDM in December 1953 attracted even more 
comment for being published on the eve of two important 
Conservative backbench committee meetings and a foreign 
affairs debate; government whips quickly realised Churchill 
and Eden's interventions might not be enough to head off a 
public expression of unease and 'glumly resigned themselves to 
a two-day debate which would allow plenty of time for the Tory 
malcontents. The Whips were therefore wreathed in smiles when 
the Socialists decided on their vote of censure on the African 
muddle133 [since] it gave them the perfect excuse to cut the 
debate down to a single day.'134 Again in July 1954, 
Buchan-Hepburn left 'nothing to chance',135 sending three- 
line whips by telegram to all Conservative MPs to ensure their 
presence.
THE ANTI-SUEZ GROUP
This small group of Conservative MPs only emerged in the Suez 
Crisis of 1956. They did not play any part in the fight Eden 
encountered within his party in his determination to negotiate 
the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Sudan, nor the Suez Base
131 Sir Richard Thompson
132 Daily Sketch 15.12.53
133 The deposition of the Kabaka of Uganda.
134 Daily Sketch 15.12.53
135 Daily Telegraph 29.7.54
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Agreement in 1954.
Membership:
Jakie Astor*
Cyril Banks*136 
Philip Bell137 
Robert Boothby*
Alfred Bossom 
Edward Boyle*
Henry D'Avigdor Goldsmid 
Walter Elliot 
Sir Lionel Heald 
Keith Joseph 
Peter Kirk 
Hugh Lucas-Tooth 
Robert Mathew 
Frank Medlicott*
Godfrey Nicholson 
Nigel Nicolson*
Basil Nield 
Anthony Nutting*
David Price 
William Shepherd 
Alec Spearman 
William Whitelaw 
William Yates*138
In contrast to the well-organized Suez Group, the Anti-Suez 
Group had no recognized leader, nor did its members fit easily 
into any particular category. All of those who publicly 
abstained had already antagonized their local parties through
136 Banks resigned the party whip on 8.11.56 in protest against Eden’s Suez policy.
137 Bell was a member of the Suez Group in 1953-54.
138 * Publicly abstained in the vote of confidence on 8.11.56.
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their opposition to capital punishment, but overall they 
represented a motley collection of independent minded, 
'liberal intellectual'139 Conservatives. Frank Medlicott, a 
National Liberal, was one of the 1945 'Brigadier Group'. 
Astor was a former PPS to Selwyn Lloyd, who had already
informed his constituency association that he would not be 
standing again. Boothby, a political buccaneer, was an ardent 
European. Nicolson's instincts were not those of a politician 
at all. 'His adoption of a high moral line - a very difficult 
thing to do in politics - was that of a member of the
intelligentsia.'140 It was ironic that his political 
neighbour in Bournemouth West was John Eden, whose warlike 
utterances caused his uncle considerable embarrassment.141 
Paradoxically, the group contained two Jewish MPs, Joseph and 
D'Avigdor Goldsmid, and included Elliot, who had been a
supporter of Zionism since the 1930s, influenced by his
relationship with Baffy Dugdale who was an ardent and active 
Gentile Zionist.
This faction contained varying degrees of antagonism to Eden's 
Suez policy, ranging from unease to active opposition. In 
addition to the six MPs who publicly abstained on 8 November 
1956142, the views of Heald, Elliot and Spearman were well 
known in Westminster. Beyond these were approximately 20-30 
Conservatives whose profound concern caused them to 
contemplate seriously rebellion against the government.143 
The Economist commented at the time of the Suez crisis: 'Most
139 Epstein, pp.97-122
140 Private information
141 Paul Williams
14213 Conservatives were ’paired or absent because sickness or because they were abroad’ 
(Times 9.11.56) in this critical vote of confidence; of these Beamish, Bossom, Mathew, and 
Nield were probably uneasy about Eden’s policy, either because of their American connexions 
or their barrister training.
143 Nicolson in Alan Thompson: The Day Before Yesterday, p. 141.
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of the doubters in this group seem likely to stay silent if 
things go well, and would certainly rally round [Eden] if 
things go really bloodily badly.' In the end, most kept 
quiet. Dumbfounded by the news of the initial assault, 'they 
felt they deserved time to reflect before committing what they 
assumed would be personal as well as party political suicide 
and the noisiness of the Opposition benches did not make 
things any easier since it suggested that any surrender would 
be surrender to disorder'.144
The Formation and Organization of the Anti-Suez Group:
The rallying point of the Anti-Suez Group was Sir Lionel 
Heald's speech calling for a referral of the dispute over the 
ownership of the Suez Canal to the UNO in September 1956. 
These rebels' hopes that Heald would thereafter lead their 
little group were dashed145 when Heald refused to carry his 
criticism of the government any further. These MPs developed 
into a group in a haphazard manner. 'It was a gradually 
coalescing movement. One would sound out others quite openly
in the smoking rooms, who might point out a fellow dissenter,
along the lines, ”1 know old George over there feels as you 
do”.' Spearman came to act as their co-ordinator and quasi­
leader in that 'he was the man in whose flat we met'.146
Spearman was not very senior, but from his seat below the 
gangway, he had earned the reputation of an independent 
thinker, and 'respect as one who understood finance'.147 
There was an element of older MPs, such as Walter Elliot, 
whose unhappy feelings about Eden's policy encouraged their 
younger colleagues into open defiance? however, once the
144 Economist 10.11.56
145 Nigel Nicolson
146 Nigel Nicolson
147 Sir John Astor
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younger men had 'gone over the top', their elders declined to 
commit what appeared to be political suicide - there was a 
tendency to shake their heads in sorrow, along the lines of 
'Poor fellow, I knew his father'.148
The 'Philosophy' of the Anti-Suez Group:
The Anti-Suez Group was formed as an instinctive reaction to
the government's military intervention in November 1956.
Although these MPs did not hold a coherent philosophy on 
Britain's place in the Middle East, they were on the party's 
progressive wing? they were traditional Tories who were anti­
socialist. With their mixture of ages, political experiences 
and coming from different political generations, they held 
markedly disparate views on ideal links with the Middle East. 
The Group included Boothby and Elliot who had long been
supporters of Zionism - and Boothby had advocated arms to 
Israel to counterbalance the Soviet decision to provide 
military equipment to Egypt through Czechoslovakia? William 
Yates, an ardent Arabist, who once appeared at the count in 
his constituency (The Wrekin) wearing an Arab headdress149? 
and Cyril Banks, who had taken a long-standing interest in the 
problems of Palestinian Arab refugees, and whose objections to 
Eden's Suez policy were no secret in Westminster. Banks' keen 
interest in Egypt had been demonstrated by two visits to that 
country over the previous two years? in December 1955 he had 
made an unofficial attempt to start talks between Egypt and 
Israel. Nor was there a common theme of 'anti-appeasement': 
Boothby and Nigel Nicolson, as the son of Harold Nicholson 
were in the Churchill camp, and Medlicott had voted against 
Chamberlain in May 1940. On the other hand, Walter Elliot who 
was known to have been deeply unhappy about Munich, had not 
resigned over the issue - much to his later regret.
148 Observer, 18.11.56, confirmed by Sir John Astor
149 Enoch Powell
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Despite their individualist approach to politics, these MPs 
shared a respect for the rule of law and diplomacy, together 
with a respect for observance of the Charter of the UNO. Each 
of them had already courted the ire of their constituencies 
for their opposition to capital punishment.150 There was an 
acceptance of the necessity of the American alliance? many of 
these MPs had personal and/or business links with America: 
Price had been educated at Yale, Jakie Astor had an American 
mother, Keith Joseph an American wife, and Boothby had 
travelled extensively in America.151 Like the Suez Group, 
the Anti-Suez MPs jealously defended the right of an 
individual MP to exercise his judgement on behalf of his 
constituents. But unlike the Suez Group, all save one (Banks) 
kept their opposition within the scope of the party. In the 
violently partisan crisis, they took an extremely courageous 
stance, politically and personally, faced with trenchant 
opposition from many of their Conservative colleagues,152 and 
outright hostility from their constituency associations. 
Unlike the more reactionary rebels, the Anti-Suez group MPs 
did not escape censure by their local parties in the Suez 
crisis? only Boothby and Boyle survived politically unscathed.
Some political commentators felt that the confrontation 
between the Suez Group and the Anti-Suez group was a battle 
within the aristocracy. The comment, 'Suez was lost on the 
playing fields of Eton'153 holds a superficial truth in that 
some of the protagonists were old Etonians: Amery, John Eden, 
Hinchingbrooke, Pitman and Sir Charles Williams versus Astor, 
Boothby, Boyle, Nicolson, Nutting, and Price. The bulk of the
150 see Epstein, pp.97-138
151 see Eldon Griffiths: ’"Yanks at Westminster": Our Friends in Commons’, Newsweek 
Magazine 3.2.58
152 One Suez Group MP called Astor a ’degenerate’ to his face, and never spoke to him 
again: Private information
153 Brian Inglis, Irish Press 7.1.57
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party was irate at the lengths to which these rebel MPs were 
prepared to carry their opposition to the government. 'They 
feel lately that the division of the party have mostly been 
the work of the 'aristos'. "Our betters", laments Dr Johnson, 
"indulge in fratricidal strife while we the party proles look 
on helplessly at the ruin of our fortunes".'154
Summary:
Individual members of the Suez Group held a more important 
place within the party than has been appreciated hitherto. 
However, despite their excellent contacts and sizeable outside 
support, skilled organization and lobbying, the Suez Group 
suffered from the image of being composed of 'yesterday's 
men', which detracted from the force of their message. It 
exercised a powerful, but ephemeral influence. Ironically, 
the Anti-Suez Group, despite its apparent small size and lack 
of organization and representing a tendency within the Tory 
party rather than a coherent faction, were remarkably 
influential and exercised a powerful brake on the Cabinet in 
1956.
154 Inglis
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CHAPTER 7: THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND THE MIDDLE EAST; 1948-
1951
The Palestine crisis, Britain's relations with Egypt and the 
Abadan crisis provided the formative experiences for the Suez 
Group. While the Conservative party was in opposition, this 
was an inchoate group - indeed between 1948 and 1950, many of 
those who later became stalwart members of the Suez Group were 
not MPs - but their views coalesced with each successive 
crisis in the Middle East, and their determination to 
influence their party and the government increased 
accordingly.
Britain's Position in the Middle East after the Second World 
War:
Britain's position in the region had been pre-eminent since 
the First World War, through treaty rights, business 
interests, the Mandate in Palestine, and part-ownership of the 
Suez Canal Company. Britain's dominant position was 
reinforced after the Second World War by a network of 
treaties, her position as one of the victors in the recent 
struggle, the huge military base at the Suez Canal, a naval 
base at Aden, air squadrons stationed in Iraq, and rear bases 
in Cyprus and Malta. In addition, the commander of the Arab 
Legion in Jordan was provided and paid for by the British 
Government? Britain had protectorates over the Persian Gulf 
Sheikdoms and conducted their foreign affairs through a 
Political Resident based in Bahrain. As well as this physical 
presence, Britain had enormous oil investments in Persia 
through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and a growing interest 
in the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf.1
1 Evelyn Shuckburgh: Descent to Suez, p. 109
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The Position of the Middle East in Conservative thought:
To the future Suez Group and their sympathizers within the 
Conservative party the Middle East was the 'new Empire', which 
had evolved from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the 
First World War. Even the less emotional Tories regarded the 
area as vital to the Commonwealth, demanding firm statements 
from the Labour government that 'we British are determined to 
stay in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East'.2 Departure 
'would be the beginning of the end of the greatness of 
ourselves as a Great Power and be the beginning of further 
troubles for that area'.3 The Conservatives persisted in 
their pre-war view of the strategic importance of the whole 
region, despite the independence of India, Pakistan, Ceylon 
and Burma in 1947. The emotional tie to India had not been 
severed with the lowering of the British flag on the Indian 
sub-continent4, and this continued belief in the need to 
protect the route to India was extremely influential upon 
Conservative opinion.
PALESTINE
Palestine was the bastion in the informal empire in the Middle 
East. Britain had acquired the Mandate for Palestine in 1922? 
thereafter the territory was supposed to be the shield of the 
Suez Canal, the 'Clapham Junction of the British 
Commonwealth'.5 Palestine offered the overland route between 
Iraq (where there were key British air bases) and Egypt (the 
Suez Canal Zone base), and the air route to India and the Far 
East passed through the Mandate territory. In addition, Haifa
2 Butler, 5.5.48, H C D ebA 50 .\m
3 Butler
4 Aubrey Jones
5 Amery speech at Margate party conference, 9.10.53
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was at the Mediterranean end of the vital oil pipeline from 
Iraq and Iran (crucial to Britain's oil supply), and was 
potentially significant as an alternative to the Suez Canal 
base. This was to assume greater importance for Conservatives 
when Egypt demanded revision of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty.
There were varying currents within the party on the best way 
to maintain Britain's prestige and influence in the region. 
Balancing the view of Palestine's strategic importance, which 
required a continued British presence or controlling 
influence, was the party's position as the heir to the 1917 
Balfour Declaration which had promised a homeland to the Jews. 
In the Palestine conflict the Tory party was torn, privately 
and publicly, between moral duty and views of military 
necessity.
Palestine: Tories United
Whatever their views on the relative merits of Zionism, 
Conservatives concurred on the vital necessity of maintaining 
Britain's standing in the Levant. All saw the Palestine 
problem as 'linked to all the other questions in the Middle 
East',6 especially Britain's future position in Egypt. The 
Conservative party was also united in its desire to separate 
the twin problems of what to do with the European Jews and the 
Mandate. Tories stoutly refused to concede that the Jews' 
suffering during the War gave them a unique claim upon the 
world's conscience and entitled them to unlimited immigration 
into Palestine.7 There was universal Tory criticism of 
extravagant promises made by Labour MPs during the 1945 
election campaign in support of the Zionists, which had raised
6 Churchill, 23.10.46, HC Deb.42%. \6U
7 eg Keeling HCDeb.426.1290-1 and Ponsonby HCDeb.426.1304-6,1.8.46; Pickthom, 
23.1.48, HCDeb.4A6.542
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hopes yet offered no decided policy.8
On the issue of Jewish immigration, Conservatives had tended 
to side with Arabs, fearing that to do otherwise would forfeit 
the confidence of the Moslem World and the 90m Moslems on the 
Indian sub-continent. Just as before the Second World War, 
the major considerations were military: the need to protect 
Britain's position in the Middle East when the international 
horizon seemed likely to continue to be stormy. There was a 
fervent Tory hope that by keeping the problems of the European 
Jews and Palestine separate Britain would avoid being put in 
a position which 'did not permit us to give free and 
unfettered advice and help to those people who have always 
looked to us in the past'.9 For the most part Conservatives 
confined themselves to recommending the amount of immigration 
permitted should be to 'the limits of economic capacity'. It 
was repeatedly stressed that Britain should prevent 'putting 
an over-supply of Zionists into Palestine'.10 Even Churchill, 
who had taken a highly unpopular line within his party by 
publicly supporting the Zionists, persistently encouraged the 
Labour government to investigate other avenues in resettling 
the Jewish diaspora from Europe.11 There was general 
agreement that Conservatives must demand from the government 
a much more firm and positive policy than hitherto12, and 
widespread Tory concern at the apparent power vacuum in this 
key strategic region and its vulnerability to Russian 
infiltration.13 In the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war of 
1948, this appeared more serious as 'along all our lines of
8 eg. Churchill, HC Deb .459.716 and Boothby, HC Deb.459.185, 10.12.48.
9 Glyn, HC Deb.435.1971-5 and Peto, HC Deb.433.1915-8, 25.2.47.
10 Dodds-Parker, 4.5.48, HC Deb.450.1169; Pickthom, 1.8.46, HC Deb.426.1271-9
11 1.8.46 HC Deb.426.1252
12 FAC 3.3.48
13 see Fitzroy Maclean, 9.12.48, HC Deb.459.651
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communication with the Far East there is a series of [power] 
vacuums'.14
Palestine: Tories Divided
Palestine cut 'right across party ... in fact the parties 
[were] divided within themselves on the matter'.15 The 
Conservative party was fractured between the pro-Zionists who 
favoured a Jewish National Homeland , those who supported 
partition as an interim measure, and those who regarded the 
indigenous Arab population as the more important. Varying 
attitudes to America further complicated the picture.
(a) The pro-Zionists
The post-war Conservative party was at best ambivalent towards 
the Jews. The party had few Jewish voters and hardly any 
Jewish MPs. Many Tory MPs were fervently pro-Arab, influenced 
in part by a romantic idea of the Arab fostered by T E 
Lawrence16 which had survived war-service in the Middle East. 
However, Churchill, Walter Elliot, James Henderson Stewart,17 
Boothby, and Macmillan saw supporting the Jews as their 
party's moral duty, because of the Balfour Declaration of 
1917.
Churchill's position on the Palestine issue was crucial, given 
his extraordinary position on the opposition benches as * a 
foreign policy expert, world statesman, ex-prime minister, and 
prime minister-in-waiting. Churchill was a long-standing 
advocate of a Jewish homeland. His support for Zionism had
14 Mott-Radclyffe, 10.12.48, HC Deb.459.135
15 Legge-Bourke, 10.12.48, HC Deb.459.15%
16 Paul Williams. Earl Winterton had served with Lawrence in the First World War
17 MP for Fife East 1933-61
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led him to oppose the 1939 White Paper which limited 
immigration into Palestine, and he had persisted in his 
proposal for partition against the advice of his Cabinet in 
1945. Despite this opposition from his colleagues, notably 
from Eden, Churchill remained committed to the idea of 
partition.18 His stand was not popular with his party,19 and 
some Tories remained very suspicious of Churchill's 
Zionist/Liberal credentials. Churchill was always careful to 
state that his stance was a personal view, and was measured in 
his support for Zionism in Parliament and his recommendations 
to Bevin. Henderson Stewart was similarly restrained. 
Macmillan and Elliot, despite their pre-war support for the 
Jews, did not express an opinion in Parliament at all. 
Boothby was the only other prominent Conservative publicly to 
back the Zionists which earned him opprobrium from his party20 
as the Jewish terrorist attacks against British troops 
escalated.
b) The Optimists
Those who agreed there should be a partition of Palestine 
ranged between those who advocated the creation of a Jewish 
state as the end result, either because they supported the 
cause of Zionism, or because it seemed practical politics, and 
those who endorsed dividing the territory as an interim 
measure, on the grounds that it was possible for Arabs and 
Jews to live together in harmony;21 hopefully there would 
eventually be a united Palestine for both Arabs and Jews.
18 see Churchill, 1.8.46, HC Deb.426.1246-1257
19 Churchill, 23.10.46, HC Deb.427.1681
20 Robert Rhodes James: Bob Boothby, p.336
21 Peto, 25.2.47, HC Deb.433.1975-8
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(c) The pro-Arabs;
The bulk of the party accepted 'local home rule'22 and were 
anti-partition. These MPs could use irrefutable geopolitical 
arguments to back their case. The Arab revolt in Palestine in 
the 1930s had demonstrated the indigenous population's 
opposition to unlimited Jewish immigration and partition, and 
turmoil in the area had offered outside hostile powers the 
opportunity to meddle. Britain's policy had increased Arab 
nationalism to Britain's later cost.23 The Balfour 
Declaration was seen as 'a mistake'.24 For these Tories, 
their party's moral duty lay in protecting the interests and 
desires of the indigenous Arab population who should be 
consulted first before any decisions were taken about their 
country's fate.
From the start many Conservatives were deeply concerned that 
by failing to put down the Jewish revolt, and by bowing to 
American pressure on immigration, Britain was by implication 
pursuing too Zionist a policy which would have a catastrophic 
impact on Arab opinion. The Zionists in Palestine, backed by 
America, were challenging the s t a t u s  quo  with potentially 
disastrous strategic implications for Britain, at a time when 
Egypt was demanding a revision of the 1936 treaty, Britain's 
treaty relations with Iraq were under question, and Russia 
appeared to have revived to her traditional imperial quest for 
a warm water port.
There was a decided strain of anti-Semitism within the Tory 
party.25 'In spite of the Nazi atrocities against the Jews
22 see 31.7.46-1.8.46, HC Deb.426.951-1015, and 426.1232-1317
23 see Churchill, 1.8.46, HC Deb A26.1249, referring to the 1941 pro-German revolt in
[•
24 Pickthom, 1.8.46, HC Deb A26.1212
25 Sir Robert Rhodes James
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in the war, British public opinion and Conservative opinion 
remained ambivalent.' But when the fight against the British 
Mandate began in earnest and British troops were being killed 
'an ugly Jewish backlash resulted ... Episodes such as the 
hanging of the two British sergeants and the explosion at the 
King David Hotel inflamed anti-Jewish feeling in Britain and 
particularly in the Conservative party'.26 Jewish outrages 
destroyed any inclination to make further efforts on behalf of 
Zionists. Conservative MPs recognized the paradox of the 
British government using armed force to compel the Arabs in 
Palestine to take more Jews than they wanted and were furious 
at the 'disgraceful' government policy which had placed 
British troops in such an impossible position.27 There should 
be no partition, because it would be 'utterly impossible to 
enforce partition on an unwilling Arab population without an 
international police force'.28 There should be no Jewish 
state, and Britain should hang on until the Zionists' attitude 
changed completely.28
Conservative Opinion of America
The greatest source of Conservative anxiety derived from the 
government's failure to secure American co-operation over the 
Palestine question, despite an apparent affinity of interest 
in the region. There was frustration at America's refusal to 
take responsibility for the policy Washington was advocating 
and contempt for Truman's susceptibility to American Zionist 
pressure. America seemed unfairly to be forcing Britain to 
bear the whole weight of Washington's policy, while the
26 Rhodes James: Boothby, p.335
27 Brigadier Mackeson, 3.3.47, HC DebA34.31m, General Jeffreys, 25.2.47, HC 
£>e&.433.1957-1960
28 Beamish, 19.3.48, H C£>^.448.2522-3
29 Manningham-Buller, 25.2.47, HC Deb A33.1993
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Muslims who were so important to the Empire were alarmed and 
estranged, with America sitting on the sidelines criticizing 
'Britain's shortcomings with all the freedom of perfect 
detachment and irresponsibility'.30
There was a decided Tory ambivalence over America's proper 
place in the Middle East. Conservatives recognized that 
American support was vital to underpin any settlement,31 but 
were convinced that the Labour government, if it was 
sufficiently firm, could persuade America to accept the 
responsibility for urging partition upon Britain.32 However, 
America and the United Nations should look to Britain for the 
lead.33 Britain was the rightful pre-eminent power in the 
region and should assert her first-class status: 'nothing is 
more despicable ... than that with our record, we should go 
creeping round the world with an inferiority complex'.34 This 
exasperation with American policy hardened into antagonism 
among the MPs who later came to form the Suez Group.
Conservative Opinion of the United Nations Organization:
Churchill led calls for the Mandate to be referred to the 
UNO,35 which initially 'shocked the majority of Members on all 
sides'.36 Gradually Tory opinion shifted, albeit reluctantly,
30 Churchill, 1.8.46, HCDebA26A25?>
31 see Boothby, 10.12.48, HCDebA59J%l
32 Churchill, 10.12.48, HC Deb A59.715
33 see Stanley, 25.2.47, HC Deb A33A926-7; and Head, 4.5.48, H C£><£.450.1160
34 Gammans, 23.10.46, HC DebA27.1709-10
35 1.8.46, HC DebA26.1253
36 Macmillan, quoted in Alistair Home: Macmillan 1894-1956, p. 145
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towards accepting the offices of the UNO.37 Although some had 
reservations, on the grounds that UNO had already failed 
because of the attitude of Russia,38 the official Tory line 
was that whilst there was no complaint against this referral, 
the Labour government's method and timing of the appeal was 
lamentable.39 However, Conservative contempt for the role of 
the UNO grew as the crisis dragged on and permeated the entire 
party.40
The Impact of Conservative Opinion on Labour policy
Had there been a united Tory cavalry charge upon the Treasury 
bench, a Conservative thesis might have stood a greater chance 
of influencing the government, for although Labour's 
parliamentary majority was 146, the party was riven on the 
issue. However, there was no question of an alliance between 
the Tory party and Labour backbenchers on the issue. The 
corresponding impact of Tory opinion on Labour's policy during 
the Palestine crisis was minimal.
Bevin had to manage dissent within his own party and contend 
with an outspoken section of his supporters who were ardently 
pro-Zionist, as well as with an American Administration which 
was heavily influenced by the vociferous American pro-Jewish 
lobby, but which stubbornly refused to take responsibility for 
the policy it advocated. Although there was an overwhelming 
sense of frustration, manifest in Tory interventions in 
debates on Palestine, that the government appeared to be 
drifting at the mercy of outside events, having missed key
37 Stanley, 25.2.47, HCDeb.433.1923
38 Gammans, 23.10.46, HC Deb A l l  M W
39 Stanley, 25.2.47, HCDefc.433.1923
40 Beamish, 19.3.48, HC DebM%.2523; Pickthom, 9.12.48, HC De^.459.635, and 
Legge-Bourke, 10.12.48, HC Deb A59.761; Boothby, 10.12.48, HC Deb A59.7S7
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opportunities,41 the Conservative front bench throughout the 
crisis was careful to support Bevin in his attempts to involve 
America, and taking the matter to the UNO; criticism was 
reserved for method and timing, Eden recognized the problems 
Bevin faced as he struggled to deal with a difficult and 
emotive issue. More hard-headed on the problem of Palestine 
than his emotional leader, in a Cabinet paper before the War 
Eden had argued for limiting Jewish population in Palestine, 
on the grounds that the Middle East was an organic whole; 
Palestine in Arab eyes was an Arab country, the most fertile 
area of which was being handed over to an alien and 
particularly dangerous invader.42 Eden's support, as an ex- 
Foreign Secretary and acknowledged foreign policy expert, was 
of great value to the beleaguered Foreign Secretary throughout 
the crisis.
Bevin's vain attempts to placate the Arab nations whilst 
reining in the more extreme Zionist demands merely served to 
alienate both camps in Palestine, and incurred the distrust of 
Washington. Despite the Foreign Secretary's best efforts, 
Britain was obliged to relinquish the Palestine mandate 
without securing a satisfactory settlement between Arab and 
Jew. Conservatives no matter what their opinions on the ideal 
solution in Palestine saw this decision to withdraw on 15 May 
1948 as a total abnegation of Britain's responsibility to 
ensure a just settlement to the issue; Labour was charged with 
'scuttle', 'too little too late',43 'a lamentable tale of 
prejudice and incapacity'.44 War was inevitable and almost 
all Tories expected the Jews to be annihilated.45 Churchill
41 see Butler, 4.5.48, tfCM >.450.1121-1133
42 quoted in John Barnes ed.: The Leo Amery Diaries, p.362
43 Beamish, 4.5.48, HC Deb.450.1210
44 Churchill, 10.12.48, HC Deb.459.716
45 Beamish, 4.5.48, Z/CZ)eZ>.450.1210
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was the exception: during the War he had asked Lord Wavell his 
opinion as to which side was the stronger in Palestine, and 
had received the unhesitating reply that if both sides were 
left to themselves the Jews would win.46
The Conservatives were 'unhappy and divided'47 by the outcome 
of the Arab-Israeli war and differed on the best way to react 
to the new situation. Boothby was one of the few who drew the 
obvious conclusion that as that the Israeli army was one to be 
reckoned with, there should be a realignment of Britain's 
treaties in the Middle East. King Abdullah, ruling the most 
progressive of the Arab states, should be encouraged to make 
a separate peace with Israel,48 whatever the objections from 
Egypt. The two 'strong' states in the Middle East - Israel 
and Turkey - were being ignored: both were 'modern',
'significantly non-Arab' and firm in their opposition to 
Russia - all of which should make these two countries the 
natural pivot of British policy in the region. The pro-Arab 
section of the Tory party found it difficult to come to terms 
with the new State of Israel. It had been established by 
'completely casting aside the rule of law and the principles 
of the UN Charter and of the Atlantic Charter',49 and 
unchecked immigration into Israel would be a disruptive force 
in the region as Israel sought new borders for her burgeoning 
population. Legge-Bourke suspected King Abdullah of 
territorial designs which might one day be detrimental to 
Britain's position and interests in the Levant.50
Churchill and Eden permitted this latitude of opinion but
46 Churchill, 10.12.48, HC Deb.450.716
47 Harold Macmillan: Tides of Fortune, p. 149
49 Boothby, 10.12.48, HC Deb.459.787 and letter, Times 3.1.49
49 Beamish, 21.7.49, HC Deb.461.1634
50 Legge-Bourke, 10.12.48, HC Deb.459.759
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urged dissenters within their own party and the Labour 
government to 'face the facts'. The Jews had established a 
government that functioned effectively and which had been 
recognized by the United States and Russia. Britain 'who 
still [has] many interests duties and memories in Palestine 
and the Middle East ... would surely be foolish in the last 
degree to be maintaining a sort of sulky boycott'.51 A 
powerful additional reason was Britain's treaty obligations to 
Jordan. Conservative criticism of Labour's handling of the 
Palestine question culminated in their decision to divide the 
House52 in protest at the government's policy of 'folly, 
futility and fatuity'. It was the first occasion in the 1945 
Parliament in which the Conservatives had voted against the 
government on a major issue of foreign policy. Even though 
the government's majority dropped to 90, Labour's authority 
was not gravely damaged, merely shaken.53 Churchill was 
careful to explain that his party was not withdrawing its 
support for Bevin's foreign policy in general.
The Influence of the Palestine Crisis upon the Future Suez 
Group:
For the imperial wing of the party, many of whom became 
stalwart members of the Suez Group, the Palestine debacle was 
an integral part of Labour's disastrous policy of retreat from 
Empire. Britain's abandonment of India, the jewel in the 
imperial crown, had immeasurably weakened her position in the 
Middle East. Not all latter-day members of the Suez Group 
took this static view of the British Empire. Amery and Biggs- 
Davison both took a more progressive view of the necessity of 
Indian independence, but they concurred with their colleagues
51 Churchill, 10.12.48, HC Deb.459.717
52 on 26.1.49
53 Times 27.1.49
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that a line should be drawn thereafter.
For the nascent Suez Group Palestine proved the first in a 
series of major disasters for British policy in the Middle 
East. Britain had let down the Arabs in Palestine? she had 
not ensured a just settlement54 and had made enemies without 
rewarding or strengthening her friends. Britain's position, 
power and prestige had been damaged, as the British government 
had not been able to impose its will on the region, unable to 
hold sway against America, and had inflamed Arab nationalism, 
to the detriment of Britain's position in other Arab 
countries. This emerging faction of the party was anti-Israel 
for the most part, suspicious of American policy and designs 
in the Middle East and contemptuous of the UNO. The departure 
of Britain from Palestine without any residual influence 
strengthened these MPs' conviction that Britain must have a 
physical presence in the Middle East - and Labour had 
committed the cardinal sin of opening the question of 
Britain's withdrawal from the Suez Canal. The Palestine 
conflict did nothing to alter strategic perceptions that had 
endured since the 1930s.55 The festering conflict between 
Arab and Jew which offered opportunities for Communist 
subversion further underlined the need for a secure British 
presence on the Suez Canal.
BRITAIN'S RELATIONS WITH EGYPT 1948-1951
In considering Conservative reaction to later events in Persia 
in 1951, the history of Britain's relations with Egypt 
following the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 was of crucial 
importance. The Conservative party as a whole believed 
Labour's decision to open the question of the Suez Canal base 
immediately after the War had placed Britain in an
54 Legge-Bourke, 10.12.48, HC Deb.459.759
55 see Beamish, 21.7.49, HC Deb M l  .1633
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unnecessarily vulnerable position in the Middle East.56 Nor 
did the Tories believe it was justified: Britain would need to 
import military supplies through Egypt57 to protect her 
position in Palestine. The idea that Egypt 'could ensure by 
her own resources the liberty and entire security of the 
Canal' (Article VIII of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty) was 
frankly laughable. While there was private awareness that the 
defence of the Canal might be affected by the atom bomb,58 
more immediate concerns focused upon the possible effect on 
the Sudan, an Anglo-Egyptian condominium.59
Conservative Perceptions of the Strategic Importance of the 
Suez Canal:
Conservative opinion concentrated upon the strategic 
importance of maintaining a British military presence in the 
Middle East: control of this bridge between continents was 
seen to be of the 'first importance to any aggressive power in 
the Eastern Mediterranean and Levant' and therefore it was 
imperative that Britain, through her base at the Suez Canal, 
continue to hold this keystone in the arch of Western and 
Commonwealth defence, enabling Britain act as a deterrent to 
possible Russian military aggression, and to react quickly 
should a crisis develop.60
56 Churchill, 1.8.46, HCDebA26A256
57 FAC 4.5.46
58 FAC 4.5.46
59 Churchill, 23.10.46, HCDebA21A6S\
60 Mott-Radclyffe, HC DebASlA\94  and de Chair, HC Deb AS1.1229, 29.11.50
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Economic Importance of the Middle East to the British Economy
By the late 1940s the problem of the future of Britain's 
substantial base in the Suez Canal Zone was compounded by the 
Labour government's inability to settle the problem of Arab- 
Israeli animosity. Egypt refused to permit the passage of 
Israeli-bound cargo through the Canal, in direct contravention 
of the 1888 Convention governing international use of the 
Canal. Cairo's intransigence and the closure of the oil 
pipeline to Haifa from Iraq following the 1948-9 war meant the 
Haifa refinery was lying idle at a cost of $4 million a month 
to the British economy.61 Some Conservatives feared that as 
the British economy became increasingly dependent upon Middle 
Eastern oil (rising to an estimated 82% in 1951), the success 
or failure of the European Recovery Programme would be tied 
more closely to the continued security of the Middle East.62 
The closure of the Haifa refinery was of particular importance 
during the Abadan crisis.63
For the Tories, the problem of securing passage through the 
Canal was two-fold: the need to gain passage for vital oil 
supplies?64 and the danger of British power and prestige being 
eroded by an inferior nation's ability to flout Westminster's 
will (and incidentally the rule of law) with impunity.66 It 
was obvious Egypt's success in barring Israeli-bound traffic 
from the Canal spurred the nationalist clamour for Egyptian 
sovereignty over the Canal Zone base. Conservatives felt that 
the Egyptian people should be far more co-operative with the 
United Kingdom, in gratitude for Britain's sacrifice during
61 Geoffrey Lloyd, 29.3.50, HC Deb.473.514
62 Beamish, 21.7.49, HC Deb.454.1641
63 see Eden, 21.6.51, HCDeb.489.748
64 see Eden, 28.3.50, HC Deb.473.310; Arbuthnot, 19.5.50, HC £>*£.475.1510
65 see Low, 21.7.49, HCDeb.467.1645
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the Second World War, both in terms of loss of life and the 
considerable cost of defending Egyptian territory from her 
Nazi-Fascist aggressors.66 There was a large element of 
racism, albeit cloaked in a paternalistic guise, in 
Conservative attitudes to the Middle East, and in particular, 
towards Egypt. Many Conservatives were soldiers, or ex­
soldiers who had served with the 8th Army in the Middle East, 
an experience which had done nothing to improve their poor 
opinion of Egyptians, either as soldiers or as 
administrators.67
General Conservative impatience with Labour's inability to 
settle these outstanding issues was mirrored by the feeling 
that Egypt should be concentrating on the wider issue of 
uniting against the threat of Communism, rather than taking a 
narrow nationalist view about the Anglo-Egyptian treaty. The 
outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950 inevitably reinforced 
Conservative anxiety of Russian encroachment in other areas of 
the world which were vulnerable to Communist infiltration. 
Now more than ever the Middle East appeared to be a security 
vacuum which posed an irresistible target for Russian 
aggression,68 making a substantial British military presence 
in the region seem all the more imperative. The notion that 
Egypt could become neutral in any future conflict was simply 
not practicable.69
The Conservative party was united on the need for 
international solidarity and preferably for active allies in 
the Middle East to bolster the British position.70 Labour's
66 see de Chair, 28.3.50, HCDeb .473.295
61 Reginald Bevins: The Greasy Pole, p.37
68 Reginald Bennett, 14.9.50, HC Deb.47S.1313
69 Mott-Radclyffe, 29.11.50, HC DebA&l .1194
70 Earl Winterton, 13.9.50, HC Deb.418.111S; Dunglass, 28.3.50, HCDeb.473.302
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crowning error was seen to be its persistent failure to 
persuade America that its vital interests were equally at 
stake and to secure joint co-operative action.71 The 
Tripartite Declaration, signed by Britain, America and France 
in May 1950 (which guaranteed the armistice frontiers of 1949) 
was seen as a poor substitute for active co-operation, or even 
better, an Eastern Mediterranean or Middle Eastern pact - 
witness the efforts made by Churchill's government to secure 
a Middle East defence organization in 1951-1952. A very 
small group of Tory MPs, notably Boothby and (after 1950) 
Julian Amery and Somerset de Chair,72 felt the obvious ally 
capable of providing effective resistance to Russian 
aggression, was Israel. From the end of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict of 1948 these MPs were increasingly critical of what 
they perceived to be the failure by successive British 
governments to harness Israel as a progressive and stabilizing 
force in the region.73 Israel was denied arms necessary for 
its survival, while Britain continued to supply arms to Egypt, 
a nation that openly flouted British will by refusing free 
passage through the Suez Canal.
The Suez Group in potentia
This nascent group carried the general Tory low opinion of 
Egyptians to extremes. Imperial-minded Tories felt Egyptian 
independence had been an unhappy experience: 'Egyptianization' 
had been pushed through too rapidly, to the detriment of, 
Egypt's real industrial interests, and misgovernment with the 
accompanying search for scapegoats - in particular foreign 
powers, with Britain as the ex-imperial presence leading the 
pack - had led to a decline in the rule of law and an
71 Head, 12.2.51, HCDeb AM .\52
72 MP for Norfolk South West 1935-45; Paddington South 1950-51
73 see Ameiy, 30.7.51, HC Zte6.491.1023
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increasing disrespect for international conventions.
The Conservative imperial wing endorsed the strategic 
arguments for a British military presence in the region and 
the need for the ability to react to a sudden and unexpected 
threat.74 Convinced that there was no military justification 
for a revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, they firmly 
contended that the treaty contained a provision for its 
indefinite continuation (Article X), as Britain had the option 
to take to arbitration the question of whether Egypt was 
capable of maintaining full security at the Canal - which 
most, if not all, Tories felt she was not. After the outbreak 
of the Korean war, these MPs regarded it as inconceivable that 
Britain could abandon the base and move it somewhere else in 
the Middle East, like 'some sort of suitcase'.75 The Suez 
Canal and the Panama Canal were comparable in importance to 
Britain and America respectively.76 Quite simply, Britain had 
to maintain a position of strength in the area to make an 
effective contribution to world security.
To these MPs, the Suez Canal base was vital to the maintenance 
of British leadership of a strong Empire? if Britain was 
pushed out of Suez the country would be dependent upon America 
and the Panama Canal for her air and sea communications with 
Australia and New Zealand.77 They had no desire for Britain 
to be as dependent upon the United States for her defence in 
the Middle East as Britain was in Europe. Although they 
agreed with the official Conservative line on the need for 
Anglo-American co-operation in the region since Britain could
74 de Chair, 29.11.50, HCDeb AS1.1229-30
75 de Chair, 29.11.50, HC DebASl. 1229
76 de Chair, HCDeb AS 1.1234
77 Amery, 30.7.51, HCDeb.491.1024-5
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not act alone,78 they felt Britain's pre-eminent position in 
the region should be maintained and respected.79 America 
should play a supporting and definitely junior role,80 while 
the gap in manpower created by the loss of the Indian Army 
should be filled by colonial troops recruited from East and 
West Africa.81
The emerging Suez Group disliked the Tripartite Declaration 
which was clearly aimed at eliminating traditional spheres of 
influence. If Britain was to continue to play its part 
effectively against Communist aggression in the Middle East, 
she must retain her sphere of influence82 - a clear warning 
that the government should impress upon the American 
administration that it interfered with British interests in 
the region at its own peril. The signature of the ANZUS pact 
in September 1951 governing the defence of the Pacific, which 
specifically excluded Britain from a region previously 
regarded as one of rightful influence, was to reinforce their 
determination that British influence in the Middle East was 
not to be eroded in a similar fashion. There was a decided 
feeling that the US attitude to 'colonialism' should not go 
unchallenged, and the general effect of regional pacts 
concluded piecemeal would be to dismember the British 
Empire.83
78 Amery, 30.7.51, HC Deb.491.1024-5
79 eg de Chair, 29.11.50, HCDeb M l .  1233-4
80 Amery, 30.7.51, HC Z>^.491.1025
81 Earl Winterton, HCDeb .41% AY1% and Hinchingbrooke, HCDeb.478.1198, 13.9.50; 
Amery, 30.7.51, HCDeb.491.1024
82 de Chair, 29.11.50, HC Deb.4% 1.1234
83 Gammans and Ryder, FAC 25.4.51
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Conservative Influence on Labour's Egyptian Policy:
Despite initial Tory hopes84 that the return of Nahas Pasha 
would signal an era of better understanding, negotiations on 
a revision of the 1936 Treaty continued in a desultory fashion 
throughout 1950 against a background of increasing Egyptian 
restrictions on British ships. Tories fumed at Labour's 
persistence in trying negotiate with a blatantly unreliable 
nation85 and at Cairo's ingratitude and unreasonableness,86 
accompanied by strident anti-British propaganda in the 
Egyptian press. 'If only the government had pushed a stronger 
line of action our tankers would now be passing through the 
Suez Canal',87 and the Haifa refinery would be going again. 
Such comments implied it was outrageous that an inferior 
nation should try hold the British Empire to ransom. They 
urged the use of economic sanctions to force Arab co-operation 
over Haifa.88 The incipient Suez Group's calls for the use 
of military equipment sales to Egypt to extract her compliance 
with Article IV of the 1888 Convention89 enjoyed wider support 
within the party.90 Churchill was in favour of using such 
pressure91 whereas Eden was more cautious.92 It is 
interesting that Churchill was already part of this 
belligerent group and Eden was obliged to counter his leader, 
running contrary to the alignment one might have assumed of a
84 see de Chair, 29.11.50, HCDeb AS 1.1231
85 Crossthwaite-Eyre, 14.6.50, HC Deb A16.191
86 see de Chair, 28.3.50, #C  £><£.473.295
87 Arbuthnot, 19.5.50, HCDeb.475.1510
88 Amery, supported by Geoffrey Lloyd, 10.7.50, HC Deb A l l  .954-5
89 Hugh Fraser, 19.4.50, £K7£><£.474.114
90 eg Arbuthnot, 19.5.50, HCDebA15.1510
91 12.9.50, HC £><£.478.980-1
92 14.9.50, H C D e b .m .m i
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particular group striving to capture the leadership's 
attention.
Britain's relations with the Wafd government came to a head 
with Cairo's call for an unconditional withdrawal of British 
troops from the Canal Zone and the unity of the Sudan and 
Egypt under the Egyptian crown on 15 November 1950. This 
coincided with the Attlee government's decision to resume 
despatch of jet fighters and tanks to Egypt (suspended in 
September 1950 because of the demands of Britain's rearmament 
programme). Thereafter there was a marked swing on the 
Conservative benches in support of using the obvious levers of 
sales of military equipment.93 Conservatives were incensed 
that the government appeared to be selling much needed 
equipment abroad - and to a suspect nation -ignoring the prior 
claims of the Commonwealth. Conservatives were also acutely 
aware of the interaction of events in the Middle East.94 
London's difficulties with Cairo coincided with problems with 
Tehran, where the Persian Parliament was steadfastly refusing 
to ratify the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's Supplementary 
Agreement of 1949. Thereafter, the Conservative front bench 
adopted the tactics advocated by their robust backbench 
colleagues,95 with Eden notably in the vanguard of the attack. 
Political circumstances favoured the Conservatives in the 
short term. Faced with a knife-edge majority and widespread 
Labour backbench unease about the wisdom of military equipment 
to a truculent government,96 the government was forced to 
concede a temporary suspension of arms shipments.
93 de Chair, William Bennett, Gammans, Fisher, 20.11.50, HC Deb.482.33; Low, de 
Chair and Keeling, 29.11.50, HC Deb.481.1151-4
94 Mott-Radclyffe, 29.11.50, HC Deb.4S1.1193
95 Eden, 22.11.50, HC Deb.4^1.341 and 23.11.50, HC Deb.481.512-3; Churchill, 
22.11.50, HCDeb .4*1.344; 23.11.50, HCDeb. 481.515 and 29.11.50, HCDeb.481.1153-4
96 see adjournment debate, 22.11.50, HCDeb.481.424-468
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When Gaitskell announced the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian 
financial negotiations on 16 March 1950, the Conservative 
front bench also took up backbench suggestions of using 
Egyptian sterling balances in London97 as a quid pro quo for 
free passage of British tankers through the Canal. Responding 
to Conservative disgust at Labour's failure to use a readily 
available lever, Eden moved an adjournment debate on 20 March 
1951. The wider political implications could not be ignored: 
this lily-livered approach would have serious repercussions on 
Anglo-Persian relations, currently at a very critical stage 
with the proposal before the Persian parliament for the 
nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's interests. 
The more the Chancellor gave way to Egypt the more difficult 
it would be to stand up to Persia.98 But despite
Conservative outrage and deep misgivings within his own party, 
'Mr Gaitskell found votes where he had lacked voices'.99
Throughout the Abadan crisis Conservatives saw a continued 
interaction of events between Britain's positions in Egypt and 
Persia.100 Britain's humiliation in Persia led to a 
stiffening of the official Tory line on Haifa and the Suez 
Canal. With the two largest British owned oil refineries in 
the world out of action, the time had come to take steps to 
ensure that British tankers could go through to Haifa and 
other countries could have refined oil products to which they 
were entitled under international law.101 If Egypt still 
refused to permit free passage of the Canal, Britain should 
take measures 'that lie within our power to take with our 
Allies to ensure observation of our rights' such as a tanker
97 Amery and Geoffrey Lloyd, 10.7.50, HC Deb A l l  .954-5
98 Mott-Radclyffe, 20.3.51, HCDeb.485.2358
99 Times 21.3.51
100 see Eden, 21.6.51, HCDeb. 489.747-54; and see Churchill election speech, reported 
in Times 2.10.51
101 Eden, 19.6.51, HCDeb.489.239.241
- 260 -
escort through the Canal.
And as negotiations on the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty stalled, 
Conservatives repeatedly raised questions on the continued 
sale of military equipment to the Cairo government, prompted 
by a fear that the British government had not taken into 
consideration the demands of the country's own rearmament 
programme, in addition to a violent dislike of supplying a 
country which had 'behaved in such a shabby manner' towards 
Britain.102 Tories were agreed no further supplies should 
be forwarded until treaty rights were observed. Their efforts 
were to no avail? Labour ministers insisted that substantial 
items of equipment were not being supplied and the complete 
cessation of all arms supplies might prejudice future talks.
THE ABADAN CRISIS: 1951
The Abadan crisis, sparked by the Mossadeq government's 
decision to nationalize the holdings of the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
company, was more straightforward for the Conservatives than 
the debacle over Palestine. There were no complicating 
factors of prior commitments to a an unpopular minority, nor 
arguments over Britain's moral obligations. Nor was there a 
problem over the appeal of differing Arab countries. However, 
again, there were differing currents of opinion on how best to 
respond to the challenge to Britain's position. In essence 
the Abadan crisis was the skirmish which determined the battle 
lines within the party over the Sudan and the future of the 
Suez Canal base once the Conservatives were returned to 
office.
The Mossadeq government's action, together with the Persians 
subsequent refusal to submit to arbitration or to permit the
102 Vere Harvey, 18.4.51, HC DebAS6.1818
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export of oil under the old terms103, appeared the last straw 
to Conservatives, whose sensibilities were already flayed by 
Egyptian truculence over Haifa and the Canal Zone base. All 
sections of the party concurred it was the culmination of the 
absence of any effective policy in the Middle East104 and 
there was universal concern at the lack of effective protest 
and policy, seen in the large attendances of backbench party 
meetings,105 and their public calls for a determined 
approach.
The Official Conservative Line:
(a) The Position of Eden:
Throughout the Abadan crisis Eden was the most prominent 
Opposition spokesman on Persia. Initially Eden had favoured 
doing 'nothing... in a hurry',106 but by mid-June he was 
leading vigorous Conservative calls for firm, effective 
action: namely a declaration that there would be no evacuation 
from Abadan.107 It was the 'inescapable duty of the 
Government to take any steps that may be necessary to protect 
[British personnel]. The Government may be sure that what 
ever those steps may be, we shall be ready to give them our 
support.' 'Privately, Eden agreed with Labour that the wisest 
course was to handle the matter calmly and not to get into
103 Hugh Berrington: Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons 1945-55, p. 171
104 see de Chair, Mott-Radclyffe, and Eden, 21.6.51, HC 489.746-833
105 About 200 Tory MPs attended the 1922 committee meeting which discussed Persia on 
28.6.51.
106 Eden letter to Daily Telegraph, quoted in David Carlton: Anthony Eden (London 
1981), p.289
107 21.6.51, HC Deb.489.752-3
- 262 -
precipitate action in the volatile Middle East.'108 His 
robust line in public was undoubtedly fuelled by his poor 
opinion of Morrison's performance as Foreign Secretary, and 
Conservative backbench pressure.
Eden and his moderate colleagues stopped short of calling for 
the Government to protect lives and property. Nor did they 
ask for troops to be sent in immediately. Military 
intervention should 'only [be] in the final resort'; it was 
hoped that the matter would not be allowed to drift to point 
where the only choice facing Britain would be complete 
withdrawal from Persia and sending in troops.109 More 
moderate Tories were acutely aware that if British troops 
moved into the oil fields, it would be very difficult to 
represent it as protective action, whilst accusing others of 
aggressive behaviour (ie Korea).110 British intervention 
might lead to revolt in Tehran,111 raising the spectre of 
Russian inspired intervention. 'Eden also knew the Truman 
Administration considered Mossadeq as a barrier against 
Communism who should be supported.'112
Eden moved to restrain the atavistic jingoism of some Tory 
backbenchers, ensuring that it was the Shadow Cabinet which 
led pressure upon the government for debates on the crisis, 
and in trying to channel backbench agitation. On 7 June 1951 
Fitzroy Maclean, Viscount Cranborne, David Ormsby-Gore, Amery, 
Head and Stanley tabled an EDM which accused the government of 
failing to provide 'firm or coherent policy in the Middle 
East' which had gravely endangered British interests in the
108 Robert Rhodes James: Anthony Eden (London 1986), p.337
109 Edward Wakefield, 21.6.51, HCDeb A%9.19\
110 Richard Thompson, 21.6.51, HCDebA%9.807-8
111 Edward Wakefield, 21.6.51, HCDebA%9.192
112 Rhodes James: Eden, p.337
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area, especially Persia, and deplored the weakness shown by 
the government in its dealings with Egypt over the Suez Canal. 
The EDM went on to urge the government to take immediate steps 
to 'establish, after consultation with the Commonwealth, the 
United States of America and France, and in co-operation with 
the governments of Greece and Turkey, an effective Middle East 
defence system designed to ensure the maintenance of peace in 
the area'.
It was signed by 157 Conservative MPs, an extraordinary 
demonstration of the strength of party feeling on the Abadan 
issue. There had clearly been a concerted effort by Tory 
whips113 to turn this EDM into the party's manifesto on the 
Abadan crisis, and Middle Eastern affairs. The EDM had been 
signed by Gridley, the Chairman of the 1922 Committee - an 
extraordinary addition to any EDM - as well as the 1922 Vice 
Chairman (Robert Turton) and 8 (out of 12) members of the 1922 
executive (Noble, Thorneycroft, Gammans, Walker-Smith, Boyd- 
Carpenter, Selwyn Lloyd and Eccles), members of the Foreign 
Affairs (Mott-Radclyffe), Imperial (MacDonald) and Defence 
committees, members of One Nation group (Alport, Fort, 
Rodgers, Macleod, Maude); the Scottish National Liberal and 
Conservative Whip (Niall Macpherson), as well as MPs who were 
to become prominent members of the Suez Group (Amery, Fitzroy 
Maclean, Terence Clarke, Mellor and Legge-Bourke), prominent 
ardent Europeans (Boothby, Eccles, Smithers, Foster and 
Hollis); MPs young and old (Amery and Sidney Marshall); those 
who advocated a peaceable settlement by negotiation as well as. 
those whose personal preference was to send in a couple of 
gunboats to clinch the matter. The list also included those 
with experience of government and those Conservatives close to 
Eden (Nutting, Mott-Radclyffe, Lord John Hope); and to 
Churchi11 (Soames).
Despite these attempts to ensure that the party spoke with one
113 89 names were added to the list on the Order paper on 11.6.51.
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voice on the Abadan issue, this became more difficult as 
events in Persia reached appeared to reach a climax in mid- 
1951. Such a division would prove potentially damaging to the 
Conservatives when a general election seemed imminent,
prompting swift moves by leading Conservatives to disclaim any 
such internal strife,114 and to ensure a coordinated party 
line through the 1922 committee.115
(b) The Position of Churchill:
In the Abadan crisis Churchill was more inclined towards the 
robust view than his deputy. The presence of two acknowledged 
experts on foreign affairs on the Tory front bench was
increasingly an explosive cocktail.
The informal hawkish faction knew they enjoyed Churchill's 
sympathy,116 if not his explicit support. At one point
Amery, Fitzroy Maclean, Head and Cranborne, along with about
6 other concerned MPs, called on Churchill and urged him to 
take a vigorous line. Although Churchill enjoyed 'proper 
backbench pressure',117 regarding EDMs as a legitimate 
teasing of a weak government, 'he always spoke with two voices 
on this'. As leader of Her Majesty's Opposition it was 
perfectly proper to attack the incompetent policy of a 
disastrous Foreign Secretary, and the opportunity was there to 
shy away from the unpleasantness of knowledge and the 
inevitable accompaniment of responsibility. However, as the 
possible future Prime Minister in an election year, 
circumstances demanded temperance and statesmanship. Yet, 
Churchill 'loathed to be drawn into a position where he could
114 Head letter, Times 11.7.51
115 Butler, FAC 12.7.51; and see 1922 committee, 28.7.51
116 Lord Amery
117 Lord Carr
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be seen as in cahoots with the government'.118
Therefore, for Churchill, the Abadan crisis was something of 
an uneasy balancing act. Even though he was emotionally drawn 
to the nascent Suez Group's remedy, Churchill counselled 
restraint in private meetings and in the party committees. He 
was noticeably subdued in public; in June Eden made the 
running on behalf of the Conservative front bench. Churchill 
opened the debate on the Middle East for his party before the 
House rose for the summer recess, but in this and in party 
committees he was manifestly unwilling to demand publicly the 
use of force for the protection of property. His message was 
clear: he opposed evacuation, but only if British personnel 
were physically threatened should the government send in 
troops.
The Emerging Suez Group:
Since the end of the Arab-Israeli war a group of MPs who were 
'critical of the policy pursued generally by the government in 
the Middle East'119 had been increasingly apparent in the 
frequency with which certain names recurred on the Order 
Sheet, and interventions and speeches in debate. Their number 
was strengthened considerably after the General Election of 
February 1950 with the return of independent minded pre-war 
MPs120 and the election of younger MPs, whose war-time 
experiences and interests had given them a wide knowledge.121
Unlike the later party disagreements over the Sudan and the
118 Lord Carr, and see Churchill, 30.7.51, HC DebA91.978-995
119 Times 21.6.51
120 de Chair, Herbert Williams, Waterhouse
121 Amery, Maude, Powell
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Suez Canal base, this group of MPs did appreciate and applaud 
Eden's position on Abadan,122 although Eden's robust (but 
still qualified) stance undoubtedly raised expectations that 
he would be similarly hawkish in defence of British interests 
elsewhere in the Middle East. And all Conservatives were 
aware of the party's conflicting roles: as the party of
opposition, 'we were all free to say what we thought, and let 
fire over Abadan'123; yet in its role of responsible 
government-in-waiting in a year when a general election seemed 
imminent, it behoved the party to be cautious, moderate and 
restrained. 'The Conservative front bench were reluctant to 
make the running in opposition for fear of acquiring the label 
of "Warmonger". Therefore it was really left to me [and 
others] on the second bench to challenge Morrison, and to urge 
him to put British troops in to protect the British 
position. '124
In the Abadan crisis this remained an 'informal group [who] 
discussed things among ourselves'.125 At the outset, these 
MPs 'emulated the reserve of the Conservative front 
bench',126 but rapidly came to describe publicly Morrison's 
policy as one 'of despair'.127 Their robust stance on the 
need to protect British nationals and Britain's commercial and 
strategic interests enjoyed wider support from senior Tories, 
such as Lord Salisbury128, Lord Dunglass,129 Sandys130 and
122 Lord Ameiy
123 Lord Amery
124 Somerset de Chair
125 Lord Amery
126 Times 2.5.51
127 Legge-Bourke letter, Daily Telegraph 11.7.51
128 5.7.51, reported in Times 7.7.51
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Head.131
The Views and Aims of the Emerging Suez Group
The Persian crisis was not an isolated phenomenon: the
'scuttle' from Palestine and sour relations with Egypt and 
Iraq had created a background of weakness and withdrawal which 
went a long way to explain recent events in Persia.132 'The 
nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's holdings by 
Mossadeq immediately raised the whole question of British 
influence in the Middle East. If he was allowed to get away 
with it, it followed almost automatically that someone [like 
Nasser] would want to nationalize the Suez Canal Company.'133 
They fumed at Herbert Morrison's inadequacies.134 Nothing 
less than the survival of the British Commonwealth and Empire 
as an independent force in the world' was at stake.135 
Legge-Bourke was goaded into to throwing a penny 
contemptuously across the floor of the House at the Foreign 
Secretary, with the instruction that Morrison 'should put on 
another record'.136 This gesture was regarded as
particularly shocking and received extensive press coverage.
129 21.6.51 HC Defc.489.770; see 1922 committee, 28.6.51, FAC 28.6.51. MP for 
Lanark 1931-51. Dunglass was an unexpected recruit, as a former PPS to Chamberlain, 
supporter of Munich and Chamberlain in 1940.
130 21.6.51, HC Defc.489.763-65
131 see Head letter, Times 11.7.51. MP for Carshalton 1945-59
132 Amery, 30.7.51, HC De&.491.1019
133 Somerset de Chair
134 eg Rayner, 16.7.51, HC Deb.490.842
135 see De Chair letter, Times 19.6.51
136 on 21.6.51
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Britain's interests in the Persian Gulf appeared to be under 
attack from two quarters: Russia and America. Just as Persia 
was a traditional target of Russian expansion,137 now there 
was a desire to deny Russia control of the oil fields of the 
Gulf: securing control of this oil would immediately treble 
Russian oil reserves.138 In addition to these MPs' fear that 
the Tudeh party would triumph and that Persia would become a 
Russian satellite,139 there was also the wider concern for 
Middle Eastern defence: if Russia swept through Iraq, Persia 
and the Levant, it would be of no avail that Greece and Turkey 
were members of NATO.140
Since a purely British organized defence system in the Middle 
East was not feasible, reluctantly, they accepted the need for 
Anglo-American co-operation, but with the US playing a 
subsidiary role.141 America should realise that 'the
defence of the Middle East must primarily be a British 
responsibility' as 'the Middle East is the backbone of the 
Commonwealth and Empire: if it goes the sea and air routes to 
Australia and India will lie not through the Middle East but 
through the United States and the Panama Canal'.142 Implicit 
in this was the belief that Britain should not be constrained 
in the Middle East by America's attitude? it was, of course, 
desirable to act in concord, but this was by no means 
obligatory. (This view surfaced repeatedly in the
Conservative party in the 1950s, only to be refuted brutally 
in the Suez crisis.) Their ideal was for a joint Middle
137 Fitzroy Maclean, 30.7.51, HCDeb.491.1035
138 De Chair letter, Times 19.6.51
139 Legge-Bourke letter, Daily Telegraph 11.7.51; Fitzroy Maclean, 30.7.51, HC 
Deb.491.1039
140 de Chair letter, Times 31.6.51
141 see de Chair letter, Times 19.6.51
142 Amery, 30.7.51, HCDeb.491.1024-5
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Eastern defence force,143 but its composition varied. Amery 
preferred an arrangement whereby the British and Turkish 
armies should have primary command, with contributions from 
Israel and the Arabs nations, together with American and 
French contingents.144 Other future members of the Suez 
Group were decidedly unenthusiastic about the inclusion of 
Israel? Fitzroy Maclean's stated preference was for a strong 
Western force, together with troops from the Commonwealth, 
America and France.145
Persistent rumours that Persia was in negotiation with US oil 
companies to take over the AIOC concession146 fuelled 
Conservative suspicions of American oil interests over­
influencing Truman's policy in the region. The Times pointed 
out that even though there was little evidence of any such 
negotiations, it was undoubtedly in the back of the Persian 
government's mind that if agreement with Britain was not 
reached on Persia's terms, then US technicians could fill the 
breach. Sandys' comment that if British technicians were 
thrown out only America or Russia could provide replacement 
personnel,147 clearly revealed the view that either 
alternative was equally unpalatable.
While the incipient Suez Group agreed with its senior 
colleagues that there should be no evacuation of AIOC 
personnel, these MPs wanted a declaration that force would be 
used if necessary to protect British lives and interests. As 
the crisis progressed, this faction's pressure for the active 
protection of British personnel and property gathered
143 de Chair letter, Times 31.6.51
144 Amery, 30.7.51, HCDeb.491.1024-5
145 30.7.51, HC Deb.491.1037-38
146 Times 21.5.51; Crossman, 21.6.51, HC Deb.489.'776
147 21.6.51, HC Z)e£.489.759-60
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momentum, both on their front bench and the government. They 
felt that if the government were to declare its determination 
to send in troops this would make war less, not more, 
likely.148 They were aware of a Cabinet split on the issue. 
'At first Morrison was very friendly and sympathetic ... in 
his replies. Then I noticed he got increasingly irritated and 
uncomfortable about the whole matter. I was stopped in the 
lobby by Hector McNeil [Minister of State at the Foreign 
Office] who said "You're going for the wrong man. He wants to 
put troops in. The Cabinet are stopping him on the grounds it 
would upset the UNO [in Korea] - the Americans would not wear 
it".'149 Conservatives were singularly unimpressed by such 
arguments. In the first place, as Eden had pointed out, they 
felt entitled to unstinting American support in Persia in 
return for Britain's loyalty to the US in Korea. Washington
should be made to acknowledge that it was in her interests,
economically, politically and strategically, to have continued 
British pre-eminence in the Persian Gulf. In the second 
place, in this faction's view, Britain did not have to defer 
to American wishes.
Once aware of the schism within Cabinet, these MPs were 
relentless in trying to drive a wedge publicly between 
Morrison and Attlee, pressing the Foreign Secretary to admit 
that by his earlier statements to the House he had given the 
impression that he was prepared to use force, and urging 
troops to be sent in immediately150 - the principal effect
would be psychological.151 They were unimpressed by
Morrison's refusal to be drawn on a specific line of
148 Fitzroy Maclean, 30.7.51, HCDeb.491.1042
149 Somerset de Chair
150 de Chair, 20.6.51, HC Deb.489.526
151 Legge-Bourke letter, Daily Telegraph 11.7.51
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action.152 They also were determinedly pressing their line 
on the Conservative front bench, through an EDM153 and in the 
party committees. Dissatisfied with the response to this EDM, 
and what they regarded as Labour's pusillanimous behaviour, 
immediately after the Persian oil debate on 21 June 1951 
Fitzroy Maclean and 28 Conservatives tabled a further EDM 
deploring the Foreign Secretary's refusal to give an assurance 
that the government would take the 'necessary measures to 
protect British lives and installations'. Unlike the earlier 
more moderate EDM this motion was phrased in stronger terms, 
calling on the government to use force to defend property as 
well as lives. This went further than the Conservative 
leadership and the more moderate wing of the party were 
prepared to go, since in the debate Eden specifically had 
excluded the protection of installations. It was sponsored by 
Fitzroy Maclean, Amery, Viscount Cranborne, Christopher 
Soames, Captain Ryder and Richard Fort, all of whom had also 
signed the earlier Conservative's 'manifesto' on Abadan. It 
attracted the following signatures:
Michael Astor 
John Baker White 
Tufton Beamish 
Reginald Bennett 
Eric Bullus 
Albert Cooper 
Viscountess Davidson 
Nigel Fisher 
Hugh Fraser 
John Hare 
Reader Harris 
Edward Keeling 
Gilbert Longden 
Douglas Marshall
152 Times 21.6.51
153 on 7.6.51
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David Ormsby-Gore 
Peter Smithers 
Lady Tweedsmuir 
Fletcher Vane 
Charles Waterhouse 
Sir Herbert Williams 
Geoffrey Wilson 
Richard Wood154
Berrington describes these MPs as being predominantly younger, 
elected since the War who had had 'no share in the pre-war 
policies of appeasement but would have absorbed its lessons. 
To such men Labour's policy of imperial retreat, its 
compliance with the demands of local nationalist leaders may 
have been reminiscent of what, by then, was regarded as the 
disastrous course of the Baldwin and Chamberlain 
governments'.155 The average age of these MPs was 42, but 
there were notable exceptions: Herbert Williams, Waterhouse 
and Davidson were noticeably of a different political vintage. 
Also these three MPs had certainly had had a share in the 
'pre-war policies of appeasement': all three had voted for
Chamberlain in the Munich debate of October 1938, and had 
supported Chamberlain in 1940. Also, as the son of Lord 
Halifax, Richard Wood was 'guilty by association'.
Although this group 'was still spontaneous'156 it was 
increasingly obvious that there was a discrete faction of 
Conservative backbench MPs who were prepared to take a 
vociferous interest in Britain's position in the Middle East. 
Of the above signatures, six went on to be active members of 
the Suez Group in the 1950s: Waterhouse and Amery were to be
the ring leaders; Fraser, Marshall, Fitzroy Maclean and Reader
154 EDM No. 78. Orders of the Day and Notices of Motions (1951) Vol.4. No. 122
155 Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons 1945-55, p. 172
156 Somerset de Chair
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Harris publicly rallied to their cause, and Ormsby-Gore and 
Fisher remained firmly sympathetic. The addition of Soames 
is a conundrum. Was he acting as his father-in-law's 
spokesman on the backbenches, or on his own initiative? 
Soames had not impressed his contemporaries with his political 
acumen at this point.157 However, any 'instinctive reaction 
that he may have been performing his bull-in-a-china shop act 
was probably completely off the mark as we grossly underrated 
him to begin with because of his superficial behaviour. As 
Churchill's PPS, he was superb, much more intelligent, 
reactive, with a degree of sensibility which his earlier 
impression had totally belied.'158 Therefore, his
contemporary, Lord Carr, feels that the truth lies between the 
two poles. 'I would guess he would have had Churchill's tacit 
support. To sponsor an EDM is such a natural action for a 
backbencher, that I am doubtful whether Soames felt the need 
to consult his father-in-law. But he could count on his 
natural feeling of support ... I think it was a question of 
Churchill letting the backbenchers 'fly the flag', while he 
looked round in a supportive way - though not actually 
'tipping them the wink'.159
This emerging faction also pressed their front bench in the 
party committees that a firm line should be taken with both 
Persia and Egypt.160 As the AIOC staff were increasingly 
beleaguered, this nascent group tapped the deep sense of 
humiliation within the party? Britain seemed to being seen off 
by a 'Persian jack-in-office',161 and, despite their leaders 
counselling caution, 'the weight of opinion seems to incline
157 Lord Carr
158 Lord Carr
159 Lord Carr
160 Ormsby-Gore and Fitzroy Maclean in the 1922 committee, 12.7.51, supported by a 
"considerable majority of MPs" at the 1922 committee, 26.7.50
161 Maxwell Fyfe weekend speech 7-8.7.51
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towards the views expressed by Lord Salisbury. Concern is 
felt ... at the possible effects on British prestige 
throughout the Middle East'.162 Their demand for action 
would have taken the government a good deal further than it 
had so far been willing to go, or indeed that the Opposition 
leaders in the Commons had urged they should go.163 The 
critics seized the opportunity of the debate on the Middle 
East at the end of the summer session to issue a firm 
statement of their views. Undaunted by the clear instruction 
from their front bench that Conservatives should not demand 
that the installations be protected,164 Amery and Maclean 
pressed the Prime Minister to give a declaration that the 
government would use all means at its disposal to protect 
British lives and interests. If British objectives were 
achieved by negotiation so much the better, but the government 
was urged not to negotiate while AIOC personnel were being 
harassed.
The Effect of Tory rhetoric:
(a) On the Conservative party:
Although the emerging Suez Group failed in its efforts to 
persuade Churchill and Eden to press for military 
intervention, under pressure from the Tory backbenches Eden 
and his more moderate front bench colleagues demanded that 
AIOC personnel would not be evacuated from Abadan, and that 
the Conservative party would support any Labour government 
measures to defend them at the refineries. The Tory militants 
did have another, less positive influence upon the public 
bearing of their party in the crisis. The Conservative front
162 Times 6.7.51
163 Times 7.7.51
164 Churchill, 30.7.51, HC Deb.491.994-5
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bench needed to promote a responsible, coherent line in an 
election year, yet was faced with wayward and extremely vocal 
backbenchers. This, combined with the political luxury of 
opposition, meant that the party never confronted the question 
of how a Conservative government would have risen to 
Mossadeq's challenge. As the Times commented,165 it was 
never possible to say how the Tories would have handled the 
dispute.
(b) On the Labour government:
The Conservatives felt they had succeeded in finally wringing 
an admission from the Labour government that Britain was 
prepared to stay in Abadan.166 However, such satisfaction 
was short-lived. Tory relief at Attlee's decision to call a 
general election in October was balanced by the fear that 
events in Persia were moving inexorably towards disaster, 
while the Labour government wrung its hands.167 Conservative 
MPs' pressure during the election campaign was to no avail, 
and their worst fears were realised. Denied American support 
and outmanoeuvred by the Mossadeq government in referring the 
matter to the UNO, the Labour government had no choice but to 
sanction the withdrawal of the remaining AIOC personnel.
Conservative urgings to use force did not affect the debate 
within the Cabinet, although this support may have goaded 
Morrison on since the Foreign Secretary was enthusiastic for 
intervention, as was Shinwell, the Minister of Defence. The 
crux of the matter as far as the Cabinet was concerned never 
surfaced in public debate: namely, the impossibility of using
165 22.10.51
166 see Attlee 30.7.51, HCDeb.491.1072; Lord Chancellor’s statement 31.7.51, reported 
in Times 1.8.51
167 see Fitzroy Maclean letter, Times 26.9.51
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force in the dispute in opposition to America, given Britain's 
support for America in the UNO over North Korea's invasion of 
South Korea.
The outcome of the Abadan crisis revealed Britain could not 
take military action in the Middle East with impunity. 
However, a sizeable section of the Conservative party refused 
to accept the logic of the need to observe the UN Charter and 
to act only with American support. Britain's humiliation was 
due to the Foreign Secretary's 'ignorant laziness and lack of 
understanding of foreigners',168 his 'flabby diplomacy',169 
not deference to Britain's mainstay in Europe. To a great 
extent Eden was also guilty of this, with disastrous results 
in the Suez Crisis. He and Churchill were briefed by Attlee 
following the Cabinet's decision on 27 September 1951 not to 
use force without American support, on the grounds that 
Britain did not have the strength to act alone in defiance of 
America. In 1956 Eden never asked himself the difficult 
question of whether America would oppose British military 
intervention.
Summary:
As far as the Suez Group was concerned, Abadan was the 
'preparatory exercise' in the Conservative party's future 
relations with Egypt. It helped identify people who cared 
about the Middle East, and who worried about the appeasement 
of Middle Eastern radicalism.170 The crisis helped coalesce 
ideas about Britain's ideal place in the region, and the 
optimum defence arrangement. Specifically the events of 1951 
helped concentrate Conservative attention on Britain's future 
in the Suez Canal Zone, causing an early declaration of what
16S Maxwell Fyfe constituency speech, reported in Times 22.8.51
169 Henry Hopkinson constituency speech, Times 9.9.51
170 Lord Amery
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was to become the Suez Group's thesis: a request for the
reaffirmation of Britain's treaty right under the 
Anglo-Egyptian treaty to maintain a garrison in the Canal 
Zone, that all measures be taken to restore free passage 
through the Canal, and a clear expression of determination 
from Westminster not to leave the Sudan 'until such time as 
the Sudanese people can freely determine their own 
destiny'.171 In the critics' view, Britain had taught that 
terrorism paid: King Abdullah of Jordan had been 'killed
because he was a friend of Britain and the Middle East no 
longer believed that Britain could or would protect her 
friends ... For six years the Government have sought to 
conciliate the Egyptian regime ... It is high time that we 
turned our backs on any attempt to appease the Egyptian 
government.'172 The incoming Conservative government had 
been warned.
171 Fitzroy Maclean, 30.7.51, HCDebA91.1040-1
172 Amery, 30.7.51, HC Deb.491.1021-2
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CHAPTER 8: THE CONSERVATIVES IN POWER:
CONSERVATIVE DISAGREEMENTS OVER EGYPT AND THE SUDAN: 1951-53
The relatively short, but very heated party battle over the 
Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Sudan was comparable in 
importance in Conservative attitudes to the Middle East to the 
effect of the Schuman Plan on Conservative attitudes to 
Europe. Both episodes proved a watershed in backbench 
opinion. In the case of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the 
Sudan, it provided the catalyst for the 'Sudan group',1 from 
which grew the active and extremely vocal faction, the Suez 
Group. The furore over the proposed agreement was the most 
serious revolt Churchill's peace-time administration had yet 
faced, coming on top of internal wrangling over transport 
policy, commercial television and government expenditure. The 
party was already excited by Egyptian truculence over 
Britain's future in the Suez Canal base, the strategic 
importance of which was believed to have increased with the 
tension of the Cold War, and it was well known on the 
backbenches that Churchill was at logger-heads with his 
Foreign Secretary in Cabinet on Eden's Egyptian policy.
The backbench unrest over the issue of Sudanese self- 
determination equalled the later discontent over the Suez base 
Agreement? indeed, 'some said Eden had even more of a fight 
[over the Sudan]'.2 Certainly, Eden was on the point of 
resignation,3 a possibility of which he never hinted in his 
autobiography when writing about his battle over the future of 
British troops in the Canal Zone. Churchill, whose own 
preference was to resist any policy which conciliated Cairo, 
used the backbench outcry to tell Eden bluntly that only if he 
could persuade the bulk of the party, would he (Churchill)
1 Enoch Powell
2 Sir Richard Thompson
3 Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle, p.247
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agree to the proposed Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Sudan. 
It was to prove a considerable test of Eden's powers of 
persuasion, and cost him dear in terms of his support from 
those who had been persuaded by his vigorous statements in the 
Abadan crisis that he was 'sound'.
The View of Eden within the Conservative Party
Eden did not command uniform respect in the Parliamentary 
party, although he was firmly entrenched as a leading member 
of the pantheon of Conservative gods as far as the party in 
the country was concerned. There were MPs who muttered that 
Eden's opposition to appeasement in the 1930s had been 
half-hearted; the received wisdom was that he had resigned 
from Chamberlain's Cabinet in 1938 on principle, but some 
political insiders thought that this had been more for reasons 
of style than substance. Admittedly in 1951 his parliamentary 
supporters far outnumbered his critics. However, those 
Conservative (such as Waterhouse and Herbert Williams) who did 
not trust his espousal of more progressive domestic policy, 
came to form an unlikely alliance with those Tories who were 
at odds with Eden's indifference to Britain's involvement in 
European integration (Amery, and later Biggs-Davison). This 
coalesced into the third strand of opposition to Eden: 
criticism of his Middle East policy.
As questions persisted about Churchill's continuing 
leadership, the rumbles of discontent grew. The party rank 
and file felt increasingly ignored by their aging leader,4 
just as the friction between Eden and Churchill, which belied 
the public image of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary 
working in perfect harmony, opened the door for the critics of 
the government's Middle East policy. As well as being the 
'arch appeaser' in the Middle East, Eden was also Churchill's
4 see Tom Driberg, Daily Express 13.4.52
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heir apparent.5 His assumption of the party leadership could 
not fail to affect the balance of power within the 
Conservative party. This internal political discontent 
obliged Eden to pay assiduous attention to the presentation of 
his policy on the Sudan and Egypt to minimize backbench 
objections, and magnified his conflict with Churchill, since 
the Foreign Secretary could not count on the good temper of 
the party in the Commons in his battle with the Prime 
Minister. Although Eden's policy enjoyed the support of the 
majority of his Cabinet colleagues,6 the existence of a 
sizeable faction of discontented backbenchers enabled 
Churchill to conduct his own war of attrition.
The Legacy from Labour in the Middle East
The legacy from the Labour government did not seem a happy 
one, but there was considerable optimism that Britain's 
position in the region could be restored after the rout from 
Abadan, or at least the line held. There were high hopes: 
Churchill the titan who had fulminated against the scuttle of 
Palestine, was in charge once more; and Eden was back at the 
Foreign Office, the man who had originally negotiated with 
Nahas Pasha the 1936 Treaty, a man of proven diplomatic 
ability and undisputed knowledge of world affairs, and who had 
encouraged the Conservative diehards by his strong stand in 
the Abadan affair. Thus Conservatives hoped that the Persian 
fiasco would prove merely a setback, and with assiduous 
attention, Britain's former position and prestige could be 
recovered? the damage, although acknowledged to be serious, 
was not seen as irreparable.
s He did not enjoy the position as clear favourite (over Butler and Macmillan) until 1954, 
his annus mirabilis.
6 see John Grigg: ’The Crippled Giant’, Encounter, April 1977, Vol.48, pp.9-16
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PERSIA: 1951-54
Persia ceased to be a bone of contention within the Tory 
party. Eden adopted a 'softly-softly' approach to a 
settlement with the Mossadeq government over London's 
outstanding claims for compensation - 'the best policy, now 
Mossadeq has rejected the latest Anglo-American proposal, is 
to leave him alone. The trouble is America will never let 
anyone alone'7 - and the issue dropped below the political 
horizon as far as the mainstream of the party was concerned. 
Occasional questions were raised in the House and in the 
Foreign Affairs Committee over the likelihood of a settlement, 
but on the whole the matter was left to the Foreign 
Secretary's discretion. For this Eden had to thank private 
knowledge among MPs® of the contacts between the CIA and MI6 
in Persia. The calming effect of their inside information, 
confirmed by Eden's hint above, was not apparent at the time.9
A final settlement of Britain's outstanding claims had to 
wait until after the fall of Mossadeq in July 1953, following 
a coup inspired by the CIA using the contacts established by 
MI6.10
EGYPT: OCTOBER 1951-JULY 1952 
Conservative Debate on Egypt
Initial Conservative hopes of an improvement in Britain's 
position in the Middle East proved over optimistic. The 
nationalization of the AIOC was merely the harbinger of 
increased threats to Britain's commercial and military
7 FAC 8.1.53
8 such as Amery, Kerby, Hyde, all of whom were to become members of the Suez Group
9 Lord Glendevon
10 see Grigg: ’The Crippled Giant’
- 282 -
interests from Arab nationalism. Relations with Egypt over 
the Anglo-Egyptian condominium of the Sudan and the continued 
presence of British troops in the Suez Canal Zone proved the 
main points of contention in foreign policy for the 
Conservative party between 1951 and 1954. The swell of 
feeling had been mounting throughout 1951: the negotiation of 
the Egyptian Sterling Balances Agreement in March had drawn 
sharp Tory criticism and Conservative feeling throughout the 
Abadan crisis had been exacerbated by difficulties with Egypt 
over the 1936 Treaty. The humiliating evacuation from Abadan 
compounded London's difficulties: encouraged by the spectacle 
of Tehran's successful defiance of John Bull, Egypt was 
spurred on to commit further outrages in her war of attrition 
to force Britain's withdrawal from the Canal Zone base, and to 
press more fiercely King Farouk's claim to sovereignty over 
the Sudan.
The Conservative backbenches were united on three points: they 
supported their government as it held to the outgoing Labour 
government's refusal to accept Egypt's unilateral abrogation 
of the 1936 treaty? they concurred with Eden's desire to 
protect Britain's power and prestige in the Middle East; and 
it was their universal view that the base remained the best 
point from which the defence of the Middle East could be 
conducted. Whatever Tory appreciation of the validity and 
strength of nationalism in Egypt, the Conservatives, leaders 
and supporters alike, were united in the view that Egypt was 
making a tragic mistake if she thought she could remain 
neutral in an East-West war as long as there remained a threat 
of Soviet aggression. Convinced that Cairo must be brought to 
face wider realities posed by the Russian threat to the 
Northern Tier, to which all requirements of satisfying 
national feeling should be subordinated,11 these politicians 
regarded the Wafdist government's arguments of the threat 
posed by the continued presence of British troops merely as
11 Mott-Radclyffe letter, Times 19.2.52
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proof that the Egyptian leaders were victims of communist 
propaganda and misinformation. However, thereafter, the 
strands of party opinion divided.
(a) The Mainstream of the Conservative Party
The Conservative mainstream accepted Eden's assessment of the 
requirements of Britain's post-war role balanced against her 
straightened resources. In Eden's opinion, it was vital for 
London to reduce Britain's global military commitment, whilst 
maintaining British prestige. He recognized the danger
involved in this retreat and was profoundly concerned that too 
rapid a reduction of Britain's presence might destroy 
Britain's credibility abroad. In any case, his party's
internecine conflict denied the Foreign Secretary this option 
since the government could not carry its supporters, let alone 
public opinion,12 on a policy of running down boldly Britain's 
onerous overseas commitments.
But Eden was convinced a contraction of the British presence 
in the region was imperative, gambling that once the irritant 
of British troops was removed from the Canal Zone base, Anglo- 
Egyptian relations would improve sufficiently to allow a 
regional defence organization to offset this shedding of 
Britain's responsibilities and encourage America to take the 
lead.13 There was general Conservative support for a Middle 
East Defence Organization,14 but the Conservative government.'s 
attempts to involve Egypt with Britain, Turkey, France and 
America in a Middle East defence organization between 1951 and 
1952 foundered on Egyptian determination to remove all foreign
12 Anthony Adamthwaite: ’Eden, the Foreign Office and the Making of Foreign Policy’, 
International Affairs 1988 No.64 No.2, pp.241-259
13 Adamthwaite
14 Nutting, 20.11.51, HC Deb.494.232
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troops from her soil, and Washington's refusal to join except 
at Egypt's express invitation.
(b) The Emerging Suez Group
Eden's 'supine' view of the vital necessity of removing 
British troops was not shared by a vocal section of Tory 
backbenchers, whose opinions enjoyed wider support within the 
party. From the start of Churchill's peace-time government, 
these MPs urged the Foreign Secretary to take a 'firmer line' 
with Egypt.15 While this incipient group recognized that the 
number of British troops currently in the Suez Canal Zone 
considerably exceeded the allocation under the arrangements of 
the 1936 treaty, they saw no reason to renegotiate the terms; 
these, they argued, entitled Britain to remain in the Canal 
Zone beyond 1956, and they entertained an increasingly 
sceptical view of the benefits to be derived from negotiating 
with such an unreliable and improvident people. This faction 
were infuriated by Eden's determination to try to negotiate a 
replacement treaty with Egypt against a background of 
continuing guerilla warfare in the Canal Zone, and attacks on 
British lives and property which culminated in the Cairo riots 
of January 1952. Increasingly alarmed at possible concessions 
to Egyptian nationalism, they feared that Britain was 
incurring the odium of using strength without any of the 
stability which a policy of strength, if wisely applied, 
should have secured.
This section of the party regarded as specious in the extreme 
the argument that Britain's continued presence could only 
bring about the war which it professed to be aimed at 
averting. Egyptian nationalism appeared narrow-minded and 
misplaced; the nationalist movement was dismissed as a motley 
bunch of pilferers, religious extremists, and communist
15 eg Legge-Bourke, 19.11.51, HC Deb.494.128
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agitators bolstered by the Cairo poor and the press, in the 
face of which the Wafdist government was proving lamentably 
feeble. Yet, there remained a hangover of Britain's 
nineteenth century 'civilizing mission', and the assumption 
that Britain was only acting for the good of the (unworthy and 
ungrateful) Egyptian populace was deeply engrained in their 
psyche.
While their opponents criticised them for being 'less 
solicitous about money and resources',16 these MPs were far 
from blind to the parlous state of the British economy. But
they refused to accept the logic of wholesale withdrawal
overseas, and bitterly resented the passing of Britain's 
imperial greatness. They were aware through their contacts 
with the Army that military opinion was 'almost unanimous that
the best base for defending the area will always be the Suez
Canal because of communications and existing installations'.17 
Therefore for the emerging Suez Group, its sympathizers and 
the Conservative press (especially the Northcliffe and 
Beaverbrook Groups) the region remained a vital sphere of 
influence and nothing should be done which might undermine the 
country's reputation and resolve. Britain's pre-eminence 
there was part of the natural order.
(c) Cabinet Dissent on Analo-Eayptian Relations:
Eden very quickly encountered difficulties with backbench 
colleagues and the Cairo authorities in his determined pursuit 
of a negotiated settlement with Egypt - seen in the 
extraordinary letter written by the Chairman of the 1922, 
Derek Walker-Smith, to Eden in February 1952, giving the 
Committee's support to the Foreign Secretary on Egypt and the
16 Aubrey Jones
17 confirmed by Times 5.8.52
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Sudan.18 By the spring of 1952 he had also aroused the wrath 
of his leader. Concerned about the 'strong forces within the 
Tory party which were deeply stirred by the prospect of moral 
surrender and physical flight',19 of which he was well aware 
from reports from the Chief Whip, Churchill himself was 
congenitally opposed to any imperial retreat and was furious 
with the conciliatory line his Foreign Secretary was taking 
with the Cairo government.20 Churchill was in no hurry to 
renegotiate the pre-war treaty? he was firmly of the view that 
Britain was in a position of strength and there was no urgency 
to conclude an agreement 'which sacrificed all Britain had 
striven for for so many years'.
After the overthrow of King Farouk in July 1952, the majority 
of the Cabinet concurred with Eden on the need to conciliate 
the new Neguib regime, in marked contrast to Churchill who 
felt that Neguib's increasingly critical and hostile 
statements about Britain as the autumn went on should be met 
with clear signs that Britain would not appease the new 
government. Churchill was extremely reluctant to concede that 
Britain had to withdraw from the Canal Zone base. He wanted 
Britain to hand over her responsibilities in Egypt to an 
international organization and he fervently hoped that America 
would take some share in the responsibility of protecting the 
waterway.21
Division at the top gave backbench critics greater opportunity 
to press their case, just as the emergence of a vocal 
backbench faction gave the Prime Minister powerful ammunition
18 1922 Committee minutes, 21.2.52
19 PRO.PREM11/91, quoted in Ritchie Ovendale: ’Egypt and the Suez Base Agreement’, 
in John Young ed: The Foreign Policy of Churchill’s Peace-time Administration (Leicester 
1988), p. 138
20 see John Colville: The Fringes o f Power - Downing Street Diaries 1939-55, p.645
21 see Churchill address to Congress, 17.1.52, reported in limes 18.1.52
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in Cabinet. The demand by the young Egyptian army officers 
for serious negotiations for British withdrawal prompted Amery 
and Waterhouse to take further soundings within the party to 
form a cohesive group to fight any such proposal? and 
fortified by backbench support, Churchill conducted a 
determined rear guard action, both within the Cabinet, and by 
nods, winks and asides in the corridors of Westminster in 
support of the rebels on his own benches.
THE SUDAN:
Conservative Backbench Attitudes to the Sudan
The Conservative government's reaffirmation of Britain's 
commitment to Sudanese self-determination22 had further 
complicated Anglo-Egyptian relations, already strained by the 
Cairo government's unilateral abrogation of the 1936 treaty, 
as King Farouk's ministers were determined to assert 
sovereignty over the whole of the Upper Nile. Conservatives 
had been concerned about the future of the Sudan since 
Attlee's statement in 1946 on the withdrawal of British forces 
from Egypt.23 Eden's expressed determination to honour 
Bevin's pledge of 27 March 1946 to Sudanese self-government, 
together with his view that the burden of defence could, and 
should be reduced - ran directly contrary to the beliefs of a 
sizeable faction of Tory backbenchers, who stoutly advocated 
that the Sudanese should not be sacrificed to conciliate the 
Egyptians.24 The emerging Suez Group cultivated links with 
Sudanese politicians to prevent a 'sell-out'? for example, at 
a lunch hosted by Leo Amery, Sir Abd al-Rahman Al-Madhi, the 
head of the Umma party, 'made it very plain that he had no
22 Eden, 15.11.51, HCDebA93.1176-8
23 FAC 7.5.46, and Churchill, 1.8.46, HCDeb.426.1256
24 see Fitzroy Maclean, 7.5.52, HC Deb.500.354
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intention of accepting restoration of Cairo's sovereignty over 
the Sudan and gave [his fellow guests Waterhouse and Julian 
Amery] plenty of ammunition with which to fire questions and 
write letters to the government'.25
The feeling that the Sudan was being thrown away to appease 
Egypt went far beyond the emerging Suez Group's apparent 
numbers in the Commons, and was supported by elements in the 
Conservative press. Throughout 1952 there was great anxiety 
lest the government would make extensive concessions to the 
Egyptians on the Sudan, under pressure from the Americans who 
were strongly suspected of a pro-Egyptian bias.26 These 
fears, already buoyed by the behaviour of Caffrey, the 
American Ambassador in Cairo, were aggravated by press reports 
covering the arrival of H M Hoskins as Head of the Middle East 
Department at the State Department: 'Hoskins is understood to 
have tried to persuade the Sudanese leaders to support the 
Egyptian demand for Egyptian sovereignty'.27
Negotiations with Egypt prior to July 1952 foundered on 
Egypt's refusal to separate the issues of the Sudan and the 
British presence in the Canal Zone. Although the Neguib 
government proved no more susceptible to the idea of Egypt 
joining a Middle East defence organization, the July 
revolution did open the way to a negotiated settlement of 
Anglo-Egyptian differences, since it finally separated the two 
contentious issues. The fall of the King removed all 
legitimate claim by the Egyptian government to sovereignty 
over the Anglo-Egyptian condominium. However, this did not 
diminish Cairo's hopes of ultimately controlling the whole of 
the Upper Nile. Neguib, himself half-Egyptian and educated at
25 Julian Amery: ’The Suez Group’, in Selwyn Troen and Moshe Shemesh ed.: The Suez- 
Sinai Crisis, p. 113
26 Edward Wakefield, FAC 30.4.52
27 Times 12.5.52
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Gordon College in Khartoum, hoped to use his origins and the 
Egyptians' new-found role as comrades-in-arms with the 
Sudanese to tie an independent Sudan firmly to Egypt. In the 
meantime, Egypt could pose as the champion of Sudanese 
independence. Britain could not now renege on her public 
commitment to Sudanese self-determination.28
Conservative anxiety hardened into outrage when the details of 
the proposed Anglo-Egyptian agreement over the condominium 
became known in January 1953. This concern extended far 
beyond the diehard wing of the party, who opposed self- 
government on imperial grounds. Others Conservatives 
sympathetic to Sudanese self-determination, such as Dodds- 
Parker who had served in the Sudan Civil Service, and Edward 
Wakefield,29 a former member of the Indian Civil service (both 
of whom had friends and excellent contacts in the Sudan) were 
profoundly disturbed. These MPs agreed that the Foreign 
Office line on the Sudan was correct on the importance of 
taking the problem of the Sudan out of Anglo-Egyptian 
relations30, but they were fearful of future independence of 
Sudan after self-government. Tories were convinced that the 
interests of the Sudanese had been jeopardised by the proposed 
agreement?31 Britain's administration of the condominium 
through the Sudan Civil Service was seen as an outstanding 
feat of government by all sections of the party,32 and the 
proposed replacement appeared fraught with difficulties.
This party discussion on the Sudan was part of the 'gradual 
decolonization debate ... It struck very deep emotional chords 
in the Tory party; there was an emotional depth to duty. They
23 Wm Roger Louis: The Tragedy of the Anglo-Egyptian Settlement of 1954’, in Wm 
R Louis ed: Suez 1956 - the Crisis and its Consequences (Oxford 1989), p.51
29 MP for West Derbyshire 1950-62
30 Dodds-Parker, FAC 28.1.53
31 Waterhouse, 5.3.53, HCDeb.512.593
32 Harold Macmillan: Tides of Fortune, p.658
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hated the fashionable view which mocked Britain's contribution 
to development.'33 In these MPs eyes, Britain was rushing 
into Sudanese self-government for misguided reasons. Critics 
questioned Eden's arguments that the deteriorating relations 
between London and Khartoum justified a speedy resolution to 
the matter and early elections; Patrick Maitland and Fitzroy 
Maclean argued that reports of Anglo-Sudanese tension were 
completely at variance with previous appraisals, and suggested 
that the government's sources were unreliable. In addition, 
there was a widespread conviction that Britain was reneging on 
her responsibility towards the Southern Tribes of the Sudan 
who were culturally and racially very different from their 
Arab, Muslim northern neighbours. There was an underlying 
concern that a mere political settlement could not protect the 
Southern tribes from incursions from the North.34 They argued 
that less than 1 per cent of the Southern Sudanese were 
literate, or had any sort of political knowledge or 
experience; to talk of self-government for such a people was 
'only a mockery, and an abandonment of our trust'.35 The 
Noble Savage could not protect himself, or if he tried to, the 
result would be civil war. The memory of the bloodbath that 
had accompanied Indian independence was fresh in people's 
minds.36
Deeply worried that Egyptian money would corrupt Sudanese 
politicians and the electorate, many backbench MPs were 
unhappy with government assurances that Sudan would be free to 
seek Commonwealth association with Britain after 
independence.37 Eden's assurances that the Sudanese could
33 Sir Richard Thompson
34 Savory, FAC 10.2.53
35 Assheton, 12.2.53, HC Deb.512.608-9
36 Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker
37 reflected in Waterhouse’s question, 17.2.53, HC Deb.511.1067
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choose either complete independence, a link with Egypt or a 
link in some form with Britain were seen as empty promises. 
As far as his critics were concerned, Eden could promise until 
he was blue in the face that 'complete independence did not 
exclude the right of any country to apply, if it so wishes, 
for association with or membership of the British 
Commonwealth'38; he had not made this sufficiently clear to 
the Egyptians39 - as Neguib's swift contradiction of the 
Sudanese right to associate with Britain once the country was 
independent, seemed to demonstrate, in the Sudan Group's 
opinion, that it was 'quite immpossible to accept the word or 
the signature of the Egyptians'.40
There had been private Conservative suggestions for Britain 
'to make arrangements with the Sudanese even in defiance of 
the Egyptians if necessary'.41 These plainly extended
beyond Commonwealth status, to include a separate arrangement 
for the Southern Sudan, whose tribes were known to be 
profoundly disturbed by the proposed settlement. Eden refused 
to countenance such suggestions, stressing in his statement on 
the progress of negotiations concerning the Sudan's future on 
20 January 1953, that the Government did not propose to add to 
the safeguards in the draft self-governing statute which gave 
the Governor General special powers to protect the interests 
of the Southern provinces. This and his comment regretting 
the suspicion Britain had wanted to detach the Southern 
provinces, were clear indications that the Foreign Office had 
been under pressure to implement this option. His backbench 
critics regarded his refusal to make active provision for 
either Commonwealth status or certainly a special treaty
38 Eden, 12.2.53, HC Deb.511.610
39 see Waterhouse, 12.2.53, HC Deb.511.609 and 17.2.53, HCDeb.5\ 1.1067
40 Waterhouse 17.2.53
41 Malcolm McCorquodale, FAC 28.1.53
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relationship,42 was seen as 'a great mistake: it was a
passive, not an active foreign policy'.43
In the view of Conservative backbench critics, any settlement 
should be based on the long-term welfare of the Sudanese. 
Some interpreted this as an unhurried progression to self 
government, involving the continued, long-term presence of the 
British in the country. What was needed was a barrier in the 
region, not a bridge between Africa and the Middle East, to 
prevent Middle Eastern disorders spreading south into the East 
African colonies. The Mau Mau emergency in Kenya merely 
underlined the argument for the need to protect Britain's air 
communications with East Africa44? and the unrest in the 
colony undermined the notion that Britain could establish an 
alternative military base there.45
Other backbench critics were convinced that self-government 
would be detrimental to the security in the area: an
independent Sudan along side Egypt with the British 
administration withdrawn was very likely to be a source of 
constant friction in the region. They entertained fears of 
Sudanese claims that Britain had allowed Egypt too much Nile 
water, with the ever-present threat that the Sudan might 
interfere to alter the allotment in her favour. Given that 
the Sudan was sparsely populated while Egypt was manifestly 
overcrowded on the available cultivated land, Egypt would be 
subject to immense economic pressure to widen her boundaries? 
if matters did lead to armed conflict Sudan was unlikely to be 
able to defend herself, faced with her northern neighbour's 
industrial and financial potential.
42 Wakefield, FAC 30.4.52; Dodds-Parker, FAC 10.2.53
43 Paul Williams
44 Amery, FAC 10.2.53
45 This formed part of the Bevin-Sidky agreement of 1946: Times 4.1.52
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For the 'Sudan Group', this untimely withdrawal from the Sudan 
also had to be seen in the context of Britain's future in the 
Canal Zone base. By the time of the young Egyptian army 
officers' coup d'etat in July 1952, there had been a 
widespread suspicion in Conservative circles that the question 
of the evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal (along 
with the problem of the defence of the Canal) had been settled 
in the confidential talks. Reports had appeared in the 
press at the beginning of May 1952 that it seemed that 
Britain's acceptance of evacuation from the Canal Zone would 
be met on the Egyptian side by a willingness to negotiate an 
engagement of foreign technicians to help the Egyptian Army to 
make the Canal base safe and to discuss in detail Egypt's part 
in Middle East Defence. Foreign Office disclaimers of the 
alternative of Cyprus46 seemed highly suspicious. Britain's 
departure from the Canal base would remove any sanction London 
possessed over Egypt's continued observance of the Anglo- 
Egyptian agreement on the Sudan. These critics also 
questioned the benefit such an agreement would confer on 
Anglo-Egyptian relations, arguing that Eden was grossly 
misinformed if he thought that settlement of Anglo-Egyptian 
differences over the Sudan would improve Anglo-Egyptian 
relations. Selwyn Lloyd, the Minister at the Foreign Office, 
was forced to concede that Egypt might negotiate just as hard 
over the Canal question.47 The Conservative stalwarts feared 
that the termination of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium would 
only serve to strengthen immeasurably Egypt's hand in their 
attempts to secure the evacuation of the Canal base: the
presence of British administrators were a necessary 
counterweight to the continued presence of British troops in 
the Canal Zone.
Therefore, not only was Britain failing in her 
responsibilities, but the proposed arrangement appeared to
46 see Times 5.8.52
47 FAC 10.2.53
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offer boundless opportunities for increased Egyptian influence 
over a newly independent southern neighbour. Conservative 
opponents of imminent Sudanese independence feared that the 
Foreign Office was being seduced into an agreement which, once 
concluded, would free Neguib and his colleagues to pressure 
the Sudan by bribery and other means to seek unity with Egypt. 
They had little hope that Egypt would respect an agreement, 
and it would be highly dangerous to assume that Cairo would do 
so.48
The Influence of Conservative Backbench Opinion in Cabinet: 
Eden vs Churchill
Eden was well aware that he had a fight on his hands with his 
backbenchers. He appeared before the Foreign Affairs 
Committee in December 195249 to inform his backbench 
colleagues on the progress of the 'tough negotiations on the 
Sudan', and was obliged to address the committee again at the 
end of January to ward off growing criticism, assuring his 
colleagues that two particular points required attention: the 
power of the Governor General to act in an emergency, and 
safeguards for the Southern Sudanese. The Foreign Secretary 
insisted that the Governor General should press ahead with 
elections, and that if no agreement was reached 'it must not 
appear to be our fault'.50
However, Eden had not anticipated the mammoth battle he faced 
in the combination of a defiant Churchill in Cabinet and 
outrage on Tory backbenches. Although he and Churchill had 
clashed over their preferred approach to Egypt during the 
autumn, Eden's view had apparently prevailed? and Churchill
48 Waterhouse and Harmar Nicholls, FAC 10.2.53
49 FAC 10.12.52
50 FAC 28.1.53
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had 'allowed Eden a pretty free hand'51 over the Sudan. 
Although the Prime Minister favoured a more hard-line approach 
to Egypt, he had no coherent alternative policy to offer his 
Cabinet colleagues,52 who accordingly supported Eden's line 
of attack. With the publication of the proposed agreement in 
mid-January 1953 against a background of more press reports of 
Southern fears of Northern domination, Eden was suddenly 
confronted with a major crisis: on the backbenches and in 
Cabinet. The Sudan Group and the Beaverbrook press were 'in 
full cry'53 and most important, given this ground swell of 
feeling, he had incurred the animosity of Churchill.54 To 
some political commentators it was comparable to the Bevanite 
split within the Labour party.55 Eden was also in the 
doldrums politically,56 compared to the meteoric rise in the 
fortunes of his rival Butler.
'He did have a great battle over it'.57 Churchill had just 
returned from his holiday in Jamaica, and was 'passionately 
interested in the Egypt situation'.58 The Prime Minister 
envisaged the appropriate tactics for dealing with the 
Egyptians as follows: 'I would like [the dictator] to kick us 
and show him we did not run ... unless you can show that we 
have imposed our will upon Neguib you will find it very 
difficult to convince the Conservative party that the 
evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone conforms with British
51 Sir Anthony Nutting
52 Eden diary note 22.12.53, quoted in Robert Rhodes Janies: Anthony Eden, p.358
53 Evelyn Shuckburgh: Descent to Suez, p.77
54 Sir Anthony Nutting; Shuckburgh, p.75
55 Bristol Evening Post 20.2.53
56 Sir Richard Thompson; Bristol Evening Post
57 Sir Richard Thompson
58 Shuckburgh, pp.74-5
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interest or prestige.'59 'Churchill was always trying to 
avoid having to make a decision to "scuttle", as he called it. 
He did not like the Sudan agreement because it was hauling 
down the flag, although Sudan was not part of the Empire. 
Churchill had a romantic concept; the feeling [probably 
because of his participation in Sudanese history] that we must 
always hold firm, and that British rule was beneficial [to the 
Sudanese people].'60
Churchill was well aware of the depth of backbench feeling on 
the issue. The Sudan Group had conveyed the intensity of 
their wrath up the party ladder61, and with the party in 
uproar, the Government was obliged to reveal details of the 
agreement to its supporters before it was put before the 
House. Conservative opposition now came out in to the open: 
Legge-Bourke 'fired the first shot'62 with his intervention 
in the Chamber on 10 February 1953. That afternoon Selwyn 
Lloyd attended a tumultuous meeting of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee and was bombarded with guestions. Conservatives 
across the political spectrum rose to voice their concern at 
the inadequacy of the agreement. Selwyn Lloyd who 'undertook 
to convey the feeling of the meeting to the Foreign 
Secretary'63, was 'so roughly handled that Eden felt obliged 
to come and defend [the Sudan agreement] himself at a separate 
meeting' .64
59 PRO.PREM11/392, quoted in Ovendale in Young ed.: The Foreign Policy of 
ChurchilVs Peacetime Administration
60 Sir Anthony Nutting
61 At Eden’s suggestion, Waterhouse met Sir James Bowker, head of Egyptian affairs at 
the Foreign Office, and Nutting on 2.2.53; Waterhouse to Eden 11.2.53. Waterhouse papers
62 Bristol Evening Post 20.2.53
63 FAC 10.2.53
64 Bristol Evening Post 20.2.53
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The truth was somewhat different to the press reports. 
Churchill was openly on the side of the protestors: Waterhouse 
and Assheton had been invited to No 10 by Churchill after they 
had put down their oral question on the Sudanese agreement in 
the House. The fact that the Prime Minister saw fit to summon 
two government backbenchers 'to a personal interview indicates 
the importance the government attaches to the revolt. It 
should never be forgotten how slender the Conservative 
majority is./6S The following day (11 February 1953) the 
Cabinet considered a draft of the Sudanese agreement with 
Egypt. Churchill brusquely informed his Cabinet that he 
doubted whether Eden's proposals on the Sudan as an 
independent state would have sufficient support from the 
Conservative backbenches; he charged that it would be seen as 
'an ignominious surrender of our responsibilities in the Sudan 
and a serious blow to Britain's prestige throughout the Middle 
East'. He believed it would be sharply criticised by the 
Press. It seemed likely to involve the Government in serious 
political difficulties which would doubtless be exploited to 
the full by the Opposition. He would therefore prefer that no 
decision should be taken until early the following week, by 
which time it would be easier to forecast the probable 
reaction of public opinion.66
In the Cabinet discussion which followed it was clear that 
Churchill was in the minority. He was informed that the 
Sudanese expected self-government and that nothing could be 
gained by delay. But although Eden secured the support of the 
majority of his Cabinet colleagues, the Prime Minister was 
adamant in his opposition to the proposed agreement. 'There 
was a big row between them. Finally Churchill said he would 
give his consent if Eden could get the party to accept. Eden 
asked, "What do you mean?" Churchill replied, "There is a 
meeting of the 1922 this afternoon. If you can convince them,
65 Bristol Evening Post
* PRO.CAB128/26.CC(53)9 11.2.53
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I will agree to the Agreement." Eden was furious? he said it 
was totally unconstitutional and how could anyone expect him 
to operate under such circumstances.'67 However, he was 
determined to persevere and thought he could win. In a fury, 
he went upstairs to the 1922 meeting and stated his case, 
'using all of his great charm and persistence'.68 The meeting 
was 'well attended' and he had a stormy reception. Eden knew 
he was arguing for his political life,69 and told his critics 
that if they did not support the agreement, the remedy was in 
their own hands.70 His impassioned advocacy 'made a profound 
impression at this meeting ... after all his personal
experience of foreign affairs exceeded the collective 
knowledge of every one else in the room. Even the
incalculable Boothby ran ... to his defence.'71
This was still not quite enough, and Eden was saved -
literally -by the bell. 'Just as he finished his speech the 
division bell rang. I think he would have won the vote
anyway, but by the time the division was over, the opposition 
had melted away. Only his supporters came back, and voted for 
him.'72 The Sudan Group, although they sensed they had 
Churchill's backing, realized when the division bell rang that 
Eden had triumphed.73 Eden's successful advocacy enabled him 
to report to the full Cabinet later that evening that his 
explanation 'had removed many of the misunderstandings which 
had been current in the Party and had gone a long way towards
67 Sir Anthony Nutting
68 Sir Richard Thompson
69 Eden, p.247
70 Bristol Evening Post 20.2.53
71 Bristol Evening Post 20.2.53
72 Sir Anthony Nutting
73 Sir Anthony Nutting
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allaying the anxieties mentioned in the Cabinet discussions 
earlier in the day.' Although many Conservatives remained 
anxious about the situation, 'they now recognized that the 
course which the Government was proposing to follow was the 
most satisfactory of the alternatives open to them'.74
Thus the Sudan issue was settled with Churchill and the Sudan 
Group beating a grudging, temporary retreat in the face of 
Eden's argument, supported in Cabinet and the rest of the 
party, that the agreement offered Britain the best opportunity 
to secure the foundations of a stable peace in the area. The 
signature of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement was announced by 
Eden in the House on 12 February. Although it was 'widely 
welcomed for the hope it offered in improving Anglo-Egyptian 
relations', 'a cold douche of misgiving about the effective 
self-government of the Sudan was given by Assheton and Legge- 
Bourke'.75 Although the Suez Group MPs had agreed to hold 
their fire over the Sudan agreement, these critics were 
determined that the Foreign Secretary's triumph should prove 
ephemeral. Waterhouse rapidly served notice that he and 
like-minded colleagues were bloodied, but unbowed.76
Summary:
The cost of the Sudan agreement for Eden in terms of political 
support within the party was severe. The Foreign Secretary 
had succeeded 'in soothing over his backbench critics [on the 
Sudan] but only at the cost of awakening the party ... After 
the Sudan, Suez [was] the issue of the hour throughout the
74 PRO.CAB. 128/26 CC(53)10 11.2.53
75 Times 13.2.53
76 Waterhouse, 17.2.53, HCDeb.511.1067; Waterhouse FAC 25.2.53; Waterhouse letter 
to Eden 2.3.53, Waterhouse papers; Fitzroy Maclean and others, FAC 22.4.53
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Tory Party7.77 Eden had done nothing to dispel Conservative 
criticism of proposals to evacuate the Canal Zone base. The 
dissenters were encouraged by the breadth and depth of feeling 
inspired within the party by the Sudan affair, and the 
corresponding vulnerability of the government. Those outside 
the future Suez Group recognized that, given the slender 
government majority, there was 7a real danger of a minority 
group in the House of Commons holding the balance of power and 
forcing the government to dance to its tune7.78
77 Crossbencher, Sunday Express 22.2.53
78 Jocelyn Simon, MP for Middlesborough West, writing in the Week in Westminster, 
Evening Gazette 14.2.53
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CHAPTER 9; NEGOTIATING THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SUEZ CANAL ZONE
BASE 1953-54:
The Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Sudan sealed the Suez 
Group's determination to oppose Eden's 'appeasement' of the 
Cairo regime. In the succeeding seventeen months, these MPs 
conducted a highly public campaign aimed at obstructing Eden's 
answer to the problem posed by Britain's straitened finances 
on her position in the Middle East.
Conservative Debate and the Suez Base Agreement:
(a) The Conservative Pragmatists and the Suez Base Agreement:
Eden's argument throughout remained that the presence of 
troops in the Suez Canal Zone was a heavy political and 
military liability and would achieve nothing. Britain needed 
to have at her disposal base and transit facilities in peace­
time and the right of reentry in war-time, and this could only 
be done with Egypt's agreement. Redeployment without 
agreement would be far more damaging to Britain's prestige.1 
While no Conservative liked the idea of evacuation, by 1954 
more moderate, younger Tories accepted the logic of seeking an 
agreement with Egypt, albeit some more reluctantly than 
others. They appreciated that the present treaty had only two 
more years to run and that the base, even if it were 
drastically reduced in size, could only function efficiently 
with a large Egyptian workforce. In the present
circumstances, Britain was being obliged to keep far more 
soldiers in the Zone than the country could afford, given her 
other global commitments, and far more than Britain's 
entitlement under the existing treaty. Yet, even with the 
enormous garrison there, Britain was being hard pressed to 
maintain order and the efficient running of the base for lack
1 Eden to Waterhouse 24.6.54, Waterhouse papers
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of Egyptian labour.2
Some Conservatives recognized that Egyptian nationalism should 
be acknowledged; without Egyptian goodwill the Suez base could 
only be a heavy liability in time of war. Although it would 
be unwise to assume Egypt could maintain the base properly, 
the spectacle of 80,000 British soldiers defending a vast 
ammunition dump, whilst unable to prevent Egypt denying use of 
the Canal to Israel-bound cargo, did not impress other Arab 
nations.3 The pragmatists felt the Suez Group's thesis of 
contracting the Canal Zone base had not been very well thought 
out.4 The crucial question facing Conservatives was, if no 
agreement was reached with Egypt, was the retention of the 
base in peace-time worth its present cost in money and 
manpower? The base was working at 50% capacity or less, and 
the installations were deteriorating despite an annual 
expenditure of £50m.5 Agreement was essential; the 
alternatives were abandonment or the reoccupation of Egypt.6
These Tories argued that the enormous Suez Canal base made 
little sense in the shifting dimensions of the post-war world. 
If Russia advanced through the Caucasus, the base would be 300 
miles away from the line Britain wished to secure.7 They 
shared Eden's hope that once the irritant had been removed, 
Anglo-Egyptian relations would be restored to their natural 
alliance. This sentiment underpinned support for Eden's
2 PRO.FCO371/102766/JE1052/134 Dodds-Parker personal notes after visit to Egypt 7- 
16.10.53.
3 Mott-Radclyffe memo to Foreign Office, quoted in Foreign Body in the Eye, (London 
1975), pp.213-221; Spearman, FAC 25.11.53
4 Mott-Radclyffe, p.213-221; Alport, FAC 30.6.54
5 Dodds-Parker, FAC 21.10.53
6 Dodds-Parker, FAC 21.10.53
7 Prior-Palmer, FAC 2.12.53
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policy, since Egyptian ill-will meant the Canal Zone was a 
rapidly depreciating asset.® To most politicians, Britain's 
right of re-entry was an bargaining point: it was patently a 
political move - once the treaty was signed, they agreed with 
the Suez Group that it made no sense as a strategy. But even 
those who accepted the logic of evacuation firmly believed 
that the base could not be run without the assistance of 
British technicians, endorsing the view that Egypt was a 
second-class nation. There remained considerable concern that 
these technicians would be all too vulnerable to Egyptian 
attack9, and that Egypt might seize on the evacuation of 
British as her golden opportunity to attack Israel.
There was irritation that the Suez Group's organization and 
methods were 'bypassing the party committee dealing with the 
subject and the 1922'.10 Some claimed that the rebels, 
particularly in December 1953, were trying 'to hold a pistol 
to the government and their colleagues in the House [which] 
could not be tolerated'.11 Others took a sour view of the 
dissidents' motivation and felt, as former Whips, Waterhouse's 
(and Grimston's) behaviour was particularly unbecoming12: Lord 
Lambton's explicit suggestion that some rebels were spurred 
solely by political pique13 greatly angered many of his 
colleagues, who sympathized with the Suez Group's views.
8 Times 17.12.53
9 see Mott-Radclyffe, p.213-221
10 Prior-Palmer, 1922 Committee, 3.12.53
11 Derek Marks, Daily Express 16.12.53
12 Lambton to Waterhouse undated. 12.54, Waterhouse papers
13 17.12.53, HC Deb.522.623
- 304 -
(b) The Suez Group and the Suez Base Agreement;
The following is a precis of the arguments developed by the 
Suez Group as it strove to prevent the signature of Heads of 
Agreement with Egypt which involved the complete withdrawal of 
British troops from the Suez Canal Zone base. Many of the 
arguments rehearsed in the previous skirmishes over Palestine, 
Abadan and the Sudan were re-deployed.
Irrevocably opposed to the total withdrawal of British troops, 
on psychological, political and military grounds14, the Suez 
Group believed that under Article X of the 1936 Treaty, 
Britain had the legitimate right to remain in the Canal Zone 
beyond 1956, even if London failed to negotiate a new treaty 
with Cairo.15 The Suez Group was not opposed to a negotiated 
settlement per se. It accepted that the number of British 
troops currently in the Canal Zone grossly exceeded Britain's 
needs16, 'eventual redeployment would release much needed 
forces' and it appreciated the 'deplorable conditions under 
which many units were serving'.17 But there was a 
considerable difference between reducing the garrison and 
total evacuation, and reducing Britain's commitments would not 
produce a strategic reserve if this led to new pressures on 
Britain's position in the region.18
The Suez Group felt Eden and his supporters were deluding 
themselves in imagining there would be an dramatic improvement 
in Anglo-Egyptian relations once the issue was settled. Nor 
had Britain had any basis whatsoever for confidence in Egypt's
14 Fitzroy Maclean, FAC 22.4.53; Guy Lloyd, FAC 2.12.53
15 Hoi land-Martin, Waterhouse and others letter, Times 13.5.53
16 Waterhouse press statement, Times 16.12.53; Hinchingbrooke, in Dorset Daily Echo
1.11.53
17 Suez Group to Eden 17.6.54, Waterhouse papers
18 Amery to Waterhouse 16.2.54, Waterhouse papers
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willingness to abide by a diplomatic settlement.19 Egypt 
repeatedly demonstrated her bad faith by attempting to 
undermine the agreement over the Sudan. Britain as the former 
imperial power had a continuing responsibility to protect the 
Sudan from possible Egyptian encroachment,20 and the future 
presence of British troops in the Canal Zone was rendered 
imperative by the unstable situation in the Sudan.21
The Suez Group argued the Cold War had conferred on the Canal 
Zone base a significance far beyond its original function as 
the guardpost for an international waterway. It disputed that 
the NATO alliance obviated the need for the base: protecting 
NATO's supply of vital Middle Eastern oil and Turkey, the 
exposed flank of the alliance, demanded a base in the Canal 
Zone, with perhaps smaller advanced bases near the battle 
front. Should Turkey fall, at present there was nothing 
beyond it to stop Russia from sweeping into Palestine, Egypt 
or the Persian Gulf. Stalin's death and the hope inspired by 
Churchill's summit offer (May 1953) did not dispel the rebels' 
conviction of the necessity of Britain's continued military 
presence in the Zone. They felt the international climate 
remained uncertain, and continued to be deeply suspicious of 
Russia's global intentions? the Middle East appeared one of 
the most vulnerable sectors in the world-wide front against 
Communism, vulnerable to political infiltration and to overt 
aggression. There was also the festering sore of
Arab-Israeli animosity? recent frontier clashes and guerilla 
incursions had only served to underline the dangers of another 
conflict - anarchy in the Middle East and possibly erupting 
into a wider conflict with irretrievable consequences. The 
withdrawal of British troops might encourage Egypt to attack
19 Fell letter, Times 29.7.54; James Duncan to Churchill 15.7.54, Waterhouse papers
20 Waterhouse to Eden 17.6.54, Waterhouse papers
21 Daily Telegraph 18.6.54; Patrick Maitland letter, Daily Telegraph 7.7.54; Suez Group 
to Eden 17.6.54, Waterhouse papers
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on Israel, quite apart from the advantage conferred by the 
materiel at the base.22
The importance of the base was not solely in its military 
value as the spearhead against a Soviet advance and a 
deterrent to renewed fighting between Arab and Jew. The 
dissidents felt there was a lamentable tendency to lose sight 
of Britain's major commitment to protect communications with 
the Empire.23 Despite the increase in air-traffic, the Canal 
remained the main thoroughfare for the Commonwealth.24 There 
was also the issue of Britain's responsibility for ensuring 
free navigation of the Suez Canal. There were two crucial 
considerations: Egypt was not yet in a position 'by its own 
unaided resources to ensure the liberty and entire security of 
the Canal', and Britain was in the Canal Zone not only to 
protect British interests, but to discharge her 
responsibilities under the 1888 Suez Canal Convention. The 
critics warned that if Britain evacuated her garrison, Egypt 
would grab the Canal;25 and Egypt had already 'repeatedly 
flouted her duties'26 by preventing passage of Israeli-bound 
traffic. Britain could not unilaterally divest herself of 
these responsibilities 'without the fullest prior consultation 
of the other signatories of the Convention and other 
interested parties', nor before 'adequate alternative 
provision' had been made for the discharge of those inherited 
responsibilities.27
The Suez Group argued that there was Commonwealth disagreement
22 Maitland letter, Daily Telegraph 7.7.54
23 see Hankey et al letter, Times 24.9.53; see Legge-Bourke letter, Times 12.11.53
24 Maitland letter, Daily Telegraph 17.7.54
25 PRO.PREM11/636 Hankey to Salisbury and Eden 7.2.53.
26 Powell, 5.11.53, HCDeb.432.344
27 Times 10.7.54
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on the correct line to take on the future of the Suez Canal
base.28 Through its contacts in the military, the Suez Group
was aware of divisions within the Army on the base.29 
Conservative pragmatists might argue that soldiers in the base 
uniformly wanted to withdraw,30 but the Suez Group found a 
powerful ally in General Sir Cameron Nicolson, 
Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land forces, who publicly 
rejected suggestions that smaller bases in Cyprus, Iraq,
Jordan, and North Africa were viable alternatives.31 As 
secretary of the Suez Group, Amery also got in touch with the 
Indian general staff who informed him that although the Indian 
government felt differently, in its opinion if British troops 
were pulled out of the Suez Canal base, the Indian Army would 
have no more use for Britain.32 Therefore, a British presence 
in the Canal Zone base appeared vital to maintain the
London/Delhi axis in the Commonwealth system.
The Suez Group also used arguments of prestige. 'After 
Britain's withdrawal from India, Palestine and Malta, it was 
only the Suez Canal Zone base which enabled Britain to exert 
influence westward in the Mediterranean, including North 
Africa, and eastward into the Indian Ocean and southward into 
Africa.'33 A withdrawal from the Canal Zone would confirm 
Britain's inexorable retreat from the Middle East? the 
government had to hold the line at the Canal if Britain was to 
have any hope of retaining great power status and leadership
28 Legge-Bourke letter, Times 6.5.53
29 Lord Amery
30 Mott-Radclyffe, p.213-221
31 see Times 29.6.53
32 Lord Amery
33 Julian Amery: The Suez Group: A Retrospective on Suez’, in Selwyn Troen and 
Moshe Shemesh ed.: The Suez-Sinai Crisis, p. 112
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of the Commonwealth.34 Withdrawal was 'an act which could 
result in the complete disintegration of the British 
Empire'.35 These MPs were convinced that their government's 
persistence in seeking terms and in permitting commercial and 
financial deals (eg the sale of aircraft, and the release of 
sterling balances) in the face of Egyptian intransigence 
demonstrated a fundamentally misguided, pusillanimous 
policy.36 In granting favours to a hostile country, whilst 
not rewarding nor bolstering her friends, Britain appeared to 
be behaving as a suppliant which ill-suited her great power 
status. Irrespective of the massive blow that withdrawal from 
the Suez Canal base would deal to Britain's position in Africa 
and the Middle East, Britain's standing would be fatally 
undermined by acceptance of terms negotiated and granted under 
duress.37 The issue was an acute political one.38 If 
Britain appeared to be on the run, this would have 'disastrous 
results' abroad and at home.39
The government's policy should be to withdraw the terms 
offered to Egypt. With 'firmness and patience', 'it would be 
possible to come to a reasonable settlement either with this 
or another Egyptian government'.40 The Suez Group hoped that 
by 'sweating it out' Britain would exert sufficient pressure, 
persuasion or force to bring to power an Egyptian government
34 Amery, 5.11.53, HCDeb.432.379; Powell, 5.11.53, HC Deb.432.345-6
35 Legge-Bourke speech at Downham Market, Sunday Express 13.12.53 and widely 
reported elsewhere
36 Legge-Bourke, 17.2.54, H C£><£.523.1966
37 Fell letter, Times 29.7.54; James Duncan to Churchill 15.7.54, Waterhouse papers
38 Assheton, FAC 2.12.53
39 PRO.PREM11/635 Suez Group letter to Churchill 22.4.53
40 Waterhouse press statement, Times 16.12.53
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who would accept its minimum terms.41 In the circumstances 
Britain could not agree to reduce her forces to a mere handful 
of care and maintenance technicians, merely for the sake of 
reaching a settlement on paper. The Suez Group conjured the 
nightmare of British technicians in mufti without sidearms 
being overrun by fanatics42 equipped with British weapons. 
It remained overwhelmingly sceptical that Egypt could fulfil 
her promise that the existing base should be efficiently 
maintained, while talk of Britain's right to reactivate the 
base was seen as pure fantasy. The critics mocked: 'Will the 
base and its facilities be open to us at need without 
prevarication, or demur?'43 'That right might easily be 
disputed or unilaterally denounced and we might be met, in the 
event not only by protest but by armed force.'44 Against the 
'many dangers of the situation', (a British garrison) was the 
only guarantee which held the slightest value.45
The rebels dismissed arguments on the diminishing value of the 
Canal Zone base, surrounded (as it was) by a hostile 
population on whom the efficient functioning of the base 
depended for its pool of labour? the answer was foreign 
labour.46 They conceded the argument that Britain could not 
afford to exercise her responsibilities had some merit, but 
responded that the anti-British propaganda and agitation in 
Egypt did not reflect the will of the Egyptian people:47 if
41 Amery to Waterhouse 16.2.54; Hinchingbrooke to Waterhouse 4.3.54, Waterhouse 
papers
42 Fell letter, Times 29.7.54
43 Powell, Truth 5.3.54, quoted in Patrick Cosgrave: The Lives of Enoch Powell (London 
1989), p. 130
44 Leo Amery letter, Times 20.2.53
45 Leo Amery letter, Times 25.9.53
46 Hinchingbrooke, FAC 30.6.54
47 see Rennell, Hankey, Vansittart and Killeam, 17.12.53, HL Deb. 185.189-258
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London's determination 'were clearly announced, and supported 
by such economic and other steps as might be required to show 
that we were in earnest [noticeably unspecified], Egypt could 
or would go on indefinitely cutting off its own nose to spite 
our face'.48 Similarly, suggestions that the base was not 
the only station for operations in the Middle East were 
brushed aside. But they did not address the crucial problem 
of fresh water, obtained v i a  the Sweet Water Canal from Egypt.
The rebels also dismissed the menace of the atomic bomb - 'Mr 
Sandys has told us it can be met by a strong air force on the 
spot backed by all the most modern anti-aircraft devices' - 
pointing out that if the Government truly wished to see a 
continued military base in the Canal Zone, it would not be 
contemplating handing over responsibility to Egypt since 'in 
neither respect has Egypt the resources which would enable it 
to exercise that response'.49 They argued a base located 
anywhere else in the region would be just as vulnerable to 
possible atomic attack - which was undeniably true. On these 
grounds, selecting Cyprus as the replacement headquarters for 
Middle East command made no sense whatever.
The Suez Group was also determined that Britain should not be 
further dependent on America, and was deeply distrustful of US 
policy in the Middle East. 'Post-war Governments have paid 
too much attention to the well-meant, but often unsound, 
advice of the USA, who have no responsibility and much less 
experience of these oriental peoples than we have 
ourselves'?50 and this untutored rival appeared to be 
increasingly influenced by US interests in Middle Eastern 
oil.51 The critics bitterly resented what was seen as undue
48 Leo Amery letter, Times 30.9.53
49 Leo Amery letter, Times 30.9.53
50 PRO.PREM11/636 Hankey to Churchill 25.11.53.
51 Beresford Craddock, FAC 3.3.54
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American pressure on Britain to come to terms with Egypt.52 
Washington's unreasonably sympathetic policy to Cairo seemed 
part of America's systematic attack on Britain's position in 
the Middle East and Empire53 using political, commercial and 
military levers.54 Through their contacts, the Suez Group was 
well aware that 'when the Egyptians had got the British ... 
out of the Suez Canal Zone, the Americans would step in and 
give all sorts of help to Egypt'.55 The prospect of Britain 
being 'jockeyed out to enable God's Own Country to take our 
place'56 was deeply galling.
It was Eden's firm hope that once Britain's withdrawal from 
the base had been conceded, Egypt would be ready to enter into 
discussions for the maintenance of the base for a Middle East 
defence organization in which America would play a leading 
part. All Conservatives remained dedicated to a more coherent 
organization to provide Middle Eastern defence, but in the 
rebels' opinion, even if Britain did secure Cairo's adherence 
to a regional defence organization, Egypt would inevitably be 
the weak link. Their scant respect for the Egyptian soldier 
as an opponent had been reinforced by the recent spectacle of 
the Egyptian army being trounced by the woefully outnumbered 
Israelis. The Suez Group argued 'the only body which we would 
be justified in inviting to share our responsibility [to 
protect the Canal] would be one representing the whole free 
world including Egypt, but in which we should retain the 
leading position to which our historical connexion to the 
Middle East and the security of the whole Commonwealth
52 Hankey to Churchill; Suez Group to Eden 17.6.54; Herbert Williams to Buchan- 
Hepbum 16.7.54, Waterhouse papers
53 Paul Williams
54 see Powell, 5.11.53, HC Deb.520.342-349
55 PRO.PREM11/636 Hankey to Churchill 4.6.54.
56 PRO.PREM11/636 Hankey to Churchill 4.6.54
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entitles us'.57 America's contribution was conceded, but this 
should be a decidedly junior role.
In the meantime, in the absence of a coherent Middle East 
defence system, there was only one possible and morally 
justifiable policy: 'to remain in the Canal Zone in sufficient 
strength so that it can be reinforced at short notice to meet 
whatever storms may break upon us.'58 The Suez Canal Zone 
base was the only base which offered equally the opportunity 
to send reinforcements to the eastern Mediterranean or to the 
Indian Ocean. Its importance therefore, in peace or in war, 
lay in its crucial position in the 'strategy of the free 
nations and the keystone in the structure of imperial 
defence'.59 No other arrangement could substitute for the 
presence of a British fighting force, deliver the same 
benefits and enable Britain to exert decisive influence in the 
region. Eden's proposed formula would create a vacuum, with 
disastrous consequences for peace and stability in the area. 
The government's stubborn refusal to grant the same weight in 
its deliberations to the importance of Britain's other 
responsibilities to keep the Canal open in the interests of 
trade and peace of the world and the Commonwealth, appeared a 
dereliction of duty. In the words of Leo Amery: 'Britain
[was] on the point of abdicating her responsibilities to the 
Commonwealth, the world at large, the peoples of the Middle 
East. /6°
57 Leo Amery letter, Times 20.2.53
58 Leo Amery letter, Times 20.2.53
59 Leo Amery letter, Times 20.2.53
“ letter, Times 25.9.53
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The Methods of the Suez Group:
(a) The Suez Group as a backbench faction:
The professed aims of the 'Suez Canal Committee'61 were '(i) 
to remind public opinion of the true nature of Britain's 
obligations and interests in the Suez Canal Zone? (ii) to 
strengthen the hands of all those in government, Parliament 
and outside who are anxious to resist the unreasonable demands 
of the present Egyptian government; (iii) to work for an 
agreement with Egypt under which Britain shall retain in the 
Canal Zone bases, airfields, port facilities and sufficient 
British personnel to maintain and operate these; and British 
fighting units, strong enough to make effective Britain's 
right to reinforce the base in the event of necessity of which 
Britain must be the sole judge'.62 10,000 British troops 
should remain in the Canal Zone base.63
The Suez Group enjoyed an unofficial alliance with a small but 
extremely influential group of peers: the Lords Vansittart, 
Rennell, Killearn, and Hankey, who were influential former 
public servants with 130 years service between them. Hankey 
was still on the board of the Suez Canal Company, and took his 
directorship seriously.64 A number of other influential peers 
shared Hankey's views and privately lent support to the Suez 
Group's campaign.65 Leo Amery, who instigated 'the Suez Canal
61 Leo Amery to Biggs-Davison 23.10.53, Biggs-Davison papers
62 draft press release drawn up by Julian Amery, in Amery to Biggs-Davison 8.11.53, 
Biggs-Davison papers.
63 Rees Davies, 11.3.54, HCDeb.524.2595; Julian Amery letter to Eden, 18.3.53, quoted 
in Wm R Louis: ’The Tragedy of the Anglo-Egyptian Settlement of 1954’ in Roger Louis & 
Roger Owen ed.: The Suez Crisis and Its Consequences, p.59
64 see Stephen Roskill: Hankey, Man of Secrets (London 1974)
65 see PRO.FC0371/102766 Leo Amery to Churchill 7.10.53, signed by 13 peers, 
including Hailsham, Cromer and Simon.
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Committee', remained an active conspirator until his death in 
1955. These men also shared strong links through membership 
of other political organizations and war-time connections; for 
example, Killearn and his former war-time ADC, Legge-Bourke, 
were members on the Empire Economic Union. (Herbert Williams 
also served on this committee.)
(b) The Suez Group MPs as individuals:
The rebels operated as individuals as well as members of a 
organized, well-briefed committee. 'There were conversations 
both private and by telephone between members of the group. 
There were social occasions such as lunches at my father's 
house. [In addition to attending the Suez Group's meetings] 
individual members took it upon themselves to ask questions, 
make speeches in defence or foreign affairs debates and 
express their views in the ordinary party committees.'66 Each 
MP possessed a different threshold to which he was prepared to 
carry his opposition.67 There were varying grades: 'protest 
in the party committee; open opposition on the floor of the 
House; abstention; voting against the government; and lastly, 
resigning the Whip. It was obvious to me that an awful lot 
would fall out along the way'.68
(c) Foreign vs domestic policy:
There was also the question of whether or not to carry the 
fight beyond the field of foreign affairs. Government 
difficulties in the committee stages of the Finance Bill in 
May 1953, in which the Government's nominal majority fell to
66 Amery in Troen and Shemesh ed., p . l l l
67 Paul Williams
68 Paul Williams
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3, drew some rebels' thoughts towards the use of votes and 
abstentions on major pieces of domestic legislation,69 but 
this tactic was not considered 'cricket' by their colleagues. 
There was a marked absence of the same 'so-called right-wing 
group in domestic policy'70 and on other aspects of foreign 
policy (Europe and the Far East): 'Suez was the glue'.71
(e) Links with Labour?
The government's small majority (17) offered the rebels the 
opportunity of coordinating their campaign with Labour. They 
were not prepared to do this, preferring instead to rely upon 
the implicit threat that their opposition could bring the 
government down. This enabled them to proclaim their supreme 
loyalty to the Conservative tradition (if not the party); they 
were also well aware that a Labour government would pull out 
of Suez. In February 1954 a Labour motion sponsored by Mrs 
Barbara Castle, deploring the government's handling of the 
Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, was amended to exclude the words 
'and urges that the withdrawal of our troops and equipment 
should begin forthwith', offering the Suez Group the chance of 
inflicting a humiliating defeat on its own side. This ploy to 
make the motion more acceptable to the critics72 failed as the 
dissidents had 'no intention whatever of supporting a motion 
which they regarded as a blatant political manoeuvre to 
exploit internal Conservative dissent'. Similarly, in the 
division on the Heads of Agreement in July 1954, Amery 
proclaimed that he was voting against the Government because 
he 'could do no other'. Amery privately argued even the risk 
of letting in a Socialist government would only be a short
69 Enoch Powell; see John Barnes ed: The Leo Amery Diaries, p. 1064
70 Lord Aldington interview with author
71 Sir Richard Thompson
72 Times 10.3.54
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term disaster, 'less than the permanent disaster of a 
Conservative government staying on after our surrender'.73 
But for the overwhelming majority of the Suez Group, had 
Labour decided to join the dissidents to vote the government 
down, abstaining in the division lobby was the limit of 
acceptable opposition.74
The Influence of the Suez Group: Churchill vs Eden
The principal sceptic of reconciliation with Egypt was 
Churchill himself.75 His was an emotional resistance to the 
process of 'scuttle' which had begun in India, continued in 
Abadan and which he feared would end in British retreat from 
Africa.76 His reluctant acquiesence to the Anglo-Egyptian 
agreement on the Sudan was an open secret in Westminster, as 
was his resistance to evacuation from Egypt.77 The Suez 
Group's morale was bolstered by its knowledge of this schism 
between Eden and Churchill78 and by Churchill's private 
encouragement: three or four times Churchill stopped Amery in 
the voting lobby and urged him to keep up the 'good work'.79
The Suez Group hoped it would be able to exploit Churchill's 
distaste for the whole business to its own advantage;80 in the 
opinion of Jane Portal, his secretary, Churchill was open to
73 Amery to Waterhouse 16.3.54, Waterhouse papers
74 Economist 7.8.54
75 see Louis in Louis ed., p.53
76 Louis in Louis ed., p.53
77 Paul Williams and Arthur Gavshon
78 Paul Williams; see also Suez Group letter to Churchill 22.4.53, Waterhouse papers.
79 Lord Amery
80 see Suez Group to Churchill 22.4.43, Waterhouse papers
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constant influence - in particular, Soames (now his PPS) egged 
him on over the Sudan and Egypt81 - and Labour certainly 
attributed the strength of the rebels' obstructive influence 
to Churchill's support.82 As matters transpired, it was the 
other way round: the presence of a sizeable group of
disgruntled backbenchers which enjoyed the sympathy of 
approximately 100 other less committed Conservatives,83 
strengthened Churchill's hand as he sought to counter his 
Foreign Secretary's Egypt policy. In contrast to the Suez 
Group, Churchill recognized the economic and military logic 
behind Britain's proposed withdrawal84 he was determined to 
drive a much harder bargain with Neguib. Contemptuous of the 
Egyptians, he felt that Eden's approach smacked of 
'appeasement'.85 Perhaps there was also an element of 
mischief in Churchill's encouragement of the Suez Group - 
regarding all 'as rather fun, seeing what would come out of 
it' .86
The Activities of the Suez Group
Neither the Suez Group nor Churchill made much progress while 
Eden remained at his desk, supported by the majority of his 
Cabinet colleagues. Eden's illness and absence from the 
political scene from April to October 1953 offered the Prime 
Minister a golden opportunity87 and Churchill was determined
81 Jane Portal in conversation with Evelyn Shuckburgh: Descent to Suez, p. 141
82 Denis Healey, 5.11.53, HCDeb.520A23; Barbara Castle, 11.3.54, HCDeb.524.2510
83 Lord Amery
84 Churchill wanted American cooperation to set up a joint command in the Middle East.
Harold Macmillan: Tides of Fortune, p.501 and Shuckburgh, p.77
85 Shuckburgh, p.75
86 Ursula Branston
87 Shuckburgh, p.86
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to preside over 'the Egyptian business' himself.88 The Suez 
Group quickly seized its opportunity of a change at the helm 
to re-iterate89 its position to Churchill90, pointing out 
that although Eden had assured the Foreign Affairs Committee91 
that the government had minimum terms on which it would 
insist, since this meeting there had been press reports which 
were 'causing anxiety'; the Chief Whip was also alerted to its 
concern about the course the negotiations might take.92
Buchan-Hepburn realised from his own soundings that the Suez 
Group's views reflected 'a real anxiety in the Party'.93 This 
agitation was attributed 'to fundamental strategic facts not 
being fully understood', but Buchan-Hepburn appreciated that 
there was a general sense that the government was out of touch 
with the backbenches on the matter.94 At his urging, 
Churchill addressed the Foreign Affairs Committee on 29 April 
1953, and his tougher stance with Egypt95, confirmed in the 
Commons,96 was welcomed by the critics.97 Robin Hankey's 
appointment as Chargd d'Affaires in Cairo seemed to hint that 
Lord Hankey's (and the Suez Group's) views would now have more 
weight.
88 Macmillan, p.502
89 PRO.FC0371/102806 Amery to Eden 18.3.53, quoted in Louis in Louis ed., p.59
90 PRO.PREM11/635 Suez Group to Churchill 22.4.53
91 FAC 25.2.53
92 PRO.PREM11/635 Mott-Radclyffe to Buchan-Hepburn 22.4.53.
93 PRO.PREM11/635 Buchan-Hepburn to Churchill 24.4.53
94 Buchan-Hepburn to Churchill
95 FAC 29.4.53
96 11.5.53, HC Deb.515M 5 - m
97 Waterhouse note 11.5.53, Waterhouse papers.
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This satisfaction was short-lived. Press reports continued98 
to suggest a basis of agreement with Egypt that cut across 
Churchill's assurance of minimum demands that would not be 
conceded. Selwyn Lloyd's remarks to the Foreign Affairs 
Committee on 12 July 1953 appeared to confirm the disquieting 
reports that Britain had agreed to the withdrawal of all 
combat troops.99 Accordingly, the Suez Group used the Daily 
Express100 to leak Lord Hankey's 'confidential report' sent 
to Eden in February 1953 which warned that 'if British troops 
were withdrawn from the Suez Canal Zone, the Canal would be 
impassable to all shipping in little more than a year'.101 
For the government 'the disclosure could not have come at a 
worse time'102 - as Amery undoubtedly knew - since it co­
incided with secret talks in Washington with the Americans and 
the French about the freedom of the Canal.
Although this leak caused considerable consternation in 
Whitehall,103 the hardliners' initiative was lost with 
Churchill's continuing indisposition following his stroke in 
late June. Salisbury, Lord President of the Council, assumed 
control of the Egyptian discussions and gave an early 
indication of his determination to pursue negotiations104, 
rather than imitate Churchill's procrastination. 'The
Government had no real worry of getting parliamentary 
approval? it was assumed that Labour would not vote against a
98 Legge-Bourke, FAC 6.5.53, referring to Times and Daily Telegraph; Fitzroy Maclean 
and Legge-Bourke, FAC 17.5.53
99 Fitzroy Maclean, FAC 1.7.53
100 22.1.53
101 PRO.FCO371/102766 JE1052/137 Ledward memo: ’Lord Hankey and the Suez Canal’
22.7.53
102 PRO.FCO371/102766 22.7.53
103 see PRO.FCO/371/102766
104 Times 29.7.53
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treaty and ... [i]t seemed unlikely that the disturbed Tories 
would go as far as to force a vote against the government; 
even if they did Socialist non-intervention would ensure a ... 
government majority.'105 On this line of reasoning 
negotiations with Egypt progressed rapidly, and it was 
tentatively agreed Britain should withdraw all troops except 
a small force to keep the base in working order. The 
outstanding issues were reduced to four main points;
reactivation; duration of the agreement; uniforms; and a time 
limit for withdrawal.106
As the talks appeared to be drawing inexorably towards a 
highly unsatisfactory conclusion, the dissidents went on the 
offensive in mid-September 1953. With Parliament in recess, 
letters to the national press were the most obvious
tactic.107 There ensued a very lively correspondence in the 
Times on the future of the Suez Canal Zone base: the Suez 
Group had succeeded in touching a nerve among the paper's 
readership, and the issues were discussed at length.
Newspaper coverage of the Margate party conference108 also 
paid great attention to Julian Amery's contribution to the 
debate on defence and foreign policy, which was received with 
rapturous applause. Salisbury, who found the Suez Group's 
views 'extremely irritating',109 replied for the government 
and directed much of his argument towards rebutting the 
critics' accusations and seeking to play down expectations of 
the sort of agreement the government could reasonably achieve. 
His speech concluded with the clear challenge to the rebels to 
dare to doubt the sagacity of its leaders.
105 Gloucestershire Echo 17.11.53
106 Louis in Louis ed., p.61
107 the Lords Hankey, Vansittart, Killeam and Rennell letter, Times 24.9.53; and from 
Leo Amery letter, Times 25.9.53
108 eg Times 9.10.53; Daily Telegraph 9.10.53
109 PRO.FCO371/102826 minute by Salisbury 9.9.53, quoted in Louis ed., p.60
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(a) The Suez Group in Ascent:
By the autumn of 1953 the government 'was in serious
trouble'110 over its policy towards Egypt. The Suez Group,
through letters, private meetings and public speeches, had 
succeeded in stirring the party. Despite Salisbury's 
exhortation that the party conference trust its leaders, 
Conservative MPs became 'highly alarmed'111 by the persistent 
rumours of a total withdrawal from the Canal Zone base which 
'went undenied'.112 Many MPs were deeply unhappy at the 
prospect of leaving Suez? it would be 'foolish to leave a 
military vacuum? for reasons of both geography and politics 
they did not see Cyprus as a suitable alternative base'.113 
'I can only conclude that [Churchill] has found it necessary 
to shift his ground greatly to our disadvantage.'114
Ministers also began to realise that Labour might 'cash in' on 
defections of a group of Tories, to whom Eden's announcement 
of a resumption of negotiations [mid-October] proved most
unpalatable'.115 'It was calculated that if 25 [Tories] went
as far as to abstain the government could be defeated, 
assuming the Liberals and Labour opposed the government./116 
Before the party conference it had been assumed that a general 
election was 'just around the corner'? then there had been no 
particular advantage in defeating the government in the 
division lobby. 'Now Churchill changed all that' by his
110 Paul Williams
111 Gloucestershire Echo
112 Gloucestershire Echo
113 Reginald Bevins: The Greasy Pole, p.39
114 Waterhouse to Leo Amery 1.10.53, Waterhouse papers
115 Daily Herald 26.10.53
116 Gloucestershire Echo
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declaration that there would not be an election until 1955. 
Labour leaders had no desire to go to the polls whilst their 
party was racked by disagreements over rearmament, but did not 
want to wait another two years. Defeat on Suez might 'catch 
the Tories at a disadvantage'.117
Churchill's continued opposition to Eden's line of 
approach118 was bolstered by his awareness of the 'stentorian 
belly rumble!'119 of dissent on the backbenches. Although he 
reluctantly supported Eden and Salisbury on 15 October 1953 
over new proposals to Egypt,120 Churchill was determined 
these should be 'presented to the Egyptians as our last word'. 
He was equally 'anxious that no final agreement should be 
reached ... until Parliament had reassembled'. It was of 
great importance that 'ministers should have that opportunity 
of preparing the way for the agreement, if it was to be 
concluded, and doing their utmost to reduce the risk of it 
being subjected to damaging criticism by their own 
supporters'.121
When Parliament reassembled, the Suez Group began to coalesce 
as Waterhouse and Amery made discreet approaches to certain 
members.122 These moves were matched by 'strenuous
efforts'123 by senior Tories to manage the 'very substantial
117 Gloucestershire Echo
118 John Colville: The Fringes of Power, pp.679-80
119 Paul Williams
120 PRO.CAB128/26.CC(58)53 15.11.53
121 PRO. CAB128/26. CC(58)53 15.11.53
122 Waterhouse to Leo Amery 15.10.53, Waterhouse papers
123 Derek Marks, Daily Express 16.12.54
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swell of opinion' on the issue.124 Only Churchill's personal 
intervention in the 1922 in October prevented an open
revolt.125 Eden wrote to Waterhouse assuring him that the 
government was very conscious of the importance of a workable 
agreement over the Canal base: 'We should not sacrifice our 
minimum conditions for the sake of Egyptian goodwill, 
essential though we believe this to be.'126 The presence of 
five members of the government (Churchill, Eden, Lloyd, 
Salisbury, Nutting) at the Foreign Affairs Committee on 21 
October 1953 was eloquent testimony of the government's 
concern.127 Despite Buchan-Hepburn' s initial hope that
thereafter 'things would be much better',128 'this
sledgehammer did not crack the nut'.129 Appalled by the
confirmation of the government's intention to withdraw all 
fighting troops, the Suez Group immediately began to increase 
its pressure.130 Powell and Amery were spurred into public 
criticism.131 Hinchingbrooke, widely tipped for the position 
of Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport,132 
let it be known that he declined the offer because of 
'differences with the government on the evacuation of the Suez
124 PRO.FC0371/1026766 Leo Amery to Churchill 7.10.53; Paul Williams; and Times
17.12.53
125 Economist 9.12.53
126 Eden to Waterhouse 20.10.53, Waterhouse papers
127 When pressed by the agitated Chief Whip to attend to this committee meeting to 
support Eden against the Suez Group, Churchill only agreed very reluctantly, adding ’you 
see, I’m not on "our” side’. Leo Amery diary entry 22.11.53 in John Barnes ed., p. 1064
128 PRO.PREM11/635 Buchan-Hepburn to Churchill 24.10.53
129 Healey, 5.11.53, HC Deb.520.423
130 Gloucestershire Echo 17.11.53; PRO.PREM 11/635 Suez Group (27 signatures) to 
Churchill 22.10.53; Suez Group and Hankey letters to Churchill 25.11.53
131 Powell, HCDeb.520.342-349 and Amery, HCDeb.520.369-380, 5.11.53
132 eg Morning Advertiser 3.11.53; Sunday Despatch 8.11.53; Birmingham Post 10.11.53
- 324 -
Canal7.133
The Whips realized that the Suez Group had struck a chord of 
profound unease within the party. In the party committees MPs 
questioned the logic of complete withdrawal134 and relocation 
to Cyprus? for others the right of reentry was the crux.135 
Eden was only too well aware of the tightrope he was walking: 
given the volatile temper of the party, logic might fall prey 
to national pride and fears of a Middle East conflict. 
Buchan-Hepburn was warning Churchill there were 'quite enough' 
members of the Suez Group 'for it to be difficult',136 and 
urged if an agreement was reached 'you or Anthony will have to 
talk to people alone'.137
The political temperature rose dramatically in late 1953 with 
the news of Egyptian interference in the Sudanese elections. 
This appeared to confirm the Suez Group's worst fears that 
Britain had failed in her duty to ensure Sudanese 
self-determination and could not depend on Egypt's word not to 
interfere with her southern neighbour. From Eden's point of 
view, this evidence of Egypt's unreliability came at a highly 
embarrassing time? he was at pains to address this backbench 
alarm.138 Eden had braved the wrath of his leader and a 
sizeable portion of his party to force through the treaty for 
the Sudan? he remained determined to secure a negotiated 
agreement with Egypt involving British evacuation from the 
Canal Zone base. Yet here was undeniable grist for the Suez 
Group's argument that no satisfactory agreement could be
133 Birmingham Post 12.11.53
134 eg Maclay and Elliot, FAC 16.12.53
135 Godfrey Nicholson, FAC 16.12.53
136 PRO.PREM 11/635 Buchan-Hepburn to Churchill 24.10.53
137 Buchan-Hepburn to Churchill
138 see Eden’s lengthy written reply to Prior-Palmer, 13.11.53, HC Deb. 102.102-104
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reached with the unreliable Egyptians.139
Fearful that under American pressure140, the Government would 
try to sneak through an 'disastrous' agreement with Cairo 
during the Christmas recess141, the Suez Group was determined 
'to tie [Britain's] hands'.142 Talks were currently at a 
standstill, which gave the critics 'an opportunity to make 
their views heard in time':143 the terms offered to Egypt 
should be withdrawn, so that 'if the circumstances justified 
a new approach Britain could enter negotiations with her hands 
free'.144 Private conversations with the Whips, objections 
in the party committees145 and letters to Churchill were not 
having the desired effect. Therefore, after secretly
canvassing support, it warned Churchill and Eden that it was 
contemplating putting down a critical EDM;146 this was also 
designed to press the government to commit to prior discussion 
in Parliament before it entered into 'any commitment to modify 
their rights under the Treaty of 1936/147 - which was
'precisely what [Eden was] not prepared to do'.148
The Cabinet was aware that as a result of the Sudanese
139 Marks, Daily Express 16.11.53
140 PR0.PREM11/636 Hankey to Churchill 25.11.53
141 see PRO.PREM11/635 Waterhouse to Churchill 25.11.53
142 News of the World 13.12.53
143 Daily Express 16.12.53
144 Waterhouse to Churchill 25.11.53, Waterhouse papers
145 FAC 25.11.53 and 2.12.53
146 PRO.PREM 11/635 Minister of State to Eden, telegram 105 3.12.53; Marks, Daily 
Express 9.12.53 and 16.12.53
147 PRO.FC0371/102766 Killeam notice of Parliamentary Question 15.12.53
148 PRO.FC0371/10276611 Leward 12.12.53. and Shuckburgh toO ’Regan 12.12.53
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elections,149 there was extensive sympathy for the Suez 
Group's arguments150 and the critical EDM seemed likely to 
attract at least 35 signatures.151 The Cabinet was in 'no 
doubt that [the Suez Group] held very strong views and could 
not be relied upon to refrain from causing acute embarrassment 
to the government'.152 However, government attempts to head 
off a backbench rebellion153 with an exploratory meeting 
between Butler, Crookshank and Nutting and those Privy 
Councillors who were not in the government - Assheton, 
Waterhouse, Charles Williams, Maclay, McCorquodale and Spens - 
were unsuccessful. At Nutting's urging, Assheton and 
Waterhouse agreed not to put down an EDM while Churchill and 
Eden were in Bermuda;154 but Nutting's refusal to give any 
undertaking or any new interpretation of government policy 
goaded the dissidents into briefing the press of their 
intention 'to carry on their campaign in public by party 
motions, on the order paper, and public speeches'.155
On their return from the Bermuda conference on 11 December 
Churchill and Eden found themselves confronted with a 'serious 
demonstration'.156 The Suez Group's threat was not an idle 
one: a revolt of '37 would be sufficient to bring great
pressure on a government with a majority of only 16'.157 The 
Whips were warning that 'the strength of the rebellion is
149 PRO.PREM 11/635 Foreign Office to Bermuda telegram 105 3.12.53
150 Foreign Office to Bermuda; Daily Telegraph 16.12.53
151 Foreign Office to Bermuda
152 PRO.CAB128/26 CC(53)79 14.12.53
153 Foreign Office to Bermuda telegram 3.12.53
154 Foreign Office to Bermuda
155 Birmingham Post 2.12.53
156 Times 16.12.53; see Daily Telegraph 16.12.53; News of the World 13.12.53
157 Marks, Daily Express 9.12.53
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growing'.158 'The big danger for the government is that the 
Socialists may vote against any evacuation plan which does not 
safeguard the position of Israel.'159 Eden immediately set 
about the business of pacifying restive MPs. On 11 December 
he held a private meeting with Waterhouse and his fellow 
critics,160 aware that if he was not successful they would 
use the forthcoming foreign affairs debate to air their 
grievances.161 There was considerable Cabinet discussion 
over the best way to defuse the incipient rebellion.162 On 
Buchan-Hepburn' s recommendation, it was agreed163 that 
Alexander should address the Foreign Affairs Committee, rather 
than the smaller Defence Committee164, on military strategy 
and economic facts of the case to detach a large number of 
restive backbenchers, and isolate the hard core.165 'No 
doubt the hard core is not going to be satisfied with any 
assurance, but at least an attempt could be made to avoid a 
large number of Conservative [signatures to the EDM], which 
might well turn out to be considerably more than the 40-50 
quoted in the press.'166 The forthcoming debate on foreign 
affairs due on 17 December 1953 was deliberately 
curtailed.167
158 Marks
159 Daily Express, 16.11.54
160 Shuckburgh, p. 118
161 Times 14.12.53
162 PRO.CAB128/26 CC(53)79 15.12.53; PRO.PREM11/635 Buchan-Hepburn to 
Churchill 15.12.53
163 PRO.PREM11/635 Eden to Churchill 14.12.53
164 PRO.CAB128/26.CC.(53)79 14.12.53
165 PRO.PREM11/635 Buchan-Hepburn to Churchill 14.12.43
166 Buchan-Hepburn to Churchill 
PRO.CAB128/26 CC(53)79 14.12.53
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When its threat failed to elicit a satisfactory change of 
tack, the Suez Group publicly placed its objections on the 
record on 15 December 1953, the evening before Churchill's 
annual luncheon with the 1922 committee and just before 
Alexander's appearance before the Foreign Affairs 
Committee.168 Described as 'a virtual vote of no 
confidence',169 and 'the most serious revolt the government 
had met on a major policy issue',170 this rebellion was 'a 
more serious matter than an ordinary flurry of 
backbenchers'171 since the list included 'three Privy 
Councillors, a Joint Treasurer of the Party and many MPs who 
have expert and specialized knowledge of the Middle East and 
whose views cannot be lightly disregarded ... [T]he body of 
opposition which Eden faces is a really formidable one and it 
is evident that the Cabinet is taking the challenge as 
seriously as it deserves.'172 'Minority movements within 
parties are usually drawn from a fairly narrow field, but 
among the 39 are to be found representatives of practically 
every distinctive Conservative group: the 'Old Guard'
[Waterhouse, Herbert Williams, Charles Williams]; One Nation 
[Maude, Powell]; Ex-Army Types [Clarke, Legge-Bourke]; Rural 
MPs [Crouch]; Industrialists [Assheton, Mellor]; Veterans 
[Savory]; New Boys [Hall, Paul Williams].' It was 'probably as 
complete a cross-section as could be got'.173
168 Alexander was accompanied at this meeting by Butler, Selwyn Lloyd, Lord Reading 
and Head. FAC 16.12.53
169 Marks, Daily Express 9.12.53
170 Daily Telegraph 18.6.54
171 Diaiy, Time and Tide 19.12.53
172 Time and Tide
173 Yorkshire Post 17.12.53
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(i) The Impact of the December 1953 EDM upon Churchill and 
Eden:
Churchill's own inclination was to send troops to Khartoum to 
offset the 'disgrace' of retiring from the Canal Zone, to stop 
negotiations with Egypt and announce that Britain would leave 
in its own time, destroying or removing the base before 
departure (the latter was hardly a feasible proposition given 
the enormous quantity of stores there).174 However, he 
assured Eden, currently in Paris, that he would tell the 1922 
committee its members must have faith that the government was 
'not animated by fear or weakness'.175 Churchill was more 
inclined than his Cabinet colleagues to take a robust view 
that the EDM would be 'a timely reminder to [Egypt] that 
Britain had to consider public opinion'.176 He also hoped to 
use this lever of a 'disturbed and increasingly angered 
section which could at any time cancel [the government's] 
modest majority' to dissuade Eisenhower from granting economic 
aid to Egypt before agreement was reached.177
The Suez Group succeeded in wringing two apparent concessions 
from the government. Churchill's appeal at the 1922 annual 
luncheon 'for the Suez rebels not to threaten the small Tory 
majority ... and to argue in the privacy of the 1922 
committee, rather than in public' included the specific 
'promise that an agreement with Egypt would not be rushed 
through in the recess'.178 The previous day the Suez Group 
had won an admission from the government that any proposed 
agreement would be debated by Parliament before
174 proposed in Cabinet 9.12.53: Shuckburgh, p. 118
175 PRO.PREM11/635 Churchill to Eden 14.12.53
176 PRO.CAB128/26 CC(53)79 14.12.53
177 PR0.PREM11/699 T.310/53 Churchill to Eisenhower 19.12.53
178 Guardian 17.12.53
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ratification.179 There the concessions ended. The reply 
given by Eden and Churchill in the foreign affairs debate to 
'the restive backbenchers ... was in forthright terms'. Eden 
'firmly and flatly' refused to 'break off negotiations with 
Egypt in the existing circumstances', or to refuse to promise 
that if the British Ambassador reached heads of agreement that 
the government would not go on to try to prepare a treaty to 
replace that of 1936.180 Similarly Churchill stated that the 
Government's actions would not be dictated by the violence of 
our foreign enemies or 'by the pressure of some of our best 
friends' (a reference either to America, or the Conservative 
backbenches).
Churchill's personal appeal to the 1922 had succeeded in 
quelling some dissent on Egypt but the Suez Group remained 
defiant in debate.181 It regarded Eden's speech as 'a slap in 
the face',182 and warned the Whips of its intention 'to 
appeal to the party in the country with speeches and letters 
to the press', bolstered by the belief that although military 
opinion led by Alexander supported Eden, 'an important 
military element' and some Cabinet members shared its 
view.183 Before the foreign affairs debate the Suez Group 
had only contemplated abstention; thoughts of voting against 
the government were now crystallizing.184 The press was
179 PRO.FC0317/102766 Ledward 12.12.53 and Lord Reading HLDeb. 185.68 15.12.53. 
Lord Reading refused to commit the government to a debate before entering into Heads of 
Agreement.
180 Times 18.12.53
181 Times 18.12.53
182 PRO.PREM 11/635 Whips note from conversation with (unspecified) member of the 
Suez Group 18.12.53
183 Whips note
184 Whips note
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rapidly appraised of its determination to continue the 
fight;185 and it was strongly hinted the EDM would not be 
withdrawn.186
The Suez Group continued their campaign to persuade the 
government to break off negotiations187 and to withdraw the 
present offer188 in the party committees, in Parliamentary 
debates,189 in articles in journals190 and through briefings 
to the press? it warned of continued Conservative suspicions 
of 'too tender an attitude towards Egypt were still very much 
alive within the party'191 and many more Conservatives would 
now be prepared to back the December EDM. (Darling and Kerby 
were the only ones who did so.) With the recrudescence of 
attacks on British troops in the Canal Zone, the dissidents 
pressed the government to halt all discussions until these 
disturbances had been firmly crushed.192 Egypt's failure to 
put down the violence demonstrated official encouragement for 
sabotage, while the 'Neguib-out, Nasser-in, Neguib-in again 
fiasco' in February 1954 demonstrated a dangerous instability 
in the Cairo government193 which vindicated the stand they 
had taken.194 Their gathering frustration led them to accuse
185 see Times 18.12.53
186 Times
187 Amery to Waterhouse 23.2.54, Waterhouse papers
188 Daily Telegraph 26.1.54; Sheffield Telegraph 3.3.54
189 Army Estimates Debate 3.3.54
190 Powell, New Commonwealth 4.1.54, quoted in Cosgrave, pp. 130-1
191 Maitland, 3.2.54, HC Deb.523.364
192 see Daily Telegraph, 26.1.54, Sheffield Telegraph 3.3.54; Maitland, Paul Williams, 
Bromley-Davenport, Waterhouse, 17.2.54, HC Deb.523.1960-1963
193 Sheffield Telegraph 3.3.54
194 Powell article, Truth; Nabarro, 1.3.54, HC Deb.52A.Z21
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Eden of a policy of 'appeasement'195 - the ultimate political 
insult - and to decide to vote against a Heads of 
Agreement.196 While Amery and Waterhouse realised that it 
was unrealistic to expect to get 40 MPs to vote against the 
government, this decision197 was not an empty one. 'No 
government can lightly disregard a warning of this kind'198
(ii) The Continuing Struggle over Egypt between Eden and 
Churchill:
Behind the public united front on the Egyptian negotiations of 
December 1953, tensions persisted between Churchill and Eden 
in private. Much to the alarm of the Foreign Office, the 
pressure of backbench dissent and his own Prime Minister's 
opposition was beginning to tell on Eden's resolve.199 Armed 
with the backing of the Suez Group, Churchill at the end of 
December told the Cabinet that negotiations should be 
abandoned if an agreement was not reached in the near 
future.200 Eden was acutely aware that if he succeeded on 
getting Egyptian agreement on the present proposals, he would 
carry the party, but with 20 or 30 voting against this might 
'gravely compromise his position'.201 Shuckburgh noted in 
his diary that Eden seemed to be toying with the Prime 
Minister's 'so-called alternative to agreement with Egypt - ie 
breaking off negotiations, and announcing that Britain would 
redeploy her troops in her own time'. Eden, however, remained
195 Maitland, 3.2.54, HC Deb.523.364
196 Suez Group meeting 15.3.56, Waterhouse papers
197 Suez Group meeting 15.3.54
198 Amery to Waterhouse 19.3.54, Waterhouse papers
199 Shuckburgh, p. 125
200 Scott Lucas: Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis, p.30
201 Macmillan, pp.502-3
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uncertain, as he did not wish to 'throw over the Arabs 
altogether and rely on Israel and Turkey' - the Prime 
Minister's strong choice.
While the Foreign Secretary was racked with indecision over 
the Egyptian question, his deputy Selwyn Lloyd, seemed even 
more influenced by the Tory rebels,202 suggesting that 
'redeployment' should mean that British troops would stay in 
Egypt in some force until 1956 and even thereafter.203 To 
Eden's consternation, while he was in Berlin for the 
Four-Power conference on Germany, Selwyn Lloyd gave a lunch in 
London for the Persian Ambassador to which he invited 
Assheton, one of the leading rebels. This raised fears in the 
mind of the highly strung Foreign Secretary that Selwyn Lloyd 
was plotting against him. Whilst still in Berlin, Eden 
received a 'rude message' from Churchill, which made it 'very 
clear that the Prime Minister is doing all he can to thwart 
agreement with Egypt on the base and Selwyn Lloyd is not 
playing straight with us'.204 Churchill had again seized the 
chance of overall control of Egypt negotiations with Eden's 
absence. Supported by war cries from the backbenches, and 
'egged on' by Soames205, in the Cabinet the Prime Minister 
'was raring to occupy Khartoum' and giving Eden 'a rough 
ride' .2°6
Under these pressures by mid-March Eden was still showing 
signs of indecision, toying with the idea of breaking off 
negotiations with Egypt. 'Quivering with sensitivity to 
opinion in the House, the party, the newspapers', he was
202 Shuckburgh, p. 125
203 Shuckburgh, p. 125
204 Shuckburgh, p. 132
205 Shuckburgh, p. 141
206 Shuckburgh, p. 137
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'beginning to find the unpopularity of his Egypt policy with 
the party 'too heavy a burden and is seeking ways to abandon 
it'.207 The Cabinet, led by Salisbury, was in favour of a 
new plan of refusing to renew talks until Egypt had done 
certain things to restore confidence (stop anti-British 
propaganda, undertake not to upset the Governor General's 
commission in the Sudan, etc), in opposition to Churchill who 
still wanted to send troops to Khartoum, keep 10,000 men on 
the canal, and break off all discussions.
(b) The Suez Group Checked:
To the relief of the Suez Group208 Eden announced on 22 March 
that negotiations had been broken off.209 However, initial 
hopes that the severance of negotiations would be followed by 
'a material change of approach'210 were not fulfilled. Eden 
persisted with his policy, convinced there was no viable 
alternative211 to negotiating with Neguib for the evacuation 
from the Canal Zone base. Caught between American pressure to 
concede terms to Egypt and Churchill's pressure to stand firm, 
backed by the Suez Group, for the beleaguered Foreign 
Secretary the solution to maintaining Britain's Middle Eastern 
position after withdrawal from Suez, lay in 'close relations 
with Jordan and Iraq'212 building upon the Turkish-Pakistani 
pact.
207 Shuckburgh, p. 148
208 Waterhouse to Amery 23.3.56, Waterhouse papers
209 before the Suez Group’s letter was sent to the Chief Whip. Waterhouse to Julian 
Amery, 23.3.56, Waterhouse papers
210 Waterhouse to Julian Amery 23.3.54
211 CAB129/66 CC(54)74 25.2.54, Memorandum by Chiefs of Staff, ’Egypt’, quoted in 
Louis in Louis ed., p.64 and p.66; Scott Lucas, p.31
212 PR0.FC0371/110819/VI 193/8 Eden minute 12.1.54, quoted in Scott Lucas, p.31
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By early summer faced with the spectre of an imminent 
Anglo-Egyptian settlement, the Suez Group and their 
aristocratic allies were spurred into frenetic activity, 
despatching articles213 and letters214 to the press, to 
Selwyn Lloyd215 and to Eden,216 'warning that the group ... 
was now even more strongly of the view that British forces 
must be maintained in the Canal'217 because of the situation 
in the Sudan rendered this imperative. Through informal chats 
with Eden, deputations to Churchill218 and private 
meetings219 it sought to defend Britain's honour as well as 
her interests.220 As the process of proposal and counter­
proposal was followed avidly in the press, the Suez Group's 
efforts to broadcast its dissatisfaction were extremely 
successful, as were its efforts to stimulate wider party 
unrest.221 As the press picked up this backbench
dissatisfaction - 'another Tory civil war warms up'222 -
there was sharp Conservative protest at the reopening of
negotiations in mid-July.223 Diehard opinion within the
party was also enraged by Eden's 'supine attitude'224 to
213 ’Suez and Why We Must Stay’: Waterhouse, Daily Telegraph 5.7.54
214 Powell, Times, 25.6.54; Hankey, Vansittart, Killeam and Rennell, Times 10.7.54
215 23.6.54
216 Waterhouse to Eden 17.6.54, Waterhouse papers
217 Daily Telegraph 18.6.54
218 PRO.PREM11/635 Waterhouse to Churchill 9.7.54
219 see Crossbencher, Sunday Express 4.7.54
220 Suez Group to Eden 17.6.54, Waterhouse papers
221 see FAC 30.6.54
222 Crossbencher, Sunday Express 4.7.54
223 FAC 12.7.54
224 see Walter Fletcher letter, Times 21.6.54
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China at the Geneva conference convened to discuss Indo-China: 
there were private fears that America's agreement for Eden's 
brokered deal in Indo-China was at the expense of British 
concessions over the Suez Canal base.225 Yet, again, there 
was no uniform Suez Group view on Far Eastern matters.226
The government was considerably alarmed at the prospect of a 
general backbench revolt over the resumption of negotiations. 
Eden wrote at length to the Suez Group's leader insisting 'any 
alternative policy will not give us what we want' ?227 and the 
very considerable weight of senior Tories had to be brought to 
bear upon the critics to bring them to order.228 First 
Selwyn Lloyd, Nutting and Dodds-Parker faced the Foreign 
Affairs Committee on 12 July 1954, and Churchill met a 
deputation from the Suez Group.229 The following day 
Churchill, Butler and Head addressed the Army Sub-committee 
convened specifically to discuss the Suez question further 
before the forthcoming Commons debate. It was Churchill's 
emotional arguments, rather than strict military logic, that 
won the day for Eden.
(c) Churchill Admits Defeat:
Churchill had only conceded defeat very reluctantly230. His 
favoured solution of an international base, with a few
225 see Eden to Waterhouse 24.6.54, Waterhouse papers
226 see Amery vs Legge-Bourke, FAC 26.5.54; Maitland letter, Daily Telegraph 7.7.54
227 Eden to Waterhouse 24.6.54, Waterhouse papers
228 Times 14.7.54
229 PRO.PREM11/635 Waterhouse note of meeting. Waterhouse to Buchan-Hepburn 
13.7.54
230 see PR0.PREM11/702 CAB CC(54)43 22.6.54 and CC(54)47 2.7.54
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thousand British troops and American support231 foundered 
when America refused to co-operate at the Bermuda conference 
in December 1953.232 By March, as the result of grim
discussion of Britain's financial position,233 the Prime 
Minister was no longer talking of sending troops to Khartoum. 
And the American reports of the Eniwetok nuclear test had a 
decisive effect of Churchill;234 he was powerfully affected 
by the scientists' conclusion that this nuclear test had come 
very close to cracking the earth's crust.
By this point Churchill's ability to stimulate trouble for 
Eden using the Suez Group was greatly curtailed by the 
uncertainty of his own future.235 In addition, Churchill 
still hankered after a summit with Russia, a notion which his 
Foreign Secretary heartily opposed. The Cabinet furore in 
July 1954 over Churchill's private attempts to secure a summit 
meeting - during which it was noticeable that whereas 
Salisbury was prepared to resign on the issue of collective 
cabinet government, Eden was not - demonstrated to Churchill 
the limits of his authority. A general election seemed highly 
probable within the next year; Churchill would be 80 in 
November, and no one expected him to lead the party into the 
next election. In contrast, Eden's star shone brightly: in 
1954 he was acclaimed as Churchill heir apparent and the 
chances of the Suez Group were necessarily diminished. With 
Eden's successes (real or apparent) in Indo-China, Trieste, 
and Persia, never had his standing within the party in the 
country been higher.
231 Ovendale in Young ed.: The Foreign Policy of Churchill’s Peace-time Administration, 
p. 146
232 PRO.PREM11/699 and PREM11/702
233 see Shuckburgh, pp. 137-9; Eden, pp.257-9; Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956 (New York 
1978), p. 14-23
234 Sir John Colville in conversation with Professor Donald Watt
235 Macmillan, p.505; Sir Richard Thompson
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Despite his sympathy with the Suez Group's stance, outnumbered 
in Cabinet and awed by the vulnerability of the Suez Canal 
base to nuclear attack, Churchill bowed to reality. His 
public support for Eden in the party's committees in mid-July 
was crucial: 'Conservatives attach great importance to [his] 
intervention at this stage. Though he produced no new 
arguments, it is felt he was at pains to align himself 
personally and unmistakably with a negotiated settlement with 
Egypt'.236 However, the Prime Minister still disliked the 
agreement intensely, and made Eden present it to the Commons.
(d) The Suez Group 'Stalemated':237
Churchill's change of heart effectively ruled out any 
possibility of a change of approached. However, the
dissidents were still determined to draw as much public 
attention as possible to their dissatisfaction with Eden's 
policy. They remained convinced that the proposals currently 
under discussion with Egypt were an 'unconditional 
surrender',238 and were profoundly unimpressed by the Prime 
Minister's arguments239: how could Britain hold the Empire
together if Churchill's statements about the bomb and the 
impossibility of holding a base surrounded by a hostile local 
population were taken seriously?240 As Powell said to his 
colleagues, 'if Churchill had said Britain could not hold the 
base and walked out with the flags flying and the drum 
beating, I for one would have supported [him]; but to argue, 
as Churchill had done, that Britain could re-enter the base
236 Daily Telegraph 14.7.54
237 Lord Amery
238 Amery, FAC 30.6.54
239 Waterhouse note of Suez Group meeting with Churchill 12.7.54, Waterhouse papers
240 Ameiy to Waterhouse 4.8.54, Waterhouse papers
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because of her position in Cyprus, Jordan and Kenya, was 
self-delusion.'241 At midnight after this meeting the Suez 
Group formally declared its decision to vote against 'any 
treaty, which involved the removal of all fighting troops from 
the Suez Canal area'.242 Legge-Bourke announced his 
intention to sit as an Independent Conservative on 14 July 
1954? Chairman of the Empire Economic Union and with a 
distinguished war record, he was the second Conservative that 
year to resign the party Whip (Mellor had resigned over the 
issue of MPs' salaries). It was a courageous gesture in the 
face of considerable pressure from the Whips, and one which 
made the Prime Minister very angry indeed.243
It is plain that the full weight of the Whips office was 
brought to bear on the rebels. While Waterhouse's public 
statements sought to put a gloss of principle on his 
resignation from the Chairmanship of the Defence committee, 
the Suez Group's leader was patently forced out by government 
supporters.244 No other member of the Suez Group was 
prepared to resigned the Whip.245 The resignations of Legge- 
Bourke and Waterhouse made little impact, though they 
attracted considerable press comment and there was evidently 
considerable Tory sympathy246 for their patent sincerity. 
Sir Thomas Dugdale's resignation as Minister of Agriculture 
over the Crichel Down affair was a political event of far 
greater importance, and threw their resignations completely 
into the shade.
Enoch Powell
Times 14.7.54
Robert Jackson: Rebels and Whips, p. 112
see Daily Telegraph 15.7.54 and 16.7.54
Paul Williams
Times 15.7.54
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The many doubters were swayed by Churchill's personal 
intervention, if not by his sombre analysis of the 
vulnerability of the Canal Zone to nuclear attack. Certainly, 
'to vote against Churchill was to lose sleep'.247 The Whips' 
moves to contain the rebellion proved effective as hints 
emerged that not all the Suez Group were prepared publicly to 
defy their front bench and risk a government defeat.248 In 
the event Labour supported the Government, which enabled the 
Suez Group to register its displeasure in the division lobby, 
rather than having to take the less obvious route of 
abstaining to avoid the odium of voting with Labour. Contrary 
to earlier press predictions of a larger revolt,249 only 26 
rebels voted against the government. Of the remainder of the 
December 1953 rebels, 7 abstained (including Morrison, Hall, 
Hicks Beech, Rayner and Fell); Burden, Reader Harris, 
Frederick Harris and Clarke were paired; and Savory and Baker 
were in hospital. Herbert Williams had died three days before 
the debate. 'I think two or three others abstained who were 
not in our group, but sympathetic to us, among them Jocelyn 
Lucas. We would have done better if Churchill had not been 
against us.'250
'Fitzroy, Bell and Bromley-Davenport were the only three 
defections.'251 In the debate Maclean declared that he had 
been sufficiently convinced by the strategic arguments and was 
now prepared - reluctantly - to accept the government's 
argument. His former fellow conspirators were livid this 
betrayal of their cause. Their reason was simple:
247 Lord Amery
248 Times and Daily Telegraph 15.7.54; Daily Telegraph 30.7.54
249 Daily Telegraph 15.7.54
250 Amery to Biggs-Davison 3.8.54, Biggs-Davison papers
251 Amery to Biggs-Davison
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'At the meeting before the vote in one of the Committee 
rooms upstairs, ... Waterhouse went round the table,
asking us all whether we would oppose the government. He 
said anyone who wanted to quit could do so? there would 
be no dishonour. I remember Fitzroy declaring, "I'm 
certainly not going to support the government. I'm 
probably going to abstain." Waterhouse then submitted 
the names of those who would like to be called in the 
debate. Fitzroy was called ... and supported the 
government. After our meeting closed he must have 
trotted down the corridor to the Chief Whip. When 
Fitzroy was made Under Secretary for War soon afterwards, 
Julian [Amery] sent him a note: "As you are incapable of 
shame, accept my congratulations".'252
The Continuation of the Suez Group
The Suez Group had in essence 'shot their bolt' as a crusade 
against the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal 
Zone base.253 Despite warnings of its continued opposition 
to evacuation,254 the issue of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement 
was totally eclipsed at the Blackpool party conference by the 
party's preoccupation with German rearmament. Legge-Bourke's 
application to have the Whip restored to him on 19 October 
1954, together with the 'quietness' of the Suez Group at the 
party conference, seemed indicative that 'politically the 
issue of Suez withdrawal was dead'.255
However, most of the rebels wanted to continue as a cohesive
252 Lord Lauderdale
253 Amery to Biggs-Davison 3.8.54, Biggs-Davison papers
254 eg Daily Mail 3.9.54
255 Daily Mail 29.10.54; Amery to Waterhouse 20.10.54, Waterhouse papers
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group.256 Their opposition to withdrawal from the Suez Canal 
base had been symptomatic of a far deeper disagreement with 
their government: Eden's foreign policy involved 'the
surrender of our rights to decide our own actions and 
reluctance to give a lead to the rest of the Commonwealth in 
economic and commercial matters'. 257 Therefore it was hardly 
surprising that 'from the debris of the Suez Group now springs 
a new backbench Empire group'.258 The rebels took steps in 
the recess to maintain the solidarity of the group, through 
letters and private meetings, and to sort out an 'after Suez' 
policy.259 'The only possible way the Suez Agreement can be 
lived down is if we could make a reality of all the talk about 
Middle East redeployment.'260 Henceforth Cyprus was to be 
'the glue'.
Summary:
Although the Suez Group was recognized as the most serious 
backbench challenge to the government's foreign policy since 
1951, its primary influence was as the Prime Minister's tool, 
rather than as an outside agency exerting pressure on the 
Foreign Secretary. Churchill came to appreciate very clearly 
the strategic absurdity of a huge base at the mercy of one 
nuclear bomb, and was haunted by his experience in the 1920s 
as Chancellor of the Exchequer, when it became apparent that 
the rearmament programme initiated by the Attlee government in 
1950 was making Britain bankrupt. With his defection, the 
Suez Group's fight became a rearguard action. When the terms
236 Crossbencher 4.7.54; Daily Telegraph 31.7.54; Amery to Waterhouse 20.10.54
257 Legge-Bourke speech at Empire Economic Union, Cambridge Times 24.9.54
258 Sunday Express 1.8.54
259 correspondence in Waterhouse papers; see Geoffrey Wakeford, Daily Mail 3.9.54
260 Amery to Waterhouse 20.10.54, Waterhouse papers
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of the final agreement were announced on 20 October 1954, 
there was 'no longer much fight left in these dissidents'.261 
However, as observers commented,262 all depended on the 
spirit in which the agreement worked, as there remained many 
possible sources of conflict. Eden was hostage, in the eyes 
of the Suez Group, to Nasser's continued observance of the 
treaty.
261 Times 1.11.54
262 eg Daily Telegraph 30.7.54
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CHAPTER 10: THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND THE MIDDLE EAST:
1955-1956
The Suez crisis was the most divisive event to confront the 
Conservatives since 1940, and very nearly broke the back of 
the party in the aftermath of military intervention. However, 
there were several decisive domestic and foreign developments 
prior to July 1956 which helped the frustrated, angry, yet 
containable group of July 1954 evolve into the faction that 
seized the ear of the party and the Prime Minister, setting 
the parameters of party debate on the best way to deal with 
Nasser's challenge to British's position in the Middle East. 
These were Churchill's resignation from the premiership in 
April 1955, Conservative opinion of Eden as Prime Minister, 
and developments in Cyprus, Egypt and Jordan.
The Evolution of the Suez Group: 1955-6
(a) Domestic Factors:
(i) The importance of Churchill's retirement in April 1955 was 
twofold:
(1) the departure of the titan, and the loyalty and respect he 
commanded, was akin to the lifting of a great repressive 
force. All kinds of tensions and discontents could and did 
well up.1 The Suez Group had long harboured unkind thoughts 
about Eden's suitability for high office, cemented by their 
hostility to 'his' treaty with Egypt? their reluctant support 
of Eden became dependent upon Egypt's continued 'good 
behaviour'. These MPs wanted a more 'Conservative' foreign 
policy generally and felt their government's increased 
majority after May 1955 (60) gave the backbenches greater room 
for manoeuvre?2
(2) Eden's own personality in the conduct and presentation of
1 see Phillip Williams ed.: The Diaries o f Hugh Gaitskell 1945-56 (London 1983), p.411
2 Maitland, FAC 9.11.55
- 345 -
policy: the political world rapidly filled with rumours of his 
moods.3 Inordinately sensitive to criticism, particularly to 
charges of appeasement (the skeleton of Munich still loomed 
large in the Tory cupboard), he was determined that no future 
crisis should resemble the events of September 1938.
(ii) Eden's feeble performance as Prime Minister:4 with an 
increased majority in the May 1955 election 'all looked set 
fair. Yet within six months there was turmoil within the 
party'.5 By the autumn the economy was in the doldrums. Eden 
was increasingly under attack for his delay in reorganizing 
the government and acting against inflation. Tory 
dissatisfaction with the persistent lack of direction spilled 
over into the Conservative press.6 Critical editorials in 
the Daily Telegraph in December and January culminated in a 
scathing criticism on Eden's half-measures and 'clumsy 
courtship of unfriendly and fickle Arab statesmen'.7 Eden was 
cut to the quick, and resolved to strike back at his 
detractors?8 not unnaturally, he turned to the field of 
foreign affairs where 'he was absolutely the master'.®
(b) The Middle East: 1955-56
(i) Egypt:
Eden's honeymoon with his backbench critics came to an abrupt 
end in September 1955 with the bombshell of Czech arms sales
3 see Lord Moran: Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival 1940-65 (London 1968)
4 Reginald Bevins: The Greasy Pole, p.37
5 Sir Edward Du Cann interview
6 see Williams ed: Gait shell, p.421-2
7 Daily Telegraph 3.1.56
8 Anthony Nutting: No End of a Lesson, pp.25-26
9 Robert Allan in Alan Thompson: The Day Before Yesterday, p. 122
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to Egypt. The spectacle of Russia leap-frogging over the 
Northern Tier confirmed Conservatives' worst fears of the 
emptiness of Egypt's promise to maintain the Suez base in a 
high state of readiness. Persistent anti-British propaganda 
pumped out by Radio Cairo, against the background of mutiny in 
the Southern Sudan (which reinforced the sense of Britain's 
betrayal of the Southern tribes), further primed Tory anger10, 
and prompted some members of the Suez Group11 to look at 
possible alternative allies in the Middle East.12 Amery 
shared the French politicians' view of the threat posed to 
Algeria by Egyptian nationalism, and was at the heart of moves 
behind the scenes to weld a Franco-British alliance in North 
Africa and the Middle East.13 Amery was also central to Tory 
pressure on Macmillan when Foreign Secretary for a closer 
alliance with Israel, as a means to counter Nasser's influence 
and because of Cyprus.14
(ii) Cyprus:
There was increasing Conservative anxiety over Cyprus15, where 
Britain's position was under attack from the Enosis campaign, 
and EOKA guerillas. Backbench rumblings were growing, 
orchestrated by the Suez Group16, calling for a clarification 
of government policy and decisive action. It was argued that
10 see Middle East Sub-Committee meetings May/June 1956
11 Amery, Hinchingbrooke and Hugh Fraser all had close links with Israel: Arthur 
Gavshon
12 Amery, who enjoyed excellent contacts in Egypt, was also in touch with a group of 
rebel Egyptian officers. Julian Amery: The Suez Group’ in Selwyn Troen and Moshe 
Shemesh: The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956, p. 121
13 Roger Louis seminar on Eden, LSE, 1992
w see Legge-Bourke, MES-C 23.4.56.
15 5.12.55, HCDeb.547.32-156
16 see Times 28.6.56; Suez Group letters to Heath (20.6.54) and to Eden (28.6.54), 
Waterhouse papers
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the arrival of Russia in the Middle East reinforced the need 
for Britain's continued presence in Cyprus to protect the 
region from Soviet incursion, to keep the peace within and to 
underpin Britain's role as the rightful guardian and arbiter 
in the Middle East, to defend vital supplies of oil, and to 
sustain her allies in the Gulf, as well as her communications 
with the Commonwealth. No one was immediately inclined to 
regard these rumblings as an incipient backbench revolt, but 
they represented a serious body of Conservative opinion, which 
extended far beyond the original Suez Group, which was restive 
and anxious about Cyprus.17
(iii) Jordan:
Jordan was traditionally an area of British predominance - not 
only was her army British trained, with British officers, and 
commanded by the legendary Glubb Pasha, but the country 
received substantial financial support from London. The Suez 
Group supported Macmillan's attempt to persuade Jordan to 
adhere to the Baghdad Pact,18 since this would successfully 
pull Amman from Cairo's orbit. Conservatives were already 
alarmed19 by Macmillan's commitment to self-determination for 
Cyprus20 when the furore over the failure of General Templar's 
(Chief of the Imperial General Staff) mission to Jordan burst 
upon the party. The blow to British prestige was attributed 
directly to Nasser; a barrage of Tory criticism erupted that 
because of Eden's indecisiveness, Britain was being maligned 
and insulted by an upstart Egyptian. Any image of firm and 
competent handling of Middle Eastern affairs further dented by 
the political storm surrounding the export of surplus war 
stores to Egypt in January 1956.
17 FAC 27.6.56; FAC 4.7.56; and Times 28.6.56
18 see Randolph Churchill: The Rise and Fall o f Sir Anthony Eden (London 1959) p.223
19 Times 16.12.55
20 5.12.55
- 348 -
The Catalyst: The Dismissal of Glubb Pasha:
Anthony Nutting later described the sacking of General Sir 
John Glubb as commander of the Arab Legion by King Hussein on 
1 March 1956 as the start of the whole Suez episode. Although 
the Suez Group and its allies in the press were discontented 
with Eden/s handling of foreign policy, they had been ' devoid 
of argument' until Glubb's abrupt dismissal. Coming hard on 
the heels of Eden's domestic discomforts, such a set-back in 
a sphere where Eden was the acknowledged expert, was 'the last 
straw' for the Prime Minister. Suddenly, 'everything seemed 
to be going wrong' .21
(a) The Reaction of the Suez Group:
The Suez Group were incandescent with rage. It fully shared 
Eden's view22 that this was another stroke in Nasser's 
relentless campaign. This was a 'studied affront',23 the most 
sinister event since the Czech arms deal, and since the 
Foreign Secretary was at that moment in Cairo, a 'calculated 
insult'.24 Britain seemed to be 'marching with dreadful 
certainty' towards a clash over oil in the Middle East which 
was more likely than any other event to precipitate a third 
World War. The Suez Group firmly laid the blame for this 
body-blow to British influence in the Middle East at Eden's 
door. The time for concession was past.25 Eden must accept 
the challenge while the Communist position was still 
unconsolidated and show that there were points beyond which
21 Nutting: No End of a Lesson, p.27
22 Nutting: No End of a Lesson, p.27
23 Waterhouse letter, Times 5.3.56
24 Waterhouse
25 Waterhouse
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Britain would not be driven. 'Any vigorous action taken by 
the Government which brings Egypt to her senses and forces her 
neighbours to assess her true worth will receive general and 
enthusiastic support in the country. We should at once 
declare that any further traffic through the Suez Canal, any 
threat to a Middle East people or any movement of troops 
towards Palestine, any further plot to disturb the peace and 
embarrass the government of the Sudan, or ferment trouble in 
Libya, will be taken as an indication of hostile intent and 
will be met by sanctions, military and economic.'26
The reinforcement of British ground troops and the air force 
in Jordan, was merely the preliminary step in the Suez Group's 
recipe for containing the 'xenophobic upsurge'27 and ensuring 
a revitalized British presence in the region. 'An all-out 
effort now, military, then economic and political' was needed; 
France should do the same, or face the loss of Algeria. 
Britain should adopt a clear policy of unwavering support for 
her friends, deemed far more likely to earn the respect of 
'neutralist' Arab nations, and counter the influence of Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt. Appeasement stood no chance of stemming the 
anti-British tide.28
To the critics' amazement, no Cabinet meeting had been 
arranged to discuss Glubb's dismissal. Determined to rectify 
this 'supine inattention'29, on Sunday 4 March Amery and 
Randolph Churchill called on Butler and pressed him to seek an 
early Cabinet meeting. This was a shrewd move. It was 
perfectly proper for concerned backbenchers to approach Butler 
as Leader of the House. He was also still Eden's probable 
successor, despite his demotion from the Exchequer, was known
26 Waterhouse
27 Stephen McAdden letter, Times 7.3.56
23 McAdden
29 Churchill, p.225
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to be disturbed by Eden's lack of grip, and represented the 
progressive wing of the party in Cabinet. Amery had probably 
approached Butler on Macmillan's recommendation, the other 
most senior member of the Cabinet. Butler's reputation for 
'sitting on the fence' gave his support for convening a 
Cabinet meeting to discuss the situation greater weight. 
Randolph Churchill later recalled that Butler was surprised at 
their urgency since, in his view, 'not much was at stake'.30 
However, Butler did contact Macmillan, undoubtedly already 
primed by his son-in-law, and a Cabinet meeting was held the 
following morning.31
Intent on maintaining the pressure on the Prime Minister, the 
next day two letters appeared in the Times32 outlining the 
Suez Group's 'strong feelings and serious misgivings'.33 
Eden was pressed further in the Commons by Amery and Maitland 
demanding an emphatic reassertion of British interests in the 
area. There appeared an ineluctable correlation between the 
evacuation of the Suez base and the withdrawal from the Sudan 
- which had done nothing to secure Egyptian friendship for 
Britain - and Glubb's humiliating dismissal? significantly, 
Amery urged that in default of American co-operation, Britain 
should act for herself - a comment which revealed his 
knowledge of the outcome of Eden's recent visit to Washington.
For the time being although they were active, the critics were 
'mainly content to make their views known and influence felt 
through the party's foreign affairs and defence committee 
rather than any independent action'34 - a thinly veiled
30 Churchill, p.225
31 Churchill, p.225
32 Amery and Waterhouse Times, 5.3.56
33 Churchill, p.225
34 Times 6.3.56
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warning to the Whips. Disgusted by Eden's abysmal 
parliamentary performance on 7 March 1956, they maintained 
their pressure through letters to the press, and the normal 
party channels, hotly disputing as a dangerous fallacy the 
argument that the Arab/Israeli conflict was to blame for 
Britain's humiliation.35 'The crux is this: do we stay in the 
Middle East or do we go?' Their demand for the restoration of 
Britain's position in Jordan was justified on the need to 
uphold the Baghdad Pact, to sustain Britain's allies in the 
Persian Gulf, and to maintain access to vital oil supplies.36
(b) Eden's response to the Conservative outcry:
Eden too was incensed by Glubb's dismissal. He wrongly 
attributed the blame to Nasser, but he correctly assessed the 
enormous blow to Britain's prestige. Significantly, Eden's 
main concern was that he would be jeered in the Chamber of the 
House.37 With the Suez Group and at least half the national 
press insisting that 'a lost grip ... had to be recovered', in 
the view of Nutting, this was enough to stampede Eden, a man 
relatively unaccustomed to harsh criticism.38 Crucially, now 
the bulk of the Conservative party endorsed the Suez Group's 
attitude. In the party committees, there were 'especially 
vigorous demands that action should be taken immediately to 
restore British prestige in the Middle East'.39 Eden was also 
under considerable pressure from his Cabinet colleagues for a 
dramatic reassertion of British might? the majority were in 
favour of withdrawing the remaining British staff from Jordan
35 Amery and McAdden letters, Times 7.3.56
36 Amery, Times 7.3.56
37 Evelyn Shuckburgh: Descent to Suez, p.340
38 Nutting: No End of a Lesson, p.32
39 Times 7.3.56
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without notice. Fearful of driving Jordan further into 
Egypt's embrace, Eden cast round in his desperate need to flex 
British muscle to silence his vociferous critics; he initially 
toyed with the idea of reoccupying Suez,40 but then decided 
on Cyprus to provide the check for the apparent slide, 
banishing Archbishop Makarios to the Seychelles on 10 March 
1956.
The Suez Group and its sympathizers were jubilant.41 Eden 
received a great ovation when he addressed the 1922 Committee 
and in the debate on Cyprus, when he asserted that Cyprus must 
be held to defend the oil of Arabia. In Sir Edward Boyle's 
view, Eden's gesture to placate the Suez Group 'unleashed 
certain emotions in the party that were dangerous and which 
could easily recoil on him in a few months time'42, as he 
raised expectations that henceforth whenever Britain was 
slighted he would take resolute action. In Nigel Nicolson's 
opinion, from this moment Eden became convinced that his role 
was to be 'that of a strong man who was going to speak up for 
England and for the Empire, for this is what the Tory party in 
the country really wanted, and in a sense he was perfectly 
right, they did want it'.43
The immediate result of the Glubb episode was a toughening of 
British policy everywhere in the Middle East and East 
Mediterranean.44 'We and the Americans really gave up hope 
of Nasser and began to look around for means of destroying 
him.'45 Eden made overtures of friendship to Israel and
40 Shuckburgh, p.341
41 Times 13.3.56
42 Sir Edward Boyle in Thompson, p. 125
43 Nigel Nicolson in Thompson, p. 125
44 Nutting: No End of a Lesson, p.36
45 Shuckburgh, p.345
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France, ended his objections to French secret arms sales to 
Israel46 and lent support to France's policy of suppression 
in Algeria. The Suez Group welcomed this toughening of 
Britain's policy. Convinced by its intelligence sources that 
Nasser was increasingly under Communist influence and that his 
regime represented Britain's main enemy in the Middle East, it 
seemed logical to overthrow Nasser; 'this is indeed where 
Britain's anti-Nasser policy is already tending'. The inner 
core of the Suez Group gave considerable thought was given to 
the chances of a Wafdist counter-revolution supported by 
dissident Egyptian officers. Amery informed Waterhouse that 
Wafd spokesmen gave the strongest assurances that if in power 
a Wafd regime would be more co-operative.
'Much might depend on the extent to which Britain helped 
them return to power. Prospects of a counter revolution 
in Egypt will depend on foreign encouragement as much as 
on domestic circumstances ... Moreover, should the 
attempt succeed, a Restoration regime is likely ... 
before it is securely established to feel more than 
usually dependent on outside support and goodwill. 
During this period and perhaps beyond it Egypt might once 
again be very much under our influence. Even if a 
Restoration government ultimately proved a disappointment 
a good deal might still have been gained. The Nasser 
myth would have been broken, a communist coup forestalled 
and the immediate threat to the Baghdad Pact removed. At 
best therefore Restoration would seem to offer a chance 
of getting off to a fresh start in Anglo-Egyptian 
relations and at worst a means of paralysing a country 
which, under its present rulers is a real danger to our 
vital interests.'47
Glubb's dismissal exacerbated the general mood of apprehension
46 Williams ed.: Gaitskell, p.493
47 Amery to Waterhouse 14.6.56, Waterhouse papers
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that had built up over Eden's leadership. His government was 
struggling in more than mid-term doldrums. After
disappointing results in four by-elections in February 1956, 
the dramatic drop in the Conservative vote at the Tonbridge 
by-election on 7 June delivered a further blow. The party 
was restive with Cyprus providing a rallying point for those 
profoundly concerned at the erosion of Britain's pre-eminence 
in the Middle East. Significantly, the issue had attracted 
far wider backbench support than the 1954 Suez Group 
rebellion. Eden's political future - given that he had 
'virtually railroaded' the evacuation strategy through 
Churchill's cabinet in 195448 - became inextricably linked 
with Egypt's continued observance of the spirit of the 1936 
treaty. The embattled Eden had no choice but to respond 
forcefully to Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal 
Company on 26 July 1956. However, the immediate use of force 
was not possible.
THE SUEZ GROUP
The Suez Group and the Suez Crisis: July-September 1956
The Suez Group felt Nasser's action vindicated its stand that 
withdrawal from Suez would lead to a rapid decline of British 
influence in the region.49 Before Parliament rose for the 
summer recess, it became the most vociferous section of the 
party. Its reaction was a combination of an atavistic surge 
of the past (Suez as the fulcrum of the Empire) and a hard- 
headed and sober response50 to the threat to Britain's
48 Sir John Colville interview with Anthony Howard: RAB, p.228
49 Amery, in Troen and Shemesh ed., pp. 116-117. In July 1954 Amery received an 
intelligence report from Egypt which warned that the present Egyptian regime had decided 
to nationalize the Canal if it stayed in power: Amery to Waterhouse 4.8.54, Waterhouse 
papers
50 Paul Johnson: The Suez War (London 1957), p.x-xi
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position in the Middle East, and vital access to oil.51 
Nasser's act posed a calamitous precedent for British 
investment overseas. He should be make to revoke his 
nationalization decree and restore the Suez Canal Company to 
its former rights - indeed, most people did not see it as 
'nationalization', just plain theft. 52
Thereafter the Suez Group's moves behind the scenes were those 
of a three-pronged attack:
(i) to create and maintain a political atmosphere that would 
deny Eden a diplomatic solution that did not ensure the 
permanent removal of the Canal from Egyptian control by an 
international body and Nasser's abject humiliation53?
(ii) given that the Anglo-French invasion force would not be 
ready until mid-September, to rally domestic support for the 
use of force if necessary; and
(iii) to forge an alliance in the Middle East that would 
effectively halt Russian direct encroachment and check 
Moscow's stooges in Damascus and Cairo.
Once Parliament had risen for the summer, the Suez Group used 
the correspondence columns of the Times, and speeches in the 
constituencies to maintain its pressure upon the Government. 
From the outset these MPs harboured no doubts about the 
required firm action. 'The challenge to Nasser has to be met 
... with a direct uncompromising negative. Never is Egypt, 
and least of all Nasser's Egypt to be allowed unfettered 
control of the Canal.'54 Nasser had modelled himself on 
pre-war dictators: he had deliberately 'sown discord between 
Britain and the Arab world,' and had already delighted in 
flouting, whenever convenient to himself, free passage of the
51 Amery letter, Times 30.7.56
52 Anthony Fell letter, Times 2.8.56
53 Waterhouse, MES-C 30.7.56
54 Waterhouse letter, Times 8.8.56
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Canal in defiance of the 1888 Convention. In the absence of 
an UN police force, 'the free nations themselves must redress 
the wrong ... and teach Nasser, any other aspiring dictator 
that crime does not pay'.55
The Suez Group's principal arguments were emotional ones. 
Nasser should be forced to hand back 'our' canal in as
humiliating a fashion possible. While not all went as far as
\
Hinchingbrooke's argument that the Suez Canal was an integral 
part of Britain,56 the Canal's strategic importance to 
Britain, her Empire and Commonwealth, was thought to give 
Britain inalienable rights. But these MPs were not only 
concerned that the world's neck was being encircled by 
'unpredictable hands'. There was an acute awareness if Nasser 
'got away with it', his stock would rise inordinately,57 and
the situation in the Middle East would become extremely
/
dangerous. Britain's ally, Nuri-es-Said of Iraq would be more 
vulnerable, as would Israel.
The Suez Group was firm: there should be no negotiation with 
Nasser until the decree had been revoked. 'Britain and France 
with or without America should present an ultimatum to Egypt 
with a time limit attached to it'.5* The economic sanctions 
(freezing Egypt's sterling reserves; and blocking the Suez 
Canal Company's assets) were insufficient - the example of 
Europe's failure to bring Mussolini to heel after the 
Abyssinian war was cited. Stronger measures were needed. 
While it was the government's duty to determine exactly what 
these should be,59 armed force, in this case, was fully
55 Fell letter, Times 2.8.56
56 Hinchingbrooke speech, reported in Dorset Daily Echo 3.10.56
57 Killeam letter, Times 4.8.56
58 Hinchingbrooke, 2.8.56, HC Deb.557.1640
59 Amery letter, Times 30.7.56
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justified. Bolstered by its contacts with French politicians, 
who saw this as their chance to confront Nasser60, the Suez 
Group was intent on preventing any capitulation to 
transatlantic pressure.61 It was well aware that the American 
administration in a Presidential election year could not 
tolerate anything which might lead to war, let alone defend 
Britain's oil interests and her lifeline with the Empire, but 
the Suez Group had no doubts that Britain could act 
independently in her traditional sphere of influence62: 
Nasser 'must be taken down a peg or two', and Britain and 
France were the ones to do it.63 'It is really a question of 
whether the government has the necessary willpower.'64
(a) The Influence of the Suez Group upon the Conservative 
Party:
Kenneth Love suggests that 'the rebels had no official 
standing and little organization'.65 This is inaccurate. The 
Suez Group was united by a firm sense of purpose, held regular 
closed meetings, and many of its members occupied key 
positions within the backbench structure of the party. 
Ministers were very concerned about the critics' activities: 
'It was not just what they might do, it was what they were 
doing! They effectively converted the Prime Minister to their 
point of view.'66 Although the Suez Group was unable to keep
60 Amery to Waterhouse 3.8.56, Waterhouse papers
61 Many feared an ignominious conclusion to the affair - see Harold Nicolson: Diaries 
and Letters, 1945-62, p.306
62 see Hinchingbrooke, 2.8.56, HC Deb.557.1640
63 Hinchingbrooke, reported in Dorset Daily Echo 27.9.56
64 Amery to Waterhouse 3.8.56, Waterhouse papers
65 Suez: The Twice Fought War (London 1969), p.401
66 Sir Anthony Nutting
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'bellicosity on the boil' once the House had risen, the 
cumulative effect of its political sabre rattling raised 
Conservative backbench expectations of a swift and crushing 
diplomatic victory.67
Throughout the protracted crisis, the Whips paid close 
attention68 to its meetings and those attending. A young 
backbencher curious about the brouhaha, joined one such 
meeting at the Carlton Club. His innocent inquiry of 'why was 
it all so secret since surely the Whips had a good notion of 
the goings on' was quelled by a terse 'Shut up!' from one of 
the Group's leaders. 'But I was right, for when we came out 
of the room, there in an armchair at the end of the corridor 
sat one of the senior Whips, ostentatiously holding a copy of 
the Times in front of his face. He had, however, cut a large 
hole in the middle of the paper, and was busy writing down 
names as we came out'.69
The Suez Group no longer represented a minority view within 
the party. Its demands for resolute action received 
widespread support? the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee commented, 'I would prefer a government supported by 
pashas or bandits to what we have got now, this Nasser 
fellow'.70 At least five officers and members of the 1922 
executive in 1956 were privately sympathetic to the Suez 
Group's views: Morrison, Charles Ian Orr- Ewing, Alan Green, 
Vere Harvey, and Legge-Bourke. In addition, the Suez Group 
had now grown well beyond its original number, who harboured 
'latter-day imperialist thoughts'71. It was now approximately
67 Economist 8.8.56 and 18.8.56
68 Sir Richard Thompson
69 Private information
70 Sir Charles Mott-Radclyffe
71 Sir David Price interview with author
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100 strong (out of a total of 345 Conservative MPs); the new 
adherents 'did not necessarily respond to some of the Suez 
Group's vibrations, but felt in terms of defence they were 
right'.72 Nor were the Suez Group MPs seen as political 
pariahs, indulged for their eccentricity and outdated view of 
the world. The national press was united in its indignation 
at Nasser's 'grab', apart from the Manchester Guardian.73
Although some political observers did not regard the entire 
party as seduced by the Suez Group's rhetoric74, the Group's 
views had acquired a remarkable reverberation.75 The danger 
Nasser posed was felt to be greater by 'middle and older 
generations,76 the inheritors of an imperial sense of military 
geography and an experience of a Middle East in which Britain 
held positions of power and influence' - a sense that Nasser 
was upsetting the natural order of things. There remained a 
residue of their guilt in accepting the appeasement of 
dictators in the 1930s which spurred some pre-war MPs into a 
determination not to countenance appeasement again in any 
form. However, the sense of the critical danger Nasser posed 
to the West, and to Britain and her imperial possessions in 
particular, was not confined to Tories over 40. 'In the 1950s 
on the backbenches there were far more aspiring Foreign 
Secretaries, than Chancellors or Defence Ministers! Most had 
been in the forces, and this had marked them.'77
72 Sir David Price
73 28.7.56
74 see Economist 18.8.56
75 see Alfred Bossom letter, Times 10.8.56
76 Iverach MacDonald: History of the Times 1939-1966 (London 1984), p.260
77 Sir David Price
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(b) The Influence of the Suez Group upon Eden:
Although the extent to which Eden was bent on a vengeful war 
from the outset is disputed78, Eden was determined that Nasser 
should be humiliated as publicly as possible. Importantly, 
backbench pressure for a firm line came not just from the Suez 
Group and their allies within the party. Nigel Nicolson 
reported to his father that 'most Tories are breathing fire 
and slaughter against the Egyptians'.79 'After Suez, we 
became the party'80 may seem an exaggeration, but to a very 
great extent the Suez Group had educated the party to accept 
that something now had to be done.81
Although Eden's first statement on the Suez question in the 
House was measured, he soon appeared to be swept up by the hue 
and cry.82 Selwyn Lloyd had privately sought the Suez Group's 
endorsement of his 'extremely strong statement' before his 
address to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 31 July 1956.83 
The enthusiastic backbench reception of this belligerent 
message was of crucial importance in the hardening of Eden's 
rhetoric.84 Although the Prime Minister was initially 'much
78 Nutting vs Iverach MacDonald
79 Harold Nicolson: Diaries, pp.306-7
80 Lord Amery
81 120-130 MPs attended the MES-C on 30.7.56. ’Every speaker supported our general 
view. No one indicated dissent at all’. Waterhouse note ’Events Following Canal Seizure’ 
3.8.56, Waterhouse papers.
82 see Eden, 2.8.56, HCDeb.557.1602-1608
83 Lambton (Selwyn Lloyd’s PPS)/Waterhouse conversation before FAC meeting. 
Waterhouse notes 3.8.56, Waterhouse papers
84 William Clark: From Three Worlds (London 1986), p. 167; Harold Nicolson: Diaries, 
pp.306-7
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disturbed ... and thought Selwyn Lloyd had gone too far'85, 
thereafter Eden certainly gave the impression in party 
meetings that he was determined to 'have a go at Nasser' to 
achieve a crushing victory. One young backbencher, 'catching 
sight of the look in Eden's eye', came to the immediate 
conclusion that Britain would be embroiled in a war over Suez 
by mid-August and he hurriedly changed his holiday plans to 
avoid the Eastern Mediterranean.86
The Suez Group's behaviour prevented the party from cooling 
down sufficiently to let Eden climb back down to a position 
which gave him more room to manoeuvre.87 As Eden had little 
contact with his backbenchers, either before or after the 
crisis erupted, '[this] distance strengthened the influence of 
our dissident group'.88 By the end of August some political 
insiders thought the Prime Minister would listen to calmer 
counsels and might succeed in finessing his belligerent 
supporters.89 But the political pressure was on Eden to avoid 
any suggestion that he might be compelled to negotiate for a 
long time.90 The strain on the Prime Minister was beginning 
to tell.91 There was mounting restiveness among the 
reservists whose morale was plummeting; and impatience in 
sections of the press and Conservative party was hardening, 
with calls for immediate action and renewed talk of indecision
85 Eden/Raikes conversation in the division lobby, 31.7.56: Waterhouse notes 3.8.56, 
Waterhouse papers
86 John Baldock
87 Economist 11.8.56
88 Sir Richard Body
89 Williams ed: Gaitskell, p.587
90 Economist 18.8.56
91 Clark, p. 178
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at the top.®2 Amery was actively hawking the slogan: 'Either 
Nasser, or Eden, must go before October'.®3 Faced with the 
prospect of protracted negotiations which might not achieve 
the desired end, or one that could be sold to the party as a 
triumph for Britain, by the end of August Eden was pressing 
Cabinet for immediate decision on the use of force if Nasser 
refused to accept the internationalization of the Canal.94 
Selwyn Lloyd relayed Eden's intention to 'go through with it' 
to Hinchingbrooke, with the warning that 'there would be some 
diplomatic diversions to gain time, which we must not 
misunderstand' .®5
The Suez Group in Temporary Eclipse: September 1956
The Suez Group were confident at the beginning of September 
that the government was 'still firm', much encouraged by the 
landing of French troops in Cyprus. 'There comes a point of 
no return in military preparations and we may be fairly close 
to it already. All the same ... [Eden] will need more nerve 
than he has shown hitherto if he is to act in what is by now 
rather cold blood.'®6 The Suez Group still regarded getting 
rid of Nasser of equal importance to getting a satisfactory 
solution to the Canal problem, underwritten by a Anglo-French 
force permanently stationed in the Zone. 'There is always a 
danger that Nasser will climb down, I cannot help thinking 
the only surrender we could now accept would be too 
humiliating for him to survive. But plainly this is the 
danger and one on which we cannot count much on America.'
92 Robert Rhodes James: Anthony Eden, p.510
93 Williams ed: Gaitskell, p.588
94 Clark, p. 180
95 Hinchingbrooke to Waterhouse 28.8.56, Waterhouse papers
96 Amery to Waterhouse 3.9.56, Waterhouse papers
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Much to Amery's amusement 'the Foreign Office have suddenly 
discovered they have no friends among the anti-Nasser forces 
and have accordingly come, slightly cap in hand, to me of all 
people to help'. Amery put them in touch with the opposition 
in Cairo.97 He undoubtedly knew MI6 had concluded 
assassinating Nasser would make him a martyr? instead it was 
hoped an Anglo-French military operation against Nasser would 
arouse so much popular discontent that dissident Egyptian 
officers and politicians could seize power. With Britain and 
France in charge of the Canal and a new Egyptian government, 
the prospects of 'a new plan' for the Canal looked rosy.98
The Suez Group's hopes of Eden's resolve were soon 'belied by 
events'.99 The failure of the Menzies' mission100 was not 
followed by the desired British action against Nasser; instead 
there were renewed cross-party demands101 for Britain to take 
the dispute to the Security Council. The Suez Group was 
firmly opposed to this102 and was already discussing an 
amendment for the party conference 'should we need one'.103 
Initial pleasure over the Suez Canal Users Association104 
(SCUA) as the opportunity for 'an incident ... of sufficient 
size to justify dramatic action'106 with America's backing,
97 Amery to Waterhouse 3.9.56, Waterhouse papers
98 Amery, in Scott Lucas, p. 193-4
99 Amery to Waterhouse 18.9.56, Waterhouse papers
100 3-9.9.56 to persuade Nasser to accept the proposals of the London Conference for the 
internationalization of the Canal.
101 PRO.PREM11/1123 Oliver Poole to Eden 29.8.56; Fraser to Poole 11.9.56
102 Lawrence Turner to Biggs-Davison 7.9.56, Biggs-Davison papers; PRO.PREM11/1123 
Poole to Eden 29.8.56
103 Biggs-Davison to Amery 5.9.56, Biggs-Davison papers
104 proposed by Dulles on 10.9.56.
105 Paul Williams letter to his constituency chairman 2.9.56, Williams papers
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rapidly gave way to disgust: when he saw news of Dulles' press 
conference on the tape, Amery exclaimed, 'We've been double 
crossed!'106 With SCUA rendered bankrupt, there were renewed 
calls for recourse to the UNO, an organization for which the 
Suez Group had scant respect.107 It was convinced that any 
claim by the UNO to superior moral authority was nullified by 
the membership of nations who openly flouted international 
convention. The consequence would undoubtedly be a Russian 
veto108 - whereupon Britain would be faced either with not 
acting at all, or acting in default of a Security Council 
mandate, which would contravene international law. The UNO 
was failing to measure up to the needs of a grave situation, 
therefore Britain should not be constrained from taking 
independent action: 'Hitler was not stopped by the League, but 
by the will of free nations.'109
The Suez Group made its opposition plain in the 1922 
Committee, fearing the matter would become bogged down in a 
mire of legal language and irresolution. But it lost this 
round: when faced with the pressure from the 'wet' wing of the 
party, Eden 'failed to give leadership' and agreed to take the 
matter to the Security Council. This 'went much too far for 
the Suez Group'110 but little could be done to promote a 
belligerent policy before the party conference.111 'The
military plan has apparently been changed and no effective 
action can be taken for several weeks; 4-5 weeks is the figure 
I heard today ... I hear the Jordanians are already asking us 
to withdraw from air bases there. I also had an indication
106 Lord Amery
107 Poole to Eden 29.8.56
108 Turner to Biggs-Davison 7.9.56
109 Donald Mcl. Johnson, Henry Kerby and Robert Crouch letter, Times 18.9.56
110 Churchill, p.252-3
111 Amery to Biggs-Davison, Biggs-Davison papers
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from the French side that they are beginning to despair. If 
the rot sets in Paris it will spread very quickly.'112
The Suez Group in Ascent:
(a) The Party Conference
'The general malaise which followed the abortive September 
debate fuelled Eden's difficulties with the backbenches who 
felt he had lost his touch.'113 The pretexts for military 
force seemed to be slipping away. It was becoming clear that, 
contrary to all expectations, Egyptian pilots could run the 
Canal. Nasser appeared to be getting away with his theft.
The Suez Group was determined to act to prevent the issue 
going 'off the boil'. With Parliament in recess until 23 
October 1956, the party conference was the obvious venue. The 
government was on the defensive in foreign and domestic 
policy, with the party restless and impatient, and widely 
reported to be so,114 while the Labour party was 'in buoyant 
spirits' under its newly elected leader, Hugh Gaitskell. The 
clear undercurrent at Llandudno was that unless the government 
could pursue policies that were 'distinctly Conservative'115, 
Labour was going to win the next election.116 Therefore 
Conservative unity behind the government was of vital 
importance.117
112 Amery to Waterhouse 18.9.56, Waterhouse papers
113 Lord Watkinson
114 eg Economist 29.9.56
115 Times 11.10.56
116 Economist 13.10.56
117 Times 11.10.56
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To halt backsliding by their front bench and in defiance of 
the Chief Whip118, Waterhouse and Amery, ably abetted by 
Angus Maude, drew up an addendum which 'put teeth' into the 
original anodyne resolution in the foreign policy debate, put 
forward by crypto-members of the Suez Group.119 This 
addendum which was accepted (in itself an extraordinary 
occurrence) immediately120, pledged support for a solution 
'designed to ensure international control of the canal in 
accordance with the proposals of the London conference'. In 
the debate Waterhouse's robust message that at all costs and 
by all means Nasser's aggression must be resisted and defeated 
met with his audience's wholehearted approval. Amery's 
explicit warning to Eden received an equally enthusiastic 
reception: 'If the discussions at the Security Council do not 
bring Nasser to his senses, then I believe the process of 
negotiation will be exhausted. Every day strengthens the 
Soviet grip on the Middle East.' Any further compromise would 
mean surrender. Amery too played upon Conservative resentment 
of Dulles: 'We must go forward with American approval if we 
can get it, without it if they withhold it, and against their 
wishes if need be.' The debate was televised which provided 
a further fillip for the Suez Group's cause.
(b) The Impact of the Suez Group upon the Cabinet:
(i) at the Party Conference:
The Suez Group's concerted effort at Llandudno was crucial in 
the Prime Minister's later decision to use force. Eden saw 
the possibility of a triumph over Nasser had receded now the
118 Lord Amery
119 Churchill, pp.260-1
120 Times 12.10.56
dispute had been taken to the UNO.121 While the party 
conference was proceeding, the Foreign Secretary was 
negotiating in New York with the Egyptian Foreign Minister? 
and Selwyn Lloyd, whose own instinct was for a diplomatic 
solution122, was sending optimistic telegrams about the 
prospect of a negotiated settlement.123 Eden, who remained 
convinced in the very last resort action would be 
necessary124, was increasingly fearful that Britain's 
position was being eroded.125 Egypt appeared confident the 
crisis was 'burnt out'? therefore it was imperative that 'we 
should not be inveigled away in negotiations with the 
fundamentals to which we have held all along'.126 He was 
insistent that Britain 'should not be parted from the 
French' .127
The Cabinet plainly hoped to regain the initiative from the 
Suez Group which was riding on the crest of the wave. Butler 
and Lennox-Boyd were closely involved in the Chief Whip's 
frantic manoeuvres to reduce the impact of the Suez Group's 
addendum.128 Whatever the later debate over Nutting's 
integrity, his speech129 'left little, if anything for the
121 Sir Anthony Nutting interview with Richard Lamb: The Failure of the Eden 
Government (London 1987), p.228
122 Sir Anthony Nutting in Lamb, p.228
123 see PRO.PREM11/1102
124 PR0.PREM11/1102 Eden to Selwyn Lloyd telegram T.440/56 7.10.56
125 PRO.PREM11/1102 Eden to Selwyn Lloyd T.445/56 8.10.56
126 Eden to Selwyn Lloyd 7.10.56
127 PRO.PREM11/1102 Eden to Selwyn Lloyd telegrams 7.10.56 and 12.10.56
128 Waterhouse notes on ’Suez Canal Comings and Goings at the Conservative Conference 
16.10.56’, Waterhouse papers
129 Nutting delivered Salisbury’s speech, the text of which was cleared by the Cabinet 
beforehand.
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Suez Group to say against the Government'.130 However, this 
proved a high-risk approach. 'The conference ... permitted 
the party's fretful to blow off steam' but the audience's 
support of the Suez Group's strident rhetoric from the 
platform created the fear in the minds of many in the Cabinet 
that if the government did not act on the brave words uttered 
by ministers at the conference, these would be shown up as 
'rhetorical verbiage'.131 Eden did nothing to defuse the 
charged atmosphere at Llandudno. The Prime Minister, who had 
just risen from his sick bed, wound up the conference on 13 
October 1956 with a pugnacious speech.132 To tremendous 
applause, he echoed Nutting's commitment that the government 
meant business and 'will stand firm'. He concluded that 
Britain would continue her military preparations in the 
Eastern Mediterranean: 'I have always said force is the last 
resort, but it cannot be excluded'. The day after the end of 
the conference, Eden received a deputation from General Challe 
and Acting Foreign Minister, Albert Gazier.
(ii) upon Eden: the French Siren 'Marianne':
The importance of the French government's links with the Suez 
Group cannot be exaggerated. The French feared Eden would 
weaken and not seek the desired confrontation with Nasser133, 
leaving France isolated.134 The Foreign Minister, Pineau, 
had long argued Britain and France should press ahead firmly 
on their 'chosen path' - military action against Nasser by no 
later than the end of October;135 talking to the Americans
130 Nutting: No End of a Lesson, p. 82
131 Selwyn Lloyd: Suez 1956, p. 191
132 Times 15.10.56
133 see PRO.PREM11/1102 Eden to Lord Privy Seal T.415/56 27.9.56
134 The French-Israeli military operation was dependent upon British logistical support.
135 ’They allege the weather will preclude it later.’ PRO.PREM11/1102 Eden telegram 
to Lord Privy Seal T.415/56 27.9.56
- 369 -
was a waste of time as 'they will never authorize any action 
likely to prove the fall of Nasser at any rate until after the 
US presidential elections'.136 Throughout the crisis Guy 
Mollet, the French Prime Minister, maintained contact with 
Amery who was also aware of the French contacts with 
Israel137 and had long kept in very close touch with the 
Israeli Ambassador in London. 'Amery was remarkably well 
informed, as the Israelis through their own intelligence 
network were aware of top level exchanges between Russia and 
America, and passed all this on to their man in London.'138 
Just before the conference Mollet urged Amery to keep up the 
pressure on Eden at the Party Conference 'as it may be our 
last chance to fuel the fire'.139
Therefore it was a question of national and international 
pressure working in close communion on Eden whose judgment was 
affected by the strain of overwork, poor health, and a highly 
strung temperament. The Suez Group had educated the party to 
the point that after Nasser had grabbed the Canal something 
had to be done. The August recess had provided 'a breathing 
space for the government',140 and inevitably had taken steam 
out of the issue. The rebels' role at the party conference 
was all-important in re-injecting this steam into public 
debate when the issue was 'going cold'141 and in 
demonstrating that the party as a whole would not accept 
anything that smacked of retreat. 'Their accumulated criticism 
did, therefore, have an effect on Eden.'142
136 PRO.PREMll/llOO Sir Gladwyn Jebb telegram to Foreign Office No.295, 9.9.56
137 Lord Amery
138 Arthur Gavshon
139 Lord Amery
140 Lord Amery
141 Lord Amery
142 Sir Edward Du Cann
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Eden's own beliefs would have made him more susceptible to the 
Suez Group's arguments: he was personally less inclined than 
Churchill to work to secure American co-operation in all 
areas.143 Like the Suez Group,144 Eden was concerned at the 
extent of Soviet infiltration in the Middle East, and believed 
that there was an alternative government to Nasser.145 And 
the pressure on Eden for a tough stance was strong: from the 
Suez Group; from Mollet and Pineau? from Clarissa Eden, who 
was 'eager that Eden should assert himself against the 
calumnies of Conservative newspapers and drawing rooms that he 
was a man of straw'? and from the pressure of his memories of 
the First and Second World Wars.146 Personal factors were 
involved: given the 'rocky autumn',147 the bumpy spring and 
the warning of the Tonbridge by-election, it was inevitable 
the Prime Minister should be concerned about the reception of 
his actions on the benches behind him, quite apart from his 
own hyper-sensitivity to criticism. Eden's leadership of the 
party was not yet seriously in question, but he would not have 
been human if he had remained impervious to the rip current of 
opinion within the party.
By 16 October Eden had opted for war. 'If it had not been for 
the Suez Group, Eden would have hesitated for a long time 
before he undertook such a dangerous manoeuvre.'148 Despite 
Selwyn Lloyd's encouraging telegrams, Eden was faced with the 
stark prospect of undoubtedly protracted and possibly 
inconclusive negotiations; weighing very heavily in the scales 
was his knowledge, gained first hand at Llandudno, that his
143 witness his willingness to oppose American action in Guatemala in July 1954.
144 Amery to Waterhouse 14.6.56, Waterhouse papers
145 Scott Lucas, p. 101
146 Hugh Thomas, Sunday Times 4.9.66
147 Sir Anthony Nutting
148 Sir Anthony Kershaw
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party as a whole would not accept a less vigorous policy. 
Indeed, the party conference probably appeared to confer a 
mandate for military action against Egypt, which the Cabinet 
had been most reluctant to seek in Parliament.149 To the 
increasingly ill Prime Minister, the French plan seemed 
miraculously to cut the Gordian knot.
(iii) on Macmillan:
The Suez Group also served to bolster the Chancellor's resolve 
at a critical time. In a private conversation with his 
son-in-law at the end of August,150 Macmillan expressed 
reservations about the wisdom of an alliance with Israel151 
and was upbraided by an irate Amery. The Chancellor's renewed 
determination to confront Nasser rendered him deaf to the 
crucial hints he received in Washington that his optimism of 
ultimate American benevolent neutrality was wildly misplaced; 
Macmillan assured Eden that 'Ike was really determined, 
somehow or other, to bring Nasser down'.152 In the view of 
his biographer, Alistair Horne, the effect of Macmillan's 
conviction that 'Ike would lie doggo' can hardly be 
exaggerated'.153 Macmillan threatened to resign in September 
unless the government played its hand 'to the end'. The 
feverish Eden had just returned from Paris where the French 
government was agitating for immediate action, and the 
Chancellor's hawkish views enjoyed the support of a third of 
the backbench party.
149 see PRO.PREM11/1099 Salisbury to Eden 9.8.56; CAB.CM CC(56)59 14.8.56 and 
Egypt Committee minutes 9.9.56. In both World Wars Britain had responded to an act of 
aggression.
150 recorded in Amery’s diary: Louis seminar on Eden and Suez, LSE, 1992
151 proposed to Eden by Macmillan in early August: Alistair Home: Macmillan 1894- 
1956, pp.400-401
152 PRO.PREM11/1102 Macmillan to Eden 26.9.56
153 Home, p.422
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Macmillan was also a rival for the premiership. Eden had 'a 
very deep distrust of Macmillan' and their rivalry, especially 
since 1953, had been a very important factor in their 
relationship.154 The ill-disguised menace of the Suez Group 
for Eden155 was that it would not have to look far for a 
satisfactory replacement. It was recognized in political 
circles that should Macmillan put himself at the Suez Group's 
head he would pose a potentially lethal threat to Eden's 
authority in Cabinet; thus Macmillan did not need to take any 
such crude action. This could not fail to influence Eden's 
assessment of the options open to him.
The Suez Group and Operation Musketeer:
Although the Suez Group had no official knowledge of British 
collusion with the French and the Israelis, its members 
certainly had a very fair idea of what was in the wind. 
Mollet, the French Premier, had assured Amery a week or two 
before the invasion 'it is going to be alright. We are going 
ahead, America will be intolerable but if we see it through, 
not only will Britain and France benefit. If we can win 
against America and Russia, I will make a good European of 
your Anthony Eden yet!'156
Amery continued to question Eden's resolve to obtain and, if 
necessary, impose a satisfactory solution to the Canal crisis 
- that is, 'one that gets rid of Nasser'.157 Determined 'we 
cannot go on giving the government a blank cheque', he was
154 Lord Carr
155 see Macmillan diary 13.9.56, in Horne, p.416-417
156 Lord Amery
157 Amery to Waterhouse 29.10.56, Waterhouse papers
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debating with Waterhouse158 the best means to increase party 
pressure on Eden when Eden announced the Anglo-French 
ultimatum to Israel and Egypt on 30 October. The Suez Group 
was jubilant at the outcome. Fears that Britain's standing in 
the Middle East had been weakened to the point that Jordan 
might demand a immediate revision of the Anglo-Jordanian 
treaty and Britain's withdrawal from bases there, her ally, 
Nuri, murdered or even revolution in Khartoum,159 were 
forgotten. 'The Suez Group's policy is at last accepted. Here 
is our great chance to restore our position in the Middle East 
and build for the future.'160 Britain and France in 
possession of the Canal would be able to make satisfactory 
terms for both the future regime of the Canal, and the 
establishment of an international, or better still, an Anglo- 
French base to police the area and prevent future hostilities 
between Israel and Egypt.161
Eden's announcement of an Anglo-French intervention received 
most Conservatives' hearty endorsement.162 Immediately 
before the Israeli attack on Egypt, there had been 
Conservative fears that the Tripartite Declaration could 
result in Britain fighting Jordan in a future Middle Eastern 
conflict (which appeared imminent), or even with Egypt against 
Iraq;163 Britain was now fighting the 'right' war. Many, who 
were fed up with the humiliations, had little time for 
niceties? they wanted Nasser toppled and 'our' canal back. 
'Eden striking a blow for world order. Nasser had to be 
checked - it was important for the whole trading world and the
158 Amery to Waterhouse 29.10.56
159 Amery to Waterhouse 29.10.56
m Amery diary entry 1.11.56, quoted in Louis seminar, Eden and Suez, LSE 1992
161 Amery, in Troen and Shemesh ed., p. 121
162 Harold Nicolson: Diaries, p.312
163 see Longden, FAC 29.11.56
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continued threats to the new state of Israel were 
intolerable'.164 'We asked ourselves, when was the last time 
the Egyptian Army won an engagement? It was the second act of 
Aida.'165 Resolutions of support for Eden's policy were 
flooding into Central Office, as were letters from
constituents and Labour voters.166 Once the expedition was
launched, the military operation held a cross-party appeal. 
'That weekend I went round the some of the pubs of my
constituency [Hendon North]. Life-long Labour supporters were 
coming up to me saying, "I'm against the Tories, but you're 
right on this one. We know these Gyppos". Of course they 
were all ex-8th Army, and had no respect for Egyptians'.167 
'Their jingoism was coloured by a general feeling, a hangover 
from the last War, that the Egyptians should be thumped 
regularly.'168 Others attributed constituency support to
more of a visceral reaction - 'Our boys are in danger' - 
rather than a thinking response.169 The widespread
antipathy to Dulles reinforced this further: 'anything which 
simultaneously hit Nasser for six, and Dulles for six, must be 
good'.170
Whatever their private doubts about the morality of the 
venture,171 Tories were scornful of Labour's arguments: 
letting 'things rip until the UNO could intervene' was seen as 
both unrealistic and impractical. It was glaringly obvious
164 Sir Bernard Braine
165 Sir Reginald Bennett
166 Lord Amery
167 Lord Orr-Ewing
168 Sir Anthony Kershaw
169 Lord Watkinson
170 Nigel Nicolson in Thompson, p. 141
171 Godfrey Nicholson, FAC 21.11.56
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that the UNO could not assemble a force immediately, quite 
apart from the problems of language and channels of command. 
The sceptics accepted the Suez Group's arguments that Britain 
and France had the base and all the necessary equipment, and 
concluded 'those who pretend a UNO force would function 
effectively as a fire brigade conveniently forget that the 
first object of any fire brigade is to deal with the fire 
before it gets out of control'.172 However, the sceptics 
questioned the aims of the military operation? if it was just 
to secure the Canal, they doubted whether Nasser would 
necessarily fall - which would in turn reproduce all the old 
problems which had let to the 1954 agreement. 'If, on the 
other hand, the objective was to topple Nasser, this could 
only [be] achieved by a direct onslaught on Cairo and 
Alexandria'173 - an argument with which both the Suez and 
Anti-Suez MPs agreed.174 MPs on all sides were well aware 
that continued political support for Eden was dependent upon 
a quick and overwhelming success against Egypt.175 The 
initially strong Conservative support eroded when it was 
realised just how long the military operation would take.176 
The lack of information was immensely frustrating. It rapidly 
became apparent to the backbenchers that even a sizeable 
proportion of the government were equally in the dark.177 
All the signs were that Eden was running a very personal 
policy,178 although this was not in fact the case.179
172 Charles Mott-Radclyffe: Foreign Body in the Eye, p.225
173 Mott-Radclyffe, p.224
174 Sir David Price
175 Sir Gilbert Longden interview; Christopher Hollis in Punch 7.11.56
176 Sir Anthony Kershaw
177 Mott-Radcliffe, p.222
178 Economist 3.11.56
179 see David Carlton: Anthony Eden, and Louis seminar, LSE
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All wanted a rapid conclusion to the crisis.180 '90% of the 
party were ex-services'181 and the incompetence was 
baffling.182 Sensing support for Eden was slipping away, 
the Suez Group stepped up its pressure. But the support of 
the Suez Group and its sympathizers and the growing impatience 
of the French government (who had given up all concern with 
appearances and wanted to launch an attack on the Canal with 
open Israeli support) could not match the heavy artillery 
trained upon the beleaguered Eden. He was under mounting 
pressure to stop from all sides - from the White House, in the 
United Nations, from the Commonwealth, from Labour MPs whose 
sustained vitriolic attack on the Prime Minister created 
tumultuous scenes in the House, and from within his own party.
The Influence of the Suez Group: Cease-fire to Withdrawal
(a) On the Conservative Party
The Suez Group were aghast at the cease-fire on 6 November, a 
'fiasco not through lack of power, but lack of guts. Eden 
[had] left the war unfinished to satisfy his pacific 
critics'.183 'Another 48 hours and we would ... have toppled 
Nasser and seen the emergence of a new [pro-Western] Egyptian 
regime ... [This] would have offered a new treaty over the 
Canal and the whole question of the base would have been up 
for discussion again.'184 Indeed most Tories were first
180 Mott-Radclyffe, p.222
181 Sir Edward Du Cann
182 Sir Anthony Kershaw
183 Hinchingbrooke speech on BBC Northern Region February 1957
184 Amery in Troen and Shemesh ed., p. 120-121
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stunned and then infuriated by Eden's capitulation.185 
Having had the audacity to take such a terrific gamble, and 
having withstood the venom of the Labour party, Eden had then 
not had the courage to see the venture through. 'We thought 
the whole thing was thoroughly botched. Churchill's comment: 
"I would never have dared ..." was doing the rounds.'186 For 
the Suez Group, Eden's abrupt departure to Jamaica on 23 
November 1956 sealed his fate.
It had not occurred to the Suez Group that America would throw 
a spanner in the works. Perhaps their inside knowledge of 
MI6's liaison with the CIA in the coup which ousted Mossadeq 
had lulled them into a mistaken belief that America accepted 
the legitimacy of force, whereas America, hypocritically, drew 
a distinction between covert and overt action.187 They 
certainly thought Jewish domestic pressure would muzzle 
America,188 and Amery was undoubtedly aware of his father-in- 
law's conviction, following conversations with American 
officials in late September, that 'Ike would lie doggo'. 
There had been no thought that Britain would, or could, be 
constrained in the Middle East.189
The Suez Group continued to meet190 and prepare its strategy. 
Having concluded that 'while America regarded Britain as a 
major ally in Europe against the threat of Soviet expansion, 
they were equally concerned to destroy the British 
Commonwealth and Empire' and break British predominance in the 
Middle East, these MPs became increasingly anti-American, even
185 Economist 8.11.56
186 Sir Anthony Kershaw
187 Diane Kunz: The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Raleigh 1991), p.33
188 see Churchill, p.296
189 see Amery’s Llandudno speech, Times 11.10.56
190 Lord Amery
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to the extent of 'informal contacts with Russian 
representatives, to try to persuade Moscow that a British and 
French presence in the Middle East was preferable to an 
American take over of these areas'.191 Now intent on keeping 
British troops on the Canal, either independently or as part 
of the UNO force, the critics' clamour was for British 
provision for clearing the Canal, an international settlement 
of the Canal dispute and a resolution of the Arab/Israeli 
conflict.192
Having 'hi-jacked' the Prime Minister, the Suez Group now 
appeared to do the same to the party.193 Despite warnings 
in the press,194 most Tories had thought that the Americans 
would be 'benevolent neutrals'195 in the Anglo-French action. 
'We agreed with the Suez Group that the humiliation of being 
'seen off' by the Egyptians was appalling'.196 Most Tories 
felt cheated by Washington,197 even those who had harboured 
doubts about military intervention.198 The Whips' initial 
fears of embittered Conservatives abstaining in the crucial 
vote of confidence on 8 November did not materialize, but 
press speculation of a revolt grew as the Suez Group tapped 
Tory disgust at Washington's policy. At first backbench 
opinion attributed American antipathy to Dulles - 'We all said 
that this would not have happened if Eisenhower were
91 Amery in Troen and Shemesh ed., p. 119
92 Amery, FAC 7.11.56
93 Sir Anthony Nutting
94 see Economist 11.8.56
95 Robert Allan in Thompson, p. 145
96 Sir Reginald Bennett
97 Sir Bernard Braine
9S Sir Gilbert Longden
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alive'199 - but with Dulles incapacitated after an operation 
for stomach cancer, the unpalatable truth dawned that 
Eisenhower was intent on forcing a British withdrawal.
It was the prospect of an ignominious unconditional withdrawal 
which 'really excited the hostility of the Tory party ... Many 
of them were quite ready to see the UN come to Suez ... the 
difficulty was that the force was not strong, was not ready; 
it was not really competent and would come in very 
slowly'.200 This reinforced the sentiment that Eden 'had 
failed all along the line': the Canal was blocked and likely 
to remain so for weeks; Nasser was posing as a hero and 
martyr; Britain's oil supplies were severed and this country 
had not 'a friend in the world'.201 Nor were there 
guarantees 'that the Suez Canal will be cleared and maintained 
as an international waterway'.202 Conservative resentment of 
American policy203 had been festering since the early days of 
the crisis.204 The rumours that 'Ike' was threatening Eden 
with economic sanctions, and the 'hint of military 
sanctions'205 were enough to convince excitable 
Conservatives, already apoplectic at American behaviour in the 
UNO, of Washington's iniquity.206
'The ruling emotions of Tory backbenchers are an amalgam of
199 Sir Reginald Bennett
200 Butler in Thompson, p. 143
201 Harold Nicolson: Diaries, p.318
202 Times, reporting on FAC 21.11.56
203 Economist 10.11.56; see Peter Smithers letter, Times 12.12.56, Frederick Bennett 
letter, Times 14.12.56; FAC 14.11.56
204 Dudley Williams to Waterhouse undated.8.56, Waterhouse papers
205 Biggs-Davison private letter 3.1.57, Biggs-Davison papers
206 see Times 29.11.56
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all the emotions that make the worst counsellors - hurt 
national pride, a desire for party unity by those MPs who 
never wanted Britain to go in in the first place, but who are 
now more inclined to agree with the militants that there was 
more danger in getting out precipitously and the desperate 
urge of the militants to prove the military operation was in 
some way a success.'207 With the party in this mood, no 
political observer would predict what sort of compromise the 
government might be able to sell its disgruntled supporters. 
The Suez Group stalwarts, bolstered by reports from Wafdist 
sources which suggested 'if we hold on Nasser may crack'208 
were discussing resigning the party Whip; Heath was warned 
that they would feel compelled to do so if there was 'any 
withdrawal of British troops before the Canal was cleared and 
international control of the Canal has been established'.209 
Angus Maude210 warned of a massive Conservative revolt if 
Britain was 'humiliated, betrayed by her friends abroad, 
forced to crawl to the Americans for every drop of oil,' while 
Nasser triumphed. Outspoken constituency support for the 
rebels' stance211 removed much of the Whips' clout.
The danger of mutiny grew, manifest in the tabling by 112 
Conservatives of an EDM deploring the UNO resolution and the 
attitude of America. Sponsored by Sir Robert Grimston, 
Evelyn Emmet, Ian Horobin, Hinchingbrooke, Martin Lindsay and 
Angus Maude, the signatures came from both the Suez Group and 
'the larger body of members who represent moderate opinion
207 Economist 24.11.56
208 Amery to Waterhouse 26.11.56, Waterhouse papers
209 Hinchingbrooke to Heath 20.11.56; Williams to Heath, Biggs-Davison to Lennox 
Boyd: 21.11.56, Biggs-Davison papers
210 constituency speech 21.11.56
211 Lord Watkinson
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within the party7.212 Although Grimston was one of the core 
of the Suez Group, he was also a very loyal party man213 and 
former junior minister: the front bench knew he 7could be
relied upon to make a speech to rally MPs round when the 
government was in difficulty7.214 Other members of the Suez 
Group signed the EDM, but 7if [the Suez Group] alone had 
framed it the motion would have been in more extreme 
terms7.215 The sponsors had deliberately drafted by the 
motion to attract the widest possible support to increase its 
impact on the government. The list comprised approximately 
one third of the Government7s supporters,216 and represented 
an extraordinary cross-section of new members and old; of keen 
Europeans (Hughes Hallet, Longden) and ardent advocates of 
Empire (Braine, Fisher); and of members (Langford-Holt, 
Vaughan-Morgan, Peyton, Linstead), 7who prided themselves on 
their rugged independence of thought7.217 Pickthorn, a 
member of the Suez Group in 1953-54, had had profound doubts 
about the wisdom of acting with the Israelis for fear that it 
would antagonise the entire Arab world.218 It was an
extraordinary manifestation of the upsurge in anti-American 
feeling within the party, and lent credence to Maude7s threat 
of a massive revolt over withdrawal.
At approximately the same time Geoffrey Rippon, Sandys7s PPS 
and the most youthful member of the 1922 executive committee, 
put down a motion recommending that Britain should default on
Times 28.11.56
He had been absent from the vote on the Heads of Agreement in July 1954.
Sir Anthony Kershaw
Times editorial 29.11.56
Daily Telegraph 28.11.56; Times 29.11.56
Sir Reginald Bennett
MES-C 29.11.56
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the US loan. 'I got over 100 signatures. I was called to see 
a Treasury minister who made me withdraw it. Julian [Amery] 
was furious: my motion had been chosen for Friday's
adjournment debate and we could have had approximately 100 
Tories standing up calling for reneging on the US loan. I 
withdrew because of government pressure - that did me a bit of 
good with Macmillan: "That young man knows when to make a
point but knows when to withdraw”.'219 Amery was so incensed 
at this pressure that he approached Sandys (Minister of 
Housing and Local Government) urging him to consider resigning 
and leading a reconstructed Government. 'Duncan's reaction was 
sphinx-like.'220
Matters appeared to have reached a crisis during the weekend 
of 1/2 December: 'Is there a Tory Revolt? Yes says Hinch. No 
says Heald'.221 The impression was overwhelmingly of a party 
'confused and disunited'222, compounded by rebels' speeches 
in their constituencies warning Britain could 'become the 
lackey of the US and the whipping boy of the UN'223, the 49th 
state224 and that if a decision to withdraw was taken by the 
Government, 'the Conservative party will be split from top to 
bottom'.225 The government's future was indeed at stake.226 
In the end, the Suez Group were unable to maintain the support 
of the majority of their backbench colleagues. Following the
219 Lord Rippon. In the event there was an agreed deferment of a payment on the 
American loan.
220 Lord Amery
221 Daily Mail 1.12.56
222 Times 1.12.56
223 Paul Williams, quoted in Times 1.12.56
224 Gerald Nabarro
225 Hinchingbrooke, reported in Times 1.12.56
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'bitter pill' of the announcement of withdrawal on 3 December 
1956, there was febrile press speculation of a possible 
rebellion with estimates of the number of rebels ranging 
wildly from approximately 20227 to between 40-50.228 But, 
thanks to the herculean efforts of Heath, with the invaluable 
support of John Morrison, Chairman of the 1922, and other 
party grandees (Hurd, Guy Lloyd, and Legge-Bourke), the Suez 
Group's threatened schism did not materialize. 'The majority, 
brilliantly manoeuvred or alternatively cajoled by the Chief 
Whip with a sensibility for dealing with the Tory party and 
its coalition of awkward squads, held firm between the critics 
of the whole adventure and the critics of the cease-fire.'229 
The high profile of the Suez Group was not to everyone's 
taste? there was a feeling that these MPs 'were carrying 
things to extremes. They were a very self-conscious, publicity 
seeking crowd, who loved pontificating at press conferences 
and giving interviews.'230 Hinchingbrooke was forgiven 
everything, but some saw in such people as Paul Williams and 
John Biggs-Davison 'too much of glint of satisfaction in their 
eye as they were tearing the party to pieces. And the press 
were loving it.'231
Opposition jeers at Conservative discomfort served to bring 
the party closer together. 232 A large-scale backbench revolt 
would only serve to wreck the government, letting in Labour. 
Although diehard Conservatives felt that a small majority
227 Sunday Express 2.12.56
228 Times 4.12.56. With the current majority of 58, if a dozen Tories voted against the 
government, it would survive comfortably, whereas if the larger number were to abstain it 
would be a much more serious matter: Sir Thomas Moore, 1922 6.12.56.
229 Peter Rawlinson: A Price Too High (1989), p.70-1
230 Sir Reginald Bennett
231 Sir Reginald Bennett
232 Times 4.12.56
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would 'hasten the reconstruction of the government, which they 
would welcome under a new Prime Minister',233 the prevailing 
Tory mood remained that there was no feasible alternative to 
withdrawal234; the only sensible way forward was for the 
Conservative backbenchers to back their leaders in pressing 
for effective UNO action. Heath reached a deal with the 
rebels235 and only a small number (15) abstained in the vital 
division, well aware that by the time the vote was taken their 
demonstration would not have serious consequences for the 
government236, as Waterhouse publicly admitted. Four of the 
original number dropped out, but three unexpectedly joined.
Julian Amery 
John Biggs-Davison 
Terence Clarke 
Anthony Fell 
Hinchingbrooke 
Ian Horobin 
Montgomery Hyde 
Patrick Maitland 
Angus Maude 
'Billy' McLean 
Gerald Nabarro 
William Teeling 
Lawrence Turner 
Charles Waterhouse 
Paul Williams
It was a much smaller group than that which had abstained in 
1954, and only contained one 1955 entrant, Biggs-Davison. 
These MPs were unrepentant and 'ostentatiously remained seated
233 Times 4.12.56
234 see Daily Telegraph 4.12.56
235 Andrew Roth: Heath and Heathmen, p . I l l
236 Economist 15.12.56
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during the division, which was thought to be very bad 
form'.237 Complete subjugation was too high a price to pay 
for American help, and the alliance could only continue on the 
basis of Britain being an equal partner. American policy 
amounted to the piecemeal breakup of the Commonwealth. To 
permit Nasser's victory was to assure a victory for 
communism.238
The vote marked the climax of the immediate political war over 
the Suez crisis. The mass of the party including all the 
'crypto-Suez men' trooped gloomily through the Government 
lobby.239 This was not because they viewed the government's 
performance any more favourably? they had come to the 
conclusion that 'any further action which demonstrated the 
government to be insecure, would have repercussions abroad and 
on the Chancellor's efforts to defend sterling, particularly 
with the pound under such heavy pressure'.240 Once the 
division was over, 'parliamentary tension expired like a 
punctured balloon'.241
(b) On Government Policy
Faced with American obduracy and threatened with schism on its 
backbenches, the Cabinet careered through November 1956 as 
'the driver of a fast car, with no eyes except for the next 
bend in the road'.242 The influence of the Suez Group on 
the content of government policy was negligible. Despite the
237 Paul Williams
238 Fell letter, Times 7.12.56
239 Economist 15.12.56
240 Times 6.12.56
241 Economist 15.12.56
242 Times editorial, 21.11.56
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backbench tumult, it became increasingly clear that the 
Cabinet had little choice but to withdraw.243 Britain was 
hoist on its own petard: having gone in ostensibly to separate 
the combatants, London could not change its stance now. 
Ministers came to the conclusion that Britain must capitulate 
to American demands. 244 'To sit at Port Said with a UN force 
and a blocked canal in front of you and the threat of oil 
sanctions behind you seems a high price to pay for the smiles 
of the Suez Group.'245 The most the Cabinet could offer its 
backbenchers was an assurance about the competence of the UNO 
force to discharge its tasks and the prospect of a very early 
start on clearing the canal along its whole length - the sop 
was to be the British naval task force under UN direction. 
Butler and his colleagues were relying upon backbench 
political hard-headedness and devoutly hoped that the rebels 
would not make life any more difficult by withholding their 
support. In the end, a British contribution to the UN force 
clearing the Canal was denied and there were no arrangements 
to settle the Arab/Israeli conflict nor to secure an 
international settlement for the Canal dispute. Nasser seemed 
to have triumphed.
However, the influence of the Suez Group on the government's 
presentation of policy was considerable. In his rearguard 
action against unremitting American pressure for a complete 
British withdrawal, Butler was obliged to tread extremely 
carefully. At one point Julian Ridsdale stressed to Robert 
Allan, Eden's PPS, 'For God's sake, don't let's fall out with 
the Americans', whereupon Allan pointed to Waterhouse and 
said, 'We have to take care of these people first'.246 
Heath also consulted the Suez Group for recommendations for
PRO.PREM11/1107 CAB CC(56)92 29.11.56
PRO.PREM11/1107 CAB CC(56)92 29.11.56
Birch to Butler, quoted in Howard: RAB, p.240
Sir Julian Ridsdale interview with author
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the replacement of Boyle as Economic Secretary and to discover 
whether Derek Walker-Smith had its support; Ian Harvey, who 
had supported the Suez venture, was promoted to Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Ministry of Supply.
The Cabinet was acutely aware that 'there would be an outburst 
of public indignation against the government if there were 
anything that smacked of a "scuttle”' from Egypt before the 
objectives of the original intervention had been reasonably 
achieved,247 which would 'seriously weaken the
government'.248 There were reports that approximately 70 MPs 
were seriously contemplating withdrawing their support if the 
government announced the withdrawal of British troops from 
Suez, which 'implied the demolition of what remained of a 
special British position in the Eastern Mediterranean and 
ultimately the whole of the Middle East'.249 Determined to 
'expose the smallest possible flank for criticism',250 the 
Cabinet decided that the interim statement to the House on 29 
November should be one of fact, not policy. 'If the immediate 
Parliamentary situation could be held in this way',251 a more 
detailed statement of policy could be deferred until Monday 3 
December, offering the opportunity for further approaches to 
the UN Secretary General and America for more definite 
undertakings252 - 'so as to strengthen the case for 
presentation to Conservative opinion here'.253 'The
government must be able to demonstrate that they had secured
247 Times 22.11.56; PRO.PREM11/1107 CC(56)91 Minute 2 29.11.56
248 CAB CC(56)91 Minute 2 29.11.56
249 Economist 24.11.56
250 PRO.PREM11/1107 CAB CC(56)91 Minute 2 29.11.56
251 CAB CC(56)91 Minute 2 29.11.56
252 PRO.PREM11/1107 CAB CC(56)92 29.11.56
253 PRO.PREM11/1107 Norman Brook telegram to Eden T.592/56 No.64 30.11.56 and 
CAB CC(56)92 29.11.56
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... the most positive assurances about clearance of the Canal 
which it was practicable to obtain in the present 
circumstances, and their policy in the UN had been designed to 
protect vital interests of Britain in the Middle East as these 
were interpreted by a large section of Conservative 
supporters.'254
The turmoil within the Conservative party, whipped up by the 
Suez Group, worked to Butler's temporary advantage in his 
efforts to avoid a specific date for withdrawal.255 
Washington was so alarmed at the outburst of feeling which 
seemed to threaten the survival of the Conservative 
government, (it was particularly loath to see a Labour 
government as Aneurin Bevan had just been appointed Shadow 
Foreign Secretary), that Eisenhower offered assurances of 
American oil and loans, and of 'America's intention to work 
towards clearing the Canal and the need to proceed to a final 
settlement of the problems of the area as speedily as 
possible',256 to sweeten the announcement of withdrawal, 
instead of waiting until Britain's physical departure.257 It 
was a small concession, but reflected how close Washington 
thought the Suez Group had come to bringing down the 
government.
THE ANTI-SUEZ GROUP:
In July 1956 even those Conservatives who were to be the most 
ardent opponents of military intervention, deplored Nasser's
254 PREM11/1107 CC(56)91 Minute 2 29.11.56
255 PRO.PREM11/1107 Foreign Office to Washington Telegram 5670 1.12.56; Notes of 
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action - that 'impetuous expropriation', which ignored proper 
safeguards and did not offer prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation'.258 However, decided second thoughts soon
appeared on Conservative backbenches259 as cooler heads came 
to the conclusion that Eden had missed his chance. 'If we had 
possessed the requisite force of the right type to take action 
within a matter of hours after Nasser had seized the Canal, 
all would have been well. There is only one rule and it is a 
golden rule that should govern any action in the Middle East: 
it must be quick and it must be successful.'260
Conservative misgivings remained subdued until after the 
failure of the Menzies mission; as the Economist pointed out, 
'no Tory wanted to sound pacific if the Government happened to 
be bellicose' while no backbencher could hurt 'his conscience 
or his personal prospects in the party by urging the 
government towards stronger action'. There was nothing to be 
gained in the constituencies by openly denouncing the Suez 
Group's rhetoric. Although Eden was very reluctant to take 
the matter to the Security Council,261 he was warned of a 
'general feeling that it would not be right to resort to 
military force without further conversations' including a 
referral to the UNO.262 Salisbury was urging Eden that 
under the UN Charter, Britain could not resort to force unless 
the matter had been referred to the UNO.263 The Cabinet was 
conscious that if matters did lead to war, and a war that 
entailed bombing, this could alienate a large section of Tory
258 Boothby, Times 11.8.56
259 PR0.PREM11/1099 CAB CC(56)59 14.8.56 and PREM11/1123 Poole to Eden 
29.8.56
260 Mott-Radclyffe, p.222
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voters who held liberal views on foreign affairs.264
Parliament Recalled: The Influence of the Anti-Suez Group:
Well aware of the growing division in political opinion over 
the use of force,265 the Cabinet was extremely reluctant to 
recall Parliament.
'If we are likely to have unhappily to proceed to 
extremes, a debate in Parliament is going to put us in an 
impossible position. Yet in such circumstances and 
before action of the utmost gravity is taken it will 
surely be very difficult to maintain the position that 
Parliament has no right to be consulted at all ... In a 
situation such as this we should certainly not want to 
disclose our intentions and plans.'266 'It would be 
highly embarrassing to invite Parliament to approve a 
proposal to launch a military operation against Egypt ... 
In both World Wars the Government acted in response to 
aggression then invited Parliament to endorse' its 
action.267
With the failure of the Menzies mission, Eden yielded to 
pressure to recall Parliament on 12 September. Conservative 
opposition to the use of force against Egypt before recourse 
to the UNO268 reached a peak in this short session. With 
misgivings about the progress of negotiations, and alarmed by
264 Clark, p. 144
265 PRO.PREM11/1099 Salisbury to Eden 9.8.56
266 Salisbury to Eden 9.8.56
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the influence of the Suez Group, the 'Heald group'269 (as it 
was dubbed by some newspapers) began to coalesce. When 
Dulles' 'bombshell' effectively torpedoed SCUA270, backbench 
pressure mounted on Eden to refer the matter to the Security 
Council; the Cabinet also knew that the Commonwealth was in 
favour of this move.271 Eden faced a critical meeting of 
the 1922 committee on 13 September 1956 held immediately 
before the resumption of the Commons debate on SCUA. Feelings 
were running high, and the rift between the supporters of 
recourse to the Security Council and the 'blood and thunder 
boys'272 came out into the open. The whole mood of the party 
had changed from July: those in favour of taking the matter to 
the UNO were in a majority, and 'were not at all pleased with 
the Government's attitude'. Well aware that the Security 
Council would prove ineffective, these MPs appreciated that to 
say so in advance would alienate opinion at home and abroad. 
'No one except France agrees we should [go to war against the 
wishes of the Opposition] ... if we went to war in defiance of 
our allies we should do terrible harm to all our alliances 
[NATO, SEATO and the Commonwealth)'; it would wreck any chance 
of making the UNO an effective force if Britain defied its 
rulings. There was a classic opportunity to demonstrate 
economic pressure could be more effective than military 
action.273
Heald and Nigel Nicolson insisted that any action against
269 named after Sir Lionel Heald, the former Attorney General who was well liked and 
respected, MP for Chertsey 1950-70
270 For the Cabinet the attraction of SCUA had been as a means to bring the issue as a 
head, with American backing: PRO.PREM11/1101 CAB CC(56)64 11.9.56. SCUA also 
’should satisfy your colleagues that we need not, for the time being, go to the UN’: 
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Egypt (which Tories had concluded was now merely a matter of 
time) must be taken only after a referral to the Security 
Council; and unless Eden gave such an undertaking they were 
prepared to abstain in the division lobby that evening. The 
Whips understood that approximately 23 other Members supported 
this view. As the debate resumed in the Chamber amid 
confusion on the government benches274, Heald made another 
impressive contribution that commanded a 'wide measure of 
agreement on both sides of the House'275 This backbench 
pressure was decisive in persuading Eden to take the matter to 
the UNO276, despite American opposition.277 This gesture 
also appeared to strengthen Britain's hand in any future 
confrontation with Nasser since the Russians would undoubtedly 
use their veto (hence Dulles' opposition).
Over the next six weeks, from their private soundings within 
the party and contacts with the Cabinet,278 the Anti-Suez 
Group MPs were increasingly worried about the direction of 
government policy. The overwhelming impression they gained 
was 'the Suez Group are driving [Eden] into a corner, from 
which the only escape is either a humiliating climb-down or 
... war'.279 Nicolson believed that Eden was 'only too
anxious to hear a more moderate voice raised within the party' 
but he feared, at best, 'it will mean a row like Munich'. 280 
This impression was reinforced by the party conference.
Rhodes James: Eden, p.516
Times 14.9.56
see Macmillan diary 13.9.56, quoted in Home, p.416
PRO.PREM11/1101 CAB CC(56)64 11.9.56
Private information
Nicolson private letter 21.9.56, Nicolson papers
Nicolson private letter 21.9.56, Nicolson papers
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The Anti-Suez Group and Operation Musketeer:
The Anti-Suez Group saw military intervention as the triumph 
of the Suez Group. These Conservatives felt the diplomatic 
options had not been exhausted and the six principles thrashed 
out between Selwyn Lloyd and Fawzi in New York had offered a 
real chance of a peaceful and honourable settlement. While 
they had no liking for Nasser, it seemed insanity to have 
attacked him 'when for the first time in his career he appears 
to have been wronged, instead of being the wrongdoer'.281
'The political aims appeared incomprehensible. The 
argument that Britain had gone in to separate the 
combatants? The thing was a nonsense ... I remember the 
night Israel invaded. I was doing the week in 
Westminster - it was a quiet week and not many were 
around. When I saw this story coming over the tape, I 
went with Hinch to the Library and together we got out 
maps of Lower Egypt. We both agreed that if we were 
going to intervene we had to take Alex and Cairo - these 
were vital to control Lower Egypt. The Canal was a 
side-show. The question was "What do we do then?" 
Install a puppet government? How long do we stay? How 
do we get out? There we disagreed. I was arguing we 
should do nothing and let Israel get on with it. Hinch 
saw that and curiously was as cynical? he was quite Old 
Testament about it. Hinch and I were both agreed about 
one thing - we saw it as a political operation not a 
military one. It was back to Clausewitz: war as an 
extension of politics.'282
Over the week Price became progressively more unhappy. He and 
others were deeply distressed at the split with Washington and
281 Nicolson private letter 1.11.56, Nicolson papers
282 Sir David Price
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the talk in the military that 'you could not trust 
America'.283 The stupidity of acting without American 
support was seen as 'suicidal',284 particularly so close to 
an American election. 'It put an intolerable strain on the 
American alliance'.285 To alienate Britain's principal
ally in NATO seemed the height of stupidity. The military 
intervention had disrupted to British oil supplies crucial to 
NATO defence and Britain's sustained economic growth.
Appalled at the damage to Britain's international position, 
they were mortified by the spectacle of British bombing. The 
proffered reasons for British intervention (the protection of 
British lives and property, and to stop the fighting) appeared 
specious. British lives were in greater danger because of 
British action; it could not be argued that it was intended to 
keep the Canal open for British shipping since the first 
action had been to order British shipping to stay 1,000 miles 
clear of the Canal? and it was odd, to say the least, to 
intervene against the military interests of the victim.286
Given the post-war emphasis on respect for international law, 
the whole reason for intervention in Korea, the violation of 
the UN Charter, particularly by one whose public reputation 
had been built upon the myth of championing respect for 
international law and the League of Nations, appeared cynical 
in the extreme. The Anti-Suez Group were in an
extraordinarily invidious position in the eyes of their 
constituents. Most were members of the UN Association (UNA) 
and were occasionally invited to address their local branches,
283 Sir David Price
284 Lord Boyd-Carpenter interview with author
285 Nicolson undated letter to constituent, Nicolson papers
286 Nicolson private letter 1.11.56, Nicolson papers
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yet they represented a government who defied the Charter.287 
While these MPs recognized the UNO's limitations, they still 
believed that it represented a force for international 
political stability. Their opinion that Britain was in breach 
of the UN Charter found an undercurrent of support among the 
Tory barrister MPs. To flout openly the UNO's dictums was to 
threaten a return to the uncertainties of the 1930s.
Deeply disillusioned that a man of Eden's reputed integrity 
could act in so underhand a fashion, they had private 
confirmation of the extent of Eden's collusion with the 
Israelis, first from William Clark, Eden's Press 
Secretary,288 and from General Lyne, Chairman of the UNA, who 
had been aghast at Macmillan's conspiratorial wink to his 
private question whether the government had invaded Egypt to 
intervene between Jew and Arab, or to get its way with Nasser 
over the Canal.289 They were fearful that collusion with 
Israel would merely serve to unite Arab feeling, which was 
already inflamed against France and would cause irrevocable 
damage to British interests in rest of the Arab world. The 
Anti-Suez rebels were prevented by discretion from telling 
their detractors, like the Bournemouth Tories, that Eden and 
Selwyn Lloyd had lied to the House.290
They were horrified that the Suez expedition coincided with 
Russian intervention in Hungary291, since it denied Britain 
(and France) any moral authority in seeking to restrain the 
Soviet Union. To risk war with the country divided seemed 
politically suicidal and morally indefensible. Similarly,
287 Nigel Nicolson
288 Nigel Nicolson
289 Nicolson private letter 6.2.57, Nicolson papers
290 Nigel Nicolson
291 Sir David Price
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there was deep disquiet that the Commonwealth had not be 
advised nor consulted. Not only was Britain at odds with her 
former Dominions? the public division within the Commonwealth 
itself threatened to rend the organization in two. MPs were 
fearful that although fundamental goodwill could restore the 
damage to relations with the old White Dominions, the position 
with the Asian member countries was very different.
These critics were in a fearful dilemma: how to make their 
views known forcefully enough without risking the appearance 
of being disloyal to their leader. Any open criticism would 
imply that Eden's reasons for military intervention were false 
and hypocritical? to adoring Conservatives in the country this 
would be tantamount to treachery. They were also confronted 
with the very real abilities of Heath, who was an extremely 
persuasive Chief Whip? and the trenchant views of their 
constituency parties - indeed any outright opposition raised 
the very real spectre of deselection.292 During the first 
weekend anxious private meetings were held under the direction 
of Heald and Elliot. It was decided to make their views known 
through private channels. Over the week they became aware 
that the Cabinet was far from united. The Anti-Suez Group's 
position became increasingly difficult with Nutting's 
resignation (made public on 4 December 1956), because they had 
previously declined to criticize Eden personally. Nutting's 
resignation was a very personal attack, and was closely 
followed by that of Boyle, with his reputation of being the 
only one at the Treasury who had a real grasp of economic 
matters.293 Admittedly, neither of these two ministers held 
Cabinet portfolios. However, Nutting's resignation was an 
enormous embarrassment for the government.294 But whereas 
the departure of one of the men most closely involved in
292 Nicolson private letter 10.11.56, Nicolson papers
293 Economist 10.11.56
294 see Harold Nicolson: Diaries, p.315
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Middle Eastern policy strengthened some people's doubts on the 
morality and wisdom of the military venture, to many others 
the spectacle of Eden being stabbed in the back by his protege 
seemed positively Roman. 'Thanks for Nutting' ran the popular 
political quip.2*5
Anxiety about the wisdom of Eden's action extended far beyond 
the six public opponents of his policy. 'Most seriously 
consider what they should do and came unanimously to the 
conclusion they must tell the whips privately of their strong 
feelings, but support the government in the lobby for the sake 
of our troops'296 as 'it is not very easy to risk your life 
when you know that even the government's own party believe you 
should never have been asked to do'.297 ' Some could see that
things were shaping up for a national disaster, but felt duty 
bound to support the government'.298 There was considerable 
concern where all this would lead; it was all very well to 
give Nasser a bloody nose, but it would reproduce all the old 
problems of the Canal Zone which had led to the 1954 
agreement.299 If Eden's aim was really to topple Nasser, 
this could have only been done by a direct onslaught on Cairo 
and Alexandria which was not a practical proposition in 1956 
- or by allowing Israel to advance to the east bank of the 
Canal, and there were great doubts whether this was 
logistically possible.
Israel was seen by many as a dangerous ally who 'would exploit 
the situation for her own purposes and we were mugs to get
295 Sir Charles Mott-Radclyffe
296 Nicolson reply to Balliol dons’ telegram 2.11.56, Nicolson papers
297 Nicolson to UN Students Association 2.11.56, Nicolson papers
298 Private information
299 Sir Charles Mott-Radclyffe
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involved7.300 Many seriously questioned the wisdom of
launching a military venture when the country was so clearly 
deeply divided, appreciating that the recent World War could 
not have been won without the wholehearted support of the 
British people. The big shock for many came with the news 
that Britain7s first military action had been to drop bombs. 
As the Cabinet had foreseen,301 7 for many it revived 
unpleasant memories7.302
Gaitskell7s apparent vacillation and the manner and brutality 
of Labour7s attack and contempt for parliamentary order closed 
Tory ranks. There was widespread Tory disgust at Gaitskell7s 
appeal (repeated in his broadcast on 4 November 1956) for Tory 
waverers to take action. It served to rally support to Eden7s 
banner303; in Nigel Nicolson7s view, Gaitskell clearly did 
not understand the Conservative party and its bond of personal 
loyalty to its leader. While the 7ferocious atmosphere in the 
House did decide doubters to support Eden7 ,304 as the week 
progressed the continuing spectacle of 7a particularly bloody 
prize fight7305 daunted the stoutest heart.
Despite the tensions within the party, until the announcement 
of the cease-fire on 6 November 1956, the Tory ranks were 
still closed306, a tribute to Heath7s skill. The Anti-Suez 
MPs were very slow to organize themselves, but gradually did 
so 7as the dragging international failure brought them into
300 Lord Watkinson
301 see Clark, p. 179
302 private letter to Times 3.11.56
303 see Times 6.11.56
304 Sir Anthony Kershaw
305 Rawlinson, p.61
306 Rawlinson, p.70
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the open'.307 Nigel Nicolson had approached Heald to 
discover whether he would lead the dissidents, but Heald 
emphatically refused to do so.308 Under the direction of Sir 
Alec Spearman, the group began to take shape. Nicolson, 
Elliot, Boothby, Heald, Foster, 'Jakie' Astor, Philip Bell309 
and David Price met twice at Spearman's flat at 32 Queen Anne 
Gate to draft their protest letter to the Prime Minister.310
The Influence of the Anti-Suez Group on the Government
The influence of the Anti-Suez Group in the week before the 
cease-fire announcement was more passive than active, but it 
did have a bearing upon the Cabinet's decision. The Whips' 
office was acutely aware that the government did not enjoy a 
massive majority, and of the likely impact of a public split 
in the British ruling party upon international and Egyptian 
opinion. There appeared the strong possibility that these 
rebels would vote against the government; given the 
circumstances, even the threat of 20 abstaining became 
critical. 311
Although in retrospect it is possible to see the pressure from 
Washington, the UNO and the Commonwealth as the major factors 
in the Cabinet's decision, the rumour around Westminster312 
was that Eden had been told that 30 Tories would vote against 
the government unless a cease-fire was ordered in the very 
near future. Certainly the threat of open revolt from so many
307 Economist 3.11.56
308 Nigel Nicolson
309 MP for Bolton East 1951-60, and a member of the Suez Group 1953-54
310 Nicolson diary entry 5.11.56 in Harold Nicolson: Diaries, p.317
311 Harold Nicolson: Diaries, p.315
312 see Serge and Merry Bromberger: Secrets of Suez (London 1957)
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Conservatives would have constituted vital pressure. The 
possibility of a majority as low as 10 in the division lobby 
in time of armed conflict invoked memories of May 1940. Eden 
himself denied that either reports of this dissident 
minority313, of contacts between one or two Tories and the 
Opposition leaders played any part in the Cabinet's decision 
to call a halt. But he conceded that 'all were in our minds 
in varying degrees'.314
Certainly in the turmoil of the time, the Anti-Suez Group's 
influence appeared to be decisive. In a political crisis when 
events moved and changed at bewildering speed, fact had little 
part to play, particularly as the whole affair appeared to be 
shrouded in such secrecy and intrigue. The very rumour of 
'weak sisters' threatening to pull the rug out from underneath 
Eden was enough to condemn the Anti-Suez Tories in the eyes of 
their diehard colleagues, who regarded their dissent as 
typical of the 'soft underbelly of the party' that had been 
responsible for Munich. Rumours of contacts with Labour MPs 
firmly branded the Anti-Suez Group as 'quislings'315? these 
MPs rapidly joined America and the UNO in the demonology of 
the Suez Group and their sympathizers.316 In reality, 
'largely by informal personal communication to parliamentary 
leaders, the Anti-Suez Group did add its pressure to the 
international forces seeking to stop Eden's military 
intervention ... They were helped by several factors: a
powerful moderate group within the Cabinet? a general 
uneasiness among a wider section of Tories and perhaps the 
haunting memory in the Prime Minister's mind of how
313 Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle, p.557
314 Eden, p.557
315 Nicolson private letter 16.11.56, Nicolson papers
316 see Amery, HCDeb.561.889-90 3.12.56; Robert Crouch refused to open a bazaar in 
Nigel Nicolson’s Bournemouth constituency: Nicolson private letter 9.11.56, Nicolson papers
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Chamberlain had fallen'.317 'Eden could have dealt with 
America if he had had a united party; and could have dealt 
with a divided party with Washington's support.'318 But he 
had neither.
The Influence of the Anti-Suez Group: Cease-fire to
Withdrawal:
The Anti-Suez group certainly claimed no public credit for 
influencing Eden. But their private boast was that once their 
protest had been lodged 'which they believed had achieved its 
objective',318 theirs was a constructive influence in 
rescuing Britain from her diplomatic isolation. They saw no 
profit in continuing their protest.320 Under Spearman's 
leadership, a nucleus of about a dozen MPs were hopeful of 
salvaging something from the wreckage. The Anti-Suez Group 
prepared a letter to Eden calling on the government to place 
troops in Suez under the UNO.321 Two further meetings 
followed, which led to the submission of two more joint 
letters to the Government. The Anti-Suez Group certainly 
recognized the danger to the government from the Suez rebels 
as
'the bulk of the ... party realize that the operation has 
been a disastrous flop and as usual in such 
circumstances, they are looking round for a scapegoat. 
They have found one in America which is now their central 
target rather than Mr Gaitskell and the Tory "traitors". 
The Government is in an awful hole: if they withdraw
317 Economist 17.11.56
318 Private information
319 Economist 17.11.56
320 Nicolson private letter 7.12.56, Nicolson papers
321 Nicolson diaiy note 5.11.56, in Harold Nicolson: Diaries, p.317
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their troops at once they cannot survive the diplomatic 
humiliation and the anger of their backbenchers. If they 
stay we shall seriously risk the imposition of a form of 
economic sanctions on us by the USA.'322
The Anti-Suez group's determination to improve Anglo-American 
relations received a severe battering during November. 
Disillusioned with Washington's unyielding policy, Ridsdale 
and Sharpies were to sign the critical EDM at the end of the 
month. The fact that 'the whole Conservative party [was] on 
the side of the Suez rebels'323 was one of the great 
difficulties of the Anti-Suez Group's position, for it 
rendered these MPs' 'opposition' as displeasing as Gaitskell's 
stance. 'This will not prevent us from flying our flag 
bravely in the breezes of committees. But little is to be 
gained by bringing down on our heads publicly the rage of the 
entire Conservative party inside and outside Parliament ... 
[but] the time may soon come when we must make another public 
demonstration of support for the moderate policy'.324
Older Tories, who were profoundly concerned at the possibility 
of lasting damage to the NATO alliance, were spurred into 
action by Grimston's critical EDM. On 28 November 1956 a 
group, 'including several former ministers and a number of 
members who have criticised the Government's Middle East 
policy in public,' tabled a motion urging the government to do 
all in its power to restore active co-operation with the 
American Administration. Elliot, the principal sponsor, had 
been very active in the Committee rooms and behind the scenes 
to temper the mood of the party. He had just led an all-party 
parliamentary delegation to the NATO Parliamentary conference 
in Paris, where he and others had had the opportunity to
322 Nicolson private letter 29.11.56, Nicolson papers
323 Nicolson private letter 28.11.56
324 Nicolson private letter 28.11.56
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discuss the frayed state of Anglo-American relations with 
members of Congress. The message they had received was that 
in spite of the strains, NATO must be maintained. Members of 
Congress appeared to have a better appreciation of British 
motives and problems in the Middle East than the Washington 
Administration. The thought was encouraging that 'greater 
attention would be paid to this more understanding 
approach'325 when Congress met in January.
The EDM's other sponsors included Heald, Sir Hugh Lucas- 
Tooth326 and Sir Edward Boyle. It was intended as a
demonstration to Washington, where very close attention was 
being paid to Tory internal strains, that the party as a whole 
was not being carried away by the slogans of anti-Americanism; 
and to convince Butler and his colleagues that there was 
influential backbench support for 'the most vigorous action by 
the government to do their part in restoring the traditional 
ties of co-operation and friendship with the US and 
Commonwealth alike'.
It was signed by:
'Jakie' Astor 
Humphrey Atkins 
Philip Bell 
Richard Body327 
Alfred Bossom 
Roger Conant 
John Cordeaux 
Frederick Corfield 
Henry D'Avigdor Goldsmid 
Edward Du Cann
325 Times 29.11.56
326 MP for Isle of Ely 1924-29; Hendon South 1945-70 and a former Under Secretary of 
State at the Home Office
327 An interesting addition, since by his own admission, he had been swept along by the 
Suez Group. Times, 29.11.56
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John Harvey 
Richard Hornby
Anthony Hurd (had also signed the critical motion)
Keith Joseph 
Anthony Kershaw 
Peter Kirk 
Frank Medlicott 
Godfrey Nicholson 
Nigel Nicolson 
Sir Ian Orr-Ewing 
David Price 
William Shepherd 
Jocelyn Simon 
Alec Spearman 
Douglas Spencer-Nairn328
These signatures represented the sizeable body of Conservative 
MPs who, although sharing the widespread dismay at the state 
of Anglo-American relations, felt that America was not the 
only culprit. These MPs included those who publicly and 
privately had grave misgivings about Britain's policy of 
intervention, 'not least of which about the Government's 
failure to consult America and the Commonwealth before the die 
was cast. Members who hold this view were deeply concerned 
that ... there was a time after the Anglo-French landings when 
the Commonwealth was on the verge of dissolution.' They 
deplored any further fanning of this virulent anti-American 
feeling, since it was a fundamental requirement of British 
foreign policy that Anglo-American relations should be
328 Five later withdrew their names: Atkins, Corfield, Du Cann and John Harvey (who 
had been sponsors of an EDM on 28 November 1956, congratulating the Foreign Secretary 
on his efforts to secure to secure a just and lasting settlement of all the problems of the 
Middle East, including immediate clearance of the Suez Canal, and the establishment of 
permanent international control of the Canal under the auspices of the UNO); and Kershaw. 
Body and Conant later added their names to Grimston’s EDM, patently exasperated by 
American behaviour.
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maintained on as close an understanding as possible.329
This voice of moderation and expediency was most welcome to 
Butler and his Cabinet colleagues in their battle with the 
Suez rebels. After the announcement of withdrawal, the 
Anti-Suez Group's efforts to improve the glacial state of 
Anglo-American relations were aided by an unofficial grouping 
of Conservatives with American connections who set about 
trying to improve relations with America: Beamish, Bossom, 
Joseph, Edward Leather, Price, Rawlinson, Ridsdale and Richard 
Sharpies. Sharpies had opposed America's stand on Suez and 
signed Grimston's critical EDM? however, he had telephoned 
friends in America to explain his action. Beamish, Joseph 
and Rawlinson all had American wives; Allan and Price had 
been educated at Yale and Tories with American business 
connections included Bossom, and Joseph.330 These MPs. 
offered considerable support to Macmillan's efforts when Prime 
Minister to rebuild the Anglo-American 'special relationship' 
after January 1957.
Summary:
Transient pressures are difficult to measure precisely at this 
distance since so much of the Suez Group's and the Anti-Suez 
Group's lobbying was done in informal private conversations, 
and in the party committee meetings, the minutes of which make 
scanty reading. But the Suez Group and the Anti-Suez Group 
were not inconsiderable factors in the decisions of the day, 
and their influence was discernible at the time, both to 
political players and observers. 'I did see the Suez Group as
329 Times 29.11.56
330 Eldon Griffiths: ’"Yanks at Westminster": Our Friends in Commons’, Newsweek 
3.2.58
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goading Eden on in the crisis.'331? but once the cease-fire 
had been announced the British government was forced on the 
defensive by an implacable American administration, backed up 
by the United Nations? there was nothing the Suez Group could 
do to sustain Britain's presence in Suez. The Anti-Suez Group 
played an important part in persuading the Cabinet to take the 
dispute to the UNO in September? however, these Conservatives' 
preference for diplomacy did not restrain Eden from colluding 
with the French and Israelis in October. Although the Anti- 
Suez Group's contribution to the political debate was not in 
itself decisive, the fact that these MPs represented a wider 
undercurrent of acute dismay within the party was an important 
factor in the Cabinet's decision to halt the military 
operation. Thereafter they offered constructive support to 
the beleaguered Cabinet.
331 Arthur Gavshon
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CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION
Conservative backbenchers in the period 1948 - 1956 had more 
opportunity to influence British foreign policy than has been 
generally appreciated. On both the issues of Britain's 
relations with Europe and with the Middle East, Conservative 
backbenchers as individuals and acting in concert influenced 
the climate of political debate and helped to set the 
parameters of acceptable policy.
The Europeanists
(a) The Europeanists in Opposition 1948-51:
There was no Conservative pressure group on Europe comparable 
to the Suez Group.1 Those Conservatives who supported 
European integration formed a loose affiliation of about 60 
MPs. They were motivated primarily by a desire for security 
against a resurgence of Franco-German antagonism and to
provide a bulwark against the advance of Soviet Russia in
Western Europe; European unity was also designed as an
encouragement to the East European nations under Russia's 
control. In their view, Western Europe must be seen to earn 
American financial and military support. For some
Conservative Europeanists, underlying this sentiment was also 
a thread of anti-American feeling; while they did not endorse 
'Third Force' arguments (that Western Europe could form a 
independent bloc between the two superpowers), British 
leadership of Western Europe offered the attraction of
bolstering Britain's position at the top table. The emerging 
European institutions should be directed according to British 
interests to offset American encouragement for West European 
federation.
1 Sir Anthony Nutting
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j/ Europeanists in opposition enjoyed considerable success, 
despite their individualist approach, slender parliamentary 
numbers, an overwhelming Labour parliamentary majority and 
Bevin's antagonism. The strength of this Conservative 
tendency lay in the support of highly respected and 
influential MPs, above all in the unrivalled advantage 
conferred by Churchill's advocacy and the attention his views 
commanded. Indeed, as former prime minister and world 
statesman, Churchill constituted a pressure group in himself. 
The influence of the Conservative Europeanists was also 
enhanced by the cross-party support for Churchill's crusade, 
their membership of external organizations (such as the 
British Committee of ELEC) and above all, the stage later 
provided by the Council of Europe.
By mid-1948 both sides of the Commons were infected by 
Continental enthusiasm for European union, stimulated by 
Churchill's campaign and Sandys' invaluable work behind the 
scenes. Despite Bevin's determination to ignore moves towards 
European integration not initiated by governments, he was 
obliged to yield to a considerable degree to the momentum 
generated by Churchill and Sandys, ably supported by 
Churchill's 'private army', at the Congress of the Hague and 
thereafter, and to accede to the creation of a Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. At this new assembly, the 
Conservative delegates scored again against Labour, both in 
the manner in which they dominated the proceedings, and in 
Churchill's determination to secure West German participation. 
They contributed to the transformation of the Council of 
Europe from an inter-government debating forum (envisaged by 
Bevin) into the venue for discussion on political integration. 
Thanks to Churchill's initiative in the Strasbourg Assembly, 
the idea of a European Army gained currency and credibility in 
1950, as it seemed to offer a solution to Western Europe's 
need for manpower while avoiding the nightmare of a revived, 
rearmed West Germany free to play the West off against Russia 
in her quest for reunification.
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As continental federalists set the pace of the debate, backed 
by the Conservative Europeanists who were frustrated by what 
seemed to be Labour's dilatory approach to continental 
developments, there developed a two-track approach to European 
integration. The British government firmly favoured inter­
governmental arrangements and its tactics, in response to 
continental pressure for federation, were to delay while 
appearing to be constructive.2 However, as Bevin and the 
Foreign Office made no attempt to regain the initiative from 
their opponents to ensure that moves towards Europe were not 
travelling in parallel, public debate on political integration 
was concentrated on the Council of Europe, rather than 
developing the available machinery of the Brussels Treaty? 
similarly, discussion on economic integration with Europe was 
distracting from the work of the OEEC, the inter-governmental 
organization preferred by Bevin, the Foreign Office, Eden and 
the Conservative Sceptics.
There were important limits to the Conservative Europeanists' 
influence between 1948 and 1951. Bevin's hostility ensured 
that any success was piecemeal; indeed, Churchill's campaign 
reinforced Bevin's determination to pursue inter-governmental 
links. Wider Conservative support for closer links with 
Europe was lacking, beyond general agreement that 'better 
relations with Europe were a good idea.'3 Very early on 
senior Tories were noting the profound doubts within the party 
of the wisdom of Churchill's activities. Although the 
Conservative Europeanists strove hard to convince their 
colleagues that the causes of Empire and Europe were 
complementary, not contradictory, seen in their work at the 
Westminster Economic Conference of April 1949, they were not 
aided by confused and sometimes contradictory statements on 
Britain's role in a united Europe.
2 Michael Charlton: The Price of Victory, p.63
3 Lord Thomas
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Eden's resistance to the lure of Europe was of considerable 
importance, coming from the other recognized Conservative 
foreign policy expert. In the Sceptics' view, the 
Europeanists were placing excessive emphasis on Britain's 
relations with Europe, and paid insufficient attention to 
Britain's global position, and above all her responsibilities 
to her Commonwealth and Empire. This was underlined by a 
residue of animosity towards the French. To most Tories, 
France appeared a power of the second rank; she owed her 
permanent seat on the Security Council to Britain's 
insistence, not to her own efforts in the War. The continuing 
political instability in Paris did nothing to enhance the 
appeal of European integration. There was also irritation 
that West Germany was looking to France for her international 
rehabilitation, rather than Britain, together with disdain for 
what was seen as the emotional appeal of Churchill's campaign 
to excitable continentals. Most Conservatives shared Eden's 
opinion that the whole 'Europe thing' was insubstantial, while 
a small section of the Tory party carried this scepticism to 
the extreme of opposing European federation with or without 
Britain.
Conservative debate was concentrated in private in the party 
committees as the electoral advantage of seeming to offer a 
positive response to continental developments, compared to 
Labour's apparent resistance, outweighed the desire to stymie 
emerging ideas of European federation. As the Conservatives 
moved closer to power, considerations of the actual electoral 
wisdom of Europe weighed heavily in the scales. The Schuman 
Plan caused a crisis of conscience for many Tories who had 
previously been vaguely pro-European and fermented the 
backbench debate about the direction in which the 
supranationalism of the French was leading. The indication 
that Europe was no longer looking to Britain's lead does not 
seem to have percolated through to the bulk of the party. In 
all the arguments surrounding Labour's refusal to attend the 
Paris discussions, no Conservative addressed the fundamental
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point that British participation was not acceptable to the 
French without the prior acceptance of the principle of 
supranationality. There seems to have remained the conviction 
in one part of the party that the French did not have the 
political courage to proceed in discussions with the West 
Germans without Britain's backing? and if the French did go 
ahead without Britain, that the talks were doomed to failure. 
Conservative Europeanists' arguments that every treaty 
involved a piecemeal surrender of sovereignty, and that 
Britain must attend the talks to direct the discussions in her 
interests, did not sway the majority of their colleagues. The 
Sceptics recognized the validity of Attlee's argument that it 
would be sharp diplomatic practice to join the Paris 
discussions, only then to pull out, and stayed quiet.
(b) The Europeanists in Power: 1951-56
Churchill's campaign in opposition between 1947-1950 had aimed 
at harnessing the emotional appeal of 'Europe', in marked 
contrast to the Bevin (and Eden) school of thought. By the 
time Churchill was returned to Downing Street, the whole 
question of European integration had become inextricably 
entangled with the explosive issue of German rearmament, and 
the EDC had become the chosen vehicle. None of the 
Europeanists possessed any enthusiasm for British 
participation in such a clumsy organization. The differences 
between the Conservative and Labour parties on European 
integration had become those of emphasis and tone, not 
substance.
Despite high hopes, the Conservative Europeanists failed to 
follow up their success in opposition once their party was 
returned to power. This appears a contradiction, given the 
mighty authority of Churchill and the manner in which he 
embodied the spirit of Europe, the presence of pro-Europeans 
in the government and Cabinet, and the quality of those on the
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backbenches who supported his message. However, in the early 
1950s the Conservative Europeanists who strove to educate 
their party faced overwhelming odds: the loss of Churchill's 
leadership and support? the growing animosity of leading 
continental politicians, such as Spaak and Monnet, who had 
been rudely disillusioned over Conservative policy on Europe 
in November 1951? the supremacy of Eden in Cabinet, compounded 
by Foreign Office jealousy of any free-enterprise efforts in 
Strasbourg? and the powerful distraction of the internal 
Conservative debate over imperial preference. The active 
Europeanists remained a tiny minority in Parliament. Crucial 
public and media support was lacking, and the 'bumpy first 18 
months'4 of Churchill's peace-time administration enhanced a 
general Conservative desire not to rock the boat. The presence 
of powerful sceptics in the Cabinet continued to act as a 
brake on their backbench colleagues who urged using the 
Council of Europe to counteract moves by the Six towards 
federation, and reinforced a visceral Conservative desire to 
stand aloof from the continent.
Those Conservatives who struggled for Britain's voice to be 
heard in the Council of Europe to counter the development of 
Little Europe and Britain's consequent exclusion, fought a 
losing battle to encourage the Foreign Secretary to offer a 
more positive approach in the council of the Fifteen. Eden's 
ascendancy at the Foreign Office, supported by key civil 
servants whom Eden consulted almost exclusively, meant there 
was little hope for the few who possessed a different view. 
Eden dismissed suggestions for an alternative to his 
restrained support for the EDC and was content to watch the 
efforts of the Six to weld Little Europe, confident that their 
enterprise would fail. The Eden Plan proved a temporary 
aberration. Eden did not see the need, nor did ministers at 
the Foreign Office see Europe as on the political agenda.5
4 Lord Fraser
5 Lord Glendevon
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As far as the Foreign Secretary and the mainstream of the 
party were concerned inter-governmental moves towards European 
co-operation were proceeding most satisfactorily, seen in the 
reform of NATO in the spring of 1952, the expansion of West 
European Union in October 1954 and British association with 
the ECSC (signed 23 December 1954). Association not 
participation remained the name of the game. To the bulk of 
the party, the Council of Europe seemed a supreme irrelevance: 
'it was like an engine without a gear-box? there was no method 
of implementing the plethora of plans'.6 It merely appeared 
to duplicate the functions of existing European institutions 
(WEU, the OEEC and the ECSC).7 The demise of the EDC in July 
1954 reinforced their views of the inefficacy of the 
continentals.
It was not until the 1955 election, which saw the advent of 
another political generation, with different political 
experiences and connections, that attitudes towards Europe 
began to shift within the body of the party, aided by the 
defeat of imperial preference at the party conference in 1954. 
Only then was the Conservative party as a whole was prepared 
to consider closer links with Britain, the Commonwealth and 
Empire, and Europe, reflected in the growing backbench support 
for Macmillan's and Thorneycroft's moves to develop a European 
free trade area in the summer of 1956. The Europeanists were 
responsible in part for this re-education: in the 1950s key 
Conservative supporters of Europe had concentrated much of 
their efforts on the form economic integration of Britain and 
Europe could take. Thus they contributed towards laying the 
foundations in 1951-54 of the later EFTA bloc, through the 
Economic Committee at the Council of Europe, the British 
Committee of ELEC, and conferences of the European movement.
However, as in 1950, the Conservative Europeanists were
6 Sir Charles Mott-Radclyffe
7 see Smithers, FAC 30.5.56
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singularly unsuccessful in pressing their government to 
participate in the negotiations for the common market in 1956, 
hoping that Britain could thereby ward off the creation of an 
economic bloc which excluded her. British governments proved 
remarkably consistent in their refusal to join the 
negotiations of the Six in the 1950s, from the Schuman Plan to 
the Spaak Committee deliberations of 1955-56. But by this 
point more and more Conservatives were coming to the 
conclusion that Europe was something which could not be 
ignored. It was not going to go away.8 Although Whitehall 
officials remained convinced the relance would fail, in 1956 - 
unlike 1950 - the British government 'was ready to take an 
initiative of its own, to forestall a continental trading 
bloc'.9
The Suez Group
The formative experiences of the Suez Group were in 
opposition: the Palestine crisis, Britain's humiliation at 
Abadan, and Anglo-Egyptian relations prior to the Cairo 
government's unilateral abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian 
treaty of 1936. The backbench storm over the proposed Anglo- 
Egyptian agreement on the Sudan proved the catalyst for this 
backbench faction determined to fight what it had come to 
regard as Eden's appeasement of Egypt, and the threat posed to 
Britain's rightful, pre-eminent position in the Middle East by 
Arab nationalism and American policy. In a sense, the 
formation of the Suez Group was an admission by its members 
that their attempts to exercise informal influence had failed. 
The rebels concluded, however, that overt pressure would stand 
a greater chance of success as party managers could not ignore 
the cumulative effect of backbench criticism on the political
8 Sir Edward Boyle interview, BOAPAH LSE
9 John W Young: Britain and European Unity 1945-1992, (Macmillan 1993), p.47
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atmosphere.10
(a) The Suez Group: 1951-54
The Suez Group was a Conservative phenomenon. It represented 
a clearly identifiable faction within the party. It possessed 
a named leader, held organized regular meetings attended by 
invitation only, and enjoyed considerable support in the 
Conservative national press (contacts which it also ruthlessly 
manipulated) and within the country at large, articulated 
through constituency associations. This exercise of influence 
was very public. No less important was the influence the Suez 
Group exercised behind the scenes, through membership of 
important backbench committees, official and unofficial. 
Although many political commentators placed the Suez Group on 
the fringe of the party - an 'irritant minority'11 - these 
positions placed these men and their beliefs far more 
centrally within the pattern of the party than has been 
appreciated. Thus in the judgement of their peers, members of 
the Suez Group were not necessarily the negligible men some 
writers would have one believe.
The Suez Group vehemently opposed first a specific treaty 
(which in itself was unusual), and thereafter sought to 
promote a more hard-line approach to British relations in the 
Middle East, and specifically towards Egypt. This was a 
policy of confrontation. Despite the trenchant criticism from 
its opponents inside and outside the Conservative party, the 
Suez Group's adherents possessed a coherent philosophy related 
to Britain's position and role in world affairs. 
Significantly, this faction's activities did not extend into 
domestic affairs; many of its members held progressive liberal
10 see Richard Hornby: ’The Influence of the Backbencher: A Toiy view’, Political 
Qucarterly Vol 36, 1965, pp.286-294
n Times 7.10.54
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views on social and fiscal policy, and capital punishment. In 
this sense they were the heirs to Social Imperialism.
The Suez Group, in the inchoate form it took when the 
Conservatives were in opposition (Palestine and the Abadan 
crises), failed to win the day. It also lost the battles over 
the Sudan and the Suez Base Agreement; this was a paradox for, 
in addition to the sympathy it commanded within the party 
outside its immediate number, the Suez Group enjoyed 
Churchill's tacit support, which gave it considerable 
influence. But 'when Churchill accepted what Eden wanted, the 
Suez Group lost a lot of influence,'12 which reveals its true 
factional strength as a backbench cabal manipulated by the 
Prime Minister to his own advantage against his Foreign 
Secretary in Cabinet.
Throughout the course of his dealings with Egypt and his 
battles with Churchill in Cabinet, Eden was obliged to pay 
assiduous attention to the presentation of his policy to his 
backbench colleagues, to the extent of giving private 
briefings to the Suez Group. The rebels exercised a 
discernible brake on Eden's pursuit of an agreement with Egypt 
through the weapon they provided their Prime Minister, their 
positions on backbench committees and the Progress Trust, 
their allies in the press, and, not least, through the 
prevailing attitudes towards backbench dissent. In the 1950s 
there was a greater independence of thought - as Churchill 
once commented, 'A tame Tory is no Tory at all.'13 - and the 
management of the Conservative party was more tolerant14 than 
it is today. The very fact that dissent was not stamped on 
but was aired in public, gave it greater influence on public 
debate. Admittedly, the feeling that the party could afford
12 Lord Amery
13 quoted by Lord Lauderdale
14 Lord Carr
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some dissent was encouraged by the 'friendly wind that is 
blowing in economic and general affairs'15, and by the far 
more critical Bevanite division within the Labour ranks. 
However, in 1954 the government's difficulties over the future 
of the Canal Zone base were greatly aggravated by their 
irresolution in two other politically emotive matters: MPs' 
salaries and the Crichel Down affair. In both these cases 
'backbench pressure ... played a decisive part in the 
government's change of heart', whetting backbenchers' 
appetites for assertions of parliamentary authority.16
The views of their contemporaries vary on the actual influence 
exercised by the Suez Group MPs in 1953 and 1954. At 
ministerial level, Lord Aldington credits them with 'little 
actual influence, but they had to be taken into account and 
handled in debate'. Churchill's behaviour greatly compounded 
this nuisance factor. In the opinion of the mainstream 
backbenchers the Suez Group 'certainly slowed things down: 
Eden was always looking over his shoulder at Suez Group 
objections, always asking would this or that be acceptable to 
the Suez Group'.17 'They had a substance because they 
appealed to a gut feeling in the Tory party and country. A 
lot more people wished they could have agreed publicly with 
their attitude. They mattered.'1® And in their own 
estimation? Some former MPs are inclined to be somewhat 
flippant: 'I don't know whether we had any decisive influence, 
but we certainly gave them a run for their money!'19 Others 
take a more measured view: 'We had considerable influence as 
long as Churchill was resisting Eden. When he accepted what
15 Times 7.10.54
16 Times 30.7.54
17 Sir Charles Mott-Radclyffe
18 Lord Carr
19 Lord Lauderdale
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Eden wanted, we lost a lot of influence'.20 Although, by July 
1954, the Government was not in danger of defeat on the issue 
of the Suez Canal base, the topic had been 'a long continuing 
headache for them'.21 'But the seed was sewn so when we had 
Glubb's dismissal and the Canal nationalization, the Suez 
Group became THE party.'22
Despite their best efforts and favourable circumstances, the 
Suez Group failed to carry their party up to 1954. It was 
hampered by the public perception of the calibre of its 
membership and its leadership.23 Although its members 
included several ex-ministers, Privy Councillors, holders of 
important backbench posts, several very able and ambitious 
young MPs and respected older members, it appeared that the 
Group was comprised of predominantly yesterday's men.24 This 
was in marked contrast to the Conservative Europeanists, many 
of whom seemed and were indeed the party 'heavyweights'. 
Therefore overall the Suez Group was not the sum of its parts. 
The limits of the influence of the Suez Group also reflected 
the shift in the party since the 1930s. Both Captain 
Waterhouse and Assheton would certainly have wielded great 
power within the pre-war Conservative party. Their power in 
the 1950s was more strictly circumscribed, partly because of 
the strengthening since 1945 of the power of Conservative 
Central Office over the Conservative Unionist Associations.25 
The effect was a strengthening of the party leadership at
20 Lord Amery
21 South Wales Argus 24.7.54
22 Lord Amery
23 A Cummings cartoon in Punch on 21.7.54 depicted Waterhouse in a glass box, holding 
an umbrella and fuming, ’By Gad, Sir’. The box’s label read, ’Vintage Tory’; the button 
underneath was marked ’Press for Sound’.
24 Lord Orr-Ewing
25 Times, 15.6.54
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Westminster. In addition, in 1953-54 the Suez Group did not 
secure wider support in the Cabinet. Churchill was supported 
by Maxwell Fyfe and Monckton, but other members of the Cabinet 
(Salisbury, Macmillan and Sandys) whom one might have expected 
to have condoned their campaign either supported Eden or were 
silent. In particular, Macmillan was noticeable in his 
reticence; he did of course, discuss the issue with his son- 
in-law, giving the advice: 'Dont assert, ask questions!'26
Part of the problem was the great divide between those in 
government and those on the backbenches;27 another was Eden's 
undeniable authority in foreign affairs.
The Suez Group sought to revive the imperial traditions of the 
Tory party of old, but the mood and character of the party had 
also altered since the War. By the mid-1950s the Conservative 
party at Westminster was far more a party of 'the professional 
middle-class', with the temper of this class. It was thus 
less susceptible to appeals to the doctrines and traditions of 
Empire; the rebels did not strike a contemporary chord among 
their younger colleagues, although their cause did possess a 
important visceral appeal to the party in the country. 
'Having so many young MPs also dampened radical fervour. Many 
of them were too hungry for preferment to want to sacrifice 
their chances on the altar of rebellion.'28 Here the 
importance of a competent 1922 Chairman was shown; Derek 
Walker-Smith worked closely with Patrick Buchan-Hepburn which 
helped channel backbench opinion. The small size of the 
Conservative majority from 1951-54 increased potential 
backbench influence, but also raised the fear of a bringing 
the government down and forcing a general election. Therefore 
powerful forces militated against 'rocking the boat' too much.
26 Lord Amery
27 Sir Anthony Nutting
28 Anthony Seldon: ’Churchill’s Post-War Government’ in Peter Hennessy ed.: Ruling 
Performance, p. 83
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(b) The Suez Group: 1956
Paradoxically, the Suez Group appeared much more influential 
under Eden when he became Prime Minister, even though Eden was 
seen as the architect of the detested Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 
1954. Backbench concern over the future of Cyprus had 
provided the fuel for the continuation of the Suez Group after 
October 1954; domestic setbacks, dissatisfaction with Eden's 
premiership and Glubb Pasha's abrupt dismissal saw the Suez 
Group evolve into the faction that seized the ear of the party 
in July 1956. And importantly, by July 1956 Eden was on 
probation with an increasingly sizeable section of his party.
Convinced that the Egyptian leader was increasingly under 
communist influence and posed the greatest threat to British 
interests in the Middle East, the Suez Group were determined 
to see Nasser crushed - by swift diplomacy if possible, by 
force if need be? it was hoped that this would provoke a 
counter-revolution in Cairo, and the subsequent reopening of 
the question of a British garrison at Suez. Its influence 
became critical in the Suez crisis when larger sections of the 
party lined up with this core of opinion, as Conservatives 
concurred with the Suez Group's arguments of the need for a 
vigorous reassertion of Britain's position in the Middle East.
In the Suez crisis Eden was not pulled along passively in the 
wake of the Suez Group's rhetoric; but nor did the Suez Group 
follow in Eden's slipstream as he headed for confrontation 
with Nasser.29 In Sir Anthony Nutting's opinion, Eden all 
along wanted 'to have a fight with Nasser' because of his 
sense of personal betrayal, but this was not necessarily a 
physical fight? Eden certainly wanted Nasser to be humiliated, 
and as publicly as possible. The weight of the Suez Group
29 see Robert Rhodes James: Anthony Eden, p.456
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upon the Prime Minister was considerable as it limited the 
options open to Eden: it 'had to be taken account of ... Eden 
had to tread warily because the Suez Group might well be able 
to start a fire burning in the party'.30 Concern over his 
standing in the party, and his party's chances in the next 
election could not but feed Eden's fears of being thought 
indecisive in a crisis, particularly as he was now 'wearing 
the robes of Churchill' - as his wife repeatedly reminded 
him.31 With this came the corresponding feeling he had to 
make a mark on his supporters.
The Suez Group, both actively and passively, influenced the 
Prime Minister, by fanning criticism to which the Prime 
Minister was extraordinarily sensitive32, and as a support and 
a weapon in Macmillan's arsenal, helping to reinforce the 
expectation that America would tacitly condone any British 
action. The Party conference at Llandudno was crucial in 
Eden's decision to collude with the French and Israelis. Any 
possibility of a short, sharp diplomatic triumph over Egypt 
appeared to be receding into the mists of the UNO: Nasser 
seemed to be 'getting away with it'. Now the Suez Group 
brought home to Eden and his Cabinet colleagues what the party 
within the country would and would not stomach; the implicit 
threat was that anything less than a vigorous assertion of 
British's power would be unacceptable. To intensify this, and 
knowing that Eden was adamant Britain must not be divided from 
the French, the Suez Group was able to co-ordinate its 
pressure at Llandudno with the French government which was 
equally determined to see Nasser crushed. 'The Suez Group 
could not have done any more than they did. They effectively 
converted the Prime Minister to their point of view.'33
30 Lord Carr
31 Sir Anthony Nutting
32 Sir Anthony Nutting
33 Sir Anthony Nutting
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After the Cabinet's decision to launch the military operation, 
in Lord Aldington's view, the Suez Group did provide 'an 
extremely useful safety valve with the Conservative party on 
a major venture that had not been discussed and was kept close 
to the Prime Minister's chest'.34 But the support of the Suez 
Group was insufficient to encourage Eden to press ahead with 
military action in the face of the international outcry, and 
its opposition to withdrawal could not withstand the realities 
of Britain's isolation? however, the outcry the Suez Group 
orchestrated in November and early December 1956 forced the 
Cabinet to 'play for time'35 and pay assiduous attention to 
the presentation of policy.
Was the Suez Group right in its argument that any retreat from 
Britain's position in the Middle East would have disastrous 
results? The alternative thesis was Eden's policy of phased 
withdrawal, and dependence on the Baghdad Pact. Both sides 
correctly assessed the problem of the British garrison at Suez 
Canal Zone as a political one, but both arguments were based 
on a fallacy. Egypt saw Britain as an occupying power and 
regarded the Canal Zone base as theirs by right. Although 
Eden was correct in his appreciation of the need to remove the 
irritant from Anglo-Egyptian relations, he was mistaken in his 
hopes of the future benefits that would accrue from this, and 
in his belief in the future efficacy of the Baghdad Pact.36 
The profound animosity harboured by Arab nations towards 
Britain37 as the perpetrator of the state of Israel was all- 
embracing; there was no appreciation of British attempts to 
take a middle line. By permitting the existence of the Tel 
Aviv government Britain was supporting the enemy. On the
34 Lord Aldington
35 Alec Caimcross ed.: The Robert Hall Diaries 1956-61 (London 1991), p.79
36 Shuckburgh feared Eden was using ’instruments that would break in our hands’: Evelyn 
Shuckburgh: Descent to Suez, p.326
37 Shuckburgh, p.311 and 314
- 423 -
other hand, the Suez Group's arguments of the need to stay in 
Suez to sustain British prestige were based on the assumption 
that if Britain sat tight, eventually either Cairo would see 
reason, or the Neguib-Nasser regime would fall and a more 
amenable government would take its place. Legge-Bourke might 
reasonably argue in 1956 that the nationalization of the Suez 
Canal Company was the logical outcome of Britain's withdrawal 
from the Canal Zone base, but in the Middle East in the 1950s 
Britain was damned if she did, and damned if she did not.
The Anti-Suez Group:
In stark contrast to the Europeanist tendency within the party 
and the Suez Group, this group had a short history. Although 
only six Anti-Suez Conservatives were prepared to criticize 
the government openly by abstaining, the Chief Whip estimated 
between 20 and 30 Tories shared their deep unhappiness.38 In 
all, they represented an amorphous pressure group, whose 
defiance gave expression to general unease within the party. 
In the main they were traditional Tories, who were anti-Left, 
that is, anti-socialist - not that this necessarily made them 
'Right'. Their small number and disparate outlooks and 
personalities, together with their mixture of ages and 
backgrounds hardly merit the description 'group', even if they 
appeared to have an organizer in Alec Spearman.
The nascent Anti-Suez Group was influential in pressing the 
Cabinet to refer the dispute to the United Nations in 
September 1956. However, this expressed preference for 
diplomacy provided an insufficient brake on the Prime Minister 
in his decision to collude with the French and Israelis to 
launch a punitive war against Nasser. As Julian Amery 
commented to Anthony Nutting following the latter's 
resignation, 'You are accused of deserting your leader; it was
38 Private information
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a case of your leader deserting you'. 39 When the cease-fire 
was announced on 6 November, none of the Anti-Suez Group 
claimed credit for influencing the Cabinet's decision. The 
widespread speculation that Eden had done so because of Butler 
and 40 'weak sisters', was misplaced but it was not wholly 
wide of the mark. In that the Anti-Suez Group represented 
wider Conservative anxiety over the wisdom and morality of 
military intervention, Eden acknowledged that the Anti-Suez 
Group was a factor the Cabinet's decision to halt the military 
operation.40 After the cease-fire, the Anti-Suez Group 
helped to off-set the rabid anti-American feeling that swept 
the party in November 1956 and exercised a minor but 
beneficial influence in the work to repair the damage to 
Britain's international relations.
Rebel factions were usually temporary ad hoc  arrangements, but 
of the above three groups, only the Anti-Suez Group conforms 
to this stereotype. The Europeanists represented an continued 
desire within the Conservative party to foster a more positive 
approach in Britain's policy towards European integration to 
harness European developments to Britain's advantage, whereas 
the Suez Group was a manifestation of the constant spring of 
reactionary pressure within the party over the decades. The 
Conservative Europeanists, the Suez Group and the Anti-Suez 
Group fared very differently. Both the Conservative 
Europeanists and the Suez Group aroused the ire of their 
peers, but the supreme anger of the party was saved for the 
Anti-Suez Group. 'The Tories never mind revolts on the right, 
since they know perfectly well such demonstrations are the 
inevitable concomitant of progress: a number of members can 
always be relied upon to mistake progress and sanity for 
bloody revolution. But revolts on the Left can be dangerous, 
as the only successful one they have had this century
39 Sir Anthony Nutting
40 Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle, p.557
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demonstrated fairly conclusively to the late Neville 
Chamberlain. For at the eastern gate the lone and level sands 
stretch far away? but at the western portal stands the enemy, 
hungry for rapine, loot and office.'41
41 The Spectator 24.5.57
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Preliminary Report on Ph.D. thesis by Sandra D. Onslow by Dr.J.A.Ramsden
This is a thorough and assiduously-researched piece of work which sheds interesting 
light on all the areas on which it touches, and which will need to be consulted in the 
future by .any scholar working in the field - not least because of the author's extensive 
interviewing and skillful use of the personal evidence of a very large number of back­
bench Conservative MPs (for whose views there is no other satisfactory source). The 
thesis seems to me to satisfy clearly enough the basic requirement of a doctoral 
candidate, to have gathered much new material and organised it in a scholarly 
manner, so that the award of the doctorate should probably be made, subject of course 
to a satisfactory performance in the viva.
There are however a number of methodological problems, which are paradoxically 
most severe in connection with the central argument of the thesis, and these prevent 
this from being regarded as a thesis of the highest quality. The candidate has not used 
many rather obvious primary and secondary sources in her field, especially from 
historians and political scientists working on the general question of the working of 
the Conservative Party - on which the thesis claims to be concentrating. There is no 
use of the works of either of the candidates' examiners, nothing from any Nuffield 
Election study, and no use of the writings of Robert Blake, while some remarkably 
minor works (including a GCSE textbook) get full citation in the bibliography. The 
largest gap is the fact that the candidate has not consulted the easily available and 
well-catalogued private papers of the Ministers and Party Leaders - the Eden Papers 
in Birmingham and the R.A.Butler papers in Cambridge being the most obvious 
examples, but the papers of Woolton and Crookshank (Oxford) and the Boyle papers 
in Leeds are almost equally obvious. This is important because of the candidates' 
recurrent claim that the backbenchers she has studied were a major influence on the 
Party’s leaders. All too often we are left with only their own word for it (recollected 
forty years after the event, though underpinned by their own private papers, which is a 
saving strength of the thesis). There are also Party papers in Oxford open to scholars 
(as, say the Advisory Committee on Policy) which might sensibly have been used. 
Since these various additional resources would have needed no more than six weeks 
or so of research, I shall want to explore the reasons for this rather extraordinary gap 
at the viva. There are also rather too many textual errors to allow the thesis to pass in 
this form, especially in the bibliography, and these will have to be put right.
However, the strengths seem to me to outweigh these problems. A reader is given a 
real 'insider's feel' to the way in which Conservative MPs thought and operated 
(absorbed from the interviews in general terms as well as in specific quotations).
There is a consistently authoritative feel for the way in which foreign policy issues 
were debated and this significantly adds to our knowledge, both of the the way in 
which the integration of Europe was viewed at a critical time, and in the evolution of 
policy towards the Middle East before and during the Suez crisis.
Subject to the viva 1 would expect to recommend the award of a doctorate with the 
proviso of minor textual corrections.
John Ramsden, 
3 January 1995
This ijg an interesting thesis, well worthy of a 
doctorate. The author seeks to identify the tendencies 
and groupings among Conservative backbenchers in the 
eleven years after the war and to explore the way in 
which they influenced the party's foreign policy.
She has worked exhaustively through published and 
unpublished sources and she has interviewed many of the 
key figures who have survived. She writes a clear and 
readable narrative that seems free from vulgar error 
(though I am giving her a short list of almost wholly 
trivial misprints).
She does show a feel for the changing nature of the 
Conservative party in successive generations and she 
conveys much about the fetid atmosphere of party 
manoeuvring in her period.
If the thesis were to be published it could however 
be greatly improved.
—  At times there are difficulties in the narrative 
sequence as the text jumps forward and backward between 
the story of the factions and the story of public events.
—  A simple chronology would, one suspects, have helped 
the author as well as the reader.
—  More allowance needs to be made for the reactive 
nature of politics: it would be easier to understand the
behaviour of Conservative backbenchers if we were told a 
little more about what Labour MPs were doing in the
Chamber and in the Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet. The role 
of Gaitskell in 1956 seems much underplayed.
—  A special gap seems to lie in the treatment of
R.A.Butler and his loyal following from the Conservative 
Research Department.
—  The oddest feature is the ending of the story in 
December 1956. There is no reference to the decision in 
January 1957 to prefer Macmillan to R.A.Butler, even 
though it was plainly the climax of the events of the 
previous four months, which she so fully describes.
A significant omission from the bibliography is any 
reference to the literature on pressure groups- Finer's 
Anonymous Empire or the works of Richardson and others. 
This is, of course, a history thesis not one in political 
science. But the material is of wider interest. It is not 
fair to criticise a thesis completed some months ago for 
missing the opportunity to draw analogies beween the 
Conservatives in 1945-56 and their successors in 1994.
But the parallels are quite extraordinary. If the purpose 
of history is to throw light on the present, this thesis 
has enormous potential for exploitation in the current 
scene. But of course a thesis is a thesis is a thesis. So 
let it pass. It certainly deserves to.
David Butler
